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Abstract 
 
The arrival of high-speed trains (HST) brings an unprecedented time-space shrinkage that could 
greatly enhance inter-city connectivity. Meanwhile, it offers a major opportunity to reshape 
uneven spatial-economic development. However, the existing literature has presented a mixed 
picture. Thus, considerable disagreement on the wider effects of HST remains. This research 
contributes to the debate with new empirical evidence on two inter-related scales, based on the 
experience of British InterCity 125/225 and UK/France comparative practice from the West Coast 
Main Line modernisation and the TGV-Nord. The thesis first demonstrates the quantitative 
evidence. Then it takes a planning standpoint in examining multi-level government intervention in 
seizing opportunities presented by HST during the transformation process. 
The research findings lead to two major conclusions. Firstly, nationally, HST has had 
demonstrable and varied effects on cities within 1 hour and 2 hours from London, thus helping to 
generate renewed economies, but this effect has not been automatic or universal. Within 1-hour 
distance, HST towns located further afield from London could benefit from exploiting both 
commuting and intrinsic economic strength in knowledge-intensive activities; while 2-hour HST 
accessibility could benefit mainly from exploiting knowledge-intensive economic functions. 
Beyond 2 hours, the effect appears weak. Regionally, major regional cities have been reinforced 
by a HST hub position, but the effects have not necessarily spread out into surrounding 
sub-regions. HST needs to be well-integrated with urban and regional transport networks, so a 
spatial-economic relationship between a regional centre and its hinterland could be fostered to 
produce and magnify the wider effects. Secondly, transport alone is not sufficient to determine the 
wider effects in reducing regional inequality. Complementary measures are indispensable. Five 
conditions are found and highlighted to be vital, namely national political economy, constitutional 
capacity, planning priority and resources, city type and economic trajectory, and leadership and 
governance.  
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1.1  Research Context: Theme and Relevance  
 
This research concerns the relationship between the high-speed train (hereafter HST) and its wider 
spatial-economic patterns regarding aiding the transformation process of cities and regions. In the 
broader context, there are three concurrent elements which collectively shape dynamic cities and 
regions, namely: the competitiveness and unprecedented popularity of HSTs, economic 
restructuring towards the knowledge economy, and dynamic and uneven urban and regional 
development. These three contexts are illustrated as follows.      
 
1.1.1  Theme 1: Competitiveness and the Role of High-Speed Trains  
 
Colin Clark‘s verdict on transport as ―the maker and breaker of cities‖ (Clark, 1958) has been 
invested with a new meaning in the second half of the twentieth century with the arrival of HST, 
ushering in ―the second railway age‖ (Banister & Hall, 1993) and causing an unprecedented 
shrinkage of time and space: ―the shrinking continent‖ (Spiekermann & Wegener, 1994). A 
fast-expanding commitment to HST has resulted in the explosive growth of HST networks. Since 
the inauguration of the first HST services in Japan in 1964, around thirteen countries have begun 
operating HST services, with many more to come. According to the International Union of 
Railways (Barrón, 2009), there are currently 10,739 km of HST tracks in operation around the 
world. Meanwhile, another 13,469 km are under construction and 17,579 km are planned. By 2025, 
it is estimated that the total distance of HST networks will comprise 41,787 km, approximately 
four times the present length.    
HST appears to be more effective and competitive than other transport modes for a medium-length 
journey because they have an unrivalled reputation for interoperability on conventional lines to the 
core of cities (concerning door-to-door journey time and distance, see Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). 
Apart from competitive transport capacity and efficient connections between cities, current 
pressing issues such as congestion, uneven development and climate change (related to energy 
issues) trigger more and more government leaders to place HST on the top of their political agenda. 
Despite the fact that the introduction of HST is controversial and a costly investment, 
decision-makers have largely anticipated that HST investment is critical in their strategy to achieve 
sustainable objectives regarding economic growth and environmental visions, in comparison with 
other transport modes.   
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1.1.2  Theme 2: Economic Restructuring towards the Knowledge Economy  
 
The industrial evolution of a new ―economy‖ has occurred at different stages throughout human 
history; it is the point at which the new system diverges from the previous mainstream economy 
and exhibits a new economic system including the production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption of goods and services. Since the decline of Fordist manufacturing in major industrial 
countries from the 1960s, competitive economies have shifted from handling goods to services. 
Knowledge, a key production element, amid other key forces of information technology, 
globalisation and consumer demand (Brinkley, 2008), has brought about the explosive rise and 
dominance of high value, knowledge-intensive activities and the enormous diminution of 
manufacturing. Consequently, the scope of knowledge intensive activities has been expanding and 
evolving. Conventionally, they have been widely defined as economic activities involving the 
intensity of technology such as the R&D expenditure of high and high-medium-technology 
industries and knowledge-intensive services (see Brinkley, 2006; Eurostat, 2007; OECD, 2007b). 
However, this technology-oriented ideology for classification appears to be limited and cannot 
accurately define some of the specialised advanced services (Wood, 2002, p. 4). It is argued that 
the contemporary knowledge economy should look beyond R&D — from high-tech manufacturing 
and ICTs, through knowledge-intensive services, to overtly creative industries such as the media 
and architecture (Kok, 2004, p. 19). Similarly, the knowledge economy is referred to by Scott 
(2007) as ―technology-intensive manufacturing, services of all varieties (business, financial, 
personal), fashion-oriented neo-artisanal production, and cultural-products industries (including 
media)‖ (Scott, 2007, p. 1467).  
 
1.1.3  Theme 3: Dynamic and Uneven Spatial-Economic Development   
 
The very nature of an industrial complex involves trade. In the era of the knowledge economy, 
trade has expanded exponentially because of the sophisticated division of labour in the production 
and consumption process and the spontaneous interactivity between them. Trade is conducted in 
space, which is embodied in cities and regions as the platforms for economic development. 
"Location and trade are as two sides of the same coin. The forces determining one simultaneously 
determine the other" (Isard, 1956, p.6). Likewise, Mensch (1975) explains "[i]ndustrial and urban 
dynamism are two aspects of the same development; they give each other momentum by mutual 
reinforcement" (Mensch, 1975, p. 45). 
From the trajectory of industrial evolution, the historic shift of industrial locations to elsewhere has 
become the most dynamic process in urban and regional development and ―[s]patial realignment of 
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such activity is tantamount to reshuffling of the ranks of cities‖ (Isard, 1956, p. 11). We also have 
witnessed the rise and decline of places, as some locations seem more resilient to changes than 
others, which are inflexible and disadvantageous for new development. As a result, an increasing 
gap is resulting in uneven development, which has been occurring at both inter- and intra-regional 
scales.  
At the inter-regional scale, numerous regions have been suffering as a result of economic 
transformation, with severe unemployment and decline, while some regions have been enhanced 
with competitive advantages. As capital and labour increasingly concentrate in a few large cities, 
the degree of mono-centricity grows stronger and hence the gap between regions within a country 
widens (Hall & Pain, 2006). In the UK, a major gulf has opened between the dynamic South-East 
England and Greater London and the lagging northern post-industrial regions (Coates, Institute for 
Political and Economic Governance, & Centre for Urban Policy Studies, 2008, p. 25; ODPM, 
2006a, 2006b; TCPA, 2010).  
Zooming into the intra-regional scale, in the South-East England, an east-west imbalance in spatial 
development has been problematic. Most pervasively, intra-regional inequality in the UK exists 
within post-industrial northern regions. As Danny Doring remarks, there is intra-regional 
inequality between northern and southern regions. ―[I]n the north, there are islands of affluence in 
a sea of poverty. In the south, the sea is of affluence. And the contrast is growing‖ (The Economist, 
2012). In North-West England, Greater Manchester South (especially the City of Manchester, 
Salford and Trafford) has successfully transformed itself as the most diverse and buoyant place, in 
stark contrast to Greater Manchester North and Pennine Lancashire (EKOS, 2008; MIER, 2009a; 
The Northern Way, 2009b).  
However, study of this relationship between industrial restructuring and uneven urban and regional 
development has focused on the impact of industrialisation on cities and regions rather than the 
active role of cities and regions in making possible transformation. As Scott and Storper (2003) 
stress, this missing element within the domain of conventional theories has critical implications for 
government intervention in tackling regional inequality by promoting positive agglomeration and 
initiating growth in poorer regions.  
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1.2  Problem Statement: The Enduring Debate  
 
Based on the aforementioned context, with an unprecedented shrinkage of time and space, HST 
will inevitably have a long-term wider effect on the geography of economic activities, 
simultaneously at national (inter-regional), regional (intra-regional)
1
 and local (intra-urban) scales. 
Although the accessibility of HST has been widely promoted and it is anticipated in the political 
arena that it would benefit deprived regions, uneven development between places has increased. 
There is considerable disagreement in academia about the effects; in particular, whether HST 
would widen regional polarisation or reduce it. A quick reasoning for this lies in the fact that the 
existing literature has presented a mixed picture. In addition, during the development process, the 
nature of impact could be understood better if the temporal and spatial scales are taken into 
account. Reducing regional inequality by HST involves public intervention in a long-term process, 
which is not possible to be guaranteed or easily predicted. A detailed review of the debate and gap 
over the wider spatial-economic impact of transport investment is presented in section 2.4.  
Here, with the limited evidence, this disagreement largely arises due to two different research 
approaches. In the fields of transport and spatial economics, modelling approaches are adopted to 
predict transport investment and regional productivity. A typical accessibility-potential model uses 
measures of distance (or time) to estimate costs for industries in a region, which correspond to the 
economic measure of aggregated regional GDP (Clark, Wilson, & Bradley, 1969). However, this 
simple model emphasises ―a price-induced change in demand‖, which fails to take other factors 
into account (Vickerman, Spiekermann, & Wegener, 1999, p.4). Despite a number of scholars 
seeking to refine the role of accessibility in regional economies (see the review in Vickerman et al. 
(1999)), one remaining problem is that this approach is more suitable to handling the movement of 
goods rather than of services or people, since this group of approaches is rooted in the principle of 
economic static equilibrium and stresses demand-induced multiplier impacts. Later, imperfect 
competition models, associated with ―new economic geography‖, move away from equilibrium to 
suggest that the elimination of transport barriers may result in concentration in core cities, because 
agglomeration economies overshadow lower transport costs, thus perpetuating the gap between the 
core and periphery.  
In a recent comprehensive review, Puga (2008) adduces several studies to suggest that a 
combination of market access and labour mobility results in an agglomeration effect under scale 
economies, implying that when connected by cross-border infrastructure projects, lagging regions 
expose themselves to fiercer competition from firms in more developed areas. Thus, he argues that 
                                                        
1 Throughout this thesis, the term inter- and intra- regional impact respectively denotes the national and regional 
impact. 
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the first French TGV between Paris and Lyon led to the relocation of headquarters from Lyon to 
Paris, while the Spanish Madrid-Barcelona AVE may consolidate the spatial relocation of 
headquarters towards the capital (Puga, 2002; Vives, 2001). Nonetheless, these approaches which 
are cost-oriented, demand-driven and past-dependent fail to consider the dynamic nature of urban 
and regional development associated with different government intervention. Small wonder, then, 
that they suggest a weak or even negative relationship (Hall, 2009b).    
An alternative approach is based on empirical evidence. In the early stages, Bonnafous (1987) 
conducted an empirical study at the firm level which contradicted Puga‘s (2002 and 2008) claims. 
Most empirical studies adopt a control group of places without HST services in order to study HST 
effects. In Japan, Hirota (1984, cited in Brotchie, 1991 and Sands, 1993a), Nakamura and Ueda 
(1989, cited in Brotchie, 1991 and Sands, 1993a), and Amano and Nakagawa (1990, cited in Sands, 
1993a) all found higher population growth in cities with a Shinkansen service than in those 
without it. However, Sands (1993b) casts doubt on the causal direction. Employment growth was 
reported in these studies too, but there were differential effects: the effect was greatest in service 
industry employment, including knowledge-based industries, and this was true even when the 
simultaneous expansion of the expressway network was controlled for (Brotchie, 1991). Overall, 
these studies demonstrate faster growth rates of population and economic effects (i.e. employment 
and economic activity) for cities on HST routes than those which are bypassed, based on a time 
series before and after the HST services. However, these effects were largely concentrated in 
tourism-related activities. Although Nakamura and Ueda (1989) find a high correlation between 
high growth rates in information-exchange employment and the presence of HST stations and an 
expressway, it remains unclear what the differential impact between these HST cities are and 
whether HST could bring about wider spatial-economic impact on less-developed places. One 
related problem is the intra-regional impact of HST; such an issue has been largely ignored 
because the focus has been placed on the impact on individual cities rather than a group of cities 
within a region.  
From the limited research conducted so far, major regional cities are largely found to benefit from 
the agglomeration economy brought about by HST, but for some intermediate stations the impact 
has been marginal. Other factors in relation to the wider impact of HST have been pointed out by 
many studies. In Mannone‘s PhD thesis (1995), it is found that the TGV-Sud-Est line was just one 
of a number of factors in locational decision-making by business (Gourvish, 2010). Harman (2006) 
indicates that the design of new lines, the patterns of routes and services operated, and the 
economic structures and plans of the cities served are important. Preston and Wall (2008) suggest 
external factors and supportive planning policies are relevant. But how the wider impact of HST 
could spread into neighbouring sub-regions is hardly explored in current academic work and is 
subject to scepticism.   
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1.3  Research Aims, Questions, and Focus 
 
The current research aims to offer a critical contribution to the controversial debate on the wider 
impact of HST on dynamic spatial-economic development. The paucity of empirical evidence 
regarding this aspect encouraged this new empirical research which is intended to provide hard 
evidence of the wider impact of HST, focusing on the strategic relationships between HST 
opportunities and the active role played by cities and regions through government intervention.   
The main research question contains descriptive and explanatory elements: whether, to what extent 
and how would the arrival of HST assist the restructuring process of wider spatial-economic 
patterns towards the knowledge economy and, consequently, reduce regional inequality over time?  
 
In order to answer this main question, three sub-questions are presented below.  
  
Sub-question 1 What is the potential relationship between HST and the development of 
the knowledge economy? 
 
 
How are the terms “the knowledge economy” and “knowledge-intensive 
activities” defined?  
What are the locational characteristics of knowledge-intensive activities?  
How can their spatial patterns be explained?  
What is the role of infrastructure in dynamic urban and regional 
spatial-economic development towards the knowledge economy?  
Sub-question 2 Whether and to what extent has HST accessibility boosted a knowledge 
economy and led to a reduction in regional inequality?  
 This question is answered at two spatial scales (inter- and intra- regional) 
using quantitative findings which are based on hypotheses generated from 
Sub-question 1.   
Sub-question 3 How could the impact of HST be spread as widely as possible throughout 
a region by government intervention, which could ultimately reduce 
regional inequality?  
 
These three research sub-questions involve two elements of enquiry from the geographer‘s and 
planner‘s perspectives: (1) wider spatial-economic impact of HST and (2) the role of government 
intervention in the transformation process. Four hypotheses were developed to be tested for the 
quantitative part of research, mainly for the first enquiry. Hypotheses for the second query 
(associated with the third sub-question) were developed tentatively and revised during the research 
process.     
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Aim One- The First Enquiry: The Wider Spatial-Economic Impact of HST 
 
Based on the literature review introduced in Chapter 3, the simple hypothesis is that the rapid 
growth of services, especially the most advanced and value-added knowledge intensive sectors (A. 
Jones, Lee, Williams, Clayton, & Morris, 2008), is assisted not only by pervasive ICT, bringing 
―the death of distance‖ (Cairncross, 1997, 2001), but also by infrastructure that assists face-to-face 
contact in knowledge-generating processes (Andersson, 1985; Törnqvist, 1983) involving tacit 
knowledge (M. Polanyi, 1958) which is increasingly costly to transmit over long distances 
(Audretsch, 1998; Von Hippel, 1994). Goddard (1973) demonstrates that in London telephone 
contacts were used for initial ―programmed‖ or routine communication, while face-to-face 
communication was used for key discussions with ―unprogrammed‖ features and uncertain 
consequences. Moreover, Graham and Marvin (1996) adduce evidence that face-to-face business 
contact has been increasing at an approximately identical speed to telecommunications traffic over 
the last century. 
This suggests that innovative and creative activities cluster in order to benefit from agglomeration 
economies (Audretsch, 1998; Audretsch & Fledman, 1996; A. Marshall, [1890] 1972); 
increasingly, a sophisticated division of labour (Mensch, 1975) produces specialised economic 
activities clustered in different locations. Such innovative activities cluster in the largest cities, 
while routine-oriented ones decentralise (Hall, 2006; Hall and Pain, 2006; Llewelyn Davies 
Planning, 1996). However, due to the increasing coordination between specialised and routine 
activities, forces of decentralisation and re-concentration will operate within polycentric mega 
city-regions to place limits on the process of decentralisation, related to critical time limits from 
the central city (Hall, 2006). A polycentric spatial structure could avoid the over-concentration of 
economic activities in mono-centres and possibly reduce intra-regional inequality. In order to 
realise the vision of polycentric spatial patterns, transport needs to perform a critical role on the 
inter- and intra-regional scales. For inter-regional development, major international airports or 
HST hubs have reinforced the faster-growing mega city-regions (Hall, 2006). HST could 
particularly benefit companies or organisations which value time and the advantage of crucial 
linkages between major cities. For intra-regional development, intra-regional connectivity is 
important through either the extension of HST or the improvement of the intra-regional network.  
For the inter-regional study, two hypotheses arise. Hypothesis One assumes that HST will induce 
faster economic growth in the cities it serves, through a reduction in train times and additional 
frequency of service, with a vital role played by critical time limits. Hypothesis Two opines that 
HST cities will enjoy faster growth in service industries dealing with information, especially 
knowledge-based activities.  
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At the intra-regional level, hypotheses need to adjust to the spatial scales in question. Hypothesis 
Three suggests that the arrival of HST in sub-regions will potentially strengthen economies and 
employment in the knowledge economy over time. Hypothesis Four is that there will be 
differential effects among these sub-regions. Within two-hour accessibility from the National 
Capital, HST sub-regions could boost economies as polycentric sub-centres with the regional core. 
Within one-hour accessibility from the national capital, HST sub-regions could potentially develop 
decentralised inter-dependent functions and commuting roles. The prospects for economic 
transformation of non-HST sub-regions could be challenged, but they will not necessarily lose out 
as long as their intra-regional accessibility can be strategically improved.   
 
Aim Two- The Second Enquiry: The Role of Government Intervention in the Transformation 
Process 
 
With regard to persistent and uneven regional development, the existing literature suggests that, 
although public intervention is necessary to address the failure of market-led approaches which 
tend to reinforce the uneven trend rather than reversing it, transport alone is not sufficient; other 
conditions are needed. The review of existing literature shows that the controversy over the wider 
impact of HST could be attributed to a methodological divide, theoretical debate and different 
professional concerns over the relationship between transport and its wider impact on urban and 
regional development. The second part of the research concerns how the wider impact of HST 
could reduce regional inequality, which is closely associated with the role of government 
intervention from a planning perspective and yet is ignored in the study of HST impact.      
A close examination of a comparative case study of two poorer regions was chosen to provide 
insights into this issue. An analytical national space-economy planning framework is first 
developed to understand the national difference between planning approaches which are shaped by 
government systems (and restructuring) and transport and spatial -economic policies. This national 
planning approach will interact with and affect local intervention in determining the wider impact 
of HST, so the role of government intervention in seizing the opportunity for HST to possibly 
reduce intra-regional inequality will be embodied in the transformation process. The UK-France 
comparison shows that the French state-led approach with its decentralisation process suggests 
conducive conditions, whereas the British market-led approach results in constrained and 
disadvantaged conditions for local intervention. These two empirical investigations are tentatively 
guided and based on in-depth interviews and policy analysis, which could further identify the 
interaction between national and local conditions and assist the comprehension of differential 
impact between two regions and within two regions.  
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1.4  Research Strategy   
 
1.4.1  Methodology  
 
As previously mentioned in section 1.2, there is still sharp and continuing disagreement regarding 
the wider spatial-economic effects of HST on cities and regions. The dispute stems from two 
different approaches. Well-developed modelling approaches lead to the discouragement of the 
potential transformation of a less developed city or region and do not appreciate the role of 
strategic planning approaches and actions taken by cities and regions. This situation is well 
described by Holt-Jensen (1980), who argues that  
―[m]odels were constructed which gave an apparent explanation, but were misleading or directly fallacious in so far as 
they failed to take account of  those underlying explanations of  the actual social situation which themselves may be 
amenable to change. It is possible to argue that such explanatory models tend to support the existing conditions of  
society‖ (Holt-Jensen, 1980, pp. 67-68).   
 
On the other hand, even though individual case studies have adduced empirical evidence to the 
contrary (for an early study see Bonnafous (1987)), it is impossible to form a conclusive 
judgement due to the lack of such studies since the early 1990s. Most studies have used only 
fragmented and anecdotal evidence. In order to better understand the wider impact of HST on 
potential regional development, this research has adopted the empirical approach, with a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.  
 
1.4.2  Research Design and Justification   
 
A hypothetico-deductive method (Walliman, 2006) which combines inductive and deductive 
approaches is used in the current research. Although modern HST systems began in Japan, this 
study emphasises European experiences. The justification is found in historical dimension and 
diversity which could yield critical insights through a comparative perspective: not only because 
Europe has the longest history in developing HST networks, but also because, within a relatively 
small geographical proximity, western European countries have developed their own HST 
approaches in different ways since the 1960s.  
For practical reasons, it is not feasible to conduct a cross-European comparative study in depth. 
The UK is typical of Europe with regard to its market-led and upgrade approach to HST, while 
France is a good example of a state-led and new dedicated HST approach. Therefore, this thesis is 
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based on the British context and finds merit in a UK-France comparative case study of two 
post-industrial regions respectively served by the two HST approaches in order to gain insight into 
how the opportunities offered by HST are perceived and seized by studying the interaction 
between different levels of governments in different contexts.  
A HST system comprises transport connectivity among major cities in a nation. This study focuses 
on inter-regional and intra-regional scales by conducting a survey of British InterCity 125/225 for 
inter-regional effects, and a finer-grained and deeper-probing comparative case study of two 
regions to gain insight into intra-regional impacts. The objects of dependent variables for the 
inter-regional impact study are major cities served by HST or non-HST lines. Regarding the 
intra-regional study, objects of dependent variables are regions and divided sub-regions in order to 
grasp the change of regional inequality.  
 
1.4.2.1  An Inter-regional Study: A Survey of British InterCity 125/225  
In the first phase of the study, a survey was conducted on the UK InterCity125 (representing 
125mph, the equivalent of 200 kph). The findings are reported in Chapter 4. This lower-speed 
version of HST, which has operated for more than thirty years, provides an obvious candidate for 
empirical examination of its effect on cities since there has been no research about its 
spatial-economic impacts. Two groups of towns (with and without HST services) were used to 
examine spatial-economic impact at the inter-regional level; the non-HST towns were selected as a 
control group. To overcome the issue of selecting comparable data limitations, more than one line 
was studied in both categories. Six London-based railway routes were chosen, all over 150km in 
length: two HST lines and four without HST. These six embrace 26 local authorities and 27 
railway stations, which form the units of analysis in the study.  
In response to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the independent variables are the changes of rail 
services with regard to train times and frequencies. In general, passenger statistics are treated as 
commercially confidential and so are not generally available. Hence, train times are employed to 
present the effects of time-space shrinkage, while train frequencies are used to reflect demand for 
different routes. The dependent indicators are the proxies for these variables of economic strength 
and structural change: Gross Value Added (GVA), (un)employment, available property values and 
economic structures.   
 
1.4.2.2  An Intra-regional Study: A Comparative Case Study    
The second phase of research shifts to the wider intra-regional impact of HST; namely, to what 
extent, and how the benefits of HST could result in spill-over effects for the major regional city, as 
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well as its surrounding sub-regions, rather than creating ―the increasing peripheralization of the 
periphery‖ (Spiekermann & Wegener, 2008, quoted in  P. Hall, 2009b, p.65). 
A comparative case study of two post-industrial regions was selected. Manchester and its 
sub-regions in North West England, UK and Lille and its sub-regions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
France were chosen. Both have similar industrial trajectories, challenges, and HST opportunities, 
but are associated with two different HST approaches (the West Coast Main Line (WCML) 
modernisation versus the new dedicated TGV-Nord line). For more than thirty years, the UK has 
been maintaining its incremental approach by upgrading mainline services for major inter-city 
links, although its first new HST line (CTRL) arrived in 2007. The UK is facing a critical point for 
decisions to be made, namely whether or not the new HST infrastructure should be taken forward 
for future generations. With the growing constraints on the transport infrastructure network, the 
next stage of HST development, branded ―High- Speed Two‖ (hereafter HS2), a new dedicated 
line running at 300 kph, has been supported by all political parties and approved by the 
Department for Transport in January 2012. In contrast, France is the first European country to 
adopt a new HST approach by building its new dedicated HST network over the same period of 
time. The comparative case study provides valuable implications for HS2 in the UK through 
empirical examination of the different HST approaches and experiences in two national/ local 
contexts.  
In order to understand the intra-regional effects, both regions were divided into several sub-regions. 
First of all, the relationship between differential transport accessibility and economic performance 
for sub-regions is identified through the descriptive statistics of quantitative data. Similar 
independent and dependent variables for the inter-regional study are applied to answer Hypothesis 
3 and Hypothesis 4. The difference lies in the fact that independent transport variables for this part 
of the research are evaluated on two scales -i.e. the relationship between sub-regions and national 
capital versus sub-regions and regional capital - in order to discern the direct HST impact on 
transport services. Quantitative findings are presented in Chapter 5. Following this, the final stage 
of research seeks to understand the nature of government intervention in the transformation 
process with qualitative approaches in the form of a proposed analytical framework, policy 
analysis and semi-structured interviews conducted with experts (decision makers and academics) 
who have been deeply involved and have closely observed the transformation process. 
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1.5  Chapter Organisation  
 
The following chapters in this thesis are assembled in a logical order to best answer the research 
questions raised at the outset. Besides the research methodology (Chapter 2), there are two main 
parts. Part one focuses on the wider impact of HST in two spatial scales with the first theoretical 
framework (Chapter 3) and quantitative empirical evidence which could contribute to the current 
debate over HST with an inter-regional survey of British InterCity 125/225 (Chapter 4) and an 
intra-regional comparative study between Manchester and Lille sub-regions (Chapter 5). Part two 
emphasises the nature of government intervention in the process. It begins with an analytical 
framework generated from the literature review (Chapter 6) and two chapters on the 
transformation process of the two regions (Chapter 7 and 8), followed by a synthesised discussion 
of an overall UK-France comparison (Chapter 9). Concluding remarks, summary of key findings 
and future research are embraced in the concluding chapter (Chapter 10). Each chapter is 
organised as follows:    
Chapter 2 introduces the research methodology which underlies the theoretical and empirical 
approaches in order to answer the main research question concerning the wider impact of HST on 
regional inequality. In the first major section, regarding the debate and research gap, the wider 
impact of transport investment is reviewed through a series of key theoretical discussions, 
including the relationship between transport and regional development, types of wider impact from 
temporal and spatial perspectives, as well as ex-ante and ex-post studies. The weaknesses of 
rational models used by decision-makers and the assumption of imperfect competition argued by a 
school of ―new economic geography‖ are fostered by ignorance of the dynamic and hard-to-predict 
nature of the course of regional and urban development. Thus, the second major section positions 
the methodological stand and aims to contribute to the debate by providing empirical evidence for 
better understanding of the wider impact of HST in assisting the transformation process of cities 
and regions, since this aspect has been neglected in the literature. Issues of regional inequality are 
present in multiple spatial scales. This study focuses on inter-regional and intra-regional scales, so 
a survey of the British InterCity 125/225 for inter-regional effects and a UK/France comparative 
study for intra-regional effects is explored. In order to better understand the wider impact of both, 
quantitative and qualitative research methods are used, including data collection (the identification 
of the unit of analysis, dependent and independent variables and the conduct of semi-structured 
interviews), and consequent data analyses (descriptive statistics, interviews and policy analysis). In 
the last section, the research strategy and phases are illustrated.    
Chapter 3 institutes a theoretical framework that directs the quantitative part of the empirical data 
collection and analysis to answer the first sub-research question. The term knowledge economy is 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
32 
 
firstly defined, then the locational characteristics of knowledge-intensive activities are 
distinguished. Secondly, the factors leading to both centralisation and decentralisation of spatial 
patterns are disentangled, and the role of infrastructure that contributes to the spatial-economic 
landscape is identified. The final section thus proposes a conceptual framework of the spatial 
economy of HST in the era of the knowledge economy.   
Following the research methodology and the first theoretical frameworks, the focus turns to the 
theory-informed empirical findings. Chapter 4 introduces the background and the rationale of this 
study and the first empirical evidence comprising quantitative data on the inter-regional scale, 
focusing on the wider impact of HST through 30 years of experience of the British InterCity 
125/225. It begins with two key research hypotheses and details research methods, namely the 
selection of HST and non-HST lines, units of analysis, variables and data collection. Based on 
these criteria, the second section presents the results of independent variables (train times, train 
service patterns and frequencies) and dependent variables (wider spatial-economic patterns) 
including economic strength (area, population, (un) employment, GVAs/ GDHIs) and economic 
restructuring reflected in office rental values and services and knowledge-intensive employment. 
Travel-to-work data and population and employment data around the stations are supplemented to 
assist the interpretation. The third section interprets a restructured British economic geography 
shaped by the arrival of HST with a classification into three train time zones: one hour, one-two 
hours, and over two hours.      
Chapter 5 presents the second part of the empirical findings with the spatial focus shifted to the 
intra-regional impact of HST. Similar to Chapter 4, this chapter is mainly devoted to quantitative 
evidence to answer the ―whether and to what extent‖ questions in this research. It draws on a 
comparative case study of two HST lines serving two post-industrial regions: one is the 
modernisation of the WCML for Manchester and its sub-regions within NWE, UK; the other is the 
TGV-Nord for Lille and its sub-regions in NPDC, France. The opening section provides an 
overview of the two HST approaches and two regions selected. The second section examines 
research methods in detail. Despite the application of similar variables, due to data availability and 
the observed time periods in the two countries, necessary adaptations are made, including the unit 
of analysis, variables and data collection. The third and the fourth sections respectively entail the 
findings from two cases, covering the differentiation brought about by the arrival of HST between 
inter-regional accessibility with national capitals and the intra-regional accessibility with the 
regional capitals, as well as inter-regional and intra-regional economic performance and economic 
restructuring over time. The concluding section brings together all the findings with a synergetic 
discussion and indicates the benefits, to a large extent, are reaped by the regional cities, but not 
necessarily the nearby sub-regions.     
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Chapter 6 employs the analytical framework to answer the third sub-research question that 
underlies government interaction on different spatial scales in seizing the opportunity of HST for 
potential transformation. In order to understand the nature of government intervention in the 
process, this chapter presents a national spatial-economic planning framework in order to 
understand how local government intervention in relation to spatial-economic change and 
opportunities has resulted in different forms of impact. The section begins by exploring the 
dimension of the national political economy regarding the role of state intervention, state views on 
government intervention and transport investment. The second section reviews government 
systems and restructuring by examining the way in which the institutional form is restructured by 
the national state, which could possibly affect intervention at local government levels. The third 
section investigates urban and regional planning policies including both transport and 
spatial-economic policy in tackling uneven regional development. The last section proposes a 
synthesised framework with each element suggested in this framework. A close examination of 
British and French planning approaches result in the comprehension of national differential 
conditions which underlie the two regions‘ transformation process presented in the two empirical 
chapters.  
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are respectively devoted to scrutinising the in-depth transformation 
process in these two post-industrial regions. Both regions have experienced a major transformation 
since the 1980s, so they deserve a full chapter to cover this process. The interactions among 
different government tiers and varying reactions from sub-regions are especially emphasised in an 
attempt to understand national differences and the significant role of government intervention in 
making any changes possible.  
Chapter 9 focuses on a synthesised discussion of a model of government intervention for the wider 
impact of HST through the comparative case study in two parts. The first part synthesises five 
conditions which are found to be critical. The second half compares the two national HST 
approaches with two practical projects of HST investment and HST services and examines the way 
HST is exploited for intra-regional development through hub strategies, intra-regional and 
sub-regional rail networks, and the interlocked and indispensable non-transport initiatives.  
Chapter 10 first illustrated concluding remarks and summary of key findings. Based on lessons 
learnt from this research, implications for future research are suggested. The last section is devoted 
to a final thought.  
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2.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the focus and methodology of the current research. In section 2.2 and 2.3, 
the definition, development and competitiveness of HST are outlined as a basis for this subject. 
Section 2.4 examines the debate around two methodological approaches towards the study of HST 
impact, the relationship between transport and regional development and the research gap which 
underlies the rationale for this thesis. In section 2.5, the continual methodological debates in social 
science are discussed and clarified in order to justify the current research design comprising a 
survey and a comparative case study in order to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
gain a deep understanding of the complexity of the impact of HST. Research phases are illustrated 
in section 2.6 and the research methods for the quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
explained in section 2.7. Lastly, section 2.8 sums up key elements of the methodology of this 
study.      
     
2.2   Defining HST and HST Development throughout the World 
 
High speed is a relative concept. French steam technology achieved 144 kph in 1889, German 
electric locomotives 210 kph in 1903, German petrol trains 230 kph in 1931, French electric 
locomotives 331 kph in 1955, the TGV Sud-Est 381 kph in 1981, the TGV-Atlantique 515 kph in 
1990 (Whitelegg, Hultén, & Flink, 1993), a Japanese magnetic levitation train set a world record 
of 581 kph in 2003 (Takatsu, 2007), and more recently, the TGV-Est established a new TGV 
record speed of 574 kph in 2007.    
The European Union definition, in Directive 96/48 (European Commission, 1996), proposed a 
speed of at least 250 kph on specially-built lines and 200 kph on upgraded high-speed lines. 
Campos and De Rus (2009), analysing data on 166 HST projects from 20 countries, distinguish 
four HST models: the exclusive exploitation model, the mixed high-speed model, the mixed 
conventional model and the fully mixed model. This, together with the taxonomies of the 
European Union (European Commission, 1996) and the International Union of Railways (UIC, 
2008) definitions, illustrates the evolution of the modern HST. 
It is widely accepted that HST began with the Japanese Shinkansen Tokaido line between Tokyo 
and Osaka on 1st October 1964, with an initial speed of 210 kph. By 1992, the maximum speed 
had risen to 270 kph, reducing the time for the 515.4 km Tokyo-Osaka trip to 3 hours 10 minutes 
and making a day return trip feasible (Takatsu, 2007). Because the existing overcrowded railway 
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had a narrow gauge (1.067m), the Shinkansen had to be built as a totally new dedicated high-speed 
system on the international standard gauge (1.435m).   
In 1981, the French TGV Sud-Est line came into service between Paris and Lyon, France‘s second 
largest city, operating at 270 kph to produce a travel time of only 2 hours for the 450-km journey 
(Arduin & Ni, 2005). In this instance, due to the slow speed of the existing nineteenth-century 
conventional lines carrying a congested and mixed traffic of freight and passengers, a dedicated 
high-speed line was again adopted, even though there was no gauge problem as in Japan (P. Hall, 
2009b). However, the line began and ended on the existing railway network (Arduin & Ni, 2005). 
Then, the German ICE was introduced commercially in 1991 between Hamburg and Munich via 
Frankfurt or Würzburg (Sands, 1993b), using a combination of existing tracks at speeds of 
200-250 kph, together with 427 km of newly-built segments operating at speeds of 320 kph. The 
original ICE design envisaged a mixture of passenger and freight services, but this has been 
abandoned in favour of traffic segregation with the introduction of two new passenger-only ICE 
lines, Cologne-Frankfurt and Cologne-Hannover-Berlin (Ebeling, 2005). 
In 1992, the first Spanish AVE line started commercial operation between Madrid and Seville at 
speeds of 320 kph over 700km. As in Japan, an incompatible rail gauge on the traditional network 
(here, a broad gauge
2
 of 1.668m) made it necessary to overlay a new dedicated line with a 
standard gauge (1.435m) (Givoni, 2006) which has been progressively extended from Madrid to 
Barcelona. In 2012, a link through the Pyrenees with the French railway system was constructed, 
as part of an EU Commission programme to achieve a Trans-European Network. After rapid 
expansion of HST, Spain overtook France and achieved the largest new HST network in Europe in 
2010.   
In contrast, many HST systems have been developed on upgraded conventional lines. In the UK, 
during the process of developing modern British HST systems in the 1960s, as building new lines 
was not feasible because of ―an impossible financial task‖ (Barnett, 1993, p.165), the InterCity 
sector of British Rail was expected to hold greater interest and potential for high-speed services 
without the need of state aid. This was particularly the case for the two longest main lines, the 
West and East Cost Main lines (WCML- 642 km (401miles) and ECML- 629 km (393miles)), 
connecting major provincial cities in Northern England and Scotland with London (Barnett, 1993). 
Two British HST technological approaches were developed: the Advanced Passenger Train 
(APT-tilting train) project and the High-Speed Train, a faster and cheaper interim approach using 
diesel traction (the latter was named InterCity-125). In 1976, the UK InterCity125 (representing 
125mph, the equivalent of 200 kph) was ―the first European upgraded high-speed line‖ (P. Hall, 
                                                        
2 It has been argued that a mistaken 1844 decision to implement a broad gauge dismissed the possibility of integrating the 
Spanish railways with the European network (Gómez-Mendoza, 1993, p. 52). 
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2009b, p. 59) with diesel traction running at a maximum speed of 200 kph from London to 
Swansea on the Great Western Main Line (GWML), designed by the far-seeing engineer Isambard 
Kingdom Brunel in the 1830s. In 1978, the UK‘s East Coast Main Line (ECML) was likewise 
equipped with diesel-hauled HSTs from London to Edinburgh and in 1991 by an electric version 
branded InterCity 225, which however has never been able to operate at the planned speed of 225 
kph due to the lack of in-cab signalling. Although the tilting train technology later proved to be 
achievable in Sweden and Italy, the APT project authorised in 1968 and intended to be used on the 
WCML was abandoned before entering revenue service in 1982 (Barnett, 1993), which resulted in 
the pioneering IC125 service on the GWML as a lasting success and the postponement of 
high-speed service on the WCML until December 2008.  
The Italian Pendolino (ETR-450) and Swedish X2000 are two examples of tilting trains on 
conventional lines, developed to solve the problems of negotiating curves at high speeds, running 
at a maximum speed of up to 210 kph on the X-2000 and 250 kph on the Pendolino (ETR-450). 
The Pendolino technology has been applied to the UK‘s WCML since December 2008, operating 
at a maximum speed of 200 kph between London and Glasgow. France likewise developed a TGV 
Pendulaire with a maximum speed of 300 kph (UIC, 2003; quoted in Givoni, 2006) and capable of 
operating on both high-speed TGV lines and conventional lines, but it was not brought to 
completion. 
However, in commercial practice, the pursuit of speed has to be reconciled with other aspects such 
as frequency and stopping patterns. On the Shinkansen, the provision of intermediate stations for a 
lower-speed stopping service enhanced traffic, suggesting that an overall reduction of journey time 
is more important than travelling at high speed between two stations (Takagi, 2005). The Swiss 
Railways‘ Rail 2000 concept illustrates this point, emphasising better connections at transport 
hubs (Takagi, 2005) with the slogan ―not as fast as possible, but as fast as necessary‖. This model, 
however, demands surplus platform space in order to accommodate concentrated interchange 
needs within short periods in each hour.    
In the early 1990s, the HST development reached a new milestone. The proposal for a European 
HST network (Community of European Railways, 1989) was intended to materialise ―the 
shrinking continent‖ (Spiekermann & Wegener, 1994). Figure 2-1 shows the visualisation of 
estimated time-space effects in Europe as a result of the rail network. Concerning the 
inter-operability of different national networks, the EU regulatory framework (Directive 91/440) 
was created to permit open-access operations on European rail lines, which ensured 
non-discriminatory track access for all independent train operators. The opening of the Channel 
Tunnel in 1994 inaugurated the first cross-border international HST service operated by Eurostar 
between London, Paris and Brussels. The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) was 
further defined in 1996 (Directive 96/48/EC). The core PBKAL HST network, connecting several 
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capital cities (Paris-Brussels-Köln (Cologne) -Amsterdam-London), to which was added Frankfurt, 
became a PBKFAL network after the arrival of LGV (Ligne à Grande Vitesse) Est-Europe in 2007. 
This PBKFAL network was completed when Amsterdam and Cologne were further connected in 
2009. However, there is a growing worry that the more the rail line range extends, the higher the 
possibility that HST services will tend to serve larger urban centres and bypass smaller and less 
profitable places (P. Hall, 2009b).    
 
Figure 2-1  The Envisaged Time-Space Maps of the Rail Network in Europe (1993 vs. 2010) 
 
1993 
This figure is removed due to the involvement of third 
party copyright material. 
2010 
This figure is removed due to the 
involvement of third party copyright 
material. 
 
Source: Spiekermann and Wegener (1994)  
 
Beyond Europe, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new wave of HST development 
surged in Asia. Above all, with the commitment by a state-owned monopoly, the Chinese HST 
network developed at an unprecedented scale and speed. From 2007 to 2011, nearly 10,000 km of 
HST lines were laid (Chen, 2012). Now China has the largest HST network in the world. By 2025, 
the total global length of HST network will more than double in length from the current 17,547 km 
to 42,312 km (UIC High Speed Department, 2012) as shown in Figure 2-2.  
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Figure 2-2  High-Speed Train Lines in the World 
 
 
Source: UIC website (July 2012) 
 
2.3  The Competitiveness of HST  
 
The time-space effects of HST travel could potentially alter economic geography. For medium- to 
long-distance journeys, HST offers unrivalled possibilities through interoperability on 
conventional lines to the cores of cities. Steer Davies Gleave (2004) suggest that for distances 
under 150 km HST provides no advantage over conventional trains. Between 150km and 400km, 
rail (including HST) is faster than air city centre-to-city centre. Between 400 km and 800km, HST 
offers the fastest mode for personal travel up to four and half hours (270 minutes); beyond 800km, 
air travel is faster (Pepy & Leboeuf, 2005; Pepy & Perren, 2006) (see Figure 2-3). Therefore, 
Japanese and European experience suggests that HST should handle 80-90 per cent of traffic up to 
about 500 km and about 50 per cent up to about 800 km (P. Hall, 2009b). And, at the maximum 
practicable present speed of 350 kph, the competitive rail range could potentially extend to 1500 
km (1000 miles), bringing journeys like Paris-Madrid or London- Zürich within the 
commercially-feasible range (P. Hall, 2009b). However, in practice, the range is limited by speed 
restrictions in densely- populated areas or in tunnels or long bridges, for reasons of safety, capacity 
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and noise (UIC, 2008). Furthermore, low-cost airlines continue to weaken the competitive power 
of HST through aggressive price competition and smart marketing (P. Hall, 2009b)
3
.  
 
Figure 2-3  The Competitive Advantage of High-Speed Trains 
 
Source: Steer Davies Gleave (2004, p.23)  
 
2.4  The Debate and Gap over the Wider Spatial-Economic Impact of HST 
 
With the impressively direct impact of time-space shrinkage, HST lines would not only efficiently 
solve the constraint of transport capacity but also fulfil a broad objective, beyond transport, for 
regional economic development and thus reducing regional inequality. A classic example is the 
recent development of high-speed rail in the UK. HS2 has been expected to support regional 
economic growth and prosperity (Department for Transport, 2010) and to rebalance the long-term 
north-south divide (House of Commons, 2011). Likewise, economic growth and development is 
also the major goal for urban transit systems. Mackett and Edwards (1998) study a number of 
urban transport systems around the world. ―To stimulate development‖ was found to be the most 
popular objective underlying the decision-making on developing these systems, preceding ―to 
                                                        
3 In November 2009, EasyJet was offering a £60 return fare between London Gatwick and Montpellier for people 
travelling in April 2010. The rail websites were not yet open for reservations. By February 2010, the standard class fare 
was expected to be at least 40% higher. 
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improve public transport‖ and ―to reduce traffic congestion‖ (quoted in Balcombe et al., 2004). 
Yet, the wider impact of HST is debateable. The counter argument is that regional inequality will 
be widened because many places have experienced worsening divides, not only between 
successful central regions and unsuccessful peripheral areas but also within the peripheral regions.  
In order to understand better the impact of transport investment, it is essential to make a distinction 
between different types of impacts. Table 2-1 shows various types of transport impacts i.e. 
temporary vs. permanent as well as direct vs. indirect. Generally speaking, the permanent direct 
impact on exploitation of transport capacity and time saving for users‘ benefits is the major cause 
for transport investment, while the permanent indirect impacts such as the consequences of 
re-location decisions of people and firms, and the cumulative effects on economic development in 
cities and regions are the main objective of investment (Oosterhaven & Knaap, 2003). The debate 
and focus of this thesis rest exactly on this permanent & indirect (wider) spatial-economic benefits 
of transport investment. 
 
Table 2-1  Types of Effects of Transport Investments 
 
Source: Oosterhaven and Knaap (2003)  
 
In this section, a broad literature review of transport impact on urban and regional development is 
presented to understand the HST debate. Section 2.4.1 looks at the relationship between transport 
investment and regional development. Section 2.4.2 reviews the theoretical literature on impact 
analyses and summarises various types of wider impacts through temporal and spatial perspectives. 
Here, the assumption about the extent of influence of HST is made, which should be different from 
urban transit systems which have been studied over the past 30 to 40 years. In addition, conceptual 
and methodological issues of impact studies are highlighted. Section 2.4.3 reviews key approaches 
and findings from current HST studies. Finally, Section 2.4.4 identifies the lack of an alternative 
approach to better understand the wider effects of HST. 
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2.4.1  The Relationship between Transport and Regional Development 
 
Before exposing the current research gap in the literature on the impact of HST, it is essential to 
place this type of study in a broader context, as there has been a long-lasting theoretical debate 
about the role of transport infrastructure in economic development. The neo-classical approach 
regards transport infrastructure as an exogenous variable for economic growth. Such an argument 
holds the opposite view to the endogenous growth theory, which suggests that public goods are 
fundamental and conducive to the production process of economic activities (Rietveld, 1989). 
Thus, investment in public goods such as education, health and transport would generate positive 
externalities and trigger spill-over effects for economic development.  
Likewise, these two contesting views persist regarding the relationship between transport and 
regional development. The neo-classical approach had long concentrated on a-spatial approaches, 
namely macroeconomic variables and processes (Scott & Storper, 2003). Consequently, classical 
spatial equilibrium theories discourage government intervention. The notion of this theory argues 
that regional disparity (divergence) is unavoidable, but is not permanent. Market factors would 
result in a counterbalance process towards equilibrium (convergence). The underlying rationale is 
that, on the one hand, divergence results from changes in demand and supply in both domestic and 
foreign markets, which would favour regions with desirable products or services, but would harm 
regions without competitive capacities. On the other hand, with the assumption of perfectly mobile 
capital and labour, convergence would be achieved by the relocation of firms and labour regarding 
costs and wages: lower wage costs trigger firms to move into regions of high unemployment, 
whereas labour tends to move to other regions to pursue higher wages. Consequently, 
unemployment increases and wages fall in prosperous regions because firms move out and labour 
moves in (Prestwich & Taylor, 1990). However, this classical spatial equilibrium theory cannot 
explain why uneven economic geography has been the norm and basic fact of economic history as 
far back as human society has been recorded. As Prestwich and Taylor argue ―we are dealing with 
a continual process whereby growth regions periodically emerge, either because of shifts in the 
trade cycle or because of new technological developments, and each has an associated change in 
resources requirements which, in turn, have particular spatial attributes‖ (Prestwich & Taylor, 
1990, p.98).  
As early as the mid-1950s, a few scholars had developed spatial disequilibrium theories and 
indicated that the need for public intervention is indispensable. Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal 
(1957) developed a concept, ―a process of cumulative causation‖, which indicated that a 
self-reinforcing process occurs in a growth region; once emerging as a leader, the leading position 
would be strengthened and maintained over an intermediate period of time through economies of 
scale and localisation. The ―backwash‖ effects are used to describe the negative effects on other 
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regions which could not compete with the growth region to attract the majority of skilled labour, 
capital and commodities. As a result, a ―dual economy‖ persists and widens the gap between the 
prosperous vs. declining (stagnating) regions. Myrdal (1957) argues that the rebalancing of 
inequality could be achieved through the cost of labour, affluent resources and the development of 
markets in these stagnating regions. In order to address the imbalance, government intervention is 
needed. Although initially Myrdal tends not to assume the role of government intervention in this 
process, he accepts that intervention may be needed to overcome the backwash effects of the 
growth region towards regional convergence (Prestwich & Taylor, 1990). Around the same time, a 
similar paradigm, namely the inter-regional income inequality model, was developed by American 
economist Albert Hirschman (1958). He uses polarisation effects to describe the widening 
difference between regions and stressed the need for government intervention. If ―trickling down‖ 
effects which diffuse from the growth region are not strong enough, government action is needed 
to intervene (Prestwich & Taylor, 1990).     
Further elaboration is given by Friedmann (1966). Through his study of regional development in 
Venezuela, a centre-periphery model was employed to explain the relationship between the core 
region and the rest of the country. The rest of the country is peripheral to the core region, in that 
that there is an influx of capital, labour and raw materials from the periphery. Friedmann argues 
that divergence could be counteracted through a functional-integration hierarchy of cities and 
towns where groups of urban regions are formed because urban areas are centres of major 
economic growth. Ultimately equilibrium would be achieved. What Friedmann proposes here is an 
ideal hierarchical urban system regardless of administrative boundaries for either a nation or a 
functional region. However, this process is not automatic. How could functional-integration city 
regions be formed without any government intervention? Friedmann points out that a ―supply 
constraint‖ would limit a region‘s ability to respond to increased demand for exports (Dawkins, 
2003, p.140). Similarly, more recently, Scott and Storper (2003) stress that ―[r]egional economic 
commons‖ of physical and relational assets are regarded as critical to achieve economic growth in 
poorer regions. In order to achieve synergy of these assets, they particularly point out two issues 
which need to be highlighted. Firstly, positive externalities tend to be undersupplied without 
public intervention because private sectors prefer a free-rider approach to risk taking. Secondly, 
negative externalities would be generated if significant moral hazard occurred and nothing was 
done to address problems. Consequently, uneven patterns persist. 
This manifestly suggests that the market-led approach cannot lead to rebalanced regional 
development and public-led government intervention is needed. In particular, the public-led 
approach with supply-oriented intervention such as transport infrastructure is a necessary condition 
for regional competitiveness. The underlying rationale is aptly described as ―[r]egional 
development is not only the result of private production factors such as labour and capital but also 
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of infrastructure. Improving infrastructure leads to a higher productivity of private production 
factors. Conversely, a neglect of infrastructure leads to a low productivity of the other production 
factors‖ (Rietveld, 1989, p.255). However, empirical studies so far have shown a mixed picture. 
Many infrastructure projects have been exemplified as failures without sufficient response from 
the private sector. Empirical studies of endogenous growth effects are ―certainly far from 
conclusive and can offer conflicting results‖ (Button, 1998, p.156). For instance, by studying UK 
and Western Europe, Hart (1993) suggests that road building is not a key determinant for growth. 
Likewise, Banister and Berechman (2000) use Liverpool as a relevant example to illustrate the fact 
that the expansion of the road network in the 1960s and 1970s did not mitigate decline in 
Liverpool, with severe losses of population and jobs. Similarly, in the research project ―Can Rail 
Save the City? The Impact of Rail Rapid Transit and Pededtrianisation on British and German 
cities‖, Hall and Hass-Klau (1985) reach a similar conclusion that the construction of an urban rail 
transit system in Liverpool in the 1970s could not have saved Liverpool from decline.  
A fundamental message emerges, namely that public intervention in transport alone could not 
absolutely lead to economic development. As Blonk argues ―Transport is a catalytic force; it is 
both an agent vital for industrial growth and an agent of decline where economic resources and 
conditions and human endeavour are insufficient to meet competition of outside areas.‖ (Blonk, 
1979, p.331). Again, Button argues that ―[a]ll this is not really very encouraging from the 
perspective of public policy. Many decisions still have based as much on faith as on the basis of 
scientific principles. It is difficult to conclude that we really know much more now about regional 
growth than we did thirty years ago‖ (Button, 1998, p.157). 
 
2.4.2  Types of Wider Spatial-Economic Impacts of Transport Investment  
 
The nature of wider spatial-economic impacts needs to be further analysed with two perspectives, 
namely temporal and spatial (associated with types of rail systems). Figure 2-4 summaries various 
kinds of impacts through time and across space during the development process, which involves 
two types of evidence (ex-ante and ex-post) in relation to the expected impacts. Detailed reviews 
are reported in section 2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2. 
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Figure 2-4  Various types of impacts of transprot investment over the development process  
 
Source: author  
 
 
2.4.2.1  The Temporal Perspective  
 
Ex-ante Analyses  
From the temporal dimension, there are two major kinds of impact study, namely ex-ante and 
ex-post. In the group of ex-ante studies, a wide spectrum of theoretical models has been developed 
to forecast the relationship between transport investment and economic growth, largely at the 
macro (aggregate) level. In order to improve the estimation, more and more integrated models are 
developed to combine economic potential approaches with transport network models. Several 
scholars have given broad introduction to those models (Banister & Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011; 
Iacono & Levinson, 2014, forthcoming ; Oosterhaven & Knaap, 2003). However, there is no 
consistent classification among them. Here, in line with a classification of three different levels 
(Macro, Meso, and Micro) defined in Banister and Thurstain-Goodwin (2011) as a framework to 
incorporate major analytical models, namely macro (production function models, accessibility and 
potential models, regional input-output models, LUTI/SCGE models), meso (agglomeration 
economies), and micro (firms‘ attitude of decision-making).  
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Production Function Models        
Macro production function analysis tracks economic productivity over time. The role of 
government intervention in transport investment is regarded as a factor of production alongside 
with traditional production factors e.g. labour, capital. Such approach is denoted as follows. 
 
 
The level or change of  domestic output (Y) results from labour (L) and (K) per region or nation per time period, 
several components of  – or the total stock of  – infrastructure (Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003). 
 
Aschauer (1989) and Munnell  (1990) measure the contribution of public capital to aggregate 
economic productivity (GDP). Both studies have found enormous returns to public capital and 
argue that declines in spending on infrastructure as a share of GDP during the 1970s and 1980s 
might have been a cause for the decline in the productivity observed over that period. However, 
subsequent research largely rejects these claims (Garcia-Mila, McGuire, & Porter, 1996; Gramlich, 
1994; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Nadiri & Mamuneas, 1998). In addition, there are three main limitations 
in this approach. One, other factors are ignored (Iacono and Levinson, 2014, forthcoming; Banister 
and Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011). Second, the direction of causality is difficult to detect because a 
long series of data (both time series and regions) is hardly available (Banister and 
Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011; Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003). Thirdly, measurements of the 
infrastructure stock in individual regions fail to analyse the actual supply of infrastructure services 
in order to decide specific individual projects e.g. the type and the location for their productivity 
contribution. Consequently, no definite conclusion could be made and findings of macro 
production elasticity of infrastructure vary dramatically among various studies (Oosterhaven and 
Knaap, 2003). 
 
 
Accessibility and Potential Models 
Accessibility and potential models could address the inability of multi-regional analysis in 
production function models discussed earlier. Accessibility is measured by the reduction of travel 
time or cost made possible by the new transport investment.  
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f  is a downward sloping (gravity or preferably entropy) function of  the communication cost between region r and 
region s (Crs) (Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003). 
 
The potential model is proportional to the total flow of  traffic from region r, which in its turn is proportional to 
the total size of  the economy of  region r (Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003).  
 
The economic potential concept provides an approximation of significant change in accessibility 
for regional economies. Evers and collaborators (Evers et al.,1987; Evers and Oosterhaven, 1988) 
incorporate border dummies and a modal split parameter into a multi-sectoral potentials model to 
estimate the employment impacts of a proposed high speed rail connection from Amsterdam to 
Hamburg (Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003). 
 
Regional Input-Output Models  
Regional input-output (IO) models deal with structural economic relationships i.e. inter-industrial 
linkages through intermediate deliveries of goods and services. The basic calculation is made with 
―chain of effects‖ (direct, indirect, and induced) of expenditures on output, employment, and 
income. For instance, IMPLAN and RIMSII (economic impact models) are both 
expenditure-driven IO models. REMO (regional economic models) translate the impact from a 
transport investment project into regional economic performance via effects on business cost and 
productivity (Iacono and Levinson, 2014, forthcoming). However, the limitation of the 
multi-regional interaction IO models is the operational difficulty due to data limitation (Nijkamp & 
Poot, 1987).   
 
LUTI/SCGE Models 
The aforementioned models do not have a spatial dimension which could evaluate the differences 
when the same infrastructure may be constructed in different locations. Two spatially detailed 
models, namely land-use/ transportation interaction (LUTI) and spatial computable general 
equilibrium (SCGE), provide the solution for this purpose (Oosterhaven and Knaap, 2003).   
LUTI and SCGE have their relative niches for impact studies on different spatial scales. LUTI 
models employ a system dynamics type of modelling to predict future growth and are suitable to 
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analyse policy scenarios at the level of large urban conglomerations. On the other hand, SCGE 
models which are developed from the CGE
4
 provide a theoretically more satisfying approach to 
simulate interregional trade and location, using utility and production functions with substitution 
between inputs (Lee, Haghani, & Byan, 1995; Oosterhaven & Knaap, 2003). SCGE models reflect 
the spatially-differentiated prices among locations which affect production and household welfare 
when changes to transportation networks (Iacono and Levinson, 2014, forthcoming). Iacono and 
Levinson (2014) argue that SCGE models are gaining in popularity because of their ability to 
simulate large intra- or inter-regional transport improvement as well as its adaptability to emerging 
theories and concepts in urban and regional economies and transportation, such as monopolistic 
competition underlying patterns of specialization and trade (Bröcker, Korzhenevych, & 
Schürmann, 2010; Krugman, 1991) and agglomeration economies and associated productivity 
gains (D. Graham & Kim, 2008; Rice, Venables, & Patacchini, 2006; Venables, 2007).  
At the meso level, agglomeration effects signify that the geographical proximity of firms to each 
other could give rise to wider economic benefits, which could arise from the intra-firm level and 
scope economies at a location or from inter-firm externalities (Banister & Berechman, 2000; 
Chinitz, 1961). The contribution of transport to the level of concentration lies in the relocation 
decision made by firms and people from lower to higher productivity areas. Agglomeration 
economies are traditionally regarded as externalities and not included in a standard cost-benefit 
analysis. Venables (2007) significantly develops a theoretical model to determine the relationship 
between transport provision and agglomeration. Graham (2007b) further develops the argument 
about the positive relationship between increasing return to agglomeration and the increasing 
accessibility to economic mass. Two sets of analysis are involved, namely the urbanisation effects 
(based on settlement size) and the localisation effects (based on employment density). Graham 
(2007a) argues that the effect of agglomeration externalities is not trivial in the context of transport 
appraisal: 10-20% additional benefit could arise from increasing return to economic mass. The 
latest research by Chatman and Noland (2013) track the relationship between transit service and 
physical agglomeration measured by employment density, and then relate the results to 
productivity e.g. average wage and per capita GMP. The findings show that ―estimated wage 
increases range between $1.5 million and $ 1.8 billion per metropolitan area yearly for a 10 per 
cent increase in transit seats or rail service miles per capita‖ (Chatman & Noland, 2013, p.1). 
Hence, they argue that current benefit-cost evaluations may underestimate the benefit from transit 
improvement, especially in large cities with existing transit networks.   
                                                        
4 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models simulate the behaviour of supply, demand, and prices in interacting 
markets within the economy.  
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At the micro level, ex-ante research is often conducted at the firm level regarding the influence of 
transport improvement and accessibility on its location decisions. The concern to minimize 
transport cost has become progressively less important than other costs such as labour costs 
(Dicken, 1986). Regarding the impacts from specific types of transport investment, Oosterhaven 
and Knaap (2003) argue micro survey with firms provide more insights. However, they also warn 
that answers from micro survey at firm level may naturally vary with the factors of country, 
context, and sector of economic activities. When more and more factors are taken into account, a 
questionnaire method becomes cumbersome.      
 
Ex-post analyses  
Once the decision on transport investment is made, the development process officially begins. The 
analyses of impacts need to take the temporal perspective further into account in more detail since 
some types of impacts occur immediately or in a short term, whereas some tend to take place in a 
medium-to-long term.  Based on the experience from the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) Impact 
Study (P. Jones, 2014; P. Jones, Hanley, Mackett, & Titheridge, 2009; Jubilee Line Extension 
Impact Study Unit, 1999), three time periods are suggested to observe impacts, namely before the 
opening of services, short term, and longer-term. In line with Figure 2-4, Table 2-2 showed the 
major kinds of impacts and the indicators summarised from several ex-post studies of urban transit 
systems. There has been extensive empirical literature of impact studies on urban transit systems 
from the 1970s. Indicators depend on data availability and need suitable alternatives in different 
contexts. The methods for measurement are mainly twofold i.e. quantitative number crunching 
(securing secondary datasets from relevant national institutes and applying with either statistical 
modelling or descriptive statistics) and a more qualitative survey with questionnaires and case 
studies.    
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Table 2-2  Wider Economic Impacts of Urban Transit Systems 
Key impacts  Indicators  
Land use & development Changes in use of existing properties, the level and intensity of 
development and the use of land in areas around stations 
Changes in commercial and industrial use of floor space  
Gain/loss of open space 
Changes in retail floor area 
The additional dwellings (planning applications/ completions) 
Land/ property value  
Commercial & industrial property 
value  
House prices 
Changes in the capital (Transaction sale prices) and rental values of 
properties and land  
Townscape and image   Changes in the quality and fabric of the built environment 
Changes in the level and distribution of pedestrian activity around 
stations  
Changes in the perceptions and images of the local area 
Growth of consumer services  Changes in tourism and other consumer activities (such as retail) 
Business operation & Location  Changes in the attitudes of business operation 
Changes in business location  
Changes in the investment behavior of suppliers/operators  
Agglomeration effects  Changes in company turnover  
Changes in average wages, for that company or industry sector  
Changes in GVA per filled job  
Labour market & employment  
  
Changes in employment  activity/trends/location 
Changes in the number of jobs within 20, 30 and 45 minutes by public 
transport  
Changes to the socio-economic characteristics of the resident 
population 
Changes in attitudes to area as an employment base 
Urban form  
(The pattern of urban growth)  
Multi-centric development along certain areas  
Local interventions and incentives used to guide the development  
Source: A list of references in the footnote
5
.  
 
Firstly, before the opening of services, three kinds of impacts could occur, namely land use/ 
(re)development, land/property value, and townscape and image. This is also a critical timing 
when proactive public and private intervention could be firstly perceived. For instance, it was 
found that as soon as the JLE investment was confirmed, this encouraged land use development 
through planning permission and construction projects, which subsequently catered for increased 
employment and residents in those areas (P. Jones, et al., 2009). Banister and Thurstain-Goodwin 
(2011) suggest four periods of timing for best capturing land value change, namely ―before the 
decision to build‖, ―prior to opening‖, ―immediately after opening‖, and ―further downstream‖. 
                                                        
5 (Antwi, 1993, 1995; S. Crocker et al., 1999; Department for Transport, 2009; Forrest, Glen, Grime, & Ward, 1992; 
Forrest, Glen, & Ward, 1995, 1996; P. Jones, et al., 2009; Jubilee Line Extension Impact Study Unit, 1999; Law, 1991; 
Law et al., 1994; RICS Policy Unit, 2002) (Babalik, 2000; S. Crocker, 1994 ; Henneberry, 1996; Pickett & Perrett, 1984; 
Townroe & Dabinett, 1994)(Cervero & Landis, 1997; Dabinett, Morrell, & Vigar, 1994; Dundon-Smith, 1994; 
Fairweather, 1991, 1994; Fairweather & Law, 1992; Fairweather & Roberts, 1992; Gore, 1994; Grieco, 1994; Pope, 
1994; Vigar, 1995)  
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Hedonic pricing approaches
6
 have largely been adopted to statistically analyse the effects of urban 
transit systems on land/property value (both residential and commercial) (Lari et al., 2009). In 
addition, during this period, the construction of a new station could lead to reshaping the 
townscape and the image of the city around the station area and then change the perception of a 
place. An attempt to apply Hedonic pricing methods to the effects of HST on residential property 
value was made by Andersson et al. (2010) in the southern Taiwan. They conclude that ―the 
estimated functions show that HSR accessibility has at most a minor effect on housing prices‖.     
Secondly, the opening of new transport services physically facilitates new interaction and 
possibilities between places for business, work, or leisure, involving a process of restructuring 
place of work and residence. Four kinds of impacts have been observed, namely growth of 
consumer services (retail, tourism, etc.), business operation and location, agglomeration effects 
(GVA/ firms‘ turnover), and labour market and employment (investment and economic structure). 
These effects could progressively take place from short to medium, even long term, which varies 
with specific contexts and other complementary factors.  
Thirdly, reshaping urban form and addressing spatial disparity will need a long term to transpire. 
However, the longer the period, the more difficult will it be for data collection to be available and 
harmonised over time, and causality could be attributed although this issue of causality could also 
be difficult within a short time period. Next, how much time (how many years) could be regarded 
as a long term is not possible to standardise. Third, there is an underlying assumption in Figure 2-4, 
which is a cumulative effect of rebalancing the inequality.  
However, this stage may never been reached if there is no active public intervention as well as 
enthusiastic investment from the private sector. The case could be presented as a decay model of 
impact (see Figure 2-5) which addresses how long it will take to see a diminishing of effects from 
transport investment. According to JLEISU (1999), if there is no institutional intervention or new 
changes in the process, a decay model of impact would prevail. In order to exploit and substantiate 
the impact, active intervention is essential. A hopefully positive net effect will involve an active 
infrastructure policy which will be typically motivated either by the pattern and size of the regional 
redistributive effects or by the expected size of the national generation effect (Oosterhaven & 
Knaap, 2003).   
 
                                                        
6 In Hedonic pricing methods, land/property price depends on a wide range of attributes among which accessibility 
(the distance to rail stations among other transport modes) is particularly relevant here. The effect then is determined 
by statistical output. 
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Figure 2-5  The "Decay" Model of Impact 
 
Source: Jubilee Line Extension Impact Study Unit (1999) 
 
So far, the research findings have presented a mixed picture and the majority of existing ex-post 
impact studies on urban transit systems have been short-term, within a few months or less than 5 
years since the inauguration. Most findings show a modest effect. For instance, after the 
inauguration of Manchester Metrolink in 1992, not much evidence on the office market or on 
retailing is found (Law et al., 1994). Nor was the discernible effect on house prices (Forrest et al. 
1996). Similarly, Sheffield Supertram services opened in 1996. Crocker et al. (1999) show the jobs 
actually created by the transport investment was actually much less than the claimed quantity in 
the appraisal for the funding application. 
Given that unpredictable economic recession and fluctuation may temporarily disguise the real 
impact, definite evidence will take several more years before a fair verdict could be reached. The 
case of the BART system in California aptly illustrates this point. Knight and Trygg (1977) report 
that five years after its inauguration in 1972, development impacts along BART were generally 
minor. There was no evidence that a new transit system would increase the overall level of 
development of a metropolitan area. They stress that available evidence showed that rapid transit 
improvements can stimulate new development around the stations, but transit alone is not enough. 
Four general factors were determined to be needed for land-use impact i.e. local government 
policies, regional development trends, available land, and physical constraints of the site. They 
concluded that ―Rapid transit will not automatically revitalize and reshape our cities, but it can do 
much - if we can learn to understand that role and the others which must accompany it‖ (Knight & 
Trygg, 1977, p.246 ). 20 years later, an update of BART impact study research was reported by 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  Research Focus and Methodology 
 
53 
 
Cervero and Landis (1997). They argue that ―BART played a fairly modest, though not 
inconsequential, role in shaping metropolitan growth and land-use patterns‖. They generally 
provide similar findings to those original impact studies that land-use impacts have been largely 
localised around downtown San Francisco and Oakland and certain suburban stations. They 
maintain that BART did little to stem the tide of freeway-oriented suburban employment growth. 
Those places where local redevelopment authorities intervened to provide various financial 
incentives and assistance with land assembling have demonstrated notable changes around the 
station. Thus, stronger public policy initiatives will be needed to channel future regional growth to 
BART corridors (Cervero & Landis, 1997, p.309 ).   
 
2.4.2.2  The Spatial Perspective   
Apart from the temporal perspective, the nature of the impacts varies with the type of passenger 
rail systems since the potential spatial range of influence is associated with locational and 
operational patterns e.g. speed, frequency, time-space shrinkages although some features could be 
shared across types. Passenger rail systems, either heavy rail or light rail, involve the movement 
from one place to another with vehicles running on steel-made fixed tracks and stations involves 
three types of patterns i.e. node (point), corridor (line), and a wider geographical area (territory). 
Thus, three major spatial scales could be discerned, namely local (station area), 
intra-urban/regional, and inter- urban/regional. 
Inter-city (inter-regional) transport connectivity, such as high-speed rail (the niche lies in the 
competition with air and motorway) will potentially have spatial-economic effects on the regional 
(national) scale, in addition to its intra-urban/ local effects, while a urban transit system, such as 
MRT, LRT, etc., would naturally have wider economic impacts on a smaller spatial scale. 
Feitelson and Rotem-Mindali (2014, forthcoming) found two major spatial scales used for 
assessing investment of MRT and LRT are macro (metropolitan or city-wide) and micro (effects 
around stations).  
The identification of relevant geographic scale is critical for selecting the appropriate types of 
analyses (Banister & Berechman, 2000). The wider impact of MRT/LRT has been seen quite 
localised in particular areas and, in some cases, as a matter of shifting development from one place 
to another rather than on a regional or national scale (Balcombe, et al., 2004). As for HST, the 
spatial impacts could be visually localised if a new station is retrofitted or created through a 
deliberate development strategy combining transport planning and land use. Hence, other factors 
such as location of the station, as well as local intervention on development around the station will 
be critical. Besides that, most importantly, the arrival of inter-city connectivity by HST can only 
play a major role in serving a wider territory through integrating local transport networks (MRT/ 
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LRT or other systems) to exploit its wider impacts for a region. The differential spatial thinking 
and potentials between HST and urban transit needs to be applied. ―High speed lines are unlikely 
to have local accessibility benefits separate from connecting local transit lines because there is 
little advantage for most people or businesses to locate near a line used infrequently (unlike public 
transit)‖ (Levinson, 2012, p.291).  
Moreover, service catchments will not be identical between different transport systems. A HST 
station will have a wider catchment than a MRT or LRT/ or regional rail station. In the impact 
study of the Jubilee Line Extension, the observed catchment area was at the outset set at 1000m. 
Previous literature has established that the catchment area for commercial land use is measured 
about 500m smaller than residential use (1000m) (P. Jones, 2014, forthcoming ), while for 
measuring HST impact in Japan, the catchment was set at 5000m (Murakami & Cervero, 2010). 
 
2.4.2.3  Conceptual and methodological issues of impact study  
Either ex-ante or ex-post impact analyses has their strengths and limitations. On the one hand, 
simplified forecast modelling approaches apply historical datasets as an essential exercise in 
predicting future patterns. When it comes to demand forecast for transport investment for decision 
making, the theoretical assumption is always sketchy and controversial. There are three issues 
which increasingly loom large. One, demand forecasting is inaccurate and often results in 
overestimation. Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) reveal that ―for 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts 
are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%‖ (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2005, 
p.131). Second, with technological breakthrough, potential work productivity on train challenges 
the traditional assumption of time saving for rail services (P. Hall, 2013b, forthcoming). Third, in 
the case of UK, calculation of wider impacts derived from economic modelling do not include 
regeneration/rebalance/redistribution effects at the local level. Mackie and Worsley (2013) admit 
that ―[t]his is a topic which is important politically but where there is least consensus on what 
should be included, how it should be measured and where within the appraisal it should be picked 
up‖.  
On the other hand, two major ex-post methods have their own limitations. Empirical statistical 
modelling demands a large number of data on the same spatial scales over time. This is especially 
problematic for a long-term empirical study due to the lack of data comparability and availability. 
With respect to ex-post case study and descriptive statistics, there have been a few long existing 
conceptual and methodological issues which need to be further discussed, namely other 
supplementary factors, other contributing factors, timing for observing development process, and 
causality.  
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Firstly, although the transport improvement could potentially lead to economic growth and 
development, the overall picture from existing literature is mixed. It is worthwhile reiterating that 
transport investment on its own will not usually induce development; instead, it forms a part of an 
intervention package. If nothing else is complementarily done, the impact could be negative due to 
imperfect competition and draining away effects. Whitlegg (1994), argues that, in fact, many 
economies have lost jobs as a result of increases in road infrastructure due to the draining away of 
activities from central to out-of -town locations. Grieco (1994) argues that the assumption of this 
relationship is largely uninformed by empirical evidence and that there is a need for more detailed 
and systematic empirical research. In addition, Balcombe et al. (2004) usefully summarise the role 
of urban transit systems during the developmental process as follows.  
 
It provides a modern, efficient way for residents to reach jobs outside the area. 
It provides access into the area for workers, shoppers, and those on leisure trips.  
It demonstrates a commitment to the area by various levels of government.  
It provides a useful theme for marketing the area.  
It would need supplementary policies to start the process, such as incentives of tax reductions or 
reductions in planning restrictions (Balcombe, et al., 2004, p.134).  
 
Secondly, there may be other contributing factors which could produce similar results in parallel. 
As JLEISU (1999) argued that where changes are correctly identified, they may not necessarily be 
impacts that can be properly attributed to the new transport services, i.e. they may have been 
caused by other factors. This issue is especially critical in advanced West Europe from the 1960s 
and 1970s onwards when rail industries declined in an age of an expanding road network and 
explosive growth of car ownership. Crocker et al. (1999) argue that new road construction has had 
a stronger impact on industrial and commercial development proposals than Supertram and 
concluded that 12-15% of the land use change in those areas could be attributed to Supertram 
(quoted from Balcombe et al.,2004).  
Thirdly, the development process is complex and evolving, which will be affected by various 
factors (policies, economic fluctuations, leadership etc.) over time. JLEISU (1999) and P. Jones 
(2014) argue that the enhanced understanding of the various processes of change in the Jubilee 
Line Extension Study demonstrated that monitoring changes based on ―before‖ and ―after‖ two 
points in time, as previous research has tended to adopt, does not necessarily represent various 
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types of changes in the underlying state of the system. Therefore, there should be more 
comprehension of context-specific information, more targeted collection of data, and more realistic 
expectation of various impacts which are likely to take place at different stages of processes.  
Lastly but not least, bringing together the previous three issues, distinguishing the causality of 
transport investment among various factors over the development process is inherently difficult. 
JLEISU (1999) suggests a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches for conducting 
an impact study. There may be some correlation found through the analysis of quantitative data. 
However, some attributable impacts will only be identified by qualitative approaches such as 
interview or policy analyses. Such qualitative work is, therefore, an integral part of the 
methodology, allowing a more complete understanding of the process of change and the 
relationship between public transport infrastructure investment and economic activity. 
 
2.4.3  Current HST Impact Studies  
 
2.4.3.1  Ex-ante Forecasting Approaches 
The first methodological group for the study of the impact of HST is based on the modelling 
approach, which is largely applied in the fields of transport and spatial economics. The concern 
lies in the relationships between transport infrastructure and economic development, determined 
by accessibility and costs. ―Accessibility is not simply a desirable good by itself, but a means to an 
end, in this case economic activity and social cohesion‖ (Vickerman et al., 1999, p. 13). Transport 
infrastructure is treated as a proxy for accessibility, which is also a proxy for costs incurred. The 
assumption is that improvement in accessibility would lead to an increase in competitiveness and a 
rise in regional productivity and welfare (ibid.). A typical accessibility-potential model uses 
measures of distance (or time) to estimate costs for industries in a region, which corresponds to the 
economic measure of aggregated regional GDP (Clark, Wilson & Bradley, 1969). However, this 
simple model emphasises ―a price-induced change in demand‖, which doesn‘t take other factors 
into account (Vickerman et al., 1999, p. 4). These drawbacks have been considered by successive 
scholars devoted to refining the role of accessibility in the regional economy.  
A thorough review offered by Vickerman et al. (1999) illustrates progressive refinements of the 
measurement of accessibility, including an attempt to translate changes in regional economic 
potential into changes of employment, the modification of time-based measures, distance-based 
measures, impact studies with input-output analysis, and imperfect competition models. 
Vickerman et al. (1999) argue that time-based and spatial dimensions of measurement could 
generate misleading conclusions about the impact of transport provision owing to sectoral 
aggregation. The application is more suitable to handling traditional goods than services or the 
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movement of people, since this approach is rooted in the principle of economic static equilibrium 
and stresses the impact of demand-induced multipliers. Neither a variety of potential models nor 
impact studies could comprehend the dynamic reality with the assumption of constancy. With 
regard to the imperfect competition model, despite the fact that it moves away from the 
equilibrium assumption, the main argument suggests that the elimination of transport barriers may 
result in concentration in large cities because agglomeration economies overshadow lower 
transport costs. The inevitable result is a self-perpetuating gap between the core and the periphery. 
Following this thread, it is not surprising that, through a simple supply-driven regional 
econometric model, Sasaki et al. predict and conclude that a ―denser Shinkansen network will not 
necessarily contribute to regional dispersion‖ (Sasaki, Ohashi, & Ando, 1997, p.77). 
The aforementioned imperfect competition model features in a comprehensive review recently 
conducted by Puga (2008), who furthers the debate over HST accessibility and regional 
inequalities. He adduced several studies associated with ―new economic geography‖ to illustrate 
the point that a combination of market access and labour mobility results in an agglomeration 
effect under scale economies, whereby large markets become larger since they excessively attract 
more firms and labour. Hence, in line with this view, it has been argued that the implication for the 
effects of transport infrastructure is that ―[c]ross-border infrastructure projects connecting lagging 
regions with key markets make it easier for firms in lagging regions to reach new customers but 
also expose them to fiercer competition from firms in more developed areas‖ (Puga, 2008, p. 117). 
In the case of HST investment, Puga suggests that, instead of reducing regional inequalities, 
benefits are likely to favour major nodes and are unlikely to promote the development of new 
activities in minor nodes or in locations in between nodes. In addition, he argues that, unlike road 
infrastructure, HST is not oriented for goods transport; rather, HST may have a stronger impact on 
the location of business services and headquarters. For instance, it has been suggested that the 
construction of the French TGV connecting Paris with Lyon led to the relocation of headquarters 
from Lyon to Paris. Similarly, the Spanish Madrid-Barcelona HST may consolidate the spatial 
relocation of headquarters towards the capital (Puga, 2002; Vives, 2001).   
Instead of tending to generate negative output out of ex-ante studies, agglomeration economies as 
wider economic impacts in the context of high-speed rail have attracted much attention in recent 
years. Graham and Melo (2010) Traditionally, agglomeration effects emphasise the intra-urban or 
regional drivers of productivity generated through locational proximity in a large urban setting. 
The objective is to assess whether agglomeration effects could be generated in the context of 
inter-city interactions. The basic assumption is that transport investment can influence on the 
micro-foundations of agglomeration, and no obvious characteristics of the sources or mechanisms 
of agglomeration discussed in the literature that would limit their generation over long-distance. 
Therefore, the argument linking transport to agglomeration could hold in long-distance case if 
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spatial interactions between economic agents are made more efficiently. Increasing returns would 
be expected. They find there is a considerable amount of long-distance interactions between 
TTWAs, arguing that this suggests HSR could have an important effect on the level of 
connectivity between firms and workers. Therefore, the distance decay gradient is adopted to infer 
flow changes from the improvement of time saving. Given that a long-distance mode share for rail 
of about 7%, and that 8.56% are inter-TTWA trips, their findings show that a transport investment 
which can affect 25% (50%) increase in travel speeds demonstrates minor potential agglomeration 
benefits of 0.006% or £8.29 million (0.0011% or £15.80 million). They conclude that ―while urban 
economic theory does not preclude the existence of agglomeration benefits across inter-regional 
distances, the empirical evidence suggests that these may be very small indeed‖ (Graham and 
Melo, 2010, p.37).  
 
2.4.3.2  Ex-post Empirical Approaches: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods    
In contrast to a large number of HST impact studies conducted by ex-ante approaches, ex-post 
types of impact studies based on precious empirical evidence are still relatively few. Three major 
types of research on wider impacts have been conducted, namely socio-economic effects at the 
local authority level or a wider catchment area around the station, business operation at the firm 
level, and accessibility effects in a wider territory. 
The first and the most common type is to interrogate the wider socio-economic effects, such as 
population, employment, property value etc. In the 1980s, ex-post HST impact studies largely 
focused on the Japanese experience of the Shinkansen. Such studies adopt a control group of 
places without HST services, based on the comparison of economic performance before and after 
the introduction of the HST services. Hirota (1984, as referred to in Brotchie, 1991 and Sands, 
1993a), Nakamura and Ueda (1989, as referred to Brotchie, 1991 and Sands, 1993a), and Amano 
and Nakagawa (1990, as referred to in Sands, 1993a) all find higher population growth in cities 
with the Shinkansen service than in those without it. For instance, Hirota found growth rates of 
HST cities (1.6%) are higher than non-HST ones (1.1%). Nakamura and Ueda (1989) find a high 
correlation between high growth rates in information-exchange employment and the presence of 
HST stations and an expressway. Employment growth is reported in these studies too, but the 
outcomes vary: the effects were greatest on service industry employment, including 
knowledge-based industries, and this was true even when controlled for by the simultaneous 
expansion of the expressway network (Brotchie, 1991). In summary, these studies demonstrate 
faster growth rates of population and economic effects (i.e. employment and economic activity) for 
cities on HST routes than those that are bypassed.  
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A recent empirical evidence came from Murakami and Cervero (2011), based on job and labour 
market from 40-year Shinkansen experience within a wider catchment 5km around the stations. 
The Tokaido Shinkansen line proves to the world the most successful HSR corridor serving 
378,000 passengers per day and capturing 82% of the intercity passenger flows between Tokyo 
and Osaka in 2009 (Murakami & Cervero, 2010, p.8). The empirical findings on corridor-level job 
distributions, cross-industrial typologies, and station-level density gradients suggest that the new 
HSR project is likely to induce knowledge- and service-based business agglomeration benefits, but 
these are mostly limited to large, globally connected cities. Growth could also shift to HSR-served 
edge cities, airports, and leisure-entertainment hubs at the expense of small intermediate cities.  
However, the causality is difficult to prove. Sands (1993a) casts doubt on the causal direction. 
Similarly, by studying Ashford in South East England, Preston and Wall (2008) show the opening 
of Ashford International station has coincided with 11% population growth, 6% increase in 
employment, and 3% increase in housing prices; But they maintain that given the aggregate nature 
of the data used, attribution of causation is difficult. Moreover, they argue that city type is a factor 
for explaining the limited result in Ashford which is a medium-sized market town similar to 
Calais-Fréthun, Haute Picardie, Le Creusot or Macon Loché, and not a regional centre like Lille, 
Lyon, or Seville. Hence, they predict that the arrival of domestic HSTs in 2009 would further draw 
Ashford into London‘s commuting belt, approximating the effect in Ciudad Real.  
In line with city type, an associated series of empirical studies examine the impact on different 
types of HST cities. They suggest that HST influences different kinds of cities in different ways. 
Ureña et al. argue that the size of intermediate HST cities and their distance from the metropolis 
(usually the capital city of the country) strongly condition the effects of HST (Ureña, Menerault, & 
Garmendia, 2009). HST services appear to reinforce large regional cities (Harman, 2006; Steer 
Davies Gleave, 2008), like Lyon (Bonnafous, 1987; Payre, 2010), but for smaller HST cities, 
outcomes differ. Spanish researchers found that Ciudad Real, within one hour of Madrid by HST, 
transformed itself from a previously-isolated small regional city to become a sub-centre within a 
polycentric mega-city functional region (Garmendia, de Ureña, Ribalaygua, Leal, & Coronado, 
2008), through a sizeable rise in commuting into the capital plus reinforcement as a regional 
university and business centre (Harman, 2006).  
The second kind of research is at the firm‘s level to understand the location of industries. This type 
of research is rarely conducted. Regarding the impact of the first TGV line, Bonnafous (1987) uses 
a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative approaches to conduct two surveys at the 
micro-scale firm level in the Rhône-Alps regions respectively in 1980 (ex-ante) and 1985 (ex-post) 
in order to compare the changes of business behaviour and motives for travel between Paris and 
Lyon. This was an early study, conducted two to three years after inauguration of the first TGV 
service. Although this is not the evidence of economic growth at the local authority/ or regional 
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level, this view from businesses at the micro level provides insight into the relationship between 
HST accessibility and business operation.  
As early as the late 1980s, he has found, Parisians had increased their journeys to the Rhône-Alps 
region by 52% for business travel against 144% made by inhabitants of the Rhône-Alps region, 
which seems to imply that the inhabitants of the Rhône-Alps exploit this expanded market by TGV 
more intensively than Parisian competitors who seem to enjoy their own market. As Bonnafous 
(1987) states that ―these figures point to the fact that there was no reason to fear a 
―rapprochement‖ with Paris, a fear I , myself, had overestimated‖ (Bonnafous, 1987, p.136). 
Interestingly, in contrast to Puga‘s (2008) claim for aggregated regional development, that easy 
accessibility to Paris for specialised service industries in the Rhône-Alps region meant there was 
no need for Lyon firms to relocate to Paris, while their Parisian rivals did not feel the need to 
expand their activities to Lyon. 
The third type of study is about the accessibility effect brought by HST and is explored on multi 
spatial scales. The aforementioned existing empirical studies of HST effects have been largely 
investigated at one spatial level, in particular the urban level. Increasingly, a multi-level analysis 
has been advocated (Harman, 2006; Ureña, et al., 2009). A group of Spanish and French scholars, 
Ureña et al. (2009), adopted a comparative case study approach to take specific circumstances and 
contexts into account. Three particularly large intermediate cities, namely Córdoba and Zaragoza 
in Spain and Lille in France, were chosen in order to study HST effects simultaneously at the 
national, regional, and local levels and mutual multilevel territorial implications of HST in these 
three cities. Based on existing literature, they hypothesised that at the national level, HST offered 
these large intermediate cities new locational advantages due to improved connectivity with capital 
cities, which should attract high-level activities. At the regional level, they adopted Plassard‘s 
(1991) argument that a contradictory relationship would be induced between a regional core city‘s 
national/ international connections and its regional connection with neighbouring small cities. So 
the regional city-system was hypothesised to be restructured with the arrival of HST. Two 
scenarios could happen: small regional cities may either become closer to a regional city or a 
capital city. At the local level, they hypothesised HST as a catalyst for creating new city images 
and urban projects. In addition, they wondered whether these projects were undertaken with the 
aim of reinforcing the national and regional roles of these large intermediate cities in order to 
make the best of the opportunity brought by HST or purely pursue local objectives. They present 
empirical evidence at all three levels regarding the extent to which HST opened up new 
complementary and contradictory possibilities for urban development. In particular, they suggest 
the importance of planning in both political and technical contexts. On the one hand, political 
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agreements
7
 at different spatial scales about how HST should be introduced are vital to make the 
most of the transport investment. On the other hand, the specific technical context (the layout of 
the network, the travel-time between large cities, the gauge and compatibility of rail track) 
condition HST‘s regional performance. Similarly, a recent paper authored by Martínez and Givoni 
(2012) analyses the accessibility impacts on winners and losers as a result of the proposed HS2 
Phase one. They compare accessibility changes on the HSR network and beyond the HSR line, 
revealing that the accessibility benefits from the proposed line are relatively limited concerning the 
geographical spread. Therefore, they conclude that any examination of a HSR line must consider a 
wider geographical area than just the cities, and must consider integration between transport 
networks, in particular between HST and conventional rail networks. They highlight that ―the case 
for a HST line in the UK from a regional accessibility perspective is questionable‖ (Martínez & 
Givoni, 2012).  
Lately, an extensive worldwide sample study was conducted by International Union of Railways 
(2011) to assess the implications of HST for urban and regional development. They aimed to reach 
a definite quantitative conclusion regarding the impact of HST. Following criteria for selection, 
five countries (Japan, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) with similar HST experiences were 
chosen. Within each country, selected cities were divided into two kinds: HSR cities and non HSR 
cities (termed as ―twin city‖ in this report). The selection of cities to be studied is based on 
population, type of station, employment rate, distance to relevant cities, or city profiles. The key 
reason for this research design is an attempt to reduce the complexity of factors which affect urban 
and regional development, apart from the main aspect of HST. But the selection of suitable 
―twin-city‖ was problematic from the outset, as it is difficult to find two comparable cities which 
have a different profile regarding HST availability. A preliminary qualitative analysis was used as 
an introductive and descriptive element leading to the next step for major quantitative analyses of 
social and economic data with a time series, correlation coefficients, principal component analysis 
(PCA) and regression analysis. However, research findings did not achieve the initial research aim. 
The report concludes that, in qualitative terms, HST can change the image of a city in a positive 
way e.g. through an enhanced profile of modernity and innovation, or the transformation of the 
area surrounding HST stations through new development and land usage, but these involve some 
important preconditions and circumstances such as direct access to motorways, commuter distance 
to the next metropolis, short distances to city centres, available land for development in city 
centres, socio-economic profiles, or the political cooperation of various institutions. Quantitative 
findings suggest that there is better development in HSR cities than in non-HSR cities according to 
several analyses, but this has not been confirmed as yet. The outcomes differ regarding countries 
                                                        
7 E.g. different types and levels of investment, public authorities and participants, a new high-quality transport system, 
public-private cooperation and regional planning. 
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and other aspects, so ―a valid impact of HSR has not yet been noted‖ (International Union of 
Railways, 2011, p.3).  
 
So far, the evidence from different studies on the wider effect of HST is mixed (Givoni, 2006). 
However uncertain as it seems to be, one thing is certain. HST alone is not sufficient to achieve the 
expectation of wider effects. Many other factors and conditions are needed too. The timing is 
relevant. At the time of economic crisis, nothing spectacular was expected to take place. Most 
importantly, the role of public intervention and strategic planning is critical. In an early study, 
Bonnafous (1987) argues that government intervention and certain restructuring policy in 
depressed industrial areas play larger role in affecting the location of economic activities than the 
factor attached to the transport system, in the case of HST. He further argues that the TGV is only 
exceptionally a determining factor; while very often, the availability of the TGV is regarded as a 
―bonus‖. Banister and Berechman (2000) argue that ―the presence of a buoyant local economy that 
can take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the high-speed rail accessibility‖ (Banister 
and Nerechaman, 2000, p.282). Similarly, Preston and Wall (2008) conclude that ―where the HST 
has only led to modest changes in accessibility, feeder services to the HST hub are limited and 
supportive urban and regional policies are lacking, then socio-economic impacts are likely to be 
modest, as exemplified by Ashford‘s experience to date‖ (Preston and Wall, 2008, p.420). 
Furthermore, Murakami and Cervero (2010) also conclude, from their Shinkansen experience that 
―the spatial redistribution effects of California‘s HSR investment need not be a simple ―zero-sum‖ 
game. When leveraged through far-sighted, proactive public policies, increased agglomerations 
that take form through redistribution can indeed have ―generative‖ economic qualities, to the 
benefit of the state at large‖ (Murakami and Cervero, 2010, p.2). 
 
2.4.4  The Gap: Towards A Planning Approach Operating on Two Inter-related 
Spatial Scales 
 
An overall review of the literature on the impact of HST reveals that, thus far, existing studies 
have rarely attempted to address the reduction of inequality with the arrival of HST and have not 
provided persuasive or explanatory evidence.  
On the one hand, it is difficult to understand the complexity of the wider effect of HST through 
these general modelling approaches which are concerned with cost and equilibrium and fail to 
differentiate the dynamic uneven nature of development over time. Neither is it possible with the 
theory of imperfect competition, which tends to predict the dominance of agglomeration 
economies in large cities or regions and, thus, there is no positive implication available for 
regional policy with regard to poorer disadvantaged cities or regions.  
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On the other hand, the current empirical method is largely quantitative-led. These studies generally 
attempt to measure social-economic changes as the effects of HST through a time series featuring 
before and after the arrival of HST and a distinction between HST and non-HST cities. In addition, 
in some studies, the typology of HST cities (the size and time-space effects brought about by HST) 
is taken into account to evaluate the development effect of HST. However, the latest UIC 
worldwide sample study of the impact of HST has confirmed the difficulty of generalising on this 
topic. A qualitative-led method was applied in Ureña et al. (2009) which deepened the 
understanding of complex HST effects with a multi-level analysis through a comparative case 
study of three HST cities. However, at the regional level, the investigation focused on the 
relationship between these small regional cities with the national capital, rather than the inequality 
and interaction within the region.   
Concerning the wider impact of HST on reducing regional inequality, three aspects are lacking in 
the current literature. Firstly, there is an acute shortage of empirical research addressing the wider 
spatial-economic impact of HST in reducing inequality on both the inter-regional and the 
intra-regional scale. The investigation and focus have been placed on individual cities rather than a 
group of cities including disadvantaged peripheral cities within the country or within regions. So 
far, a few warnings have been given regarding the polarisation within regions. Troin (1995) and 
Menerault and Barre (1997) suggest that the arrival of HST results in sharply reduced frequency of 
conventional long-distance train services, which is disadvantageous for intra-regional relationships. 
Moreover, Bruyelle and Thomas (1994) predict that a worsening in regional polarisation would be 
likely to occur due to a limited number of well-served, nodal locations after the arrival of new 
transport links. But, most importantly, empirical evidence has not yet proven these assertions: 
whether and how the benefit of HST would be spread as widely as possible, rather than being 
concentrated in a few advantaged places.  
Secondly, despite it being widely reiterated that public intervention is needed to address regional 
inequality and transport is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, the role of government 
intervention regarding HST investment has not yet been explored. Decision-making about HST 
investment is generally at the national level. Perspectives towards HST investment may vary at 
different governmental levels and in different national contexts. A comparative approach involving 
two countries has merits in understanding how the difference in national context will cause wider 
effects at the local level, which will be invisible in a single-context study. As Hall (2009b) 
suggests, building a new high speed train links could reshape a country‘s economic geography. 
Nevertheless, in a nation with a market-oriented ideology, a visionary and long-term view of 
infrastructure planning could hardly be adopted by the government to structure the nation. In the 
UK, Marshall notes that ―[w]e actually know infrastructure should be a vital part of planning‘s 
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instruments, but governments do not want to grasp this in our marketised world‖ (T. Marshall, 
2009b, p.488).     
Thirdly, in relation to the second point, a multi-level interventionist approach using an in-depth 
qualitative method has been lacking. How would the different ideology at the national level 
propose diverse urban and regional policies which would affect government intervention at 
regional and local levels? Could this national framework be conducive or detrimental to possible 
transformation of disadvantaged places? How do reactions at the local level vary, and result in 
different outcomes?  
Overall, in order to deepen the comprehension of the wider impact of HST on urban and regional 
inequality, this thesis will contribute to the current literature with a new empirical study, 
presenting evidence at two inter-related scales (inter- and intra-regional) from a planning 
perspective. The aim is not only to try to measure whether and to what extent HST results in a 
wider impact, but also to understand in depth the role of government intervention in the diverse 
effects on urban and regional development.  
 
2.5  Methodology and Research Design  
 
2.5.1  The Methodological Issues in Social Science 
 
Contemporary social science has been developing based on a constant stream of dialectics 
regarding the ontology
8
 and epistemology of the real world. Walliman provides a clear 
introduction to ontology and epistemology. Ontology is about ―the theory of social entity and is 
concerned with what there exists to be investigated‖ while epistemology is ―concerned with how 
we know things and what we can regard as acceptable knowledge in a discipline‖ (Walliman, 
2006). Naturally, different ontological views lead to their epistemological views as well as their 
methodological choices (Walliman, 2006); nevertheless, Aunger has surprisingly found that 
―epistemology can vary independently of ontology‖ (Aunger, 1995, p.108).  
Generally speaking, two contrasting epistemological paradigms in social science are positivism 
and interpretivism (Table 2-1). As Kuhn argues ,―paradigms provide scientists not only with a map 
but also with some of the directions essential for map-making‖ (Kuhn, 1998 [1970], p.100), it is 
                                                        
8 There are two distinctive views in ontology, namely objectivism and constructionism. Objectivism denotes social 
phenomena which are context-independent, whereas constructionism signifies social phenomena are in a constant state 
of change because they are totally reliant on social interactions which take place. 
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critical to bear in mind that the paradigm will guide research design and choices of methods. A 
positivist approach pursues the universal law of the real world based on experiences and 
observation. Popper (1998 [1963]) argues the criterion for securing scientific knowledge is 
falsifiability, refutability, or testability based on deductive reasoning in generating hypotheses to 
verify theory. In contrast, an interpretivist approach emphasises ideas which are used to interpret 
the social world.  
 
 
Table 2-3  The Comparison between Two Paradigms in Social Science  
 
Source: adapted from Aunger (1995) and Walliman (2006) 
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These two distinct paradigms respectively reflect the underlying concerns. Bennett and Elman 
(2006) summarise two basic epistemological concerns: ―effects of causes‖ versus ―causes of 
effects‖. Both have their representative methodologies. They argue that the conventional 
quantitative approach emphasises ―effects of causes‖, as such a view drives researchers to make 
systematic efforts to demonstrate how much an outcome, on average, results from a cause. 
Therefore, pure quantitative research crunches numbers with statistical methods. In contrast, a 
qualitative methodology aims to discover ―causes of effects‖ in order to explain the outcome of 
small-N case studies. Thus, qualitative approaches tend to investigate the complex social world, 
such as ―path dependence, tipping points, interaction effects, strategic interaction…‖ (Bennett & 
Elman, 2006, p.457).  
However, conflicts arise when one approach intends to teach and correct the other with its 
superiority. The most controversial work is ―Designing social inquiry- scientific inference in 
qualitative research‖ authored by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). From the perspective of the 
positivist tradition, they argue that there are two styles of research and one logic of inference. ―Our 
view is that these differences are mainly ones of style and specific technique. The same underlying 
logic provides the framework for each research approach. This logic tends to be explicated and 
formalised clearly in discussions of quantitative research methods‖ (King et al., p.3). In a word, it 
is clear from their statement that only through the shared rules of scientific inference, that are 
largely used by quantitative research, can non-statistical research become more reliable.   
Their view has sparked strong criticism. Mahoney denounces this view of quantitative superiority 
which often regards qualitative research as lacking precision and not being deserving of the term 
scientific method (cited in Brady & Collier, 2010). Also, it is claimed that King et al. (1994) 
dangerously conflate epistemological and methodological logic (George & Bennett, 2005). 
Moreover, causal effects are preferred to a causal mechanism, with the emphasis on the ―logic of 
confirmation‖ through hypothesis testing, rather than the ―logic of discovery‖, which pays little 
attention to causal complexity. Most importantly, the methodological conflicts are largely derived 
from a fundamental difference in beliefs. Although King et al. realise most research is hybrid in 
character, they neither appreciate the importance of the qualitative approach in its own right and 
the limitations of the quantitative approach, nor attempt to propose a way to combine qualitative 
approaches with quantitative. This persistent methodological debate and the attempt to bridge the 
divide have been central issues in ―Rethinking social inquiry‖ edited by Brady and Collier (2010). 
A more balanced view is provided to assess the strength and weakness of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and the complementary role of alternative methodological approaches.  
            
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  Research Focus and Methodology 
 
67 
 
2.5.2  Research Design  
 
From the review of methodological debates in social science, it appears that the aforementioned 
methodological debate of HST studies in section 2.4 is inherited from the constant debate in social 
science. This thesis aims to understand the dynamic spatial-economic development brought about 
by the arrival of HST, asking questions such as whether, to what extent, and how about the wider 
impact of HST. Apart from the measurement of HST effects, it probes how the opportunities of 
HST are perceived, in particular, the role of government intervention in this process. Therefore, 
the methodology adopted for the current study will involve both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to obtain evidence on the two inter-related scales featured. Before moving on to a 
discussion of research design, it is essential to firstly define the terms ―region‖ and ―sub-region‖.  
 
Defining “Region” and “Sub-region”  
 
Patrick Geddes‘ Cities in Evolution (1915) aroused the need for regional/local planning to deal 
with urban expansion. This period of development could be labelled ―city-regional‖ planning, 
which is different from ―regional‖ planning under national territory. In the textbook of Urban and 
Regional Planning, Hall (2002b) distinguishes two scales of planning: the national/regional scale 
and the regional/local scale (city-region).      
Regional/national planning emerged as a pressing issue after the Great Depression in the late 
1920s in Western Europe (P. Hall, 2002b). The definition of ―region‖ is elusive by nature, as the 
concept of a region involves several different aspects which are difficult to capture in an era of 
widespread globalisation. Keating (1998) provides at least three approaches to establishing a 
definition, namely administrative, economic and cultural. Firstly, an administrative or provincial 
level of region is a formal governmental institution, which normally complies with statistical 
divisions. However, to what extent regional institutions secure their devolved functions from the 
central state to exert their political power varies with nations. Secondly, from an economic 
perspective, a functional city region reflects the close interdependence among a network of cities 
based on their functional attributes, the travel to work pattern, and market linkages. With 
technological development and globalisation, this functional metropolitan region extends far 
beyond fixed administrative boundaries. Thirdly, from a cultural aspect, regions can be defined 
through history, language and a sense of regional identity. The geographical scale for a cultural 
region may vary dramatically and regional development is dynamic and complex. ―These varying 
definitions of the region not only do not always coincide, but they may be in conflict with each 
other‖ (Keating, 1998, p.. 10).     
In this research, a region is defined as a component of national division. Regional performance is 
measured and studied based on an administrative (statistical) unit because this unit contains 
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consistently available statistical figures over time to comprehend changes. The constitutional 
capacity of a region varies in different countries. It could be a mere administrative division for 
statistical usage rather than a real government body, like current English regions except for 
London (from 2000). In France, regional divisions emerged in the mid-1950s as ―programmed‖ 
regions in the national plan and evolved in status and gained legitimate responsibility from 1982 
onwards. A region has a democratic foundation via directly elected representatives, as well as 
regional competence in economic development, regional spatial planning, secondary education 
facilities and vocational training (Colomb, 2007). In this instance, the concept of a sub-region is a 
further sub-division within a region, but this does not necessarily comply with a division of local 
government. The geographical sizes of sub-regions are not identical, since their delineation is 
made based on economic, historical and geographical features, as well as data availability.  
 
Two Spatial Scales: A Survey at the Inter-regional Level and A Comparative Study at the 
Intra-regional Level 
 
The considerations which were taken into account for this research design are as follows. Firstly, 
HST which connects major cities in a country potentially restructures national economic 
geography, so observations are focused on whether and to what extent the arrival of HST could 
revive large or medium regional cities and reduce inequality on the inter-regional scale. These 
observations take a combination of historical and comparative perspectives into account. For 
historical reasons, a country which has long-term experience in developing HST lines is more 
suitable for observation than a country which has just begun to develop HST. The comparative 
perspective is implemented through the selection of railway lines (HST and non-HST) and major 
cities or towns on both groups of rail lines. A conceptualised theoretical framework is constructed 
in relation to the research context and question. Units of variation focus on the relationship 
between changes in transport connectivity (independent variables) and economic changes 
(dependent variables). The operational indicators for transport and economic variables are then 
generated for data collection and analysis.   
The second spatial framework in question shifts to the intra-regional scale. A comparative case 
study which combines quantitative and qualitative approaches is adopted. As Tarrow (2010) 
pinpoints, quantitative and qualitative data are being intertwined within the same study more and 
more frequently. The qualitative part can play a complementary role to quantitative approaches 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006). The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods could deepen 
the understanding of the research question with triangulation effects. Tarrow advocates that 
qualitative data could be used ―to interpret quantitative findings, to get inside the processes 
underlying decision outcomes, and to investigate the reasons for the tipping points in historical 
time-series‖ (Tarrow, 2010, p. 109-110). With regard to the quantitative part, the variables and 
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indicators are similar to those in the inter-regional study, but units of observation are centred on a 
region and all sub-regions within it. The quantitative figures assist in identifying situations before 
and after the arrival of HST among HST and non-HST sub-regions within the region. Then, 
quantitative findings serve as a departure point for the qualitative section of the study. The 
qualitative part focuses on teasing out the complex nature of the impact of HST through a 
comparative case study between two regions respectively in two national contexts, which can offer 
a deeper understanding of wider HST effects.  
 
A Comparative Case Study 
 
There has been considerable exploration regarding the strengths and limitations of single case 
studies (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring & MyiLibrary, 2007; Yin, 2003), but less guidance has 
been found on small-N in depth comparative case studies (Abu-Lughod, 2007). Four supporting 
arguments underlie the comparative case study approach: 
1. A carefully designed comparative case study is invaluable for studying complex socio-economic 
systems (Hatakenaka, Westnes, Gjelsvik, & K. Lester, 2006).  
2. As Gerring argues, ―All knowledge is comparative…In order to understand one thing, we must 
know neighbouring things‖ (Gerring, 2001). Comparative analyses could be conducive to 
evaluating and improving practice and policy on the basis of enhancing comprehension about 
one system to question its practices and values (Breuillard & Fraser, 2007).  
3. A comparative case study could generate objective research evidence through reasoning in two 
ways; a deductive result out of possible and careful generalisation, and an inductive view of 
understanding individual situations and transformation processes (Pol, 2002) to transcend the 
limitation of simply descriptive empiricism (Harloe, 1991). Therefore, a comparative case study 
involves both quantitative and qualitative analyses to reinforce the generalisation of findings 
and qualitative understanding of each ―unaverage clue‖ (Jacobs, 1961). For this kind of 
well-matched comparative case study, it is argued that ―the circumstantial similarities help 
highlight the differences in terms of paths taken as well as paths not taken‖ (Hatakenaka, et al., 
2006, p. 4).  
4. A systematic comparative case study could not only reduce the parochialism of social scientists, 
but also illuminate variables that remain invisible in the single case study. ―[A] causal path that 
leads across levels of analysis, acknowledging the different contribution each level makes to 
explaining similarities and differences‖ (Abu-Lughod, 2007: p.403).    
  
Nevertheless, given that similar cities and regions still differ from each other, the intrinsic 
limitation and methodological issues of comparative research could not be ignored. The most 
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important issue is the confirmation of conceptual or functional equivalence across countries for 
specific research aims (Armer, 1973). In addition, the equivalence of measurement, languages and 
sampling is largely dissimilar (Provan, 1993). In order to tackle this issue, it is suggested that 
when conducting robust statistical analyses, efforts must be made towards ―collecting reliable and 
similarly based data‖ (quoted in Provan, 1993, p. 18).   
 
Selection for the Inter- and Intra- regional Study 
 
In line with these concerns, this research emphasises European experiences. This selection is 
justified by historical reasons and diversity, which could yield critical insights through a 
comparative perspective. This is not only because Europe has been developing the HST network 
for the longest period, but also because, within a relative geographical proximity, western 
European countries have been developing their own HST approaches in different ways since the 
1970s, as reviewed in section 2.2. Thirty years on, more and more countries are encountering 
critical moments of decision-making when developing their HST network for future generations. 
For a practical reason, it is not feasible to conduct a cross-European comparative study in depth. 
This thesis, therefore, is based on the British context, since the UK invented the railway and 
adopted an upgrade approach for HST services in the 1970s. Now, the British government has 
decided to develop future HST with HS2 projects building new dedicated HST lines. 
Inter-regionally, the 30-year experience of the British InterCity 125/225 is chosen to understand 
how British economic geography has been shaped by the upgrade approach. Then, intra-regionally, 
a comparative case study of two post-industrial regions with two HST approaches (the WCML 
modernisation versus the new dedicated TGV-Nord line) is further selected to measure the 
intra-regional impact and to gain an insight into how the opportunities offered by HST were 
perceived by the interaction between different levels of governments in different contexts. The 
country selection of a UK-France comparison is critical because both are typical examples of two 
HST approaches. The current comparison of two HST approaches in two regions will provide 
valuable implications for the UK when developing HS2 for a possible rebalancing of British space 
economy.   
The two selected regions are Manchester and its sub-regions in north-west England (NWE), and 
Lille and its sub-regions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPDC), France. Both regions
9
 have similar 
industrial trajectories, challenges and HST opportunities, but are associated with two different 
national political economic and HST approaches (see Figure 2-4 below).    
                                                        
9
 Frendreis (1983) suggests two strategies for comparative research: the most similar systems and the most different 
systems. Both designs attempt to isolate relevant and irrelevant variables and permit the co-variation to be found.  
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Figure 2-6  An Illustration of the Current Research Design at Two Spatial Scales 
 
Source: adapted from Yin (2003: p.40)  
 
The first consideration is the industrial trajectory. Despite the fact that the industrial revolution 
arrived much later in France than Britain, NPDC, together with the Lorraine region, was the cradle 
of the French industrial revolution (Colomb, 2007). In the second half of the 19th century, the 
textile industry in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area was the second largest in the world, next to 
Manchester in Lancashire (Fraser and Baert, 2003). From the 1970s onwards, the 
deindustrialisation process hit NPDC and the textile industry in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area 
was no exception (Colomb, 2007). A similar process also occurred in Manchester and the 
north-west. At the zenith of the cotton industry in Lancashire, Manchester took the position as the 
capital of the North from York, and eclipsed London (Smith, 1994). In 1830, cottons accounted for 
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more than half the amount of British domestically-produced exports (Hall, 1998, p. 314). However, 
the worldwide Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s hit the northern cotton industry hard, and 
this situation was left unchanged when the economic upturn occurred in the late 1930s (Smith, 
1994, pp. 20-22). Moreover, when massive deindustrialisation prevailed in many British cities in 
the 1970s, Manchester and Lancashire were unavoidably hit again, especially those mill towns 
north of Manchester (e.g. Oldham, Bury, Blackburn, Burnley) in contrast to towns south of 
Manchester such as Warrington, Stockport and Trafford with more diversified economies (The 
Northern Way, 2009b, p.12). 
The second concern is the similar challenge faced by both regions with regard to the increasingly 
widening inequality between the major city and the surrounding sub-regions after economic 
restructuring transformed the economic climate into a dynamic knowledge-based system. The 
wealth and strength of Manchester was built on the cotton industry, which was operated in an 
interwoven network- ―a unique synergy‖ (Hall, 1998, p. 344) between Manchester and its 
surrounding towns in the county of Lancashire. Similarly, Lille was the commercial centre for the 
Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing textile industries. The steel and coal mining area (Valenciennes, Douai, 
Lens, Béthune) around the southern part of the conurbation supplied energy resources for textile 
industries. As the previously close relationship established between major regional cities and their 
hinterlands for production purposes evaporated, these hinterlands suffered more than their regional 
core cities when adapting during the process of economic restructuring.    
The third consideration is the similar time-space range offered by HST for both routes, Lille-Paris 
and Manchester-London. The same time-space effect will be potentially realised between London 
and Manchester when HS2, a new generation of 300kph HST, is finally implemented in 2032. 
Lille, the capital of NPDC on the northern border of France, 226 km from Paris, has been within a 
time-space distance of one hour by the new TGV-Nord since 1993. Manchester, 320 km away 
from London, was the first industrial city in the world when the industrial revolution occurred in 
England. From 2004 onwards, Manchester, in the north-west, has been served by Virgin Pendolino 
on the upgraded WCML. The rail journey is two hours between London and Manchester by 
current Pendolino trains. As mentioned earlier, the comparison will critically reflect the variance in 
current HST effects between the two contexts and, in turn, provide valuable implications for future 
HS2.   
Despite these three aspects of similarity, the two HST lines, namely the modernised WCML and 
the new dedicated TGV-Nord line, were implemented at the national level under two different 
political economies in the period from the 1980s to the 2000s. The UK‘s market-led approach 
versus France‘s state-led approach brought about a series of reforms which constructed the 
national spatial-economic approaches for urban and regional development. In order to deepen 
understanding of the wider impact of HST in reducing regional inequality, how the diverse 
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national frameworks for government intervention and in what ways the different local intervention 
affected the wider impact of HST are important in this qualitative part of the research.        
   
2.6  Research Phases 
 
The whole research process has four major phases, namely conceptualisation (from literature 
review to theoretical framework), operationalisation (from variables to the measurement of 
indicators), conduct of the research (data collection and analysis), and synthesising with 
conclusions (Figure 2.5). Since the whole research investigation is conducted at two spatial scales 
and combines quantitative and qualitative methods for a comparative case study, the first three 
phases were carried out repetitively until the final synthesis. The process began with the 
quantitative part (a survey and the first part of the comparative case study), followed by the 
qualitative section (a second part of the comparative case study). It is important to note that the 
qualitative research process is non-linear and entails constant reflection and reframing of the study, 
including the revision of interview questions as the knowledge and understanding of the author 
increased over the research process.  
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Figure 2-7  Research Phases 
 
Source: author  
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2.7  Research Methods  
 
2.7.1  The Quantitative Approach   
 
The quantitative approach aims to measure the wider impact of HST over time. The first step of 
this research was to review all existing literature in relation to research concerns and to 
conceptualise the theoretical framework, which is introduced in Chapter 3. The theoretical 
framework was further developed with operational variables (dependent and independent) and 
indicators for measurement.  
 
2.7.1.1  Data Collection 
Transport changes by rail (journey time and frequency) and economic changes (economic strength 
and structure) were two major groups of data to be collected. All the indicators and data collection 
comply with time-series reflecting ―before‖ and ―after‖ situations for the observed units of analysis. 
In the inter-regional study, the context is based in the UK. Data for transport changes were drawn 
from British Railway timetables. Data for economic indicators were taken primarily from original 
government documents and databases. As for the intra-regional study, data collection for a 
comparative case study involved two national contexts: the UK and France. In the British region, 
data resources are similar to the inter-regional study; however, the time series for observing the 
change in the WCML modernisation cover three periods that are much more recent (1998, 2004, 
2008), so the availability of data differed. In the French region, transport data referred to Thomas 
Cook‘s and SNCF‘s railway timetables. Economic data were mainly drawn from L'Institut 
national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). More details of dependent variables, 
indicators and data sources are illustrated in Chapter 4 and 5. 
 
2.7.1.2  Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are the major method used to analyse transport and economic changes in 
places. The indicators of urban and regional performance are measured in comparison with the 
national average to understand whether places have benefitted from transport changes and how 
these evolutions have been reflected in spatial-economic landscapes. In the inter-regional study, in 
compliance with Hypothesis one and two, findings of the survey were expected not only to draw 
an important distinction between two groups of towns regarding their status with and without HST 
services, but also to note whether there is any different performance within the towns with HST 
stations or not, based on a critical time limit for cities which are distant from London. In the 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  Research Focus and Methodology 
 
76 
 
intra-regional study, Hypothesis three is a combination of hypothesis one and two within a 
regional context, and is expected to understand changes among HST and non-HST sub-regions. 
Hypothesis four is intended to measure the diverse effects of HST within a region to understand 
to what extent economic inequality is associated with transport inequality.  
 
2.7.2  The Qualitative Approach   
 
The qualitative section of the research is regarded as necessary and complementary to the 
quantitative findings in order to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of the wider impact 
of HST. It plays a key role in the comparative case study at the intra-regional scale in order to 
grasp dynamism in the local context when encountering HST opportunities from a planning 
approach. Therefore, a comparative national spatial-economic framework is established in Chapter 
6, based on UK-France national conditions (including different national political economies, 
governmental systems and restructuring, urban and regional planning approaches). It enhances the 
comprehension of national and local interaction and the transformation processes which have 
taken place. In addition, interviews are conducted to assist in interpreting the role of government 
intervention in dynamic urban and regional performance. 
 
2.7.2.1  Data Collection  
Three main resources that cover the times series before and after the introduction of HST services 
in both contexts are listed below. In addition, experiences throughout the process are discussed 
accordingly.     
1. Documentation: systematic searches for relevant documents (government reports, proposals, 
previous research findings, publications, minutes of meetings, online media websites and 
others).  
 
2. Face-to face in-depth interviews: semi-structured interviews with key informants are the major 
qualitative research activity used to attain primary research findings in compliance with the 
analytical framework and national conditions. The development of both regions is relatively 
well-documented. All interviewees‘ perspectives significantly contribute to generating a "big 
picture" that transcends any one single portion of data. The original information from 
interviewees was recorded electronically.  
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3. Direct observation: field work in both regions was conducted to observe local conditions in 
person; for example, did the local atmosphere have a sense of decline or revival? 
 
2.7.2.2  Conducting Interviews 
1. Design of the questionnaire: a series of semi-structured (standardised & open-ended) questions 
were used for the interviews. The standardised feature is to ensure comparability between the 
two cases, whereas the open-ended approach is to allow interviewees to express any views 
which they feel are vital. In order to allow for the recounting of precious experiences and to 
deal with unexpected issues raised by the interviewees during the process, the style is 
―free-flowing‖ in order to allow participants to adopt an open and adaptable manner so they 
could fully or partially answer the questions, according to their nature and priorities. The initial 
questionnaire was adapted slightly a few times based on reactions from participants after the 
first group of interviews in order to avoid biased or unclear questions (to see the questionnaire 
used for the interviews, refer to Appendix 1).  
 
2. The selection criterion for interviewees for this study is expert-based, including key academics, 
key government officers and advisors in both private and public sectors who are acquainted 
with national and local contexts and involved in key decision-making processes. The key point 
of the interviews is to better understand the complex regional development after the arrival of 
HST. The rationales (or ideologies) which underlie actions taken or lack of action in relation to 
HST opportunities among different government tiers (national, regional, local) and among 
different local levels are of critical importance. Interviewees were thus selected from different 
government tiers and various local authorities to gain more balanced and contested views of 
both advantaged and disadvantaged places. One aspect which is worth noting is that the role of 
transport in possible transformation is still not very commonly appreciated. Initial attempts to 
contact regeneration planning or economic development departments in local authorities for 
interviews were usually transferred to transport departments because the research title contains 
the term ―transport‖.  
 
3. The technique used to contact interviewees mainly involved snowballing and identification 
from existing literature. Apart from one interview for the French case which was conducted 
over the telephone, discussions were conducted in a face-to-face manner. In total, there are 35 
in-depth interviews for the two cases (22 interviewees for the British case and 13 interviewees 
for the French case (a list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 2)). For the French case, all 
interviews were conducted in English with French-speaking natives who are proficient in 
English. Most interviewees were selected for a particular spatial scale, but some know both 
local and national contexts well.      
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4. The process of the interviews: immediately before interview, each participant was asked to 
agree that the discussion could be recorded. All interviewees consented to this request, but it is 
worth noting that recording may make some people uncomfortable. Of the 35 interviewees, one 
mentioned that he had to be careful about what he said because the conversation was being 
recorded. The time taken for each interview was intended to be 45-60 minutes. In reality, many 
interviews were considerably longer than initially planned. 
 
2.7.2.3  Data Analysis 
The strategies used for qualitative data analysis comply with three principles: relying on a 
comparative national spatial-economic framework (established in Chapter 6), the recognition of 
constraint and enabling conditions, and the development of a case study description. In order to 
implement the strategies for analysis, the specific analytical techniques involved pattern matching 
(the spatial-economic patterns before and after the HST services), explanation building, time-series 
analysis and cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2003). The research findings lead to a deeper 
understanding of the complex nature of the wider impact of HST and provide critical policy 
implications.  
Analysis of data collected from interviews and policy analysis involves four major processes.  
Firstly, the transcribing process was completed after each interview with a full-length transcription. 
Secondly, the labelling process identified themes, issues and thoughts in separate paragraphs with 
multiple labels per paragraph. Thirdly, the ordering process involved sorting paragraphs into 
separate documents according to themes and sub-themes for both regions. Finally, the analysis 
process required two levels of comparison: both within the two regions (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) 
and between the two regions (Chapter 9) to seek commonalities, divergences or conflicting points 
of view. In addition, insights between the themes were generated with the identification of 
relationships and assisted in building typologies and generalisations for complex and dynamic 
transformation processes in cities and regions.     
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2.8  Chapter Conclusions  
 
To sum up, beginning with a brief introduction to HST development and its competitiveness, this 
chapter articulated the research focus through a critical review of the existing literature about the 
wider impact of HST on urban and regional development. With the increasing expansion of HST 
development in the world and the growing inequality between places, both methodological 
(predicative or empirical) as well as disciplinary (transport economics or urban and regional 
planning) debates are contentious. In order to better understand the wider impact of HST in 
reducing regional inequality, a planning perspective is required, as it is necessary to regard HST as 
an opportunity and to make the most of it through multilevel strategic planning. The identification 
of the current research gap was of assistance when framing the key research question and selecting 
the adopted methodological approaches.  
A traditional divide in methodology in social science has been increasingly bridged by mixed 
methods. In order to answer the research question posed, a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches and a mixed selection of research design (a survey in the UK and a 
comparative case study of two post-industrial regions in the UK and France) is designed to aid 
comprehension of wider HST effects. The quantitative findings form the first step of the research 
process, followed by the qualitative inquiry relying on documents and critical interview insights to 
depict the complex picture formed by the seizure of HST opportunities for cities and regions. 
Following the formalisation of this research programme, the next chapter embarks on a theoretical 
framework to understand the relationship between the role of HST and dynamic spatial-economic 
development.  
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3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on establishing a theoretical framework for the space economy of HST as a 
basis for conducting empirical quantitative studies, which are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
In order to understand the potential spatial-economic impact of HST, it is essential to establish the 
relationship between industrialisation and urbanisation and then to hypothesise the role of HST 
played in the dynamic interchange between them. Industrial changes could lead to urban 
transformation, and strategic HST investment with allocation of HST stations and networks could 
potentially provide necessary physical infrastructure in the process of economic restructuring 
towards building a knowledge economy. In this chapter, existing literature and theories are 
reviewed to generate hypotheses associated with the first sub-research question (SRQ1) posited in 
Chapter 1:  
 
SRQ1: What is the potential relationship between HST and the construction of a knowledge 
economy in dynamic city-regional development?  
Four further sub-questions are derived as follows:  
SRQ1-1.How should the terms ―the knowledge economy‖ and ―knowledge-intensive activities‖ 
be defined?  
SRQ1-2.What are the locational characteristics of knowledge-intensive activities? 
SRQ1-3.How can spatial patterns of knowledge-intensive activities be explained? 
SRQ1-4.What is the role of infrastructure in dynamic urban and regional            
spatial-economic development in the era of the knowledge economy?   
 
 
There are five major sections within the chapter. Section 3.2 reviews the effect of economic 
restructuring in the era of the knowledge economy in order to grasp the essence of innovations for 
the knowledge economy and to define the terms the knowledge economy and knowledge intensive 
activities (SRQ1-1). In section 3.3, dynamic city-regional economic geography is examined to 
understand where knowledge intensive activities are agglomerated and the evolution of two kinds 
of agglomeration economies (SRQ1-2). In section 3.4, an explanation is sought for the 
spatial-economic patterns through examining existing literature comprising different theoretical 
approaches (SRQ1-3 & SRQ1-4). Finally, section 3.5 discusses the role of infrastructure (in 
particular the debate between e- and transport connectivity) in dynamic urban and regional 
development in order to hypothesise the conceptual framework for the space economy of HST.     
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3.2  Economic Restructuring towards a Knowledge-based Economy   
 
The cyclical pattern of capitalism, with its long waves of economic fluctuations every 50-60 years, 
has been widely accepted. So far, five long waves have been firmly identified (see Figure 3-1). 
The pattern can be outlined as follows; the economic downturn usually occurs soon after an 
overheated peak and is accompanied by a series of economic crises. These events result in a stage 
of recession, which is then followed by depression. When the event reaches the trough of the 
process, it starts to recover and growth occurs on the upswing until the next wave begins. 
Nevertheless, the causal mechanism and the trigger point of a new wave are fiercely disputed 
without definite agreement (Delbeke, 1984; P. Hall, 1985; P. Hall & Preston, 1988; Schumpeter, 
1964). The debate rests upon two major approaches: whether the wave forms because of external 
technological change with subsequent commercialised innovations or results from the internal 
conflict of the capitalist economic system (Hall, 1985). It is beyond the scope of this research to 
examine the detail of this debate, but there is an apparent contradiction between the Marxist view 
on the collapse of capitalist systems and the cyclical long wave theory (Skousen, 2009).  
 
Whilst reading this thesis, it is necessary to appreciate that massive de-industrialisation in 
advanced countries from the 1970s onwards co-existed with the rise of weightless information 
technology such as silicon chips; this has been classified as the driver of the fifth economic long 
wave (P. Hall, 1985). As industrialisation and urbanisation reinforce each other (Mensch, 1975), 
the spatial-economic impact on cities and regions will be profound. The role of HST will hinge on 
two major developments. On the one hand, over the course of approximately 50 years, the theory 
of innovations underlies dynamic and complex economic restructuring with new types of activities 
and results in changes in all aspects of society. On the other hand, the locational logic of these 
high-value knowledge intensive activities is critical.    
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Figure 3-1  Long (Kondratieff) Waves 
 
Source: Montgomery (2007, p.7)  
 
3.2.1  Theories of Innovations  
 
Long waves are frequently termed as Kondratieff waves. Technological invention was identified 
by Kondratieff as the cause of economic development. Through the detailed analysis of 
commodity prices, Kondratieff attempts to relate the falling rates of profit regarding commodity 
prices to technological exhaustion and therefore the rise of cyclical economic crises and changes 
causes the inherent existence of long waves in capitalist development (Montgomery, 2007). 
However, except for proof of long waves coexisting with technological change, Kondratieff does 
not clearly provide an account of causal mechanism or ―any explicit commitment to the role of 
innovation‖ (Perez, 1983, p. 358). It was not Kondratieff, but Schumpeter whose novel 
interpretation of long waves inspired a number of later-generation scholars to enrich this spectrum 
of theories about the role of innovation in economic restructuring and urban development.   
 
Schumpeter advances Kondratieff‘s long wave theory and makes a distinction between the role of 
innovations and inventions in the propulsion of economic restructuring (Schumpeter, 1964, 1982 
[1939] ). These innovations, the engine of ―creative destruction‖ result from ―new men‖, 
entrepreneurs‘ innovative commercialisation of technological invention in all aspects of the 
economic realm e.g. new products, new method of production, transport, newly created markets 
and new forms of industrial organisations. For Schumpeter, innovation is defined as ―the setting up 
of a new production function. This covers the case of a new commodity, as well as those of a new 
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form of organization such as a merger, of the opening up of new markets, and so on‖ (Schumpeter, 
1964, p. 425) (Schumpeter, 1982 [1939] p. 87Book1). 
 
According to Schumpeter (1964), there are two notable features of innovations. Firstly, the bunch 
of innovations is not isolated, occurring unevenly in time, and tending to cluster in the wake of 
other successful innovations. Secondly, innovations centre on certain economic activities and their 
surroundings. Furthermore, he emphasises this kind of innovation has to be significant enough to 
―disrupt the existing system and enforce a distinct process of adaptation‖ (Schumpeter, 1964, p. 
75).   
 
Schumpeter laid the foundation for his successors to mould their views into a more complete 
theory of innovation. Perez (1983) questions the relationship between the diffusion of new 
technology and economic development and argues that Schumpeter‘s explanation of cyclical 
behaviour is based on the self-regulating organism within the economic realm, where the social 
condition and institutional framework are influenced by techno-economic restructuring rather than 
being regarded as equivalent factors. She maintains that the long waves of economic development 
are not just economic phenomena, but also involve disharmony under the existing 
socio-institutional framework. Hence, she posits that there are two subsystems under the capitalist 
system; namely, a techno-economic subsystem and a socio-institutional subsystem. According to 
Perez, a new techno-economic paradigm such as the ecological movement could give rise to social 
organisational change. The principle of this new technological style is material-saving. Possible 
development would be expected in terms of reducing waste, downsizing products, demanding 
services rather than products, and replacing much physical transportation with telecommunication. 
Then, occupational profiles would be altered by new skills, which would give rise to income 
redistribution. In turn, a new pattern of demand would be generated to request new products (Perez, 
1983, p. 373).  
 
Moreover, Perez emphasises that social and institutional innovation can provide a good way to 
find appropriate solutions to calm turbulence or find a better way forwards (Perez, 1983, p. 372). 
The socio-institutional innovations she proposes consist of three levels. Socio-institutional 
innovation at the level of the firm is referred to as organisational changes, which are included in 
Schumpeter‘s theory of innovation. Perez‘s exclusive contribution lies in the proposal of 
indispensable innovations of regulation at the international and national levels. She identifies ―the 
Bretton Woods Agreement‖ and ―the Marshall Plan‖ as examples to respectively illustrate how to 
regulate inter-country trade and investment and how to instigate international investment and 
markets at the international level. Furthermore, at the national level, education and health system 
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reforms are both great resources for employment, resulting in income redistribution (Perez, 1983, 
p. 370). 
 
Similarly, Piore and Sabel (1984) accentuate the development that industrial technology reflects 
and pivots on socio-institutional circumstance and recognise that the existing institutional 
framework (structure of market and political circumstances) might be incompatible with the 
development of flexible specialisation. ―Technology had to be flexible in both a narrow and a 
broad sense. It had to permit quick, inexpensive shifts from one product to another within a family 
of goods, and it had to permit a constant expansion in the range of materials worked and 
operations performed, in order to facilitate the transition from one whole family of products to 
another. Institutions had to create an environment in which skills and capital equipment could be 
constantly recombined in order to produce a rapidly shifting assortment of goods. As a 
precondition of this, firms were discouraged from competition in the form of wage and price 
reduction, as opposed to competition through the innovation of products and processes‖ (Piore & 
Sabel, 1984, p. 30).  
 
Likewise, given that the introduction of new technology brings about major economic and social 
transformations, Freeman (1985) envisages a range of new systems are going to emerge, namely 
"entirely new industries, new types of capital goods, components, materials, new skills at all levels, 
new management attitudes and systems, new education and training systems, new occupational 
and industrial classifications, new design and development systems, new legislation, and new 
forms of finance, company organization, and ownership" (Freeman, 1985, p. 606).  
 
Above all, economic restructuring involving the diffusion of innovations ranging from 
technological to a series of widely related and induced socio-institutional would profoundly 
disturb the existing systems and engage with a rather complex process. The importance of 
social-cultural conditions and governmental responses can never be over-emphasised on the 
grounds that, from a long-term perspective, strategic governmental policies could be devised and 
implemented to transform through the lesser degree of disturbance in wider society in such ways 
as ―generat[ing] the entrepreneurial figures, in the training and aptitudes of its workforce, in its 
capacity to develop patterns of consumption, and in the ability of the state to provide the necessary 
infrastructural and regulatory framework‖ (P. Hall & Preston, 1988, p. 266).   
 
3.2.2  Defining the Knowledge Economy and Understanding Its Evolution   
 
Since the decline of Fordist manufacturing in major industrial countries in the 1960s, there has 
been a gap for another form of economy to take its place. In the book ―post -industrial society‖, 
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Bell (1973) takes the lead in pointing out that people in developed countries are primarily involved 
in the manipulation of ideas rather than things. Similarly, it is broadly agreed that the competitive 
advantage of creating wealth is more directly and significantly based on the production, 
distribution and utilisation of intangible assets like knowledge, skills, and innovative potential than 
before and therefore requires a shift of focus ―from handing goods to the intangible information 
and knowledge‖ (Quah, 1999) or ―from physical dexterity and skills to mental processing ability‖ 
(Bryson, Daniels, Henry, & Pollard, 2000, p. 2). Although the intangible features of knowledge 
and the knowledge economy could not be defined precisely (Brinkley, 2006), the knowledge 
economy has been exploited extensively to describe the most viable alternative for economic 
development in the 21
st
 century.   
 
However, the development of the knowledge economy is not a sudden occurrence; instead, it has 
been evolving over a period of time (Brinkley, 2006; David & Foray, 2002). Yet, the creation and 
diffusion of economic knowledge has grown at a larger scale and a faster pace. There have been 
several associated forces, among which there are three in particular i.e. the rapid advance of 
technology, globalisation, and consumer demand (Brinkley, 2008) . 
  
Firstly, the gradual formation of technological convergence from three different branches of 
technological development, namely telecommunication, electronics and computing, has brought 
about the possibility of and flexibility to transmit digitised information which reconstructs any 
kind of message and also makes visual communication practicable (Daniels, 1985; P. Hall, 1998). 
This technological invention as the precondition for Schumpeter‘s creative destruction stimulates 
entrepreneurs‘ innovations. For instance, the development of online retailing services for any kind 
of goods and services further encourages the development of highly intelligent, just-in-time 
logistic services and reverse logistics (De Brito & Dekker, 2003). Another example is Dell‘s 
business model of build-to-order-production, which reflects the fact that information technology 
has been applied innovatively to facilitate the interwoven interaction of production and 
consumption activities (Kraemer, Dedrick, & Yamashiro, 2000). Also, new technology has been 
progressively and creatively merged into artistic fields in movies, TV, music and multimedia etc. 
―The implications are still exploding around us‖ (P. Hall, 1998, p. 5). Secondly, with massive 
deregulation of international trade and the increasingly extensive global infrastructure network, 
globalisation has expanded markets, assisted profit-seeking capitalistic businesses to locate their 
manufacturing in low-cost places, and intensified the competition between places. Thirdly, the 
increase in consumer demand has facilitated the development of the knowledge economy. As 
Daniels (1982) argues, the growth of service industries has been partly associated with availability 
of disposable income and leisure time for individual households. Now demand has demonstrated a 
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shift towards the consumption of services, in particular, those related to knowledge based 
industries (Brinkley, 2008).  
 
In addition, government intervention could play a key role in developing the knowledge economy. 
German experiences demonstrate how to pioneer a new kind of industry ―cleantech - energy and 
ecology-related industries‖ which would inevitably involve enormous research and development 
and is expected to be a boom sector of the 21st century. In accordance with the Renewable 
Energies Act of 2000, wind, solar and water power now account for 12 per cent of all German 
electricity consumption (P. Hall, 2008b). Similarly, in the UK, cultural or creative industries have 
been strongly encouraged by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport as strategies for 
economic regeneration (DCMS, 2007). Hall (2000) indicates that ―[n]ations and cities have passed 
at extraordinary speed from a manufacturing to an informational economy and from an 
informational economy to a cultural economy‖ (P. Hall, 2000, p. 640). But the production side of 
cultural or creative industries has been argued to be much weaker than the consumption side of 
these industries and needs to be developed more adequately in order to strengthen the ―production 
of culture‖ (Pratt, 2004, 2008).     
     
These evolutions have clearly explained the remarkable phenomenon that is the dramatic 
restructuring of the economy and labour market towards a knowledge-intensive orientation. The 
explosive rise and dominance of high value-added services and the enormous diminution of 
physical manufacturing has been witnessed, which explains the massive decline of manufacturing 
in the developed world since the 1960s (Daniels, 1982, 1985; Daniels & Moulaert, 1991; J. N. 
Marshall et al., 1988). The definition of knowledge intensive activities is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
Defining Knowledge Intensive Activities  
In parallel to the evolution of the knowledge economy, the definition of knowledge intensive 
activities has been expanding. Initially, it was narrowly confined to the field of manufacturing 
industries associated with science and technology. For example, the OECD maintains a 
classification of high-technology, medium-technology and low-technology manufacturing sectors 
based on their relative R&D expenditures or R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditures to gross 
output) (OECD, 1996). But growing complexity, competition and uncertainty led to high demands 
for ideas, response to changes and the seeking of new possibilities in the production process. For 
instance, intense competition and diverse market demands evoke buoyant demands for 
―professional services‖ (Wood, 2002, p. 6), such as production consultancy, marketing, human 
resources, research, design, management and administration, information and communications, 
and many other advanced non-manufacturing services before and after new products have been 
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decided and taken shape. Wood (2002) questions whether the adoption of a technology-oriented 
ideology fails to usefully distinguish knowledge intensive services.  
 
Later, this was extended to include knowledge intensive services (telecommunications, finance and 
insurance, business activities, education and health sectors) (see Brinkley, 2006; Eurostat, 2007; 
OECD, 2007b). But there are still innovative, advanced services that are not included in this 
expanded category, as it does not encompass the rapid growth of various cultural or creative 
industries. Kok (2004) summarises that ―the knowledge society is a larger concept than just an 
increased commitment to R & D. It covers every aspect of the contemporary economy where 
knowledge is at the heart of value added — from high-tech manufacturing and ICTs through 
knowledge intensive services to the overtly creative industries such as the media and architecture‖ 
(Kok, 2004, p. 19). Similarly, Scott (2007) refers to key sectors such as ―technology-intensive 
manufacturing, services of all varieties (business, financial, personal), fashion-oriented 
neo-artisanal production, and cultural-products industries (including media)‖ (Scott, 2007, p. 
1467). In the research output of Ideopolis by the Work Foundation, cultural and creative industries 
are included in a broader picture of the knowledge economy to reflect the dynamic reality (A. 
Jones, et al., 2008). In summary, a synergy of these arguments underlies the identification of 
knowledge intensive activities in this study comprising three types: (1) financial and business 
services; (2) high-tech and medium-high tech manufacturing (science and technology); (3) cultural 
and creative industries. Education and health are not regarded as a default kind of knowledge 
intensive activity. Instead, they are measured in this study as a separate kind of sector, namely 
―public services‖, which could be presented as a contrast to the knowledge intensive activities in 
which capital is invested privately. Locational characteristics of these knowledge intensive 
activities are examined next.  
    
3.3  Dynamic City-regional Economic Geography and the Location of 
Knowledge Intensive Activities  
 
Cities and regions, the platforms for economic growth and development, are developing in a 
constantly dynamic process and reflecting the spatial landscape of industrial evolution. The 
industrial evolution of a new ―economy‖ has occurred throughout different stages of human 
history, and involves diverging from the previous mainstream economy and exhibiting a new 
―structure or totality of relations of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods 
and services‖ (Watts, Johnston, Gregory, & Pratt, 2000, p. 200). As Florida describes, 
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―[e]very phase or epoch of  capitalism has its own distinct geography, or what economic geographers call the 
―spatial fix‖ for the era. The physical character of  the economy—the way land is used, the location of  homes 
homes and businesses, the physical infrastructure that ties everything together—shapes consumption, production, 
production, and innovation. As the economy grows and evolves, so too must the landscape‖ (Florida, 2009).  
Concomitant with increasing de-materialisation and spatial dispersal of manufacturing and routine 
services, knowledge intensive activities cluster in large cities in order to benefit from face-to-face 
(F2F) contacts. However, they tend to agglomerate in different parts of city regions based on 
different functions. The locational preferences of three knowledge intensive activities are 
discussed as follows.  
 
 
Financial and Business Services 
 
Spatial concentration remains vital in the financial and business services sector due to a 
combination of the new capacity of mobility and specialised division of labour; however, the 
location of clustering varies according to the level of function. Sassen argues that ―[t]oday there is 
no longer a simple straightforward relation between centrality and such geographic entities as the 
downtown, or the central business district‖ (Sassen, 2001, p. 122). Within financial services, three 
types of firms corresponding to their locational patterns can be identified. The degree of 
agglomeration in the city centre increases from the first type to the third type. The first type is 
referred to as highly standardised products or services, which do not involve complicated 
contracting and subcontracting networks; therefore, locational flexibility increases inasmuch as the 
operation can be maintained with lower costs. Secondly, representative firms are involved in the 
global economy by outsourcing to highly specialised services, which has formed an increasingly 
complex headquarters function. Thus, they are likely to be located wherever there are highly 
networked services benefiting from spatial agglomeration for production. The third type of firms is 
relatively place-bound among these three kinds and are involved in intensive transactions with 
―other such firms in kindred specialization‖ under time pressures because their products and 
top-level professionals are hypermobile (Sassen, 2001, p. 123).  
 
However, as the degree of uncertainty and the intensity of knowledge increases, locational 
flexibility decreases. In the case of London, the restrained capacity for growth in the traditional 
CBD (City of London) benefits the redevelopment of Canary Wharf, located three miles away, as 
an alternative destination for banks. Sixteen of the biggest banks in the UK have employees on 
both sides. In July 2012, Canary Wharf employed 44,500 bankers and was the largest gathering of 
bankers in Europe, compared with 43,300 in the City of London (Jenkins & Hammond, 2012 ). 
Besides the competition between these two locations, it reflects the importance of this type of 
business being located together in close proximity in the large city centres for top-level financial 
activities.  
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Science, Technology and Research Industries 
 
This grouping of economic drivers could be largely attributed to the science-technological 
revolution, which further developed due to diffused innovations. The innovative development of 
information technologies has revolutionised the economic process and structure, transformed 
regional wealth, and influenced all aspects of human life.  
 
The classic example of Silicon Valley has been widely appreciated as a model to enhance national 
or regional competitiveness, such as the EU National Systems of Innovation project. It has been 
imitated and adjusted in other contexts, but not all succeed. In the work of ‗Technopoles of the 
World‘, Castells and Hall (1993) identify three types of techno-pole representing the 21
st
 century 
phenomenon of the industrial complex. The first is those based on innovative milieu, combining 
R&D and manufacturing. The next type of techno-pole is termed science cities wherein the focus 
is on research without direct territorial linkage to manufacturing. The third type refers to those 
aiming at inducing new industrial growth, regarding jobs and production, attracting 
high-technology manufacturing firms to a privileged place. Although there are different types of 
techno-poles, they share a locational pattern in that they are not necessarily located in city centres; 
instead, they are located in privileged spaces with a good quality of life and good transport linkage 
with an easily accessible distance to and from neighbouring large cities.  
           
 
Creative and Cultural Industries 
 
As for creative and cultural industries, Hutton (2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2008, 2009) demonstrates this 
new economy clusters in the inner city of a metropolitan core. In comparison with the CBD, the 
inner city is usually referred to as a large zone since it incorporates industrial premises (for craft 
production, manufacturing warehouses or distribution) or working-class housing; however, the 
universal and precise configuration of these inner city zones is not identifiable and varies from 
place to place (Hutton, 2008). These diverse and new territorial forms of industrial production in 
the inner city are epitomised by four types of space, namely: extensive new production districts, 
compact new economy clusters, signifying new economy precincts and incipient new industry 
districts and sites (see Hutton, 2004a). In comparison with larger international financial and 
business firms, or technology-science-research institutions or corporations, these cultural and 
creative industries, attracted by relatively low rent in inner city areas, tend to be small in size and 
highly knowledge intensive in a creative combination of art and technology. 
 
The functional difference related to locational flexibility also occurs in cultural and creative 
industries. By studying the U.S. motion picture industry, Storper & Christopherson (1987) reveal 
that a split locational pattern varying in functions emerged between the 1960s and 1980s: 
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sub-contracting firms and employment became more concentrated in Los Angeles, while filming 
dispersed elsewhere. They argue that the firms which increasingly concentrated in Los Angeles 
were involved in specialised services, demanding non-routine and frequent external transactions 
(business hunting and the negotiation of contracted work) in order to differentiate constant product 
output. The process of conducting these transactions (deals) often requires F2F contact since they 
are hard to carry out at a distance. In contrast, once crucial issues such as finance, scripts, crew, 
equipment, props and locations have been decided, the shooting of films does not involve a high 
level of specialised external transactions and, hence, has higher location flexibility. 
 
The agglomeration of the knowledge economy mentioned above in different parts of the wider city 
region involves two forms of agglomeration economy and their evolution. A more in-depth review 
of these two forms of agglomeration economy is presented in Appendix 3.  
 
3.4  Understanding the Spatial Patterns of the Knowledge Economy  
 
The economic geography of innovation is constantly restructured. Historically, the rise of 
innovative cities has been noted in different periods. In ―Cities in Civilization‖, Hall (1998) 
identifies that there have been three main thrusts of economic significance for cities or regions. 
Firstly, in the golden ages of great cities such as Athens (500-400 BC), Florence (1400-1500), 
London (1570-1620), Vienna (1780-1910), Paris (1870-1910) and Berlin (1918-1933), their 
grandest and most civilized societies were based on a mode of artistic and philosophical creativity. 
The second group of cities illustrates an alternative mode of innovative milieu, wherein major 
technological advancement and consequent new products, new industries and new modes of 
production were created. This includes the first industrial city, Manchester (1760-1830), which 
was the commercial hub for the surrounding cotton mills and formed a prosperous cotton industry. 
Furthermore, the production of steel consolidated the leading position of shipbuilding industries in 
Glasgow (1770-1890), the invention of the automobile resulted in the boom of the car industry in 
Detroit (1890-1915), and the rise and clustering of information technology created centres of 
excellence in San Francisco/ Palo Alto/ Berkeley (1950-1990).  Thirdly, the combination of art 
and technology created golden ages for Los Angles (1910-1945) and Memphis (1948-1956). In the 
trajectory of developing a knowledge economy, spatial-economic patterns have presented uneven 
pictures and reshaped the urban hierarchy (P. Hall, 2002a) . A typical example is the gap between 
northern post-industrial core cities and the south-east region in England around London (ODPM, 
2006a, 2006b). Likewise, the decline of Detroit (Schifferes, 2007) reflects the mismatch between 
the changing economy and once-dominant manufacturing cities. Therefore, the focus of this 
section shifts to comprehension of the space-economy patterns of the knowledge economy.    
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3.4.1  Revisiting Neo-classical Location Theories  
 
The search for an explanation essentially resorts to a school of thought: neo-classical location 
theory. Neo-classical location theorists have elaborated the locations of three basic and 
conventionally classified economic sectors, namely primary, secondary and tertiary industries.  
The notion of neo-classical location theories concerns the optimal location for economic activities 
based on transport costs. Regarding the first two economic sectors, in the classic work ―Der 
isolierte Staat‖ in 1826, Thünen postulates a model for agricultural cities, in which with entirely 
uniform land, human settlement would develop in the centre of the land and be surrounded by 
concentric rings of agricultural usage. The economic rent of agricultural land decides land usage 
distancing from the centre i.e. the closer to the central city, the higher the value. In 1909, Alfred 
Weber devised a varignon frame to determine the location of manufacturing industries. The spatial 
relationship between markets, raw materials and factories is represented by a locational triangle. 
The ideal industrial location would be situated in the centre of the frame, which is controlled and 
pulled by three strings representing three variables of different weights in accordance with 
transport costs e.g. the costs of transporting raw materials to the factory or products to 
marketplaces (Weber, 1929).   
 
Concerning service industries, Christaller (1966 [1933]) proposes a central place theory in the 
form of an urban hierarchy to model the distribution of settlement according to the range of goods 
and services provided. An evenly distributed population, uniform income, perfect information and 
equal movement in all directions were assumed as given conditions and transport costs would be in 
proportion to distance. There are different levels of central places in the hierarchy. A lower level 
of central places would provide the most frequently used and uniform kinds of goods and services 
to its surrounding areas, whereas a higher level of central places would provide a less frequently 
used and more diverse range of goods and services to serve larger markets because the distance 
between central places and human settlement would decide the frequency of travel.  
 
However, Christaller‘s central-place theory could not effectively explain the location of 
knowledge intensive activities. It has been argued that the insight of the central place theory 
accounts for the location of consumer services rather than producer services because consumer 
services for final demands are more likely to be distributed based on the distribution of population 
(Daniels, 1982, p. 33). Similarly, more recently, a study about the location of financial services 
echoes this argument. Parr and Budd (2000) utilise central-place theory to study the relationship 
between the functional hierarchy of financial services and the spatial structure of the urban system. 
They identify four levels of financial activities (from the top-level to the most routine and 
standardised) and four tiers of urban centres primarily based on urban population. Their findings 
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show that, with regard to urban centres involved in financial services, the financial central-place 
system did not comply with the existing urban hierarchy based on urban population. For instance, 
in the urban hierarchy (based on population), London was situated at the top of the urban system 
(N) alone, followed by a second tier (N-1) of cities, including Birmingham, Manchester, and 
Glasgow. Cities in the third tier (N-2) embraced Leeds, Bristol, Newcastle, Cardiff, Belfast and 
Edinburgh. However, when it came to importance in financial functions, although London was still 
unrivalled at the top, Edinburgh would definitely be ranked as the second tier (N-1) of cities, 
whereas Manchester and Glasgow would be more appropriately placed in the third tier (N-2) 
alongside Leeds, Bristol, Belfast, Cardiff and Newcastle. Birmingham would be better 
downgraded to the lowest level in terms of its role in the financial system (Parr & Budd, 2000, p. 
608). In general, these neo-classical location theories emphasise the equilibrium of systems and 
static positions determined by minimum costs and maximum revenues, which cannot provide a 
promising explanation of the dynamism of knowledge intensive activities.  
 
3.4.2  Disentangling Clustered Development 
 
The review in section 3.3 showed that knowledge intensive activities tend to cluster. The 
clustering of economic activities entails not only spatial concentration, but also interwoven 
linkages among these economic activities, which is not a new phenomenon and has drawn the 
interest of researchers since the work of Marshall ([1890] 1972). Traditionally, discourses of 
agglomeration economies concern cost-productivity reasoning such as ‗industrial complex' (Scott, 
1988b), ‗industrial districts‘ (Pyke, Becattini, & Sengenberger, 1990), ‗nodes' (Amin & Thrift, 
1992). Later studies have been enriched with alternative perspectives related to the concept of 
social embedding (Granovetter, 1985; B. Harrison, 1992) and creativity and innovation such as 
‗clusters‘ (Porter, 1990), knowledge creation (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002), ―buzz‖ and 
―face-to-face contact‖ (Storper & Venables, 2004), ‗creative milieux‘ (Törnqvist, 1983, 2011), and 
others. At the same time, with the development of information technology, the product-profit cycle, 
the reorganisation of the industrial structure and the enhancement of physical transport systems, 
decentralisation discourses have provided alternative explanations of dynamic spatial-economic 
development. The two counter forces of centralisation and decentralisation are constantly at work 
in the era of the knowledge economy. Figure 3-2 summaries disentangling factors affecting 
knowledge intensive clustering. These centralisation and decentralisation forces are discussed 
next.  
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Figure 3-2  Factors Affecting Knowledge Intensive Clustering 
 
Source: author   
 
3.4.2.1  Concentrating Factors 
 
Cost-Productivity Approaches  
 
Beyond neo-classical theory, which concerns minimising the collective costs of access and 
maximising total revenues, productivity stems from a dynamic balance between division (external 
economies) and integration (internal economies) of labour, which override the price effects of 
spatial clustering. In the context of swift technical change and the growing importance of skills, 
development progresses most rapidly in a spatial concentration of diverse firms and labour.  
 
Based on the observation of British industrial regions in Sheffield and Lancashire, Marshall‘s 
([1890] 1972) classic theory of industrial agglomeration focuses on external economies and 
provides three main advantages from a common group of factors of production (input sharing 
including land, labour, capital, energy, and transport), namely a large pool of specialised labour, a 
wide range of specialised suppliers, and the prevailing industrial atmosphere. ‗Pecuniary external 
economies‘ is further identified to suggest that additional new investments made by certain firms 
contribute to multiplier effects and the profitability and expansion of other companies 
(Scitovsky,1963, cited in B. Harrison, 1992, p.472). 
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Here, the shared pool of resources comprises both physical and social infrastructure from which 
individual firms could benefit (B. Harrison, 1992). In particular, the shared services are notable for 
their contributions to vibrant economic growth (B. Harrison, 1992, p. 475). Harrison (1992) argues 
the role of the co-operative association provides an important source for Marshallian external 
economies through financial, technical assistance, training and marketing services and supports for 
member firms within the region. He raises an example of one representative Italian region, Emilia- 
Romagna, among many others. After World War Two, the privately-led co-operative movement 
successively appeared in this region in terms of agriculture, construction, food processing, 
distribution, light manufacturing, transportation, and trade associations. Since the early 1970s, 
many Italian regional governments have been inspired by these cooperative movements and 
associations and have launched small business programmes, in current terminology, called ―public 
private partnerships‖, not only aiding specific sectors, but also providing cross-sector services (B. 
Harrison, 1992, p. 475). 
 
Apart from the benefits of shared resources and investment leading to lower costs and higher 
productivity, Scott (1988b) approaches the agglomeration phenomenon from the a-spatial dynamic 
division of labour based on transaction costs and examines how this relationship shapes spatial 
patterns. He points out that there are three main types
10 
of division of labour, namely technical 
division of labour within firms (vertical integration), social division of labour between firms 
(vertical or horizontal
11
 disintegration), and spatial division of labour. In line with the operational 
logic of capitalism, the sophisticated division of labour in the dynamic production system reflects 
the pursuit of economies of scale (Scott, 1988b, p. 30). Economies of scale could be achieved with 
a technical division of labour within a firm or through a production complex of firms by market 
transactions (Storper & Christopherson, 1987, p. 105). On the other hand, the division of labour 
coexists with transactional interconnections. The more tasks are subdivided, the more transactional 
interconnections between fragmented parts are created. The implementation of such transactional 
interconnections generates transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985), which are calculated 
and assessed to determine the critical point
12 
(Coase, 1937) whether specialised tasks should resort 
to the internalisation or externalisation of transactional activities and which should do so
13
.  
                                                        
10 There might be several specialised and geographically separate branches owned by a large firm in the first type, 
whereas the second is associated with the split of a large firm into independent and individually owned workshops. 
11 Horizontal disintegration comes into existence owing to a temporary excess of work, which normally could be done 
in-house.  
12 Coase (1937) argues "[a] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm 
become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market" (Coase, 
1937, p. 395). 
13 This internalisation or externalisation of transactional activities can also be expressed by internal economies and 
diseconomies of scope (Scott, 1988b, p. 34)  
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This externalisation of transactional activities involves multiple subcontracting operations, what 
Scott calls ―industrial complex‖ and ―a system of input-output transactions‖ (Scott, 1988b, p. 33). 
The demand for linkages between input-output transactions varies from industry to industry and 
also gives rise to the spatial division of labour within firms. Scott (1988b) suggests that the scale 
and attributes of linkages affect locational patterns. When linkages are numerous, small in scale, 
un-standardised, unstable or in need of personal intermediation, they tend to locate near their 
linkage partners because of high distance-dependent cost per unit of flow. In contrast, when 
linkages are large in scale, standardised, stable and easily manageable, there is a relatively low 
transaction cost per unit of flow. In other words, these routine input- output transaction activities 
are free to detach themselves from linkage partners and to be located at greater distances from 
them.   
 
Overall, in this school of thought, explanations for independent small firms locating in proximity 
to each other are associated with shared access to shared commons (labour supply, specialised 
suppliers, finance and physical and social infrastructure) and extensive inter-firm and 
inter-industry linkages. These linkages could operate in ‗a decentralised factory without walls‘ (B. 
Harrison, 1992, p. 475), with spatial division of labour within firms on a regional scale to exploit 
external economies based on their functions. In the long run, it is expected that the reinforcement 
of these advantages would benefit individual plants and overall lead to lower costs and higher 
productivity.           
 
 
Social Relationship Approaches 
 
When exploring the spatial agglomeration of economic activities, it is clear that a 
socially-embedded aspect has been ignored in classical and neo-classical economic theories. 
Polanyi points out that the disconnection between economic behaviour and social relations in 
industrial capitalism has existed and widened since the mid-18
th
 century (cited in B. Harrison, 
1992, p.476). Granovetter (1985) recognises the extent to which economic behaviour is embedded 
in the structure of social relation in modern industrial development. He notices the weakness of 
both ‗under-socialised‘ and ‗over-socialised‘ explanations in their disregard of ‗on-going process‘ 
and the ‗embeddedness‘ of such social relationships. Hence, he emphasises that ‗an on-going 
process‘ unlike ‗once-for-all influence‘ is unceasingly constructed and reconstructed through 
interactions. Moreover, embeddedness is reflected in building trust and discouraging malfeasance 
by concrete social networks.  
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Harrison (1992) centres on Granovetter‘s concept about the on-going process and the 
embeddedness of social relations, arguing that this social aspect has been ignored in explaining the 
agglomeration of industrial districts. He cites Lorenz‘s (1988, 1989) studies of subcontracting 
relationships among the mechanical engineering firms located in towns around Lyon, France, 
proposing that social embeddedness evolves within a regional industrial agglomeration economy 
in order to secure four interactions, namely proximity, experience, trust and collaboration, and to 
enhance regional economic growth. ‗Proximity promotes the ‗digestion‘ of experience which leads 
to trust which promotes re-contracting (and the sharing of common support services) and 
ultimately enhances regional growth‘ (Harrison, 1992: 477). However, Harrison admits the 
possibility of deeply unstable structures within these industrial districts due to the potential 
violation of intellectual property rights. Furthermore, he offers an example given by Granovetter 
(1985) about the tendency of firms in a co-operatively competitive network in which strong social 
embeddedness exists to avoid this sort of legal cases.  
 
 
Innovation and Creativity Approaches 
 
In line with economic restructuring, from handling goods to information and knowledge, the 
discussion of agglomeration economies has been largely elaborated around the ingredient of 
competitiveness: ―knowledge spill-over‖ of the importance of innovation and creativity, which 
could lead to regional renewal.   
Schumpeter‘s (1964, 1982 [1939] ) theory of innovation in the propulsion of economic 
restructuring was later developed into a discourse on dynamic regional growth. Perroux‘s (1955) 
growth pole theory contributes to link innovations with the creation of agglomeration economies. 
Perroux (1955) proposes innovations in certain industries and products would develop on a 
different trajectory, affect other firms and industries through ―backward and forward linkages‖, 
and generate faster economic growth. As Perroux (1961) states, ―[t]he fact, crude but solid, is this: 
growth does not appear suddenly everywhere at once; it manifests itself in growth poles, with 
variable intensity; it spreads by diverse channels and with variable final effects for the total 
economy‖ (Perroux, 1961, p.143). In compliance with this argument, a locale in which innovations 
take place would grow faster than the average of all localities or regions through multiple linkages 
and price effects, and this momentum would be diffused and enhanced, which in turn shapes the 
complex of connected industries and attracts further waves of investment (as cited in Harrison, 
1992, p.473).  
 
Similarly, competitive industries represent that Porter‘s (1990) model of national competitive 
advantages are not distributed evenly in all economic sectors. Rather, they are linked and clustered 
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through horizontal and vertical relationships including rivals, suppliers and consumers in 
geographical concentration. Porter (1990) argues that the most important advantage for 
geographical concentration is the chance to improve and innovate, since geographical 
concentration allows interchange, cooperation, efficiency and specialisation among industries, 
ensuring faster information flow and faster response to emerging needs, attracting talented people 
and encouraging spin-offs.  
 
The concept of creativity associated with a ―place‖ are particularly developed by two Swedish 
geographers (A. E. Andersson, 1985; Törnqvist, 1983, 2011). First of all, both elaborate the 
creative mechanism on the basis of personal creativity and beyond. Four concepts i.e. information, 
knowledge, competence and creativity are essential to define creativity. Information and 
knowledge are the two fundamental elements, differing in degree. Information is regarded as the 
most elementary state, while knowledge is structurally ordered information. Competence involving 
capacity and ability is treated as embodied knowledge. Creativity has the highest order as the 
synergy of the three concepts. Based on these four concepts, the creative process could be applied 
widely to design, research, development and many other areas. Törnqvist (2011) highlights that 
creativity is a slippery concept which is applicable to wide-ranging areas and disciplines. With 
strong supporting literature, a fundamental assumption is that ―creative processes make similar 
demands on settings and their characteristics regardless of the discipline involved‖ (Törnqvist, 
2011, p. 26). 
 
Secondly, a concept of ―creative milieu‖ is used to express the creative process unfolding in a 
place. In a recent publication ―The Geography of Creativity‖ Törnqvist (2011) offers a systematic 
analysis on ―the concept of place‖ which is illustrated with different geography settings, namely 
large-scale settings e.g. regions, smaller setting e.g. cities and towns, and the core of the creative 
process e.g. organisations and firms‘ level (Törnqvist, 2011, p.26). The term "creative milieu" is 
defined to be the qualities of a place which becomes known for- where people who live and work 
along with their thoughts and ideas. Individuals, working both independently and collaboratively, 
make the discoveries and inventions (Törnqvist, 2011, p. 25). 
 
In all creative milieux, the common element is competence embodied in people. The multiplicity 
and variation of competence indicates the necessity for a number of diverse talents, specialisms, 
fields or disciplines for a significant synergy, since uniformity and homogeneity do not seem to 
provide a proper climate for creative processes. External and internal communications are both 
important, but vary in functions which would demand different media. Advanced 
telecommunication technology could only externally transmit well-structured and routine 
information, whereas non-routine information requires direct personal contact internally. He 
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further illustrates the importance of communication density in a physical milieu to ensure the 
quality and originality of communication. Creativity flourishes fast as different specialists and 
competences are concentrated at ―a meeting-place‖. ―Geographical proximity offers security and 
flexibility… The mechanical equipment is simple and allows for greater adaptability‖ (Törnqvist, 
1983, p.104).   
 
The creative milieu could be exemplified by deliberate planning of R&D villages and metropolitan 
milieu. By studying Silicon Valley, Törnqvist found that four key factors underlie a creative milieu, 
namely competence, multiplicity, variation and communication. ―[T]he creative milieu is 
frequently diverse in culture and rich in original competence in addition to possessing good 
communication facilities both internally and externally‖ (Törnqvist, 1983, p.104-5). Additionally, 
Andersson (1985) proposes ―creative regions‖ by studying Vienna for its ample evidence of 
creativity in scientific and artistic achievements between 1890 and 1930. He argues 
communication is crucial in comprehending the fundamental role of metropolitan regions in the 
creative process. In his model, a creative region would be the centre for communications between 
different types of competences (specialists): inter-nation, culture, politics, and science within 
walking distance between these institutions in the extremely dense urban fabric wherein permanent 
communication between each competence is enabled to form an intricately-interwoven network.     
 
 
Tacit Knowledge through „Telecommunication‟ and „Face-to-Face Contact‟  
 
In addition to key causes of clustering of development such as transaction costs/ productivity, trust, 
innovation and creativity, tacit knowledge is also a shared element. Polanyi (1966) makes an 
original attempt to distinguish two intangible attributes: ‗tacit‘ and ‗codifiable‘ (or explicit) 
knowledge. He stresses that ―we can know more than we can tell‖ (M. Polanyi, 1966, p.4). The 
difference between them lies in ―the degree of formalisation and the requirement of presence in 
knowledge formation‖ (Howells, 2002, p. 872). In general, codifiable knowledge is transmittable 
in formal and organised formats. The pervasiveness of ICT has allowed more and more work to be 
conducted without locational constrains, transmitting codified knowledge remotely between places 
without social interaction. In contrast, tacit knowledge is uncertain, unstable and context 
dependent (Pinch, Henry, Jenkins, & Tallman, 2003, p.375). The less explicit (or codified) feature 
of knowledge will increase the difficulty of absorption without the ―learning by doing‖, ―learning 
by using‖, and ―learning to learn‖ processes (Howells, 2002). The marginal cost of transmitting 
tacit knowledge increases with distance (Audretsch, 1998). Similarly, it is demonstrated that sticky 
and uncertain knowledge is best transmitted and generated through vital F2F interaction, with 
frequent and repeated contact (Audretsch, 1998; Von Hippel, 1994). 
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Nevertheless, the classification of the two broad types should not result in the isolation of codified 
and tacit knowledge. Rather, the linkage and continuum between tacit and explicit (or codified) 
knowledge is indivisible. For instance, explicit knowledge still has to be interpreted by tacit 
knowledge (M. Polanyi, 1966, p.7). Moreover, Goddard (1973) demonstrates in a working 
sequence of arranging business that telephone contacts are utilised for initial ―programmed‖ or 
routine communication, while face-to-face meetings are carried out for key discussions which have 
―un-programmed‖ features and uncertain consequences. Likewise, Amin and Thrift (2002) argue 
that these two types of knowledge should not be viewed as mutually exclusive; instead, they 
function in a reinforcing manner.   
 
The indispensable role of face-to-face contact in generating tacit knowledge is reaffirmed in 
Storper and Venables (2004), which attempts to emphasise the advantages and fundamentals of 
face-to-face contact in dense urban milieux. The general term ―Buzz‖ represents four key 
functions of F2F contacts namely: communication technology, trust and incentives in relationships, 
screening and socialising, and rush and motivation. Firstly, ―F2F‖ is treated as an effective 
communication technology for non-codifiable information (tacit knowledge) in contrast to 
―telecommunication‖. F2F enables high frequency and rapid feedback, with visual and body 
language cues from participants, which are not available through other forms of communication. 
Secondly, F2F improves transparency, clarifies information, detects lies and minimises the 
incentives for one partner to free ride or manipulate the other, which is the basis for constructing 
human relationships and consequently enhances trust. Thirdly, F2F could be conducive to 
identifying potential professional partners or collaborators through screening procedures, including 
loss of individual anonymity, judging and being judged and acquisition of shared values in the 
short term. In the long-run, the development of networks and their members progresses through 
the process of socialisation to share a pool of knowledge about members‘ competence. Here, the 
features of networks need to be discerned. Storper and Venables (2004) point out that in the 
construction of social and professional networks, F2F is often necessary, but does not necessarily 
lead to the co-location of these members. A network of international academic professions could 
be reinforced by F2F in conference venues rather than co-location, while for other activities 
networks are highly localised with context-dependent information, and could only be maintained 
within spatial proximity. For parts of financial services and high technology industries, local 
networks overlap with broader scale networks. Lastly, F2F communication could psychologically 
motivate better and greater efforts such as imitation and competition stimulated by the 
performance of others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  Establishing A Spatial-Economic Framework for High-Speed Trains  
 
101 
 
3.4.2.2  Decentralisation Forces  
However, agglomeration economies are subject to diseconomies such as cost, inconvenience and 
congestion. The relocation of economic activities might result in the development of nearby 
smaller clusters which are still situated within a reasonable distance from the well-established 
centre (Llewelyn Davies Planning, 1996). Four factors might affect this dynamic and unstable 
balance between concentrating and dispersing factors, namely: technology, investment in 
infrastructure, product-profit cycle and reorganisation of economic structure, and other changes as 
a result of public intervention.  
 
Technology 
 
Firstly, technology plays an influential role in all aspects of human settlement and brought about 
the possibility of change. In the era of the knowledge economy, two kinds of technology are 
critical. On the one hand, advanced information and computer technology (including software 
design) have largely increased the efficiency of dealing with repetitive data processing and the 
flexibility of locational patterns for these kinds of routine functions. Since the late 1980s, the 
pervasiveness of ICT has brought about dramatic changes to all aspects of human life. More and 
more work could be conducted remotely wherever accessibility to long-distance 
telecommunication is available and affordable.  
 
On the other hand, progressive transport technology has shrunk the space-time boundaries and 
expanded the reachable range. It also introduces new possibilities, as well as threats to the existing 
spatial-economic patterns. From a historical point of view, the first railway age (railroadization
14
) 
resulted in profound developmental effects with the rise and decay of cities. The motorway age 
arrived with the growth of car ownership and the expansion of the motorway network, which 
significantly led to urban sprawl with the rise of new types of economic activities growing outside 
traditional cities and further deterioration of the railway networks. The second railway age took off 
with the aim of lifting the increasing pressure of congestion on existing transport systems which 
had inhibited the efficient connectivity between major cities and economic growth. Thus, the first 
new dedicated HST line was inaugurated in Japan in 1964 and a series of HST developments in 
Western Europe began in the 1970s. These multi-site operations have been increasingly 
implemented and now routine functions could operate in metropolitan peripheries or accessible 
                                                        
14 A quote from Schumpeter (1982 [1939], 1964) vividly captures the significant impact of railroadization. “... 
Expenditure on, and the opening of, a new line has some immediate effects on business in general, on competing 
means of transport, and on the relative position of centres of production. It requires more time to bring into use the 
opportunities of production newly created by the railroad and to annihilate others. And it takes still longer for 
population to shift, new cities to develop, other cities to decay, and, generally, the new face of the country to take shape 
that is adapted to the environment as altered by the railroadization” (Schumpeter, 1964, p. 432; 1982 [1939] p. 
168Book1). 
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provincial cities (Llewelyn Davies Planning, 1996). However, the growth of HST development 
was challenged by the rise of low-cost airlines in the 1990s and also conditioned by different 
national policies.      
 
Due to the rapid development of ICT, the locational factor seems less dominant. There has even 
been a prediction of ―the death of distance‖ (Cairncross, 1995, 1997, 2001) i.e. places do not 
matter anymore due to the wide spread of ICT and the consequent potential of locating anywhere. 
However, there have been considerable counter-arguments and evidence to indicate that ICT could 
not replace face-to-face contact. Törnqvist (1983) notes that the revolutionary development of 
telecommunication engineering could not replace personal contact for creativity and points out, 
based on existing evidence, the need for consultations and direct personal contact has taken off 
along with the increase in long-haul transportation and telecommunications. Similarly, Graham 
and Marvin (1996) suggest that face-to-face business contact has been increasing at approximately 
identical speed to telecommunications traffic over a century ago since the dissemination of the 
electric telegraph and the invention of the telephone. The evidence reinforces the argument in 
section 3.4.2.1, backing two indispensable ingredients required for the creation of tacit knowledge. 
Hall argues that ―telecommuting supplements rather than supersedes face-to-face interaction‖ (P. 
Hall, 2003). In the Polynet study, overwhelmingly, interviewees from APS firms stress the point 
that ―information highways will never replace physical highways‖ (P. Hall & Pain, 2006, p.107). 
In the book Cyburbia, this view is supported.   
 
―Just as friendships cannot be forged on online social networks alone, neither […] can the flow of  information 
information around an electronic loop ever replace real intelligence, strategy or leadership. Information can be 
transferred into digital bits and passed around at dizzying speeds. Knowledge isn’t so portable. It takes a little 
little longer to be worked up and can only be ferried around by someone who knows what they are talking about‖ 
about‖ (Harkin, 2009, p. 251-252).  
 
F2F contacts could be ensured through either close proximity (walking distance) or travel within a 
reasonable distance by transport. The relationship is the major decisive factor. The Polynet study 
(2006) reveals the degree of proximity for APS to other actors varies with different sectors, size, 
scope of firm, but some common principles were identified. For regional players, the client 
relationship is the key, so closeness to clients is more important than F2F between regional offices. 
For international players which are located in first level and major centres, relationships between 
firms are reported to be more formal and less personal. Closeness to other sectors by co-location in 
First City Global APS clusters is as important as proximity to clients. These relationships are 
reflected in spatial-economic patterns and the need for mobility. It is reported that there is vital 
―mobility for front-office, client-facing staff, both within the regions and at an international scale‖ 
(Hall and Pain, 2006, p.110).  
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However, without investment and commercialisation, both e- and physical communication 
technologies can only be an item of technological breakthrough rather than be the backbone and 
carriers for spatial-economic development. As reviewed in section 3.2, the reoccurrence of long 
waves has been claimed to be the cause of technological inventions and, simultaneously, follow-up 
innovations. Therefore, both need to be embodied and developed in the form of communication 
infrastructure catering for the demand of people and economic activities.  
 
 
Investment in Infrastructure  
 
Secondly, as mentioned above, continual investment in both e- and hard- communication 
infrastructure is essential to materialise the potential to which technology could give rise. 
E-infrastructure could enhance telecommunication globally while a better balance of 
agglomeration economies could be spatially distributed in a wider city regional territory with the 
improvement of transport connectivity between multiple economic centres (both large and small). 
The development of new innovations and economic activities could be curtailed if transport 
systems are not efficient. This point is manifestly concluded in the Polynet study.  
 
―…failure to continue to invest in transport infrastructure could prove the big stumbling block for future APS 
regional growth, as inefficiencies are a barrier to the most important form of  regional knowledge flow: 
highly-skilled staff  travelling into, out of  and without the regions for face-to-face contact‖ (Hall and Pain, 2006: 
p.110) . 
 
Similarly, through the study of financial services in the City of London, Cook et al. (2007) 
accentuate transport as an extremely important concern of business, as inefficient transport 
infrastructure is beginning to discourage commuting and business travel (Cook et al., 2007, 
p.1342). Improvement in transport is a necessary condition for a new type of economic 
development in places created by new transport opportunities. Nevertheless, transport itself is not a 
sufficient condition to ensure positive developmental effects, as pointed out in section 2.4 which 
explores debateable wider effects of transport and the relationship between transport investment 
and regional development.     
 
 
Product-Profit Cycle and Reorganisation of Economic Structure 
 
Thirdly, the product-profit cycle theory (Markusen, 1985; Vernon, 1966) explains the relocation of 
economic activities through a product-evolving process in relation to growth rate, profitability, 
degree of concentration and location. The diminishing of growth rate and profit margin gives rise 
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to the relocation of standardised production processes to low-cost locations outside the original 
agglomerated core, but still generally within the same region. In the maturity phase, due to a 
saturated market and increasing competition, the solution for firms is to compete either by 
cost-cutting or by collusive agreement to share the market. The decentralisation of production 
occurs further afield, often to developing countries or depressed older industrial regions with 
surplus cheap labour. However, this product-profit cycle of production does not stress the spatial 
impact of the reorganisation of the production system. Storper and Walker (1989) argue external 
location factors or simple technical changes are overemphasised in the neoclassical and 
product-profit cycle discourses, which do not explain industrial decentralisation. Instead, they 
maintain that both relocation and changes result from technological change and the reorganisation 
of a production system rather than using locational changes as ―a spatial means of effecting factor 
substitution‖ (Storper & Walker, 1989, p. 84).  
 
 
Other Changes Caused by Public Intervention 
 
Fourthly, other changes brought about by public intervention can affect relocation, including the 
benign tax and regulatory environment, quality of life and other measurements (Llewelyn Davies 
Planning, 1996). More than one CBD exists in many large city cores or nearby zones. In London 
the rise of a new CBD in Canary Wharf suggests the effects of diseconomies and a conservative 
policy in the City of London gave impetus to redevelop the post-industrialised docklands (Daniels 
& Bobe, 1993). In addition, the conservation policy of constraining development in historical city 
centres has also resulted in the rise of another development node. In Paris, owing to the cap on 
building height and the demand for office space in the capital, the strategic CBD of La Défense in 
the Hauts-de-Seine département, to the west of Paris, has developed since the end of the 1950s to 
not only compete with Paris municipalities but also evolve into functional unity. Similarly, but 
located in the same municipality , the conservation policy in the historical core of the city 
of Amsterdam brought about a new CBD development on the south fringe of the city named 
Zuidas Amsterdam. Likewise, some financial companies in the City of London have indicated the 
rigorous regulation was becoming burdensome and indeed unmanageable (Cook et al., 
2007:1342).  
 
 
3.4.2.3  Path Dependence 
However, not all places are equally conducive to new opportunities. Theories of path dependence 
argue that existing situations hinder some places from adapting to economic changes. Fothergill 
and Gudgin (1982) studied the unequal growth of urban and regional employment change in the 
UK to argue that inherited structural characteristics could explain the low rate of formation of new 
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firms in certain places when their traditional industries faced decline. In their analysis, they 
identify the problems for places like Tyneside, Clydeside, Derby, Loughborough
15
, and Lincoln in 
the Midlands are that ―their heritage of large manufacturing plants does not provide a suitable 
environment for generating entrepreneurs and new firms. Almost as a result of their success in 
generating large-scale industry in the past, their cities and towns are now locked into a situation of 
increasing dependency on the fate of their remaining large employers or on injections of new 
industry from outside‖ (Fothergill & Gudgin, 1982, pp. 132-133). Likewise, in the book of ―The 
Upas Tree‖, Checkland argues that the past prosperity of the shipping industry in Glasgow results 
in ―a cumulative and interlocking problem‖ for economic regeneration (Checkland, 1976, p. 62). 
 
In a more recent study, Simmie et al. (2008) similarly argue that history matters. All industrial 
development goes through four main phases, namely: path-formation, path creation, path 
dependence, and path decay. There are two kinds of vital knowledge regarding whether path 
dependence or path creation occurs, namely absorptive capacity (the knowledge of identification, 
assimilation and exploitation) and the local innovation system (the knowledge of creation, 
adoption and commercialisation). They studied the relationship between path dependence and 
innovation in British city-regions and unveil two categories of results: ‗lagging‘ cities and 
‗leading‘ cities. There are common features within each group. In the lagging-group category, 
cities (Middlesbrough, Newport, Norwich, Swansea and Wakefield) possess weaknesses derived 
from their specific industrial histories. In contrast, leading cities such as Aldershot, Cambridge, 
Northampton, Oxford, Reading and Warrington are free of industrial heritage. They argue that the 
varied performance of city regions could be attributed to ―the aggregate ability of the different 
city-region economies to generate or adopt new economically valuable knowledge‖, requiring 
―continual indigenous innovation combined with the ability to absorb and adopt new knowledge 
from elsewhere‖ (Simmie, et al., 2008, p. 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 Thanks to the university, there’s a flourishing innovation centre of businesses in Loughborough. 
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3.5  Towards A Conceptual Spatial-Economic Framework for HST 
 
Bringing together information to answer the first sub-research question posted at the outset, in the 
era of the knowledge economy, economic restructuring entails the technical division of labour by 
the separation of knowledge-intensive and routine activities with the exploitation of flexible 
specialisation (vertical and horizontal disintegration). Meanwhile, this technical division of labour 
gives rise to the spatial distribution of labour at work places. Knowledge intensive activities are 
usually agglomerated in large city cores for creativity, productivity, forging trust, competition and 
cooperation to combat the highly uncertain and changing nature of businesses, but routine 
activities tend to be less confined to urban compactness and therefore decentralise from centres. To 
create tacit knowledge and increase coordination between knowledge-intensive and routine 
activities, virtual communication (external and internal) and F2F contacts are indispensable. A key 
requirement for F2F resulted in varying locational characteristics of specialised and routine 
economic activities. They range from co-locating economic activities to a more strategic and 
flexible locational distribution of relevant activities whose economic functions could be 
maintained by F2F contacts and not necessarily by co-location. Figure 3-3 illustrates a conceptual 
spatial-economic framework for HST. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3  The Synergy: A Conceptual Spatial -Economic Framework for HST 
 
Source: author  
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It is suggested that improved accessibility of both e- and physical links between major centres and 
secondary centres could crucially assist a monocentric region to become a better integrated 
Mega-city Region (MCR). With the advanced development of ICT and the improvement in 
transport connectivity, forces of decentralisation and re-concentration operate within increasingly 
expanding city-regions to place limits on the process of decentralisation, related to critical time 
limits from the central city (Hall, 2006). The expansion of the city boundary has given rise to the 
new phenomenon of polycentric MCRs in an either morphological or functional sense (P. Hall & 
Pain, 2006). The new phenomenon of the MCR functionally connects and integrates a range of 
major centres and sub-centres in a hierarchical order through crucial transport and communication 
infrastructures beyond the fixed administration boundary. Hall and Pain (2006) observe the origin 
and the characteristics of MCRs and point out that the MCR phenomenon results from a long-term 
process of extensive decentralisation from large metropolitan areas to neighbouring new, old and 
smaller places. These places are independent entities within the MCR, which mean that the 
majority of people live and work locally. Although they are apart spatially, they are functionally 
well-linked, physically clustering around some larger cities, and gaining huge economic 
advantages from the division of labour. For example, flows of people and information are 
transferred between places through a network of highways, high-speed train lines and 
telecommunication cables. Different MCRs vary in degree. Among eight studied MCRs, only the 
South East England MCR with a morphologically polycentric structure presents genuine 
functional relationships between secondary urban centres (see Figure 3-4) in contrast to other 
MCRs that appear mono-centric with morphologically polycentric structures.  
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Figure 3-4  South East England MCR (Commuting patterns in 2001) 
 
 
Source: Hall and Pain (2006, p.38) 
 
 
Similarly, for other British city- regions outside London, a City Relationship study (The Northern 
Way, 2009c) is conducted with a case study of five city-regions (Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Sheffield, and Newcastle). For each, the draw of the economic centre, labour market relationships 
and firm relationships were analysed to identify different places that play different economic roles 
within a city region: whether they are dependent, interdependent, independent or isolated. Figure 
3-5 shows the research finding of Manchester City Region. The key conclusion is that ―a deeper 
appreciation of different roles and influencing factors can support policy makers in maximising 
benefits from city relationships. Promoting growth in the economic core has the potential to 
benefit other cities and towns of a city region, provided there is investment in links to the 
economic centre‖ (The Northern Way, 2009c, p.43).   
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Figure 3-5  Manchester City Region and its Wheel of City Typologies  
 
 
This image is removed due to the involvement of the third 
party copyright material.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Northern Way (2009b, p.22 & p.5) 
 
 
This image is removed due to the 
involvement of the third party copyright 
material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The implication from the review demonstrates that transport performs a vital role to ensure critical 
F2F contacts within the MCR and beyond. It varies with city types. The important transport modes 
for secondary centres are regional infrastructure, motorways and fast rail. For first and other major 
cities, intra-urban and international accessibility are vital (Hall and Pain, 2006: p.110). Here, 
transport connectivity embodies a two-sided feature encountered at major transport hubs: at the 
external level, high-speed (air or HST) hub centralisation fosters knowledge intensive activities; at 
the internal level, improved transport linkage (intra-regional rail, intra-urban, or motorways) 
should be simultaneously available to allow decentralisation of routine activities from the major 
city or commuting into the major city for more employment opportunities within a reasonable 
time-distance. Similarly, this indicates the need to consider networks. As Vickerman has noted, 
―Development opportunities from new networks will occur at locations with good access to the 
new network and which provide nodal connections to other networks‖ (Vickerman, 1997, p.35). 
Figure 3-6 presents a conceptual map of a major city‘s HST hub interchange.   
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Figure 3-6  A Conceptual Map of A HST Hub Complex around A Major City and Its 
Sub-regions for Regional Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 
 
 
As reviewed in section 2.3, HST is most competitive for medium-long distance travel (150-800 
km). HST could effectively enhance connectivity between the capital city and major regional cities 
at the national (inter-regional) scale and international scale (in the case of the European HST 
network). Meanwhile, for MCRs, albeit with different sizes, HST could potentially give rise to the 
spatial expansion of functional polycentric MCRs. In order to achieve a wider impact of HST in 
reducing regional inequality, two levels of effects are necessary, namely inter-regional and 
intra-regional.  
 
 With regard to the inter-regional impact, HST could particularly benefit companies or 
organisations which value time and the advantage of crucial linkages between major city 
cores when building a knowledge economy. A great opportunity arises for post-industrial, 
well-established regional cities which were suffering from economic restructuring, so there 
could be a consequence of reducing inter-regional inequality.  
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 Concerning the intra-regional impact, the regional city tends to be the major destination of 
HST services. It is unlikely that all sub-regions could be served by HST. As long as a 
sub-regional city is connected to a national HST network, that city will have direct trains to 
the national capital. Then it will become part of an expanded MCR of the national capital 
city aided by the improvement of HST. Critics have argued that there will be a conflict 
between the national and regional perspectives. The challenges for non-HST sub-regions 
are greater, but they will not necessarily lose out as long as some strategic intervention 
takes place. Whatever scenarios it may be, it will depend on how the importance of city 
relationships in a region is perceived and shaped by public intervention.     
 
Given the huge potential of HST suggested by the review, it is also true that some places could be 
disadvantaged even if transport improvement has been made. HST and other complementary 
transport improvements are not sufficient for reducing regional inequality. The further 
investigation of the wider impact of HST will involve in-depth qualitative research with a 
comparative case study, as outlined in Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9. For now, based on the literature review, 
the four proposed hypotheses for the quantitative part of the research in Table 3-1 will be tested in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3-1  Hypotheses for the Quantitative Part of Research 
Inter-regional 
wider impact of 
HST  
 
Hypothesis 1  
HST will induce faster economic growth in the cities it serves, through reductions in train 
times and additional frequency of service, with an important role played by critical time 
limits.  
Hypothesis 2  
HST cities will enjoy faster growth in service industries dealing with information, especially 
knowledge-based industries.  
Intra-regional 
wider impact of 
HST  
 
Hypothesis 3  
The arrival of HST in sub-regions will potentially strengthen economies and employment in 
the knowledge economy over time.  
Hypothesis 4  
HST sub-regions will experience varying effects. The prospects for the economic 
transformation of non-HST sub-regions could be slight, but they will not necessarily lose 
out as long as some strategic intervention takes place.  
Source: author      
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3.6  Chapter Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, a review of dynamic spatial-economic development in the era of the knowledge 
economy provides an essential comprehension of the mutual relationship between economic 
restructuring and urban (regional) development. The essence of the knowledge economy involves 
the creation of weightless tacit knowledge, through both virtual communication and F2F contacts. 
Knowledge intensive activities tend to cluster in the dense city core, but the diseconomies of 
clustering development complicate the picture. After reviewing the centralisation and 
decentralisation factors, it is clear that the more advanced the knowledge economy, the more 
sophisticated the technical (knowledge intensive vs. routine activities) and spatial (decentralisation 
and centralisation) division of labour that could be involved in the ever-expanded MCR, with a 
backbone of e- and physical communication infrastructure. Under the circumstance of the 
increasingly coordinated and networked development, HST will undoubtedly play its role in 
enhancing physical connectivity between major cities. However, given that uneven regional and 
urban development has increased, it is necessary to examine the wider impact of HST both at the 
inter-regional and intra-regional scales by using the hypotheses proposed in section 3.5   
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4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the first empirical evidence of the wider impact of HST, based on the 
experience of the British InterCity 125/225 since its inception in the mid-1970s. These first 
empirical findings were established to answer sub-research question two (SRQ2) at the 
inter-regional level, with two hypotheses proposed.  
 
SRQ2: Whether and to what extent has HST accessibility boosted a knowledge economy and 
led to a reduction in regional inequality?   
Hypothesis 1 assumes that HST will induce faster economic growth in the cities it serves, 
through reductions in train times and additional frequency of service, with an especially 
important role played by critical time limits.  
Hypothesis 2 is that this process has varying effects: HST cities will enjoy faster growth in 
service industries dealing with information, especially knowledge-based industries.   
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. In section 4.2, the background and rationale for this study 
are introduced to set the scene and expectation. Next, in section 4.3 research methods including 
detailed research design, units of analysis, variables and datasets are illustrated. Following these 
basic principles for collecting data, section 4.4 presents the results, including the effects on train 
times, train patterns and frequencies and wider spatial-economic patterns (economic strength and 
economic restructuring). In section 4.5, the discussion focuses on the synthesis of transport change 
and economic change to interpret the wider impact of InterCity 125/225 on British economic 
geography. Lastly, section 4.6 draws implications and conclusions and leads on to the 
intra-regional study.  
 
4.2  Background and Rationale for Study  
 
When Japan Rail introduced its first new generation of Shinkansen HST services in 1964, British 
Rail was embarking on a modernisation plan in 1963, due to a severe operational deficit and the 
obsolete physical condition, in reshaping the British Railway network (British Rail Board, 1963). 
Fast train services were not included in the reshaping programme since they made a substantial 
contribution to system cost although British Rail, as a whole, was suffering serious revenue deficit. 
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It was believed that further profitability from fast train services could be achieved with improved 
services.  
Back in the 1960s, British Rail had realised that long distance travel for inter-city journey would 
remain preferable to road, providing continual attention was paid to the speed, reliability and 
comfort of trains. Similarly, for distances less than about 200 miles, fast and semi-fast trains 
services would remain more competitive than air. Therefore, special concern was paid to three 
long-haul rail services which competed fiercely with air e.g. London-Manchester, 
London-Newcastle, and London-Scotland. Consequently, the first modernisation work made to the 
long-distance rail services was introduced with the Blue Pullman services between London and 
regional major cities e.g. Birmingham, Manchester and Swansea (British Rail Board, 1963, p.13). 
However, their speed did not yet qualify them because their maximum speed was below 200 kph 
(125 mph). Additionally, it was also noticed that suburban services for daily commuting into the 
major provincial cities, in particular for London, would be operating continually to essentially 
serve commuters in and out of those metropolitan areas (see Figure 4-1).  
Meanwhile, in the early 1960s, the UK was engaged on the initial stage of constructing its modern 
motorway network. Although the road building blueprint had first appeared in 1946, the first 
section of motorway, Preston Bypass was finally completed in 1958. From then on until the 
beginning of the 1980s, during approximately 25 years, the development of motorway and road 
construction went through its golden age in several stages, albeit with a whole series of debates 
and concerns during the process (see Figure 4-2 for the motorway network by the end of the 
1970s). 
The launch of IC125 in 1976 branded as ―this is the age of the train‖ was a success, rewardingly 
improving the image of British Rail. In fact, the arrival of IC125 straddled the turning point of 
arresting the decline of rail passenger journeys against the expansion of the road network and the 
rise of car ownership (detailed table in Appendix 4), as well as of restriction in road building in the 
post-1973 Oil Crisis period. Public inquiries of several proposed road schemes were disrupted, 
which triggered the criticism of the decision-making procedure and methods of road appraisals. In 
the same year, 1976, an independent review, the Leitch Committee, was announced to investigate 
the road appraisal methods and a review of the procedure of holding public inquiries. The 
subsequent White Papers on Road Policy in 1978 and 1980 showed an adjusted road programme 
in the light of the Leitch Review towards ―less emphasis on a network of long-distance motorways 
and more emphasis on small-scale bypasses‖ (Starkie, 1982, p.143). Although Starkie (1982) 
argues that in the short term one major conclusion of the Leitch report was not accepted, since 
motorway schemes were still evident, it was indeed approaching the end of the road building 
programme in retrospect.  
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Figure 4-1  Passenger Traffic Station Receipts of British Railways in the early 1960s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British Railway Board (1963)  
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Figure 4-2  Motorways in England and Wales, December 1978 
 
Source: Starkie (1982, p.141) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As already suggested in Chapter 2, there are two types of HST systems and the upgrade of 
conventional rail systems is largely ignored because it has relatively modest effects in time-space 
shrinkage compared with newly built HST lines. In the national context, developing new dedicated 
HST lines was not a promising option (for a more detailed introduction to the development of the 
upgraded HST system in the UK: refer to section 6.4.2). Whether and to what extent have wider 
impacts from this type of HST improvement been made on British economic geography is a 
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question which has never been investigated in the context of the UK. The UK‘s IC125 and 225 
services are actually the oldest HST services in Europe, with thirty years of operation, so they 
provide an obvious candidate for empirical examination of their impact. Regarding the wider 
spatial-economic impacts of HST, as the literature review in section 2.4.2 manifests, the temporal 
and spatial perspectives are expected to be explored in the analysis of findings on the long-term 
effects (restructuring place of work and residence) and wider spatial effects beyond station areas. 
In addition, since the IC125 did not involve the creation of new HST stations (except for Bristol 
Parkway), the impact on existing rail stations was also measured as an additional item.   
 
4.3  Research Methods  
4.3.1  Research Design and Units of Analysis  
In order to test these hypotheses, a basic classification of two groups of cities or towns is firstly 
applied, namely one with HST and the other without HST services. Non-HST towns are treated as 
a control group. HST impact on major cities at the national level involves the improved 
connectivity between London and other major cities. Therefore, rail routes were chosen from 
London-based long-distance lines to investigate inter-regional impact.  
Six London-based railway routes were chosen, all over 150 km in length: two HST (Routes A and 
B) and four non-HST (Routes C, D, E and F) lines. The two HST lines are major rail routes linking 
London with Wales as well as Scotland with the longest history of running the IC125: the Great 
Western Main Line (GWML) from London to Swansea and East Coast Main Line (ECML) 
connecting London and Edinburgh. The eccentric location of London in south-eastern Great 
Britain essentially entails shorter rail routes linking London with the east and south; this feature 
also underlies the four lines without HST, which run from London to Bournemouth, Norwich, 
King‘s Lynn, and Margate
16
. In total, the six selected tracks embrace 26 local authorities and 27 
railway stations, which form the units of analysis in the study. Details are shown in Table 4-1 and 
Figure 4-3.  
                                                        
16 Of the six selected routes, Route A, B, C, and D have explicit London terminal stations, namely London Paddington 
station, King’s Cross station, Waterloo station and Liverpool Street station respectively. In contrast, Routes E and F 
have more than one London terminal station. On Route E, railway journeys from London to Cambridge or King’s 
Lynn may start from either London Kings Cross station or London Liverpool Street station. As for Route F, there are 
three alternatives, namely London Victoria, Charing Cross and Cannon Street stations. Please note that Margate has 
been served by domestic HST services since December 2009. In this study, the impact of domestic HST services on 
these Kent towns within this study is not included to avoid confusion.  
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Table 4-1  Unit of Analysis: Studied Routes, Distance, and Local Authorities  
 
Source: author 
Figure 4-3  The Routes and Major Stations Selected for Study  
 
Source: author 
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There is an inherent difficulty in selecting comparable groups and towns for study. For instance, 
major settlement corridors tend to be more likely served by HST and motorway. One may argue 
whether the city type or motorway rather than HST services makes the difference in the economic 
performance. In order to avoid confusion, more than one line in both categories and the 
accessibility by three major transport modes were studied. The reason why some longer-distance 
routes were not chosen for the category of non-HST routes is that their rail services are literally 
operated as semi-HST services. For instance, although the WCML modernisation did not achieve 
speeds of up to 125 mph until December 2008, its operational speed had reached 110 mph. 
Likewise, the Midland Main Line (MML) provided IC125 services soon after the early 1980s, but 
ran at speeds of up to 110 mph prior to this.  
It is worth stressing that this research design is different from UIC (2011) which attempted to 
measure the regional impacts of HST through selecting a pair of ―twin cities‖- two individual cities 
(one with and the other without) to discern the HST impact. There are two major reasons. Firstly, 
UIC (2011) has admitted that it is somehow difficult to select comparable twin cities. Secondly, 
the selection of several cities on HST or non-HST lines could allow flexibility, looking beyond a 
rigid HST vs. non-HST distinction. By so doing, attention could be paid to the differing effects 
within HST and non-HST towns despite being on the same routes, such as the time-space effects 
of 1h, 1-2h, or over 2h from the Capital which may manifest themselves from the findings or any 
other possible factors. In line with this design, the impact of HST could be better interpreted from 
the difference between HST and non-HST towns.   
 
4.3.2  Variables and Data Collection 
 
Independent and dependent variables were developed to measure the strength of places before and 
after the introduction of the IC125/225 HST services. Independent variables based on British 
passenger timetables were the changes in train times brought about by the IC125/225 technological 
breakthroughs, as well as train patterns and frequencies. Patterns and frequencies were analysed 
since they were normally arranged first and adjusted later according to real demand, which could 
reflect the relationship between London and units of analysis and is thus conducive to the 
interpretation of wider spatial-economic effects. In addition, in order to understand and control 
other potential factors e.g. accessibility through other transport modes, the availability of other 
modes, the opening date of a motorway and the journey time by road are carefully examined in 
these cities. 
Dependent variables measure economic strength and service development, especially the 
knowledge economy. Data for these indicators were drawn primarily from original government 
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documents and databases, including decennial Census reports, property market reports
17
 from the 
Valuation Office Agency (VOA), datasets from the Office of National Statistics (including official 
labour market statistics in NOMIS), Scotland‘s Census Results Online (SCROL), and State of the 
English Cities (SOCD). At least two time series were required in order to examine the changes over 
time representing the period before the inauguration of IC125 services in 1976 and, more recently, 
2006. The relationship between dependent variables, indicators and data sources is illustrated in 
Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2  The Relationship between Dependent Variables, Indicators and Data Sources  
 
Source: author  
 
Gross Value Added (GVA) per head, employment and unemployment were used to measure the 
evolution of local economic strength. GVA is a critical indicator, but the unavailability of figures 
before 1995 has meant that employment and unemployment figures from the 1971 Census report 
are used as proxies to present the basic strength of localities prior to the IC125 services. Although 
boundary alterations
18
 in British administrative authorities led to the incomparability of 
1971Census data with those following, exceptions including the figures of population, 
employment, and unemployment are presented in reworked tables accordant with the revised 
boundaries in some 1971 Census County Reports (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 
                                                        
17 In property market reports, the figures for office rental values were derived from property transactions completed 
(Valuation Office Agency, 1982).  
18 The boundary changes in England and Wales were effective from 1st April 1974 according to the Local 
Government Act 1972, while in Scotland they were introduced three years later on 1st April 1977 in accordance with 
the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. 
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1972) and therefore it is possible to discern changes between 1971 and 2001
19
. However, two 
points must be noted. Firstly, because employment and unemployment figures from census reports 
were based on place of residence rather than workplace, they do not reflect the economic strength 
of a locality if the majority of people worked away from home. Secondly, despite this limitation, 
unemployment figures are more reliable than employment figures, since the unemployment rate 
excludes the student population from the denominator (the whole economically active population), 
while the employment rate is the proportion of all employed and self-employed persons, using the 
whole working-age population (including working-age students) as the denominator. Hence, a 
university city with a high percentage of students may well show a lower employment rate.  
Additionally, six supplement indicators, namely Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI), 
areas, population changes, travel-to-work by transport modes and distance, population density 
around the station (0.5km, 1km and entire LA), and employment change around the station (0.5km, 
1km, and entire LA) were incorporated to assist the interpretation of spatial-economic patterns 
over time through the changing mobility between workplace and place of residence and the 
redistribution of activities in the context of existing rail stations. 
Concerning economic restructuring and the development of services and the knowledge economy, 
four economic groups are defined, namely group A (manufacturing, construction and electricity), 
group B (commerce, transport and all other services), group C (public services), and group D 
(knowledge-intensive services). Figures for service employment from NOMIS and 
knowledge-intensive employment from SOCD were obtained. As services have grown in 
importance, the different characteristics of services for places are highlighted and 
information-exchange services (distinguishing between those that are private-led and public-led) 
and services dealing with goods are distinguished. Also, two kinds of knowledge industries have 
been identified, namely medium and high technology, and knowledge-intensive services. 
Nevertheless, again the data for service employment and knowledge-intensive employment for the 
pre-IC125/225 period was not attainable from 1971 Census data. Consequently, office rental 
values of localities in property market reports that are available back to 1970 were used as a proxy 
to analyse the initial strength of local service development prior to IC125/225 services, as it is very 
evident that not only HST services, but also other factors might also affect the change of rental 
values- for example, development plans, legislation changes, the acquisition of planning 
permissions, and so on. 
                                                        
19
 According to the Local Government Act 1992, another stage of government reform creating new unitary authorities 
came into force between 1996 and 1998. In this study, three local unitary authorities including York, Swansea, and 
Cardiff therefore gained much larger areas within their boundaries. In particular, in the case of York, the new unitary 
authority area (27199 hectares) comprises the previous York City area (2946 hectares) and parts of the former districts 
of Harrogate, Ryedale and Selby. This leads to the incomparability of census figures between 1971 and 2001 at the local 
authority level for York. Alternatively, for comparison the relatively comparable figures for the York urban area were 
used.    
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There are inevitably spatial and temporal discontinuities in the data collection. Spatially, not all 
indicators were either generated for the same geographical units or are available for all places. 
Four closely related, but different geographical units exist within the data: the ward level, local 
district/unitary authority level, Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics- level 3 (NUTS3), 
and travel-to-work areas (TTWAs). In general, the ward level is the smallest among the four levels. 
This level has exhibited quite frequent changes over time, and it is difficult to directly measure 
long-term change at this level from 1971 to 2001. The only exception is a 1971-2001 set of 
comparable deprivation scores developed by Dr. Paul Norman (2010) from University of Leeds. 
Within this recreated dataset, the change of population density 1971-2001 at the ward level is used 
in this study. Changes in employment at the workplace (10% sample) around the station in 1981 
and 1991 census are used to supplement the understanding of the distribution of economic 
activities. 
Apart from these two datasets at the ward level, the local district/unitary authority level is 
fundamental and the most stable and, in this study, is available for indicators like population, 
employment, unemployment, travel-to-work by transport modes and distance, services 
employment and office rental values.  
The NUTS3 unit is only used for GVA and GDHI and is created by the European Office for 
Statistics (EUROSTAT) as a standardised and European-wide spatial unit for statistical production, 
which is geographically coarser and broader than the local authority level. Since it approximates 
the performance of individual local authorities to that of larger sub-regions, several local authority 
areas share the same figures, which might lead to inaccuracy.  
Moreover, the figures for knowledge-intensive employment were available from the SOCD 
database in three geographical units: primary urban areas, TTWAs and core city regions. With the 
aim of understanding the wider spatial-economic impacts, TTWAs, developed as approximations 
to self-contained labour markets, are used because the figures are available for more places in this 
research than only core city regions or intensive urban settlements and are also more helpful in 
interpreting local strengths as centres of employment beyond the administrative boundaries.  
Temporally, some indicators were newly devised for specific aspects and are not available over the 
entire 30-year period. For instance, indicators like GVA, GDHI and knowledge-intensive 
employment were not available until 1995. What is more, figures for office rental values from 
1970/71 Property Market Reports (PMRs) should be treated carefully since the systematic 
comparable tables like those in 1982 and 2006 PMRs were not obtainable and the figures were 
actually extracted from the descriptive valuations of office rental ranges for places. Great efforts 
were made to deal with these problems, ensure the validity and reliability of the data, and interpret 
them with due caution.   
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Due to the lack of data availability over a long period of time, the method for quantitative analysis 
is mainly descriptive for synthesising and interpreting from various data resources. There are two 
major stages of analysis. The first step is the quantitative analysis of these figures collected in 
section 4.4 and the next step is the summary of principle component analysis and qualitative 
analysis for interpretation in section 4.5. 
 
4.4  Results  
4.4.1  Effects on Train Times 
Table 4-3 shows the change in train times for weekday services between 1974/75 and 2006. The 
train times demonstrated here are based on the London-outbound services since the 
London-inbound services normally do not reveal significant differences from the outbound except 
for a few extra minutes of recovery time allocated to London-inbound train services for 
timekeeping. In addition, weekday rather than weekend services were analysed since they relate to 
routine economic activities in localities. Moreover, concerning the complex compromises involved 
in providing upgraded HST services, the figures for the fastest and average train times were 
juxtaposed.   
After the introduction of IC125 services, the reduction in train times on HST lines is noticeable, 
especially for stations further afield from London, and time-space shrinkage shows stronger effects 
on the ECML than on the GWML. On the GWML, the fastest train times were reduced by 7- 27 
minutes (8-38 minutes is the average reduction in train times): Swindon became accessible within 
one hour of London, Cardiff within 2 hours, and Swansea within 3 hours. The synergy of the 
diesel IC125 and later electric IC225 services on the ECML brought the fastest train-time 
reductions of 15-80 minutes (20-84 minutes for the average reduction in train times). The time to 
Peterborough decreased to within 50 minutes. Doncaster and York became reachable in less than 2 
hours. Leeds was brought closer by about 20 minutes (2 hours 10 minutes in 2006, though the 
fastest train was less than 2 hours immediately after electrification in 1991). Train times to 
Darlington and Newcastle changed to within 3 hours and Edinburgh in 4 hours and 10 minutes.   
In contrast, on lines without HST, train times were not greatly reduced as a result of electrification; 
instead, times literally increased for some stations such as Bournemouth (3 minutes), Cambridge 
(10 minutes from Liverpool street station), Canterbury West (1 minute), Ramsgate (3 minutes), 
and Margate (19 minutes from London Victoria station). The reduction in the fastest train time was 
2-9 minutes (1-16 minutes is the average reduction in train-time). The only exception of note is the 
change in train times from London King‘s Cross station to Cambridge and King‘s Lynn on Route 
E. A section of this route shares ECML tracks (from London to Hitchin), resulting in a reduction 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  The National Impact: A Study of the UK’s InterCity 125/225 
 
125 
 
of 28 minutes; the other branch from London Liverpool Street station to Cambridge and King‘s 
Lynn conversely shows an increase in train times. These two contrasting effects on Route E should 
be recognised as an extraordinary condition on non-HST route sections rather than being 
completely excluded from the non-HST routes.   
 
 
Table 4-3  Change in Train Times (1974/75 vs. 2006) 
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4.4.2  Effects on Train Service Patterns and Frequencies 
Using the same criteria for analysing train times above, train patterns and frequencies are 
presented in Table 4-4, reflecting service changes from London on weekdays from 1974/75 to 
2006. For these HST towns, the frequency of services has generally increased over time. Places 
within a one-hour train time show the highest frequency: around 46-70 trains in 2006 in contrast 
with 16-29 trains in 1974/75. Beyond one hour, frequency also displays considerable growth, but 
with relatively smaller numbers with 18-43 trains in 2006 against 6-18 trains in 1974/75. 
Nevertheless, some changes are worth noting. Doncaster shows a nearly fourfold increase, with 43 
weekday trains from London in 2006 against 9 trains in 1974/75. In addition, Bristol is served by 
two stations: Bristol Temple Meads located in Bristol city centre and Bristol Parkway, built in the 
early 1970s on the northern edge of the Bristol city-region as one of the main intermediate stations 
on the GWML from London to Swansea. Over 30 years, Bristol Parkway station has grown in 
importance on the transport network: the frequency to Bristol Parkway has more than doubled with 
28 trains, slightly fewer than Bristol Temple Meads with 31 trains per weekday. 
Similarly, these non-HST lines have shown apparent increases in frequency over time for most 
towns, but at different stages. In 1974/75, of four non-HST lines, towns on Route C 
(London-Bournemouth) and F (London-Margate) already showed a close relationship by train with 
London except for Margate (13 trains) - around 29-46 trains per weekday, such as Canterbury west 
(29 trains), Ramsgate (29 trains), Basingstoke (32 trains), Ashford (35 trains), Winchester (36 
trains), Southampton (46 trains), and Bournemouth (46 trains). In contrast, Route D 
(London-Norwich) and E (London-King‘s Lynn) show fewer trains from London, about 8-16.  
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Table 4-4  Change in Train Frequencies (1974/75 vs. 2006)  
 
 
In 2006, one-hour towns on Routes C and F were further intensively linked to London with more 
than twenty additional trains, including Basingstoke (52 trains), Winchester (64 trains), and 
Ashford (64 trains). Towns beyond a one-hour distance on Routes C and F, however, only showed 
relatively modest increases, even declines, in train frequency. Margate was given just one 
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additional train
20
, and Southampton, Canterbury and Ramsgate gained an additional 2-4 trains. 
Bournemouth, conversely, shows a reduction of 14 trains. On Route D, train frequencies rose 
dramatically, for Chelmsford and Colchester in particular with 98 and 91 train to London, more 
than twelve and five times the frequency of 1974/5 respectively. To a lesser degree, Ipswich and 
Norwich show 55 and 33 trains per weekday in 2006 in contrast to 16 and 14 in 1974/75. With 
regard to Route E, Cambridge and King‘s Lynn had been served by two branches (from King‘s 
Cross and Liverpool Street), but the line departing from King‘s Cross station took over most 
services from London Liverpool Street station. Cambridge experienced reduced services, 23 trains 
in 2006 as opposed to 30 trains in 1974/75, while 22 trains to King‘s Lynn in 2006 more than 
doubled the frequencies found in 1974/5. 
In addition, train linkages between London centres and London airports located outside Greater 
London were enhanced by high frequency trains from London. Southampton Airport Parkway 
station had 48 trains from London in 2006 against 14 trains in 1974/75. Similarly, after the 
completed modernisation of Stansted Airport in 1991, the Stansted Express was developed to 
provide frequent services from London, comprising 74 trains in 2006.  
Before the arrival of HST on route A and B in 1976, the British motorway system had been rapidly 
expanded by the early 1980s and these cities under study had been served by motorway already. 
Although the reduction of time saving is not as great as the new built HST, the comparison of 
journey time by rail and road, the journey time is still much shorter than car driving (see Table 4-5 
and Figure 4-4). The overall transport improvement in train times and frequency is demonstrated 
in Figure 4-5, which shows that the relationship between London and HST (left-hand side) and 
non-HST cities (right-hand side). It clearly shows that within 1 hour from London, either HST or 
non-HST cities, train frequency has been significantly increased over thirty years, with some 
exception such as Cambridge and a much higher degree in these non-HST towns.    
 
                                                        
20 In 1974/75, only one terminal station, London Victoria, served the route from London to Margate; by 2006, 
London Victoria station had been replaced by London Charing Cross station to serve Margate and just one train left 
from London Victoria to Margate (there was also only one train per weekday from London Cannon station to Margate). 
This adjustment to train services accounts for the negative figure of train frequency (-12 trains) to Margate from 
London Victoria station in Table 4-4.        
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Table 4-5  The Comparison of Accessibility to and from London by Train, Car and Air  
 
Figure 4-4  The comparison of Journey Time by Rail vs. by Road    (source: author) 
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Figure 4-5  A Summary of Improved Rail Services with London: Changes in Train 
Frequencies and Times 
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4.4.3  Effects on Wider Spatial-Economic Patterns 
Against the two hypotheses posed in the previous section, the findings of the impact of HST on the 
economy are now presented, beginning with economic strength followed by services and effects 
on the knowledge-intensive economy. For each dependent variable, HST and non-HST towns are 
juxtaposed so as to better discern the different impact. 
 
4.4.3.1  Impact on Economic Strength 
As mentioned in the methodological section, records of a key indicator, namely Gross Value 
Added (GVA), are not available until 1995, so unemployment and employment changes were first 
used to measure long-term economic strength before and after IC125 services. In addition to the 
analysis of these two indicators, identification of areas and population change is useful to assist 
comprehension of economic change, especially whether inevitable changes in areas are in inverse 
proportion to population change over time. Table 4-6 shows areas, populations, employment and 
unemployment change over thirty years between 1971 and 2001.   
 
Areas and Population / Unemployment and Employment  
Most towns did not experience major boundary changes, but York, Cardiff, Swansea and Reading 
were exceptions, with increases of over 5 % in area. Regarding population change, notably, both 
HST and non-HST towns within one hour of London showed huge increases in population in 
contrast with the reduction in London: Swindon grew by 29.2 %. However, the most striking 
figures came from Peterborough and from Basingstoke & Deane, which increased by nearly 50 %, 
around eight times higher than the GB average of 5.8 %. However, Reading‘s population increase 
of 7.6 % was smaller than its percentage increase in area (9.6 %). Interestingly, among the 2-hour 
towns, a noticeable increase is also true for non-HST towns except for Ipswich, Norwich and 
Southampton, but here the percentage population increases were smaller. Instead, 2-hour HST 
towns demonstrated population decline or a slower increase than the national average, except for 
York (urban area) and Cardiff. Leeds declined by 3.2 % and Bristol by 10.8 %, in line with 
London, which recorded a 10.3 % decline in population. Despite an increase in Cardiff, its growth 
was less than its expansion in area. Over-2-hour towns decreased in population, except for 
Swansea, which recorded a growth in population of one-third against an increase of more than 50 
% in area.  
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Table 4-6  Changes in Area, Population, Employment and Unemployment (1971 -2001) 
 
 
GVAs/ GDHIs  
In addition to unemployment and employment, more recently, the availability of two indicators, 
namely Gross Value Added (GVA), a key indicator of local economic performance, and Gross 
Household Disposable Income (GDHI), the wealth of resident populations, provide further account 
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of local economic strength and its geography. Table 4-7 shows figures for GVAs and GDHIs over 
time from 1995 to 2006. For HST-accessible towns, GVA per head is higher than the national 
average for cities within 2 hours of London (including all three one-hour towns), except for 
Newport and Doncaster, whereas GVAs for over-2-hour towns are lower, except for Edinburgh. 
On the other hand, towns within one hour of London have relatively high GDHI values, except for 
Peterborough. Paradoxically, GDHIs for 2-hour towns with high GVAs are actually lower than the 
national average, and decreasing over time. Of the over 2-hour towns, people in Edinburgh are 
wealthier than the national average; others are poorer.  
In comparison, for towns without HST services, the contrast between GVAs and GDHIs is 
conspicuous. In general, GVA values were lower than the national average for places within one 
hour of London (except for Cambridgeshire) and for places in the 2-hour ring, except for 
Southampton, although Cambridgeshire had a slightly lower index (99 in 2006) than the national 
average. However, the figure for Bournemouth & Poole has to be interpreted carefully, since the 
inclusion of Poole in the NUTS3 area would tend to diminish the GVA value; the figure for 
Bournemouth on its own might be much higher. In contrast, GDHIs of towns within the one-hour 
ring were generally higher than average levels. For 2-hour towns, the picture is rather mixed. Only 
Kent County Council and Bournemouth & Poole were richer than the national average in 2006. 
For places like Thanet, Ipswich, Norwich, and King‘s Lynn and West Norfolk, neither GVA nor 
GDHI figures exceeded the national average.  
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Table 4-7  Headline Gross Value Added (GVA) Per Head and Gross Disposable Household 
Income (GDHI) Per Head Indices at Current Basic Prices 
 
 
Travel-to-Work Patterns  
Travel-to-work data were additionally collected to better understand the spatial patterns related to 
economic performance. Two types of travel-to-work (TTW) data are collected, namely by distance 
and by transport mode. In addition, two ways of classification of TTW flow datasets at the local 
authority (LA) level are available i.e. workplace employment and home location of employees. 
TTW by distance based on workplace employment denotes how far employees who work in this 
local authority travel to work. Likewise, TTW by distance based on employee residential location 
indicates that how far employees who live in this local authority travel to work.  
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As a general trend, over time, the TTW by distance has increased significantly (more detailed 
figures are reported in Appendices 5, 6, 7, & 8). The classification of TTW distance in census data 
is not identical every decade. It has gradually evolved with more selections and longer distance. 
Therefore, in order to measure the change over time 1981-2001, the TTW by distance is sorted 
into four categories, namely within 5km, 5-9km, 10-19km, over 20km.  
Firstly, concerning TTW by distance, since long-distance commuting has grown over time, figures 
in all 26 LAs have all correspondingly reflected a noticeable decline in the first two categories 
(<5km and 5-9km) and a sharp increase in the fourth kind (>20km). Here, the difference
21
 in 
percentages of employment TTW over 20km between two kinds of commuting flow in each LA is 
used as a proxy indicator to distinguish the changing character of places between HST and 
non-HST towns. A local authority which has economic strength will potentially attain a positive 
value, which means the place where draws employees farther than 20km away from workplace, 
instead of letting residents commuting more than 20km to work elsewhere. Otherwise, the value 
could be negative. Over the 30 years, these 26 cities as workplaces have shown higher percentages 
of employees who travel to work over 20km, but the pattern of residents‘ TTW over 20km does 
not show a clear trend. Overall, it suggests that HST towns have increasingly shown long distance 
(over 20km) net in-commuting. Figure 4-6 shows the difference between workplace and place of 
residence. Three 1h HST towns have shown the highest growth rates as workplaces in contrast to 
1h non-HST towns. The exception is Doncaster which shows higher outwards than inward 
commuting flow over 20km. In the non-HST towns, the picture is sketchy. Chelmsford has the 
strongest outward TTW pattern. But Cambridge, Southampton, Ipswich, and Norwich are 
exceptions to show high inward commuting flow as workplaces. Generally speaking, 
well-established (sub-) regional centres have shown a steady positive value in gaining more inward 
commuting flow over time since 1981 because of their wider labour markets.   
                                                        
21 The value results from this formula the workplace employment detaches resident employment both are in the over 
20km category. 
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Figure 4-6  The Percentage of Travel-to-Work Employment over 20km (Workplace minus 
Place of Residence) (1981-2001) 
 
Secondly, concerning TTW by transport mode, Figure 4-7 shows the contrasting patterns 
regarding train usage to and from the 26 LAs in this study. Generally speaking, non-HST towns 
have more commuting by train to work than HST towns because more of the former are in the 
London commuter catchment area; Chelmsford has the highest percentage of all. Of the HST 
towns, Reading is the place most attractive to in-commuters, followed by Cardiff and Leeds. 
Figure 4-7  The Percentage of Travel-to-work Employment by British Rail (Workplace vs. 
Place of Residence) 
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Employment Density vs. Population Density around the Station 
Similar to the TTW data, data on employment density and population density around stations 
(0.5km, 1km, entire LA) were collected to comprehend the patterns of impact around the existing 
stations. More detailed figures are found in Appendices 9, 10, 11 & 12. Over time the population 
density has dropped around the stations in HST towns but has increased in non-HST towns, which 
implies a changing character of place for work and residence. In addition, findings of employment 
volume and density show that employment growth occurred in all the LAs, but outside the 
immediate station areas (i.e. that employment has decentralised), implying the difference between 
new and existing stations. Although all stations existed before the arrival of IC125/225, Bristol 
Parkway station opened in 1972 on a greenfield site outside Bristol city centre was relatively new. 
Therefore, the wider effects around the station are easily felt. Elsewhere, the effects are different 
from the scenario had new HST stations been built. Both findings led to the suggestion that the 
places with HST services tend to attract economic activities around the station rather than housing 
development, which may be more popular in non-HST cities because more of them are located 
within the London commuter catchment area. 
In summary, an examination of GVAs, GDHIs, areas, population, unemployment and employment 
supplemented by data of TTW and population/employment density, enhances a better 
understanding of the extent to which IC125/ 225 affected local economic strength over thirty years. 
With regard to towns within one hour from London, both HST and non-HST towns have shown 
dramatic population increase with good economic profiles from census data; in other words, a low 
rate of unemployment and high employment. However, employment and unemployment figures 
alone might not provide a decisive insight into the facts when the workplaces and residences of the 
local population are not identical. Fortunately, GVA and GDHI figures assist to fill this gap. The 
main distinction between these one-hour HST and non-HST towns is economic competitiveness 
indicated by GVAs, supplemented by GDHIs of resident wealth. The HST towns one-hour from 
London show a competitive economic performance that is much higher than the national average. 
In contrast, although the majority of these one-hour non-HST towns (Cambridge is the exception) 
show positive employment change in census data, their lower-than-national average GVAs and 
higher-than-national average GDHIs suggest that, over time, the massive influx brought 
high-income residents rather than high-value jobs. Non-HST towns grew through the arrival of 
commuting populations who worked outside the local areas; hence, it suggests the census figures 
for employment and unemployment fail to distinguish the weaker local economies. 
Of the 2-hour HST towns, the coexistence of population decline with a reduction in unemployment 
and higher-than-average GVAs for Bristol, Leeds and Cardiff suggest they had progressed via 
outreaching city-region development, following a similar trajectory to London. In other words, 
their economies were expanding while people were moving out. It is well known that London‘s 
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economic growth fuelled the development of a huge surrounding mega-city region. It seems 
possible that Bristol, Leeds and Cardiff have been following the same pattern on a smaller spatial 
scale, but not for all 2-hour HST towns. However, the disadvantaged figures for towns 
over-2-hours except for Edinburgh suggest that the impact of HST might not be as strong as for 
those towns within 2 hours. On the other hand, most 2-hour non-HST towns seem to have 
developed in a similar vein as one-hour non-HST towns, but the longer travel time from London 
reduced their attraction to commuters for residential purposes.   
 
4.4.3.2  Impact on Services and the Knowledge-Intensive Economy 
In this section, the results of three indicators, office rental values, service employment and 
knowledge-intensive employment, are used to depict the wider spatial impact of HST on economic 
activities.  
 
Office Rental Values 
Table 4-8 shows changes in office rental values over three periods: 1970/71 (Valuation Office 
Agency, 1971), 1982 (Valuation Office Agency, 1982) and 2006 (Valuation Office Agency, 2006). 
Over time, the increasing strength of places outside London as locations for service development 
has become evident. The office rental ranges in 1970/71 PMR suggest that London had higher 
office rental values than elsewhere, with figures from £2.5 to £11 per square feet (psf) 
(£0.23/m
2
/ann- £1.02/m
2
/ann) and from £1.5 to £5 psf (£0.14/m
2
/ann-£0.46/m
2
/ann) respectively 
for inner and outer London areas, in contrast to other locations with figures from £0.75 to £1.5 psf 
(£0.07/m
2
/ann-£0.14/m
2
/ann). However, there was no wide gap between HST and non-HST towns. 
Office rental values in HST towns were generally in the range from £0.75-£1.5 psf 
(£0.07/m
2
/ann-£0.14/m
2
/ann) against £0.5-£1.5 psf (£0.05/m
2
/ann-£0.14/m
2
/ann) for non-HST 
towns; both well below both inner and outer London. This might highlight that in 1970/71, except 
for London, no other places show an overwhelming attraction for office development for service 
industries.  
However, 1982 PMR office rental values reveal a notable shift. Two locational categories can be 
distinguished: town-centre
22
 and out-of-town. In both these categories, office rental values for all 
three one-hour towns exceeded the England and Wales average (excluding London), but were still 
lower than inner London except Reading. Office space in Reading was valued at £149/m
2
/ann in 
                                                        
22 In the Property Market Report, office rental values are divided into three types. Two types (type 1 and 2) are located 
in the town centre, including the suites developed in the last 10 years and those over 1,000 sq.m and 150-400 sq.m, and 
type 3 refers to converted suites located out-of-town. The figures in the town centre column represent an average value 
range for types 1and 2.    
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the town centre and £86/m
2
/ann out-of-town; much higher than £85/m
2
/ann in the town-centre and 
£64/m
2
/ann in outer London. Half of the 2-hour HST towns had higher office rental values in both 
town-centre areas and out-of-town than the England and Wales average, except for York and 
Doncaster, while Newport had higher office rental value than the average for out-of-town, despite 
the fact that the value of town-centre office space was still lower than average. Among the over 
2-hour towns, only Newcastle surpassed the England and Wales average in its town centre, and 
Edinburgh exceeded not only the Scottish average in both town centre and out-of-town, but also 
the England and Wales average for outside town centre office values, which equated with the 
England and Wales average for the town-centre. Likewise, in 1982, a general enhancement could 
be noticed in many non-HST towns. All the one-hour towns had increased office rents, which were 
higher than the England and Wales average, both in town-centre and out-of-town areas; however, 
they still could not compete with London. The exception was Basingstoke & Deane, which slightly 
exceeded the outer London out-of-town level with £65/m
2
/ann and closely followed the outer 
London town-centre level with £78/m
2
/ann. In 2-hour towns, rents were not all higher than the 
England and Wales average for both town centres and out-of-town. Southampton and 
Bournemouth had higher than, or at least equal to, values compared with the average for both town 
centres and out-of-town, whereas only Norwich and Canterbury had higher than average values for 
town-centre and out-of-town locations, respectively.  
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Table 4-8  Change in Office Rental Values 
 
In comparison with these values in 1982, which suggest a transitional process of office 
decentralisation across the country, the 2006 office rental values in many cities increased 
significantly above the England and Wales average, and some even proved more attractive than 
outer London, although the heart of London remains a unique enclave. With regard to for HST 
towns, one-hour from London, Reading‘s core shows its strength with £223/m
2
/ann, higher than 
£199/m
2
/ann in outer London, while its out-of-town rents remained weaker than outer London. 
However, Swindon and Peterborough were less popular than in 1982. Most 2-hour towns had 
higher values than the England and Wales average except for Newport and Doncaster town centres, 
while outside town centres only York and Doncaster were below the average. The increase in 
office rent in York‘s town centre reflects the fact that it is perceived as being more attractive than 
the average. Most surprisingly, Bristol and Leeds among 2-hour-towns, and Edinburgh of the 
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over-2-hour-towns, had become more expensive in both the town-centre and out-of-town areas 
than outer London. Newcastle was similar to York, with extraordinarily high central office values 
of £210/m
2
/ann and much lower values outside the centre. Concerning non-HST towns, in 2006, 
all one-hour towns had higher-than-average office rents with the exception of Colchester. 
Chelmsford exceeded the levels in outer London centres. Although Cambridge closely followed 
the values for outer London centre, it shows higher out-of-town levels than London. For 2-hour 
towns, only Southampton and Bournemouth recorded above average levels, in particular 
Southampton, which showed the highest town centre rents among the non-HST towns.                
Overall, this analysis adduces convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that, over time, the 
increasing popularity of office development outside London has allowed Reading to demonstrate 
real competitiveness in service-industry development, while core-city regional capitals like Bristol, 
Leeds and Edinburgh have enhanced their strength in the service sector; not only in their centres, 
but also outside them. In a similar manner, according to burgeoning office rental values, non-HST 
towns also show considerable popularity in office development, especially one-hour towns.   
 
Economic Restructuring/ Service and Knowledge-intensive Employment 
Following the decentralisation of service activities out of London suggested by the office rental 
values, before examining service activities, Table 4-9 shows changes in economic restructuring 
1981-2001. In comparison with the national average, the most contrasting result is the growth of 
knowledge intensive activities in HST towns and the growth of public services in non-HST towns, 
in particular in those 1-2hour from London.  
Table 4-10 demonstrates employment changes between 1995 and 2006 in three types of service 
industries: financial, information technology and other business services (hereafter Type-S1); 
distribution, hotel and restaurants (hereafter Type-S2); and public administration, education and 
health services (Pubic Services) (hereafter Type-S3). In order to distinguish the most 
representative
23
 type of services for units of analysis, the highest percentages of economic 
activities in 1997 and 2006 are highlighted; these figures are also beyond the GB average. Among 
HST towns, within the category of one-hour towns, Type-S1 services show stronger representation 
than other services in both 1995 and 2006. For two-hour towns, there was a mixture of services. 
Bristol had the most dominant economic activities in Type-S1 services for both time-series, Leeds 
developed from Type-S3 services in 1995 towards Type-S1 services in 2006. York, Cardiff, 
Newport and Swansea were Type-S3-led economies from 1995 to 2006. Over-2-hour towns show 
strong representation in Type-S3 services in 1995 and 2006, except for Edinburgh and Darlington. 
                                                        
23 Many towns had more than one type of service employment that exceeded the GB average, but in order to 
demonstrate the different effects, only the largest percentage which achieved this is highlighted in this table.  
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Between 1995 and 2006, Edinburgh experienced more growth in Type-S1 services in 2006 than 
Type-S3 services in 1995, whereas Darlington had a higher percentage of Type-S2 services in 
1995, then a higher percentage of Type-S3 services in 2006, which was lower than the GB level. 
On the other hand, service industry employment for non-HST towns presents a mixed picture from 
1995 to 2006. Compared with the GB average level, these towns show higher percentage 
employment in Type-S3 services; for instance, Cambridge had a sizeable employment 
representation (43.1%) for Type-S3 services, except for Ashford (Type S2), Basingstoke & Deane 
(from Type S2 to Type S1), Bournemouth (Type S2) and Norwich (from Type S3 to Type S1). 
Generally speaking, towns connecting to London with HST services appear more attractive to 
private services rather than public services, while towns became less attractive to private 
investment when HST train times from London increase, in which circumstance government 
intervention appears to play a stronger role in local economic development. Train times on the 
routes of most non-HST towns were relatively lengthy in relation to their distance from London, 
and their apparent representation in public services suggests a lesser attraction to private services.      
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Table 4-9  Change in Economic Structure 
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Table 4-10  Change in Service Employment 
 
Besides service industry employment, a specific indicator for knowledge-intensive activities could 
shed light on knowledge-intensive development. Table 4-11 illustrates change in 
knowledge-intensive employment in travel-to-work areas over the period 1995-2006. However, 
this indicator was not available until 2008 and the data refer to only 56 English cities with 
populations over 125,000, so specific figures for knowledge-intensive employment for several 
places are not available. Based on the limited data, Reading exhibits a significant uplift, with 
knowledge-intensive services accounting for more than half of all employment, while Swindon 
and Peterborough also show strength in both medium and high technology and 
knowledge-intensive business services. Limited data from the State of English Cities database 
suggests that one-hour towns are highly knowledge-intensive, while 2-hour towns are also 
performing above the average, but are stronger in knowledge-intensive services except for 
Doncaster. For over-2-hour towns, the only available data for Newcastle shows less-than- average 
performance. For non-HST towns, only Cambridge exceeded national average figures for both 
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high and medium technology and knowledge-intensive services in 1995 and 2006. In 2006, it 
achieved nearly 60 % knowledge-intensive employment against an average of just under 35 %. 
Among 2-hour non-HST towns, Bournemouth, Southampton and Norwich prove quite 
knowledge-intensive, especially for knowledge-intensive services. In brief, despite data limitations, 
this indicator further assists the clarification of the development in the knowledge economy, with 
and without HST services, and the knowledge-led economy of one-hour high-speed towns appears 
strong. Nevertheless, for HST towns, Doncaster and Newcastle show weaker knowledge-intensive 
development with lower than average performance. For non-HST towns, the limited data show 
some local economic structure oriented to knowledge-intensive activities, which needs further 
discussion based on a combination of other indicators in the next section.       
Table 4-11  Change in Knowledge Intensive Employment 
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4.5  Discussion  
 
Table 4-12 summarises a series of key principal components which were presented and analysed in 
section 4.4. It is difficult to separate clearly the influence from a combination of other factors 
influencing the areas it serves. City types and motorway accessibility are implicit conditions. HST 
cities are also well-served by motorways by 1980s and the employment volume is comparably 
large since they are major cities. Non-HST cities are generally smaller in size. In addition, GDA/ 
GDHI, economic restructuring, office rental value, and population growth are used here to 
highlight the findings and the role of IC125/225 has played during the process. The results does 
not present a clear-cut pattern which shows the absolute result from the arrival of HST, which 
findings have been born in mind since the beginning of this study. Instead, the key task in this 
study has been trying to use these findings to understand a larger picture, beyond the individual 
cities. A reshaped economy geography could be possible through the arrival of HST among 
London, provincial cities, and various other small-to-medium towns and cities.  
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The Interpretation of the wider impact of IC125/225 on British Economic Geography 
 
The starting hypothesis was that the dramatic time-space impact of HST, coupled with the rapid 
development towards the knowledge economy and its agglomeration in major metropolitan areas, 
could work to reduce regional uneven development, measured by the increased strength of local 
economies and rapid growth of service employment, especially in knowledge-intensive sectors. 
Given the impact of the upgraded UK IC125/225 on time-space, shrinkage would inevitably not 
prove to be as impressive as that found from newly built HST lines. The inherently modest 
time-space effects can still be discerned by analysing HST and non-HST towns; despite the longer 
routes of the former, they demonstrate stronger time-space shrinkage. For instance, HST services 
enable Peterborough (122 km) and Swindon (124 km) to appear in the category of one-hour towns 
from London, in contrast to towns which are an equivalent distance from London but are without 
HST services, such as Southampton (127 km), Canterbury (118 km), and Ipswich (110 km), which 
remain in the two-hour ring. Additionally, changes in train patterns and frequencies aid the 
interpretation of spatial-economic effects. Corresponding to two hypotheses, two key indicators 
were analysed for comprehension of the spatial-economic impact of HST. The evidence assembled 
from all indicators may assist in reaching a balanced verdict. Figure 4-8 shows a summary of 
findings: time-space effects versus spatial-economic impact of UK high-speed train services on 
cities.  
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Figure 4-8  The Spatial-Economic Impact of UK High-Speed Train Services- Summary of 
Findings 
  
Source:author, published in Chen and Wray (2011) 
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As evidence gathers, HST services appear to have reinforced the trend towards the knowledge 
economy and, as discussed, the impact on British economic geography could be categorised into 
three influential train time zones: one-hour, two-hour, and over-two-hours from London. Towns 
within a one-hour period of London have become part of a major population-inflow belt, as the 
long-term progress of London‘s metropolitan sprawl has produced a travel-to-work phenomenon. 
There is a growing inconsistency between the places where people do business and create value, 
and where they actually live and spend their income. Nevertheless, their varying economic 
strength, as presented by GVAs and GDHIs, implies that the HST has affected their spatial 
economy. The contrast between HST and non-HST towns suggests that, with growing mobility 
and time-shrinkage from London resulting from HST connectivity, London directly exports its 
GVA. Places with HST services show spillover effects of high value-added activities from London, 
with reverse commuting from London to these decentralised locations starting to happen, whereas 
non-HST towns demonstrate the local service activities to which London‘s GVA contributes: 
people who work in London export their GDHI by living outside it. Furthermore, evidence from 
office rental value and service spectra further suggests specialised activities.  
Within the 1-hour ring from London, the attraction of towns for office development has been 
enhanced over time. These three HST towns demonstrate their strength in private and 
knowledge-intensive activities, albeit distinctive types of knowledge-intensive industries. 
Relatively high percentages of medium- and high-technology knowledge-intensive activities in 
Swindon and Peterborough did not necessarily require office space as the basis of their operations, 
which may explain why the highest office rental values occurred in Reading while Swindon and 
Peterborough did not exceed the national average. In contrast, public services dominated non-HST 
towns; this condition suggests that it is difficult for them to develop a knowledge economy without 
faster train accessibility from London. Non-HST towns like Chelmsford, with rental values higher 
than the national average, and outer London, however, fail to provide GVAs higher than the 
national average, which suggests that these office developments might be, to a large extent, 
attributed to routine public services or private back-offices rather than knowledge-intensive types 
of activity. The office decentralisation policy in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s arguably played a 
role in relocating economic activities across British sub-regions (Daniels, 1982). With higher GVA 
and highly knowledge-intensive employment, the outstanding exception among these non-HST 
one-hour towns is Cambridge, which was served by two branches and two London terminal 
stations. Although the Liverpool Street line showed no time-space shrinkage, electrification 
resulted in semi-HST effects on the line from King‘s Cross station, linking Cambridge with 
commercial speed at 160 kph (100 mph) and an average 52-minute travel time, 30 minutes faster 
than travel from Liverpool Street station.  
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Within the 2-hour ring, different HST effects are evident. Before IC125/225 services, many 2-hour 
towns were well-established regional capitals e.g. Bristol, Leeds, Cardiff and Norwich, or formerly 
heavy industrialised cities e.g. Doncaster, and Newport, all suffering fierce competition in 
developing their knowledge economy after the 1960s. With the arrival of HSTs, some 2-hour 
towns reversed their previous decline. Unemployment rates were arrested in Leeds and Cardiff, 
and GVAs reflecting urban competitiveness were enhanced in Bristol, Leeds, Cardiff and York. 
Population decline reflected the varied HST effects between one-hour and two-hour HST towns. 
The evidence demonstrates that Bristol and Leeds expanded their core city-regions‘ hinterlands by 
sharing a similar pattern to the London mega city-region, which explosively grew with high GVAs 
and aggregated highly knowledge-intensive industries, in particular knowledge-intensive services, 
despite low GDHIs and population decline in the town centres. This suggests that these cities‘ 
status as critical transport hubs due to HST services from London conferred economic advantages, 
to some degree alleviating London‘s excessive agglomeration economies. It reinforces the 
argument of Bonnafous (1987), as with easy accessibility from Lyon to Paris by TGV for 
specialised service industries, there was no need for Lyon firms to relocate to Paris. However, these 
promising results are not shown in two HST towns, Newport and Doncaster. Taking their 
heavy-industrial tradition into account, path dependency may have hindered them from developing 
a knowledge economy and experiencing resulting economic growth. Recent research on the 
relationship between path dependency and innovation in British city-regions suggests that an 
industrial legacy may hinder economic adaptation, while successful cities are free of industrial 
legacies (Simmie, et al., 2008). In contrast, 2-hour non-HST towns were characterised by a 
weakness in low GVAs and GDHIs, high unemployment, low employment, low office rents and 
highly public-oriented services. It is important to note that the same GVA figures were shared by 
some places since they are allocated in the same NUTS3 unit.  
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse more than one indicator to reach a balanced judgement. 
Although Norwich shows strength in knowledge-intensive employment, its high unemployment 
and low levels of employment were still problematic. This suggests that, with longer train times 
and frequent stopping patterns, the attraction for developing knowledge-intensive activities and 
commuter residency seems to be relatively weak. This also raises another question: now that HST 
has brought East Kent towns like Ashford, Canterbury and Folkstone within one hour of London 
in December 2009, will this have a positive effect on their GDHI? An early short-term impact 
study conducted by Canterbury City Council in 2011 shows the growth of commuter housing 
market with commuters earning an average of 7% more than local workers and a 11% increase in 
average price range in two years (Canterbury City Council, 2011). A positive answer appears quite 
certain to be the case. However, Southampton and Bournemouth are two exceptions, with stronger 
economies than the others in terms of GVAs, high office rents, and more knowledge-intensive 
industries. The explanation must be that these places had a long-lasting close economic 
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relationship with London prior to the arrival of IC125/225. They are all within 2 hours from 
London and enjoy a high-frequency train service, even though they did not enjoy the same 
reduction of time as the HST towns. 
Beyond the 2-hour ring, HST effects appear weaker and also contrasting. Darlington and Swansea 
both show indicators under the average level, while Edinburgh grew faster despite a time distance 
of more than 3 hours by HST. The explanation may be that domestic air passenger traffic grew 
six-fold from 1975 to 2005 (and by 400% between London and Newcastle). More recently, from 
1995 to 2005, both London-Edinburgh and London-Newcastle have shown a near-doubling of air 
travel, contrasting with a drop for 2-hour HST towns like Leeds and Darlington (Civil Aviation 
Authority, 1975, 1995, 2005). It appears that air travel, rather than HST, has played a dominant 
role in travel to and from Edinburgh and Newcastle. Nevertheless, Newcastle provides a more 
mixed picture with GVA that is under the national average but office rental values that are very 
competitive with outer London. The results suggest a critical question: whether economic benefits 
could result from a 300km/h HST service, bringing these cities within 2 hours of London.  
 
Influence of other factors and Causality 
Despite the fact that analysis so far suggests the wider impact of HST in the case of IC125/225, as 
reviewed in Chapter 2, the difficulty of claiming causality is one of the major challenges. The 
challenge is harder in this study, since over the thirty years, the intervening factors in the process 
could be various and very complex. Here, other factors need to be taken into account, such as other 
transport modes, decision-making of business location, office decentralisation, etc. 
Other Transport Modes 
As discussed in section 4.4.2, most HST towns have been served by motorways prior to the arrival 
of the IC125/225. It is clear that the journey time to London by road is not competitive in 
comparison with rail, but it is inherently difficult to claim that only rail is the cause of economic 
performance. In particular, the majority of long-distance trips have continued to be made by car. 
Cars are used for nearly 80% of all long-distance travel mileage whereas rail accounts for only 
12% of all long-distance travel (ITC, 2010). However, observing the inter-relationship between 
these modes over time provides insights into the change. Growth in long-distance travel by car has 
almost ceased in the last few years, and coach travel has been rather flat, while rail and air have 
both demonstrated strong growth (ITC, 2010). The National Travel Survey (see Appendices 13 
and 14) has demonstrated that business travel by rail has shown a significant rise in percentage 
among all modes. For commuting and business purposes, travel by rail has risen to around 15% in 
2012. 
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Business Location and Office Decentralisation 
A survey of the location of high-tech industry in Western Sunrise (P. Hall, Breheny, McQuaid, & 
Hart, 1987) suggested that businesses would relocate to or remain in places enjoying excellent 
transport accessibility is ensured. Hall et al. (1987) argued that the role of IC125 enhances the 
competitive character of a place, which allow businesses to remain in the existing location. “All 
that the 125s did was to enhance this quality of service, investing Reading with an accessibility to 
London that was almost unique, in terms of times and frequency, among the towns of the Outer 
Metropolitan Area. This quality made the town’s centre highly attractive for decentralised office 
development, and it was clearly a significant factor for administrative high tech headquarters 
offices” (Hall et al., 1987, p.170). Similarly, Pope (1994) found businessmen in Leeds would 
expand their business if a new public transport system is developed. 
Business location in the UK has shown a long-term impact from office decentralisation policy 
from the 1960s onwards. Daniel (1983) argued that British government decentralised office 
development on a large scale during the mid-1960s, but the failure to secure a significant effect led 
to the abandonment of office development control after 1979. By the early 1970s, R.K. Hall (1972) 
argued that ―undoubtedly, office decentralisation has brought about the spread of office activity 
throughout the South East, and has modified previous relationships between homes, workplaces 
and commuting… However, few of the benefits of office decentralisation accrue outside the South 
East‖ (R. K. Hall, 1972, p.390). In the 1980s, private sector relocation took place and 
long-distance commuting became a phenomenon (A. E. Green, Hogarth, & Shackleton, 1999) . 
The findings from the IC125/225 study suggest that the arrival of the IC125 effectively assisted the 
further expansion of the office decentralisation process occurring, outside the South East. For 
instance, the Ministry of Defence and University of the West of England (UWE) Frenchay 
Campus are located in close proximity to Bristol Parkway station. These reflect a long-term 
(culmulative) effect. As Hall et al. (1987) maintained that  
―The growth of  the Crescent and eastern M4 Corridor has been powerfully aided by important public sector 
policies in addition to defence expenditure. Perversely, this aid has occurred by accident. National transport 
planning priorities after World War II caused Heathrow Airport to be established west of  the capital to serve 
as the nation’s main international traffic centre; in the 1960s, the M4 London-South Wales motorway was 
routed south of  Reading; in the 1970s, British Rail introduced the first high-speed Inter-City Trains on this 
route. None of  these policies was supposed to add to the development of  industry in the corridor; all did‖ (Hall 
et al., 1987, p.178).   
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4.6  Chapter Conclusions 
 
It is important to stress the historic circumstance that the British IC125/225 arrived at a time of 
pervasive deindustrialisation in many British cities, followed by a sometimes-difficult transition to 
a new knowledge-based service economy. Building upon evidence from upgraded British HST 
lines, findings suggest that HST has had demonstrable and varied effects on cities within 1 hour 
and 2 hours from the capital city, thus helped to generate renewed economies. Towns within 1 
hour of London tend to form a part of London‘s commuter catchment area, and the effect of HST 
helps to extend this catchment further. 1-hour HST accessibility from London benefitted from 
exploiting both commuting and knowledge-intensive economic functions, while 2-hour HST 
accessibility from London benefitted mainly the exploitation of knowledge-economic functions, in 
particular for major regional cities such as Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff. Beyond a 2-hour distance, the 
effect appears weak. However, these effects have not been automatic or universal. 
This leads to the reiterated point made by earlier researchers (Bonnafous, 1979; Fogel, 1964): that 
transport is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the wider impact on urban and regional 
development. As Blonk (1979) opines, transport can be an agent for decline as well as growth, if it 
exposes a place to outside competition. Ampe (1995) points out that a TGV network node will not 
automatically favour the city; an auxiliary strategy must be developed to capture the developmental 
opportunities. Central or local strategic policies can play a crucial role here.  
Zooming into the intra-regional scale, examination of the present pattern of accessibility by rail 
demonstrates sharp and increasing discontinuities within the UK‘s major regions, between 
relatively few core cities and favoured interchange points, and their surrounding city regions. This 
appears to be reflected in their relative economic performance. A town like Burnley, although the 
same distance from Manchester as Reading from London, has no direct rail connection and this is 
mirrored in its weak economic performance (Lucci & Hildreth, 2008). Again, in a case such as this, 
an improved train service, whether in the form of extensions of the HST network, at lower speeds, 
over conventional tracks (as SNCF have achieved in peripheral regions of France) or by good 
linkages to intra-regional services, would appear to be a necessary (though not automatically a 
sufficient) condition. Needless to say, improved access is only one factor among many in 
improving the economic prospects of languishing urban centres that have lost their traditional 
industrial roles and have failed so far to make a full transition to the new knowledge economy. 
That said, at the very least there appears to be a strong case for a finer-grained and deeper-probing 
analysis of the potential for rail improvement as an agent of change in city-region development at an 
intra-regional level. This intra-regional study is reported in the next chapter.  
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5.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter is a direct follow-up from the previous empirical study of the UK‘s Inter City 
125/225 presented in Chapter 4. There, the findings suggest that an upgraded HST system has 
brought about demonstrable effects in shaping spatial-economic patterns through improved 
accessibility within 1-hour, 1-2-hour, or over-2-hour travel limit of London. Major regional cities 
within 2-hour from London by HST have shown renewed economic growth, but the impact was 
not automatic or universal. A question naturally arises: can such effects spread from the core city 
to other locations in the surrounding sub-region, or do they in fact increase the peripheralisation of 
places not directly served by the new HST? This chapter seeks to answer that question through a 
comparative case study of two core regional cities and their sub-regions in the course of 
transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial knowledge-based economy with the arrival of 
HST. This case study examines the modernisation of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) for 
Manchester and its sub-regions in North West England (henceforth NWE) (UK) and the 
TGV-Nord for Lille and its sub-regions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais (henceforth NPDC) (France). With 
the same SRQ2, two follow-up hypotheses arise for testing at the intra-regional level (as proposed 
in Chapter 3 
24
).  
 
SRQ2: Whether and to what extent has HST accessibility boosted a knowledge economy and 
led to a reduction in regional inequality?  
Hypothesis 3 is that the arrival of HST in sub-regions will potentially strengthen local 
economies and employment within a knowledge economy over time.  
Hypothesis 4 is that there will be different effects among these sub-regions. Within 2-hour 
accessibility from the National Capital, HST sub-regions could boost economies as 
polycentric sub-centres with the regional core. Within 1-hour accessibility from the national 
capital, HST sub-regions could potentially develop decentralised interdependent and 
commuting functions. Non-HST sub-regions could be very challenged in their prospects for 
economic transformation, but they will not necessarily lose out as long as their intra-regional 
accessibility can be strategically improved.    
 
This chapter first gives an overview of these two post-industrial regions and two HST lines in 
section 5.2 and 5.3, followed by detailed research methods within section 5.4 including units of 
analysis, variables, datasets and observed time-periods in relation to key watersheds of HST 
services (distinguishing before and after HST). In sections 5.5 and 5.6, result 1 and result 2 
                                                        
24 Here, Hypothesis 4 was updated after the findings from the inter-regional study with the distinction of 1-hour and 
2-hour time-space between cities. 
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respectively present effects of time-space shrinkages and wider spatial-economic patterns of NWE 
and NPDC. Next, there is a comparative discussion in section 5.7, and finally the conclusion in 
section 5.8.    
 
5.2  An Overview of Two Post-Industrial Regions  
 
Manchester and its sub-regions in NWE, and Lille and its sub-regions in NPDC have a similar 
industrial legacy. Both were the first in their respective countries to experience large-scale 
industrialisation; NWE from the late 18
th
 century (Crafts, 1983, 1985; Deane, 1965, as referred to in 
P. Hall, 1998, p. 314), NPDC during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Between 1850 and 1900, the 
textile industry in NWE was the largest in the world, followed by NPDC (Fraser and Baert, 2003, as 
referred to in Colomb, 2007, p. 8). However, both were affected by massive deindustrialisation, 
beginning in NWE in the 1920s and in the NPDC region in the 1950s (Clout, 1971). Meanwhile, 
during industrialisation, a synergetic economic network had developed between the two core cities 
and their surrounding towns, which has altered as a consequence of deindustrialisation (P. Hall, 
1998, p. 344; 2002b). Core sub-regions began to adapt successfully; the specialised and peripheral 
sub-regions less so (ADULM, 1997; EKOS, 2008; The Northern Way, 2009b). The regional 
background prior to the 1980s in both contexts was examined below to set the scene. Figure 5-1 
shows the location of the two study regions in Western Europe.     
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  The Regional Impact: A Comparative Case Study  
 
158 
 
Figure 5-1  The Location of the Two Studied Regions in Western Europe 
 
Source: European Commission GIS Dynamic Maps (TEN-T Railways Core Passengers) 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/main.jsp 
 
5.2.1  Regional Context: The Spatial-Economic Trajectory of NWE 
 
Consisting of 7 million inhabitants on an area of 14165 km
2
, North West England (NWE) is a 
heterogeneous industrialised region which embraces the original territory of the world‘s first 
industrial revolution. By the end of 19
th
 century, Manchester and Liverpool had grown to be two 
major commercial, trading, and transport centres. The two prime metropolitan cities have been 
historical and contemporary rivals. The construction of Manchester Ship Canal in 1894 led to the 
expansion of Manchester‘s economic territory southwards into Greater Manchester South. Since 
then, Manchester had evolved into a much larger and more dominant metropolitan centre than 
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Liverpool
25
. Prior to the massive deindustrialisation, British old industrial cities were hit by the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s and did not recover. Up to the 1980s, new types of industries
26
 
had largely decentralised whereas metropolitan cities suffered from shrinking population and 
economic restructuring. Three major spatial-economic policies had significantly resulted in this 
pattern, namely the overspill from the metropolitan areas, new town development, and motorway 
development.  
 
1930s-1960s: A Process of Overspill from Metropolitan Areas  
 
Between the 1930s and the 1960s, there was an overspill phenomenon from two metropolitan areas. 
The decentralisation process was evolving through the municipal housing building programmes in 
the peripheries served by tramcars and buses, but physical barriers determined over-spill patterns. 
Due to the absence of physical barriers, population decentralisation in Merseyside was more 
flexible than in Greater Manchester. With the existence of a continuous built-up area in the west, 
east, and north, Greater Manchester suburbs outflowed southwards into rural Cheshire. By the end 
of the 1930s, the suburbanisation of Manchester into Cheshire had been steadily progressing into 
the area around Wilmslow (P. Hall, Gracey, Drewett, & Thomas, 1973, p. 575). At this stage, the 
solution for overspill problems mainly catered for place of residence instead of workplace. In the 
study of ―The Containment of Urban England‖, Hall et al. (1973) found there was a real paucity of 
studies of overspill industry in these areas and the plan assumed people commuting into traditional 
centres for work. They noticed two exceptions: Macclesfield and Congleton.
27
 The solution for 
overspill problems involved a long-distance travel-to-work pattern was not realised until the 
second wave of New Town designation in the early 1960s (Hall et al., 1973:586).  
 
1960s-1980s: The Development of New Towns and the Motorway Network 
   
Due to a policy shifting towards growth in the early 1960s, New Towns (NTs) were regarded as a 
regional solution for NWE. The underlying principle for new towns was the combination of work 
place and residence as self-contained and balanced communities. Each NT Development 
Corporation, now a long- superseded authority, was established by central government and vested 
                                                        
25 According to the census data of 1981 (ONS), the population of Greater Manchester accounted for 2,618,300 in 
comparison with 1,522,000 in Merseyside.   
26 New industries of the 20th century are electrical engineering, motor vehicles, aircraft, precision engineering, 
pharmaceuticals, processed foodstuffs, rubber, cement etc. (Hall, 2002).   
27 Macclesfield, eighteen miles south of Manchester and Congleton, twenty-four miles south of Manchester and eight 
miles south-west of the Macclesfield expansion. 
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with development power, such as drafting a master plan and providing fundamental infrastructure, 
housing, and industrial estates. In about a decade from 1961 to 1970, four new towns were 
designated in NWE to absorb the overspill flow from two metropolitan cities, namely 
Skelmersdale NT (1961) and Runcorn NT (1964) for Liverpool, Warrington
28
 NT (1968) and 
Central Lancashire NT (1970) for Manchester. 
Over this period, there was a cross-political recognition and comprehensive campaign that the 
construction of motorways could arrest industrial decline in Lancashire
29
 and an intention by the 
Government to rebalance the employment and settlement patterns with and between regions 
(Starkie, 1982). Thus, despite delayed by limited resources, the first motorway section in the UK 
began with the arrival of the Preston Bypass in 1958 in this industrialised region which was 
struggling to adapt to new economy since the 1930s. Following rapid and successive construction, 
this polycentric region is intersected by extensive motorway systems with a clear hierarchy: 
national routes (the M6 and M62), intra-regional sections (the M55, M65, M56 and M58), and 
urban orbitals (M57 and M60) around the two metropolitan cities. The density of motorways is 
likened to an English version of Los Angeles (P. Hall, 2008a), but this motorway network served 
the southern part much better than the northern part. 
Consequently, the extensive construction of motorways resulted in business relocation. As early as 
the mid-1970s, all the employment focus had shifted to those places with better motorway 
accessibility from not only other regions but also two conurbations and special development areas 
(S.D.A.
30
) which suffered from industrial decline (Cornfoot, 1982). From the late 1960s to 1980s, 
Halton and Warrington and Central Lancashire benefited from both motorways for attracting new 
industries and NT programme for housing provision. The most favourable condition was vested in 
―crossover‖ Warrington NT. In addition to the new town and motorways, it is critically located on 
the north-south WCML and a central position on the east-west rail line between Manchester and 
Liverpool.   
Hence, up to the 1980s, with the combination of a long-term uncontrolled overspill from two 
conurbation areas and later public intervention with new town and motorway construction, the 
spatial-economic landscape in NWE had been largely changed. Economic growth was taking place 
in places with less-industrial legacy and good road transport accessibility around the southern and 
middle parts of the region (Cheshire West and Chester, Cheshire East, Halton and Warrington, and 
                                                        
28 Later in 1981, the Warrington and Runcorn Development Corporation were merged to replace two initially separate 
new towns. In "the late 1980s" from 1985 to 1989, these new towns were wound up.  
29 Harry Yeadon Interview [Interviewed by Marshall, Chris] (Available from 12 April 2006, at 
http://www.cbrd.co.uk/people/harry-yeadon/)  
 
30 SDA was introduced in 1967 to assist the development of manufacturing industry in the industrial regions.   
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Central Lancashire). This applied to a lesser degree to Central Lancashire which is relatively far 
away from the metropolitan areas. 
    
5.2.2  Regional Context: The Spatial-Economic Trajectory of NPDC 
 
The Nord-Pas de Calais region (NPDC) with a population of 4 million inhabitants on an area of 
12,414 km² is located in the northern border of France. In the second half of the 19th century, the 
textile industry was the second largest in the world after Manchester and south Lancashire (Fraser 
and Baert, 2003, as referred in Colomb, 2007, p. 8). Two main inter-related industrial zones were 
dominant. The textile complex agglomerated in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing conurbation as well as 
Armentières, while the coalfield ―Pays Noir‖ was seated in the south of Lille conurbation, forming 
an extensive industrial belt (Béthune- Lens- Douai- Valenciennes) (Thompson, 1965). Outside 
these two major industrial agglomerations, the regional industrial distribution was less significant 
and widely dispersed. Since the 1950s, these previous growth industries have encountered 
economic contraction. The mining industry earliest faced the economic shrinkage and a similar 
situation of employment shrinkage occurred in textile industries (Clout, 1971). Resulting from 
rapid urbanisation and industrialisation in the past, these industrial areas are short of 
developmental land, coupled with the dense and disorganised settlement, proved unfit and 
unattractive for new types of economic activities (Clout, 1971; Thompson, 1965, p. 32). In contrast, 
places like Arras, without the industrial legacy and with good motorway links, demonstrate 
attractiveness to new economic activities. In the 1960s and 1970s, a couple of national initiatives 
and investments were implemented to assist regional economic restructuring. Before the arrival of 
the TGV-Nord, NPDC‘s regional transport infrastructure was improved for better linkages with 
major cities for industrial development, including a new canal network
31
, the electrification and 
modernisation of several railway lines and new motorway lines
32
 (Clout, 1971). However, as a 
border region with its remoteness, the transport infrastructure was still not well-developed, in 
particular for the coastal area.    
From the mid-1960s, the French state had made a series of planning reforms to rectify the 
hyper-agglomeration economies in Paris by establishing, empowering, and strengthening major 
regional metropolises. These reforms are discussed in more detail in section 6.6.2.2. Lille 
Métropole (hereafter Lille Metropolis) was designated for NPDC, coupled with various measures 
                                                        
31 In 1966, the opening of Canal du Nord to Paris and the creation of a deep-water canal link from Dunkerque to 
Valenciennes. 
32 In 1963: A25 linking Lille and Dunkerque, in 1967: A1 linking Paris- Artois-Ternois-Lille, in 1972: A2 serving 
Paris-Cambresis and Valenciennois- Brussels. 
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for addressing regional inequality in the 1960s, namely (1) the metropolitan plan organisation 
(OREAM-Nord)
33
 for promoting and coordinating city-regional plans, (2) an inter-communal 
organisation (LMCU
34
), (3) the capacity of drafting the development framework (SDAU or SD)
35
 
in a long term perspective for territory development, (4) ―Lille Est‖ New Town (villes nouvelle)
36
 
established as a (literally eccentric) part of the Parisian region‘s master plan package Schéma 
directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région de Paris (SDAURP), and (5) the expansion 
and decentralisation of higher education establishment in Lille metropolis outside Paris. Due to the 
growing congestion of Lille 1 University in city centre, the university complex was developed in 
1962 in ―Lille Est‖ new town. Three universities were recreated in 1970, each with a specialised 
field
37
. In total, with over 90,000 students, three university campuses in Lille are now the major 
knowledge assets for the Université Lille Nord de France (Watiez, 2010). In addition, with the 
available funding largely endorsed from VT
38
, in the early 1970s, the world‘s first automatic light 
vehicle system (Véhicule Automatique Léger (VAL)) was developed in Lille. The construction of 
the first Metro line began in 1978 and completed in 1983 linking between 4 Cantons and Lille 
République, on which line the Villeneuve d'Ascq New Town and the university complex was 
connected with Lille.  
Except for state intervention in developing the knowledge economy in Lille metropolis, other areas 
within the region were imposed with industrial sectors. In the coal mining area, after 200 years of 
coal exploitation, the last pit closed in 1990. There had been a process of creating a new industrial 
cluster of car and rail industry from the 1960s. An industrial expansion association in NPDC 
(Association pour l’Expansion Industrielle de la Région Nord/Pas-de-Calais) was formed in 1966 
and a wide range of light industries were subsidised and attracted to diversify the regional 
economic structure. In Lens, Renault, the then national-owned car company, was first imposed in 
this area to trigger the process. Peugeot and Toyota came afterwards. Sub-contractors which make 
plastics elements for cars were developed in parallel. In Valenciennes, two rail manufacturers, 
Alstom and Bombardier, had developed out of traditional steel industry. So Northern France 
becomes one of the most important regions in the car and rail industry. More recently, with its 
                                                        
33 OREAMs were created in six major urban regions, namely Lille-Dunkerque, Rouen-Le Havre, Nantes-Saint-Nazaire, 
Lyon-Saint- É tienne, Marseille-Aix, and Nancy-Metz.  
34 LMCU (Lille Métropole Communauté Urbaine) was renamed in 1996 and originally called CUDL (la communauté urbaine de 
Lille) when it was created in 1967.  
35 SDAU was replaced by Schémas Directeurs (SD) in 1983. 
36 Nine new towns were designated: five located around Paris (Cergy-Pontoise, Marne-la-Vallée, Sénart (former 
Melun-Sénart), É vry, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines) and the other four situated near regional cities: Lille (Villeneuve 
d'Ascq (Former Lille-Est)), Grenoble: L'Isle-d'Abeau, Marseille: Rives de l'Etang de Berre, Rouen: Val-de-Reuil. 
37 The former Faculty of Science became University of Science and Technology of Lille - USTL" (Lille I), and 
meanwhile two universities are created Lille II (Law and Health) and Lille III (Humanities). 
38 VT is a hypothecated tax introduced in the 1970s. More discussion is in section 6.4.1.  
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geographical advantage in the European territory, the logistics industry has been growing. Despite 
this area experiencing economic restructuring through the introduction of the car industry by the 
national state in the 1960s, massive employment loss has not abated
39
.  
As for the coastal area, with the state intervention, the port of Dunkerque was expanded to become 
the third biggest industrial port in France, following Marseille and Le Havre/ Rouen (Clout, 1971). 
By the end of the 19th century, apart from shipbuilding and oil factory, the port activities in 
Dunkerque were specialised in the imports of raw materials for industries, in particular for serving 
the textile conurbation
 
and some part of coalfield. In addition, grain imports also made Dunkerque 
an important marketplace (Port of Dunkerque). After Dunkerque was heavily destroyed in WW2, 
state intervention intensified the development of manufacturing economies in Dunkerque. The 
steel industry USINOR was imposed in 1957, beginning to operate in 1963. In 1968, with an 
institutional tool, the state-controlled autonomous Port Authority in Dunkerque was established to 
enhance the development of port facilities. The Charles de Gaulle lock was completed for the 
passage of large ships in 1970. In addition, Dunkerque kept on attracting energy, manufacturing, 
and other investment. A large nuclear power station Gravelines was established between 1974 and 
1984. A tax-exempt enterprise zone was created to attract foreign investment in 1987 and an 
aluminium factory Pechiney was completed in 1992 (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994; Paris, 1991). For 
all these investment, Dunkerque had grown fast as the major sub-region with the largest population 
262692 in 1990 which amounted to one third of the coastal area. 
In spite of strong public intervention on restructuring regional economy, by the mid-1980s, the 
turning point of the transformation process had not taken place. NPDC had been very much 
characterised by its distinct features of three industrial agglomerations, namely declining textile 
industries (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing), withering coal mining industries 
(Béthune-Lens-Douai-Valenciennes), and expanding industrial activities in the coastal area (in 
particular in Dunkerque). As Mr Christopher Bartholeyns who is in charge of the territorial 
redevelopment in Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) for NPDC expressed it: 
This metropolitan area was a border region, so there was no investment since the Second World War. There were 
located only production industries, not strategic one and not decision centre, so it was very specialized… When Pierre 
Mauroy obtained this connection of HST, the territory was not transformed. Here the centre of Lille was a bit the same 
after the war. There was nothing here.   
 
 
 
                                                        
39 Between 1968 and 1990, the decline in employment and population was 21.1% and 6.2% in Valenciennois and 
21.3% and 6.4% in Lens-Hénin. 
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5.3  An Overview of Two HST Lines  
 
These two post-industrial regions located in two countries respectively experienced two different 
HST approaches during their restructuring process towards the knowledge economy. From the 
1970s onwards, Europe began developing HST systems in two ways: upgrading existing main 
lines or constructing new dedicated lines. The UK typically adopted the upgrade approach until the 
early 1990s, when a new dedicated HST line (CTRL) was officially developed, in contrast with 
France which was the first European country to ambitiously and systematically develop a new 
HST network.   
 
5.3.1  The WCML Modernisation 
The West Coast Main Line (WCML) is the longest and busiest mixed-traffic railway in the UK 
between London and Glasgow serving large conurbations Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool. 
It was electrified and modernised in the mid-1960s (south of Manchester and Liverpool) and in the 
early 1970s (between Weaver Junction (north of Crewe) to Glasgow), but due to financial 
constraints, these previous partial improvements had been limited and not undertaken in 
compliance with the original investment plan (Strategic Rail Authority, 2003b). It was supposed to 
be the first upgraded long-distance intercity line, but the failure of the Advanced Passenger Train 
(APT) project on this circuitous line led to a delay in the upgrade scheme until the early 1990s. 
This was far later than the arrival of the InterCity 125 on the upgraded GWML in 1976 and the 
ECML in 1981. BR privatisation in 1994 complicated and lengthened the whole process. Virgin 
trains began its WCML Franchise in 1997 and modernisation work began in 1998. Nevertheless, 
the modernisation project soon encountered difficulties due to the ambitious, but untested 
signalling technology. Along with Italian tilting train technology, the first stage of the WCML was 
completed in 2004. Since December 2008, the upgraded WCML has operated at a maximum speed 
of 200 km/hour, with up to three trains per hour, typically taking just over two hours to travel 
between London Euston and Manchester Piccadilly station.  
 
5.3.2  The TGV-Nord 
The French counterpart in this study is the TGV-Nord, the third newly dedicated line, which was 
inaugurated in 1993/1994. With an initiative begun in the 1960s, the arrival of the TGV Sud-Est in 
1981 brought about subsequent decision making on TGV investment, which seemed promising 
due to the success of TGV Sud-Est which linked Paris with Lyon in two hours over 419 km at 
speeds of 300 kph. The TGV network has expanded not only on a national scale, but also on a 
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European scale to UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Germany. Over 
thirty years, from 1981 to 2011, considerable progress involving new TGV lines has been made to 
connect major cities with Paris, namely the TGV-Atlantique (to Tours and Le Mans in 1989/1990), 
the TGV-Rhône-Alpes (to Valence in 1992/1994), the TGV-Nord ( to Lille in 1993, to London in 
1994, to Brussels in 1996), the Paris interconnections (1994/ 1996), the TGV-Méditerranée (2001), 
the TGV-Est (to Strasbourg in 2007), and the Perpignan-Figueres line (to Spain in 2010). The HST 
lines in operation accounted for 1,896 km of tracks in 2010 (UIC High Speed Department, 2012).  
The TGV-Nord is not only the third new dedicated TGV-line in France following the 
TGV-Sud-Est and the TGV-Atlantique but also an critical section (TEN-T priority 2) connecting 
three major European capitals - London, Paris, and Brussels - in the expanding European HST 
network. However, the TGV-Nord project was not agreed and constructed straightforwardly. It 
originated in the early 1970s but later was abandoned after the UK withdrew from the Channel 
Tunnel project in 1975 on which the TGV-Nord line critically depended for profitability. In 1984, 
the German, French, Belgian, and Dutch governments launched a high-speed rail link (PBKA) 
study between Paris and Brussels with extensions to Cologne and Amsterdam. The PBKA study 
showed that in the absence of the Channel Tunnel, the economic rate of return only accounted for 
7% for the French side, and beyond Brussels, the economic return would be much lower (RFF, 
2005, p. 3). After British private companies revived the interest of constructing and operating the 
Channel Tunnel project, the Treaty of Canterbury was signed jointly by the French and British 
Governments in January 1986. Since then, the TGV-Nord line began to take shape with public 
intervention made in different government levels. These interventions are investigated and 
analysed in the following sections.        
Lille has become a dominant rail hub thanks to two TGV stations playing specific roles in train 
services. Domestic TGV services have operated to and from Lille-Flandres terminal station since 
1993, halving the Paris-Lille journey time from two hours to one hour, while International TGV 
services have called at Lille Europe since 1994, Eurostar, which successfully overcame 
technological obstacles to operate safely and efficiently across three territories (JRTR, 2005) 
began service in 1994 between London and Paris. The arrival of HST services on the 
London-Brussels route was delayed until the completion of high-speed line 1 (HSL1) from 
Brussels Midi Station, connecting to the TGV-Nord within the Belgian territory in 1996. In 
addition, a highly novel regional TGV service (TERGV), launched in May 2000 by the NPDC 
regional government, cleverly exploited available seats on underutilised domestic TGVs, for which 
a regional subsidy was paid to SNCF (Torchin, Grilly, Combes, Hasiak, & Menerault, 2008), 
bringing most sub-regions within one hour of Lille, specifically the remote coastal areas of 
Dunkerque, Calais and Boulonnais. After the devolution of regional passenger services, TERGV 
services were further extended to Artois-Ternois in 2003 and to Berck-Montreuil in 2010.  
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Hence, with similar economic trajectories and opportunities allied to two different HST 
approaches, a comparative empirical study of the two regions can offer crucial insights into the 
potential spatial-economic impact of HST systems. 
 
5.4  Research Methods 
 
5.4.1  Units of Analysis  
The definition of the unit of analysis needs to take data availability and the location of rail stations 
into account. Due to the different administrative and statistical systems in the two countries, 
regarding data availability and compatibility, there are inherent problems of comparative research 
in defining a universal sub-region as an unit of analysis. In addition, this research aims to measure 
the wider impacts of rail improvement at the sub-regional levels, so the definition of a unit of 
analysis needs to embrace key railway stations for observation.  
In order to measure varying effects between sub-regions, units of analysis need to consist of an 
appropriate number of sub-regions served by key railway stations, subdivided into those with and 
those without HST service. Key railway stations were identified according to railway timetables. 
In NWE, the upgraded WCML did not create new railway stations, while in NPDC, two new TGV 
stations (Lille Europe and Calais-Fréthun) were built for the arrival of the TGV-Nord.  
With regard to NWE
40
, sub-regions within this study exclude the county of Cumbria because it 
was not located within the main historical territory of industrialisation. The European-standard 
spatial unit (NUTS 3) was adopted as a basic unit of analysis for defining sub-regions in NWE. 
However, NUTS 3 units are unequal; some are too coarse to properly distinguish the effects, in 
particular Lancashire County Council, comprising no less than twelve local district authorities. 
Others represent a single unitary authority such as Blackpool and Blackburn with Darwen, which 
need to be grouped with other local districts to form a suitable sub-region unit for observation. 
Greater Manchester South, Greater Manchester North, Merseyside
41
, and Halton and Warrington 
are four NUTS 2/3 units, which are directly used as sub-regions for analysis. The NUTS 3 unit 
                                                        
40
 According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), NWE is one of the government offices for the regions 
(GORs) in England which were set up in 1994 (and abolished in 2010). The spatial boundaries of these English regions 
generally derived from standard statistical regions (SSRs) which were used for statistical rather than administrative 
functions prior to 1994. There were several adjustments to the North-West regional boundary before the current 
version adopted in 1998. For instance, Cumbria originally belonged to the North SSR, but was incorporated into the 
North-West when the GORs were introduced. Moreover, Merseyside, included in the North-West SSR, was first 
separated from the North-West GOR and later was re-joined with the rest of the North-West in 1998 (source: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/gor.asp). 
41 Merseyside, which is statistically a NUTS 2 unit, is used here as a sub-region because its overall area is equivalent to 
a NUTS 3 unit. 
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Cheshire county council is coarse, so two newly formed unitary authorities, Cheshire East and 
Cheshire West and Chester, are adopted as two sub-regions. Central Lancashire (main town: 
Preston), West Coast Lancashire (main town: Blackpool), and Pennine Lancashire (main town: 
Blackburn with Darwen) are three main sub-regions regrouped from twelve local authorities so as 
to properly reflect their geographical location and their close economic relationship. Finally, 
Lancaster is a large local authority in area and is quite self-contained within Lancashire, so stands 
alone as a sub-regional unit.   
For NPDC, the French statistical unit ―employment area‖, selected from three such statistical areas 
devised by INSEE
42
: ―employment areas‖
43
, ―urban areas‖
44
, and ―urban units‖
45
, is used as a 
spatial unit for sub-regional analysis in this study. Unlike the other two, ―employment areas‖ 
extend more broadly to reflect the influence of major employment centres and spread contiguously 
to the boundaries of neighbouring employment areas, thus making it possible to interpret changes 
over time. Additionally, consistent census data from 1968 to 2006 are available at the 
―commune‖
46
 level, the smallest and oldest administrative geographical unit in France, therefore 
census data can be regrouped into ―employment areas‖ to observe changes over time. In total, 10 
sub-regions in NWE and 15 sub-regions in NPDC were adopted as the basis for analysis. Details 
of both units and involved local authorities and rail stations are illustrated in Table 5-1 and 
Appendix 15.      
 
                                                        
42 INSEE [Institut National de la Statistique et des É tudes É conomiques] is the acronym of France's National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies.  
43 An employment area [zone d’emploi] is a geographical area in which people live and work, which is useful to recognise 
the influence of a major employment centre.  
44 An urban area [aire urbaine] is characterised by an urban growth core [pôle urbain] and commuter belt formed by rural 
communes, urban units [unités urbaines], or periurban areas [Couronne periurbaine]. More than 40% of residents work 
within an urban area. 
45 An urban unit [unité urbaine] is determined by two criteria: a maximum distance between two buildings of 200 meters 
and containing more than 2,000 residents.  
46 There are five major and well-established administrative units, which (proceeding from the largest to the smallest) 
are “région”, “département”, “arrondissement”, “canton”, and “commune”. Originally, there were 670 communes in the Nord 
Département and 909 communes in the Pas-de-Calais Département.   
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Table 5-1  List of Units of Analysis (Sub-regions with Corresponding Local  Authorities and 
Main Railway Stations) for the Two Regions 
 
Source:author 
 
5.4.2  Variables, Data Collection and Observed Time Periods 
 
Table 5-2 lists the dependent variables, indicators and data sources collected for two regions. The 
independent variables are the changes to rail services with regard to train times and frequencies. In 
general, passenger statistics are treated as commercially confidential and so are not usually 
available. Hence, train times are employed to present the effects of time-space shrinkage while 
train frequencies are used to reflect demand on different routes. The attended dependent indicators 
are again these proxies for these variables of economic strength and structural change. Gross Value 
Added (GVA), employment and available property values are proxies for economic strength. 
Employment structures based on work places are used to comprehend economic restructuring. 
Four identical economic groups (A, B, C,D) are defined here for the intra-regional study as in 
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section 4.3.2. In addition, supplementary indicators based on places of residence such as 
population, migration and Gross Disposal Household Income (GDHI) are used to assist the 
analysis of spatial-economic patterns. Regarding data sources, in the UK, the main data sources 
draw from the Office of National Statistics (ONS), Valuation Office Agency (VOA), and Official 
Labour Market Statistics (NOMIS). In France, L'Institut national de la statistique et des études 
économiques (INSEE) is the main source.     
Again, since the variables are subject to the inevitable variance of data comparability and 
availability in the two countries, due caution was taken to ensure reliability. The major difficulty 
lies in the equivalent measurement of economic strength at the sub-regional level for the two 
countries. GVA/head is the best indicator for this purpose. However, GVA figures are available at 
three levels (NUTS 1, 2, 3); and the smallest level is NUTS3. In the UK, NUTS 3 level is similar 
to the sub-region unit, although not all sub-regions have sufficient GVA values. Whereas in France, 
NUTS 3 is equivalent to the ―département ‖ level, which means the whole region could only be 
divided into two parts for measuring its economic change. It is not very useful to observe the 
economic change into smaller sub-regions. Therefore, the alternative indicator for measuring 
economic strength in France at the sub-regional level is the change in employment figures. For the 
rest of the indicators, problems are normal and inevitable. For instance, the two countries adopted 
different SIC code systems, UK by SIC 92 & SIC 2003 vs. France by NES 14. The key point is to 
ensure the consistency of the statistical data used for comparison among sub-regions within each 
context. 
All the indicators and data collection comply with a decisive time-series reflecting ―before‖ and 
―after‖ situations for the observed regions and sub-regions. In NWE, the WCML modernisation 
was completed in two stages: 2004 and 2008. Given that the post-2008 time-series is not widely 
available, the observations emphasise the distinction between pre-stage one of the WCML 
(1998-2004) and post-stage one (2004-2007/2008). Due to the short observation period and the 
effects of the economic recession by the time of completion, it is not possible to fully reach a 
decisive judgement; however, the study period from 1998 to 2007 allows the effects of the first 
stage to be measured. In NPDC, recent French Census data covering three periods, namely 1990 
(pre-TGV-Nord), 1999 (post-TGV and pre-TERGV), 2006 (post-TGV-Nord and post-TERGV), 
were analysed. Great efforts were made to ensure equivalent and comparable variables for the 
time-series in question.  
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Table 5-2  Dependent Variables, Indicators and Data Sources for the Two Regions 
Source: author 
 
5.5  Results 1- The Upgraded WCML and Manchester vs. Sub-regions in NWE 
 
Before the modernisation of the WCML, the layout of the WCML network had already 
significantly influenced the spatial economy of cities. Core cites such as Manchester and Liverpool 
are located on branches from the WCML, which enabled faster services for intermediate stations 
on the main north-south rail link between London and Glasgow. After the completion of the 
upgrade in December 2008, with the introduction of a non-stop service between London and 
Warrington, the different effects experienced by HST and non-HST sub-regions were further 
polarised - in particular between the northern and southern parts of the region. Figure 5-2 
illustrates railway lines, key railway stations and boundaries of 10 sub-regions in NWE. The routes 
for the upgraded WCML are highlighted in black (electrified) and dark grey (non-electrified) lines. 
Apart from core cities, a few intermediate stations on the main line (and their sub-regions), namely 
Crewe (Cheshire East), Warrington Bank Quay (Halton and Warrington), Wigan North Western 
(Greater Manchester North), Preston (Central Lancashire) and Lancaster (Lancaster), occupy 
especially advantageous positions in time-space terms. Nevertheless, it is evident that the southern 
part of the region is much better served than the northern. Nine out of 12 stations served by Virgin 
Pendolinos and Voyagers in this region are located in the south, while only three are served in the 
north. In addition, an extensive motorway network (completed between the late 1950s and the 
early 1990s) has significantly altered the spatial-economic landscape of the region.  
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Figure 5-2  The Railway Network, Main Stations, and Sub-regions in North West England 
 
Source: author (Note: The motorway network is supplementary in this diagram) 
 
5.5.1  Effects on Train Times, Patterns and Frequencies 
 
Table 5-3 displays the evolution of train times and frequencies from 1998 to 2010 between London 
and NWE sub-regions and between Manchester and its sub-regions. Two time periods are listed: 
the period between 1998 and 2007 presenting the effect after stage one of the upgraded WCML in 
2004 and the period from 2007 to 2010 for the outcome following final completion in 2008. Train 
times shown here are the average of all main stations and the frequencies are the sum of all main 
stations in each sub-region. It is worth noting that these rail times and frequencies do not all result 
from direct rail services. In measuring inter-regional services between London and NWE 
sub-regions, for non-HST sub-regions, rail times of indirect train services with London are 
calculated through at least two components of a trip. When measuring intra-regional services 
between Manchester and these sub-regions, most post-industrial towns within Pennine Lancashire 
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do not have direct rail services with Manchester. Most trains from these towns need to change at 
Blackburn or Preston rail stations for further journey to and from Manchester Victoria or 
Piccadilly station. In order to understand overall train time between these places (within Pennine 
Lancashire) and Manchester, train times and frequencies of these indirect rail services are carefully 
checked, summed up, and averaged. The effects of sub-regional accessibility after the arrival of the 
upgraded WCML are demonstrated by a comparison between the inter-regional and intra-regional 
services in sections 5.5.1.1 and 5.5.1.2.    
 
Table 5-3  The Evolution of Train Times and Frequencies in North West England  
Source: GB National railway timetables (1998, 2007, 2010)  
 
5.5.1.1  Inter-regional Services: Between London and NWE Sub-regions  
The upgraded HST system resulted in an identifiable, but modest reduction in train times. Train 
times were reduced by about 15 minutes between 1998 and 2007. A further reduction of around 15 
minutes came between 2007 and 2010. Consequently, the total reduction in train times amounts to 
approximately 30 minutes for most sub-regions, which are now connected within 2 hours (or 
slightly over 2 hours) from London except for Merseyside, Central Lancashire and Lancaster. In 
contrast, two non-HST sub-regions, West Coast Lancashire and Pennine Lancashire, with indirect 
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rail services, take more than 3 hours to reach London. Train frequency has increased overall, but 
the degree varies among HST sub-regions. Greater Manchester South and Cheshire East show the 
most significant increase after the arrival of the WCML. A total of 57 additional trains per 
weekday between 1998 and 2010 were added to serve Greater Manchester South, which was 
followed by Cheshire East with an increase of 16 trains; two thirds less than Greater Manchester 
South. For non-HST sub-regions, the marginal increase in train frequency could be explained by 
the fact that the reduction in train times through better interchange arrangements made this 
possible.   
 
5.5.1.2  Intra-regional Services: Between Manchester and Its Sub-regions 
In contrast with the time-space shrinkage of inter-regional services observed above, train times 
between Manchester and its sub-regions remained largely unaltered or were even slightly 
lengthened. Pennine Lancashire, albeit remaining within the over-one-hour catchment from 
Manchester, experienced an addition of six minutes to journey time on average. The only 
exception was Lancaster, which moved from the category of over-one-hour in 1998 to one-hour in 
2010. Most sub-regions could be reached within one hour from Manchester, except for Cheshire 
West and Chester, West Coast Lancashire and Pennine Lancashire. Regarding frequency changes 
between 1998 and 2010 which reflect the intra-regional relationship between sub-regions and 
Greater Manchester South, three patterns were found. Firstly, some sub-regions show a dramatic 
increase in frequency to Greater Manchester. Significant increases in frequency occurred in 
Central Lancashire (+52), Merseyside (+32), Greater Manchester North (+41) and Pennine 
Lancashire (+54). Here, the largely increased frequency of indirect rail services to and from 
Pennine Lancashire is different from direct rail services in the other three sub-regions. Secondly, 
three sub-regions showed marginal increases signifying relatively high, but stable travel-to-work 
patterns, namely Halton and Warrington (+5), Cheshire East (+4) and West Coast Lancashire (+3). 
Thirdly, two sub-regions show a weak connection, reflected in their low and reduced train 
frequencies, namely Cheshire West and Chester (-3) and Lancaster (-3).   
Overall, the upgraded WCML drew most sub-regions in NWE within a two-hour radius from 
London. In addition, a massive increase of frequency between Greater Manchester South and 
London enhanced the economic link between London and the regional centre, but with the limited 
existing capacity on the WCML, some intra-regional train times were not improved and were even 
slightly lengthened. These affected intra-regional services are particularly serious in the southern 
part of the region where the majority of rail capacity is prioritised for long-haul Pendolino services. 
As the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE) has claimed, additional 
Manchester-London services reduced track capacity available for other operators, and to some 
degree limited other operators‘ services (GMPTE, 2010). On the other hand, despite the 
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unimproved train times, a significant increase in frequency in certain northern sub-regions (Central 
Lancashire, Merseyside, Greater Manchester North) is closely related to the launch of 
Trans-Pennine Express services in 1998 to expand the catchment of Manchester Airport through 
Manchester Piccadilly into a wider northern catchment beyond the boundary of North West 
England. This intervention is discussed in more detail in section 7.3.2.1 and a rail connection to 
Manchester Airport is shown in Figure 7-2. It is quite apparent that within NWE, the three 
sub-regions which have shown the largest increase in train frequencies with Manchester are 
literally major service routes of Trans-Pennine Express. Due to the geographical layout and service 
patterns, these services enhance the connectivity from these sub-regions not only with Manchester 
Airport but also with Manchester Piccadilly (city centre) - the major agglomeration economies in 
Greater Manchester South. In section 5.5.2, with evidence of economic performance, the change in 
sub-regional economic geography will be teased out further.  
 
5.5.2  The Wider Impact on Spatial-Economic Development    
 
5.5.2.1  Changes in Regional Strength and Economic Structure  
Before investigating the wider intra-regional spatial-economic impact, it is essential to understand 
the overall picture of regional economic performance. Table 5-4 shows changes in GVA per head 
and GVA by four groups of economic activities over time for English regions. Three time series 
were analysed: 1998 (pre-upgrade), 2004 (the initiation of the first stage of upgrade), and 2007 
(post- the first stage of upgrade
47
). Regardless of a better performance than other disadvantaged 
northern regions, NWE showed a consecutive decrease in economic strength (88.3-86.4-85.0). The 
four main economic groups underlying the aggregated GVA figures are also further examined. The 
highest percentages contributing to the GVAs are emphasised in bold and italics. NWE 
experienced economic restructuring towards the knowledge economy from 1998 to 2007, and by 
1998 the highest economic value was generated by group A (manufacturing). The situation altered 
when group A was overtaken by group D (knowledge economy) from 2004 onwards, in contrast 
with other old manufacturing-led regions (Yorkshire and the Humber, North East and East 
Midlands) over these three time series. Overall, the result suggests that uneven regional 
development widened, but regional economic strength already relied on knowledge-intensive 
services by the arrival of the first stage of the upgraded WCML and was further reinforced in 
2007.  
 
                                                        
47 The upgrade was fully completed in 2008.  
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Table 5-4  Changes in Gross Value Added (GVA) and GVA by Group of Economic activities in 
North West England 
 
Source: ONS 
 
 
5.5.2.2  Changes in Intra-regional Economic Strength and Restructuring in 
NWE 
 
GVA / GDHI and Employment / Population 
Table 5-5 illustrates changes in GVA per head, GDHI per head, employment and population for 
sub-regions in NWE. GVAs and GDHIs are utilised to understand economic strength and 
residence wealth, but are only available for ill-defined NUTS3 units. Thus, figures for employment 
change and population change from individual local authorities were aggregated to discern 
variations between sub-regions. The figures that are higher than the regional average are 
highlighted.   
Before the arrival of phase one of the upgraded WCML in 1998, sub-regions within NWE had to 
some extent already undergone considerable economic restructuring. Higher than regional average 
economic strength and job creation were evident and concentrated in the south, namely Greater 
Manchester South and three adjacent sub-regions (Halton and Warrington, Cheshire East and 
Cheshire West and Chester). From 1998 to 2004, Halton and Warrington maintained a leading 
position with an identical GVA figure from 130.0 to 132.9. Cheshire CC (covering Cheshire East 
and Cheshire West and Chester) performed second best, but declined notably from 125.1 to 120.6. 
Greater Manchester South, ranked third, conversely improved its productivity from 124.2 to 129.1, 
coupled with an employment rise 14% higher than the regional average (8.9%). In contrast, the 
remaining sub-regions demonstrated severe disadvantages, with declines in GVA and the lowest 
employment increases, except for Merseyside and Central Lancashire. Both showed signs of 
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improvement with one well-established major city, respectively the port city of Liverpool and the 
home of Lancashire County Council, Preston. Merseyside showed a slight improvement in GVAs 
(80.4-83.0) parallel to a large employment rise of 8.7%. Likewise, Liverpool strongly improved its 
economic strength according to GVA (99.0-104.7) with employment growth of 9.7%. Central 
Lancashire demonstrated its strength with the highest employment rise of 22.4%.  
 
Table 5-5  Changes in Headline Gross Value Added (GVA) Per Head, Gross Disposable 
Household Income (GDHI) Per Head, Employment and Population for  Sub-regions in North 
West England 
 
Source: ONS/ NOMIS 
 
Furthermore, GDHIs and population change are used to comprehend the spatial distribution of 
residence and wealth. From 1998 to 2004, the four economically stronger southern sub-regions 
were also relatively wealthier than the northern, but the residence pattern is different from the 
economic standpoint. People in Cheshire CC were wealthier than in Greater Manchester South and 
Halton and Warrington. Most sub-regions showed declining GDHIs, except for Cheshire West and 
Halton and Warrington. Additionally, by the first inauguration stage of WCML services, a 
longer-term analysis between 1981 and 2004, shows an distinguishable pattern of population 
changes and transport provision within the region.  Well-established metropolitan sub-regions 
(Greater Manchester South, Greater Manchester North and Merseyside) experienced population 
losses, while substantial population increases occurred in sub-regions such as Halton and 
Warrington, Cheshire East, Cheshire West and Chester, Lancaster and Central Lancashire, which 
are characterised by a weaker industrial legacy, designated new town development, critical railway 
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stations on the direct London-Glasgow WCML and motorway connections (M6, M56, and M61 all 
completed before the end of the 1970s). In contrast, two sub-regions, Pennine Lancashire and West 
Coast Lancashire, had the lowest population increase and also the poorest GDHI index. Both are 
old post-industrial sub-regions served by poor transport provision. They are not served by the 
WCML but slow/obsolete rolling stocks, and have relatively delayed and insufficient motorway 
accessibility due to the late arrival of the M65 (Burnley-Colne section) in 1997 and the termination 
of the M55 at the edge of Blackpool, the main centre of West Coast Lancashire
48
.  
After the arrival of the upgraded WCML, between 2004 and 2007, Greater Manchester South 
continued the rise of economic competitiveness measured by GVA (129.1-130.6) and Cheshire CC 
also improved GVA value (120.6-122.4). Although Halton and Warrington still performed best, a 
decline in GVA and employment change reduced the gap with Greater Manchester South. In 
addition, Liverpool showed steady improvement in strength with 2.1% employment growth and a 
rise in GVA from 104.7 to 109.1. Furthermore, those sub-regions with more stations served by 
faster train services appeared to be more capable of creating new employment. Halton and 
Warrington (2.5%) and Cheshire East (4.6%) displayed employment figures above the GB average; 
Halton and Warrington has two WCML stations, Cheshire East has three. In contrast, Cheshire 
West and Chester has only Chester station served by Virgin Pendolino services, and this coincided 
with a lower employment increase of 0.1%. On the other hand, metropolitan sub-regions were 
becoming slightly poorer in contrast with wealthier non-metropolitan sub-regions except for West 
Coast Lancashire and Pennine Lancashire. In addition, among metropolitan sub-regions, only 
Greater Manchester South showed a population increase higher than the regional level, while a 
general minor population increase above the regional level occurred for all non-metropolitan 
sub-regions, except for Cheshire West and Chester, West Coast Lancashire and Pennine 
Lancashire.  
Overall, the figures show that, by 1998, the southern part of the region was already performing 
well and proving attractive for both business and residence, in particular for wealthy people. 
Central Lancashire shows a lesser degree of attraction of both business and residence. 
Well-established metropolitan sub-regions show more employment revival than residential 
attraction. Other northern sub-regions on the WCML were more attractive for immigration than 
business, while two non-WCML sub-regions and Greater Manchester North were very 
disadvantaged for both immigration and business. Over the short observation period, there was a 
marginal change in the figures for economic strength and residential wealth, but the arrival of the 
upgraded WCML seems to be best reflected by well-established metropolitan sub-regions and by 
creating jobs in HST sub-regions with more stations served by faster trains. 
                                                        
48 However, the motorway was later connected to the centre by a two-lane road on the track bed of an old railway. 
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Change in Property Values 
Additionally, property value changes were analysed to study possible HST effects. Table 5-6 
shows office rent and residential land value changes in NWE; figures higher than the regional 
average are highlighted in bold and italics. There are two noteworthy features; firstly, data sourced 
from VOA were analysed for specific towns within sub-regions, allowing distinctions to be drawn 
between sub-regions within identical NUTS3 units. Secondly, since the routes and stations served 
by the upgraded WCML were already confirmed by the late 1990s, it would be reasonable to 
expect that potential rises in property values would already be evident by first-stage completion in 
2004. 
Regarding office rental values, figures confirm that southern sub-regions remained economically 
stronger than northern sub-regions throughout the three time series 1982, 2004, and 2009. 
Manchester and Trafford (Greater Manchester South), Liverpool (Merseyside), Warrington 
(Halton and Warrington), Winslow (Cheshire East), and Chester (Cheshire West and Chester) 
show higher office rents than the regional average, despite a fall in Wilmslow and Chester centres 
in 2008. Additionally, the weaker office rental values in Chester demonstrates a useful distinction 
between Cheshire West and Chester and Cheshire East, which it was not possible to discern 
through analysis of GVAs under the NUTS3 unit of Cheshire County Council. This suggests that 
several towns within Cheshire East, adjacent to Greater Manchester South, became more attractive 
destinations for decentralised economic functions than Cheshire West and Chester, which were 
relatively farther away. Over time, Manchester, Trafford, Liverpool, and Wilmslow enjoyed office 
development both in town centres and out-of-town, while Warrington demonstrated competitive 
office rents stronger in its town centre.  
Well-established metropolitan core cities appeared to experience the most significant boost in 
office rents. From 2004 onwards, office rents in Manchester rose further, to levels double the 
regional level. Moreover, Liverpool showed a noticeable improvement just second to Manchester. 
Greater Manchester North is an exception. Wigan where the WCML services serve did not present 
any strength either in office rent or residential value. Only a rough area named Bolton (Bury) in 
the Property Market Report showed out-of-town office rental value above the regional level from 
2004 onwards. Although not served by the WCML, Bolton has been a major sub-regional rail 
centre between Preston and Manchester, and Bury has been well connected to Manchester city 
centre through the Metrolink since 1992. More insight could be attained by further splitting Bolton 
and Bury, but with the data limitation, one could reasonably interpret in this way: when the arrival 
of the WCML services at Manchester Piccadilly well connected to the existing efficient internal 
rail services (either regional rail or MRT), the wider spatial-economic impacts of HST could be 
realised because Bolton or Bury prove attractive for office development; both are well-connected 
and have frequent rail services with Manchester agglomeration economies. 
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Table 5-6  Change in Property Values in North West England 
 
Source: Valuation Office Agency 
 
 
Concerning residential development land, the economic recession seems to have hit the housing 
market harder than the office rental market. To a large extent, HST sub-regions show relatively 
greater resistance to falling residential land values. Manchester, Stockport and Chester were the 
only three places with values higher than the regional average throughout 2004, 2008 and 2009. 
Greater Manchester South reinforced its strength not only in office development but also in its 
attractiveness for urban living, while other HST sub-regions presented partial strength. The 
internal redistribution of residence occurred in both the sub-regions north and south of Greater 
Manchester South, but with higher rents in the south. Chester became the most popular place 
outside Greater Manchester South for residence. Cheshire East resisted the national trend of 
declining land values. Some northern towns like Bolton (Bury) in Greater Manchester North and 
Preston in Central Lancashire demonstrated a stronger resilience as residential locations than the 
regional average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  The Regional Impact: A Comparative Case Study  
 
180 
 
Structural Change in Employment 
 
Table 5-7 presents employment changes by economic groups over time. Since group B (commerce, 
transport, and other services) was one of the two highest employment bases for all sub-regions 
between 1998 and 2007, observation of the next fastest-growing employment group proves useful 
to understand the change in economic structure. The two highest percentages of employment in 
each sub-region are highlighted in bold and italics (the highest by a single underline and the 
second by double underlines). The result displays a sharply distinct trajectory of restructuring 
between the south and the north. Four southern sub-regions with stronger economic strength, led 
by Greater Manchester South, increased their employment in knowledge-intensive services (group 
D), whereas the remaining sub-regions showed high representation in public services (group C) 
except for Pennine Lancashire which was still dominated by a heavy industry-led structure (group 
A), even though most of them experienced higher than national average increases in their 
knowledge-intensive services. 
  
 
Table 5-7  Changes in Employment by Economic Structure in North West England  
 
Source: ONS 
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Among the southern sub-regions, there was a shift of knowledge creation hubs from neighbouring 
sub-regions back to metropolitan sub-regions. In 1998, Halton and Warrington had the highest 
percentage of knowledge services employment (24.4%) within the region, greater than Greater 
Manchester South which had a higher percentage of group C (24.0%) than group D (23.9%). After 
the arrival of the upgraded WCML from 2004 to 2007, group D remained the second biggest type 
of employment in Halton and Warrington (in 2004: 23.6% and in 2007: 26.3%), but Greater 
Manchester South was restructured to rely on group D (in 2004: 27.9% and in 2007: 29.4%) as the 
second biggest type of employment and overtook Halton and Warrington as the knowledge centre 
in the region. Likewise, Cheshire East and Cheshire West and Chester gained knowledge-intensive 
employment. Cheshire East and Cheshire West and Chester converted their second largest kinds of 
employment respectively from group A to D and from group C to D.  
On the other hand, in 1998, northern sub-regions had shown the two major economic group B and 
group C, including Lancaster (group C/ B
49
), Liverpool (group C/B), Merseyside (group B/C), 
West Coast Lancashire (group B/C), and Central Lancashire (group B/C). The exception is 
Pennine Lancashire and Greater Manchester North which still largely depended on group B and A. 
From 1998 to 2004, for the majority of sub-regions in the north, the structure of their two largest 
employment groups remained unchanged. Two sub-regions were restructured. Greater Manchester 
North was restructured from group B/A to B/C and Merseyside from group B/C to C/B. From 
2004 to 2007, Central Lancashire (group B/C to C/B) showed further dependence on group C. 
Between 1998 and 2007, Central Lancashire also displayed the largest increase 6% in knowledge 
intensive services. The rapid growth of University of Central Lancashire seems to be one obvious 
explanation for the dependence on public services in Central Lancashire. University of Central 
Lancashire which was the former Lancashire Polytechnic was granted university status in 1992 
and is located in proximity to Preston rail station. Since then, the University has rapidly expanded. 
According to Higher Education Statistics Agency, in 1995/1996 academic year, University of 
Central Lancashire with 17406 students was ranked 25 in England. Then it became ranked 12 in 
2008/2009 with 28130 students. In 2011/2012, with 31530 students, it has become the 6
th 
 largest 
university in England. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
49 Group C/B denotes the largest group of employment is group C and the second is group B. 
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5.6  Results 2- The TGV-Nord and Lille vs. Sub-regions within NPDC     
 
Unlike the UK‘s upgrade approach, the arrival of the TGV-Nord, the third dedicated TGV line in 
France, crucially established not only a national HST network, but also international connections 
to the UK and Belgium. Figure 5-3 juxtaposes the rail network before and after the arrival of the 
TGV-Nord. Prior to its arrival, the shortest journey between Paris and Lille had to pass over 
existing railway tracks with at least three intermediate stations. Domestically, the arrival of the 
TGV-Nord in 1993 made Lille a dominant regional railway hub, which was further fortified in 
1994 by the East Interconnection high-speed line [LGV Interconnexion Est, later Le Jonction], 
bypassing central Paris to reach major regional cities in central and southern France. However, 
Lille‘s location roughly midway between three large European cities, London, Brussels, and Paris, 
does not bring it much benefit, with only an intermediate stop on the international 
London-Lille-Brussels service. Paris (Nord)-Brussels trains bypass the city to the south and many 
London-Paris trains do not stop in order to reduce overall journey times (Ureña, et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, this disadvantage intensified after the advent of extended European HST services in 
2009 between Paris-Amsterdam and Paris-Cologne, which use the bypass line.  
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Figure 5-3  The Change in the Rail Network (Before and After the Arrival of the TGV-Nord) in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, France 
 
Source: author 
 
Figure 5-4 further demonstrates the railway network, main stations and 15 sub-regions in NPDC. 
The interoperability of TGV trains on conventional tracks allowed 12 sub-regions to be served by 
TGV services between Paris and sub-regions. The TGV-Nord tracks are emphasised in black/ bold 
and those sub-regions served by the TGV on conventional tracks in grey/ bold. Furthermore, 
unlike the well-established and extensive motorway systems in NWE before the arrival of the 
upgraded WCML, the opening of the Channel Tunnel triggered the construction of two motorways, 
namely the A26 and A16, which were respectively completed in 1992 and 1993. The A26 
bypasses Paris, from Calais towards Lyon, via St. Omer, Béthune-Bruay, Lens- Hénin, 
Artois-Ternois and Cambresis. The A16 is a coastal motorway connecting Dunkerque, Calais, 
Boulonnais and Berck-Montreuil to Paris via Amiens (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994). Hence, in 
addition to the existing A1 (serving Artois-Ternois and Lille), A2 (Cambresis and Valenciennois) 
and A25 (Lille and Dunkerque), the whole region is well-served by motorways, as well as TGV 
services. The only exception is Sambre-Avesnois, which has neither a TGV station nor a 
motorway.      
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Figure 5-4  The Railway Network, Main Stations, and Sub-regions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
France 
 
Source: author (Note: The motorway network is supplementary in this diagram) 
 
5.6.1  Effects on Train Times, Patterns and Frequencies 
 
The synergy of the TGV-Nord line and the bypass line (Le Jonction) enabled Lille to become an 
important transport hub. In addition to a faster connection with Paris, Lille was given direct train 
connections to London, Brussels and major French regional cities like Lyon, Marseille and 
Bordeaux, and later to Strasbourg and south-west Germany. In the following sections, three types 
of rail services are analysed, namely inter-regional, intra-regional and international. Table 5-8 
shows the evolution of train times and frequencies in NPDC from 1990 to 2006 respectively 
between Paris and NPDC sub-regions and between Lille and its sub-regions. Three key timings are 
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analysed in this table: 1990 (pre-TGV-Nord), 1999 (post-TGV-Nord and pre-TERGV) and 2006 
(post-TGV-Nord and post-TERGV). 
 
Table 5-8  The Evolution of Train Times and Frequencies in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
Source: Thomas Cook Railway Timetables and SNCF-SARDO 
 
5.6.1.1  Inter-regional Services  
 
Between Paris and NPDC Sub-regions 
The reduction of train times between Paris and sub-regions is evident; travel times were roughly 
halved for most sub-regions. Lille and Artois-Ternois could be reached in one hour and all HST 
sub-regions could be reached within two hours from Paris. Saint-Omer and Valenciennois are now 
served by the TGV compared with former non-direct train services from Paris. For the three 
non-TGV sub-regions, there was no reduction in train times from Paris, but they were accessible 
within two hours except for Berck-Montreuil (2 h 23 m). The time-space effects were the most 
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significant for Dunkerque and Calais in contrast with the previous average times of more than 
three hours from Paris. Train frequency has increased rather moderately as compared with the 
massive reduction in train times. The exception is Lille. Between 1990 and 2006, the train 
frequency for Paris-Lille route (+27) massively increased by more than threefold the increase for 
the Artois-Ternois-Paris route (+8). This one hour accessibility from Paris led to a significant 
demand in daily commuting. Of the top nine TGV cities
50
 which are reachable in around one hour 
from Paris, the Lille-Paris route had the largest base of customers, which exceeded the second 
TGV city (Le Mans) by 35%. Arras and Douai respectively take fifth and ninth place (SNCF, 
2011). In contrast, two non-TGV sub-regions, Sambre-Avesnois and Beck-Montreuil, demonstrate 
not only no increase, but an actual reduction in train frequency (in the latter case, probably due to a 
traffic diversion on to the new high-speed line (Vickerman, 2007)). Roubaix-Tourcoing, however, 
shows a major reduction (-14), which suggests that although the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing 
conurbation was reinforced by the revival of urban tramway services in 1994, the concomitant 
reduction in direct rail service reinforced Lille‘s gateway role as the regional intermodal 
interchange point.  
Between NPDC Sub-regions and Other French Regions 
Lille possesses a crucial rail interchange function for international and domestic rail services as a 
gateway to other French regions outside Paris. Eurostar exploited the TGV to directly reach 
Disneyland Paris in 1996, the French Alps in 1997 and Avignon in 2002 (JRTR, 2005). 
Additionally, it is evident that for passengers from either UK or Belgium, Lille Europe TGV 
station provides a seamless and effortless interchange for services to North West France (Le Mans, 
Nantes, Rennes), South West France (Bordeaux, Toulouse), South East France (Lyon, Marseille, 
Montpellier and Perpignan), East France (Nancy-Metz, Strasbourg) and South West 
Germany/Switzerland (Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Munich, Basel, Zürich). This is in sharp contrast with 
the inconvenient interchange services in central Paris, which are distributed in different terminal 
stations such as Gare Montparnasse, Gare du Lyon and Gare du Nord.  
 
5.6.1.2  Intra-regional Services: Between Lille and Its Sub-regions 
Unlike the dramatic time-space shrinkage between Paris and Lille‘s sub-regions, generally 
speaking the time-space distances between Lille and its sub-regions showed little reduction 
between 1990 and 2006, except for three remote coastal sub-regions: Dunkerque (-36 min), Calais 
(-52 min) and Boulonnais (-100 min). All sub-regions are now reachable within one hour with the 
exception of Sambre-Avesnois (72 min) and Berck-Montreuil (138 min). Train frequencies 
                                                        
50 In the order of numbers of customers from the largest to the smallest, these nine TGV cities are: Lille, Le Mans, 
Tours, Saint-Pierre-des-Corps, Arras, Vendôme-Villiers-sur-Loir, Reims, Angers-Saint-Laud and Douai.  
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increased between Lille and most sub-regions except for Berck-Montreuil, which had a higher 
frequency to Paris than its regional capital, Lille. Huge increases occurred for those sub-regions 
around 30 minutes from Lille including Calais (+21), Dunkerque (+17) and Flandres-Lys (+16). 
There are two exceptions. One, Sambre-Avesnois (+22) shows the highest increase, with a travel 
time of over one hour from Lille. Here, a similar situation to Pennine Lancashire in the British case, 
the frequency presented here for Sambre-Avesnois is the average sum of several indirect rail 
services while measuring the overall rail time spent, so the increased frequency could not be 
interpreted directly as a sign for improved intra-regional connectivity. Therefore, due caution is 
needed. The other exception was Roubaix and Tourcoing, with a dramatic decline (-44), again 
occasioned by the arrival of alternative tramway and metro systems within the 
Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing conurbation. It appears that intra-regional TERGV services enlarged the 
travel-to-work catchment areas between Lille and peripheral coastal sub-regions. According to the 
regional transport authority, from 2004 to 2009, on the basis of a regular week, the number of 
TERGV passengers increased almost threefold from 8,211 to 22,305 (Conseil Régional Nord-Pas 
de Calais, 2010). A growing number of residents in remote Dunkerque commuted to work in Lille 
(Deroo & Smuerzinski, 2008). 
 
5.6.1.3  International Services  
Located as an intermediate station between three large European centres, Lille experienced a 
transformation from an ignored border city to a potential European hub. However, the international 
reality has not yet been realised as successfully as its national counterpart. Table 5-9 showed the 
evolution of HST services from 1998 to 2006. Regardless of TGV services between Lille and Paris 
Charles de Gaulle Airport, the TGV services between Lille and Paris Nord in 2006 (4.7 million) 
already accounted for roughly ten times as much traffic as the volume between Lille and London 
(450,000), as well as between Lille and Brussels (466,000). In addition, Lille‘s relationship with 
London and Brussels differs. On the Lille-Brussels route, the initial HST services were relatively 
low, but demonstrated a steady increase over time, whereas on the Lille-London route, a 
fluctuating and unstable trend was revealed; only in 2006 did the volume exceed that of the 
Lille-Brussels route.  
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Table 5-9  The Evolution of Train Passengers between Lille and Other Cities  
 
Source: SNCF 
 
Three reasons may explain why the Lille-Brussels route is more popular than that of Lille-London, 
namely ticket price, journey time and geographical proximity with cultural similarity. Firstly, the 
ticket price to London must include the toll of £25 per passenger for using the Channel Tunnel 
(O'Connell, 2008). Secondly, the journey time on the train between London and Lille takes around 
one hour 30 minutes, which more than doubles the journey time between Lille and Brussels of 40 
minutes. Moreover, the compulsory passport and custom inspection procedure between Schengen 
and non-Schengen countries requires a minimum of 30 additional minutes before departure (10 
minutes for the premium Business service). In this sense, Eurostar services from Brussels to Lille 
are restricted by this regulation, with the exception of SNCF TGV services. Thirdly, the 
geographical proximity of Lille and Brussels creates a similarity in culture and economic reality in 
comparison with that between Lille and London. In particular, the southern part of Belgium is a 
French-speaking region closer to Lille than to the National Capital, Brussels. In fact, a call for 
cross-border Lille Metropolitan co-operation involving 15 local authorities and embracing 3.4 
million inhabitants was established based on ―a common identity forged by history‖ and now 
―shared international access‖ (SPIRE, 2005).  
 
5.6.2  The Wider Impact on Economic Strength and Restructuring 
 
5.6.2.1  Changes in Regional Strength and Economic Structure  
Table 5-10 shows changes in GVA, overall and per head, by four groups of economic activities for 
four main regions in France over three periods of time. The highest percentages contributing to the 
GVAs are emphasised in bold and italics. The unbalanced development between the Parisian 
region (Île-de-France) and the rest regions remains, but NPDC did make marginal and slow 
progress. Regional GVAs were unchanged (at 78) from 1990 to 1999, but rose to 80 in 2006 after 
the introduction of TERGV.  
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Table 5-10  Changes in Gross Value Added (GVA) and GVA by Type of Economic Activities in 
French Major Regions 
 
Source: INSEE 
 
Next, the four economic groups underlying the aggregated GVA figures were examined. Similar to 
NWE, NPDC was experiencing economic restructuring towards the building of a knowledge 
economy, but at different stages. Prior to the TGV-Nord in 1990, the main economic input came 
from group A, and this remained unchanged after the advent of TGV-Nord in 1999, until 2006 
when group D overtook it. Over the period from 1990 to 2006, group D increased in economic 
value by no less than 7.2%, higher than the national average of 6.3%. Overall, these figures 
suggest that it is necessary to properly measure impact at different points in time, in line with key 
development stages. Here, regional performance figures in 1990, 1999, and 2006 are available to 
understand the changes after the arrival of TGV in 1993 and TERGV in 2000.  
 
5.6.2.2  Changes in Intra-regional Economic Strength and Restructuring 
 
Employment/ Population/ Migration  
In NPDC, GVA/GDHI figures are not available for sub-regions, so employment changes, 
supplemented with demographic changes, were examined as alternative indictors. Table 5-11 
shows employment, population and migration changes for three time periods: before (1968-1990) 
and after (1990-1999, and 1999-2006). Prior to the arrival of the TGV-Nord, the whole region was 
hit hard by economic restructuring. The region as a whole experienced massive employment losses 
which mainly occurred in those sub-regions formerly specialising in coal, iron and textiles, in 
sharp contrast to employment growth in Lille, Dunkerque, Calais, Saint-Omer, Béthune-Bruay, 
Berck-Montreuil and less severe reduction than the regional level in Boulonnais and 
Artois-Ternois. On the other hand, regional population was growing during 1968-1990. However, 
coal mining/ steel sub-regions had lost employment as well as population. Here, although Lille 
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was part of the textile conurbation (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing), it has been the commercial/trade 
centre, which could explain why its employment growth during this period 1968-1990 is in sharp 
contrast to the dramatic decline in Roubaix-Tourcoing.  
 
Table 5-11  Changes in Employment, Population, Migrat ion in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
 
Source: INSEE 
 
After the arrival of the TGV-Nord, employment losses in sub-regions gradually decreased, while 
population migration tends to move out of post-industrial sub-regions. Between 1990 and 1999, 
employment decline was arrested except in two non-HST sub-regions: Cambresis and 
Sambre-Avesnois. Meanwhile, out-migration prevailed across the region, except for Flandre-Lys 
and Berck-Montreuil. From 1999 to 2006, employment increases occurred in all sub-regions, but 
only Lille, Boulonnais, Artois-Ternois, Douaisis, Valenciennois, Lens- Hénin and 
Berck-Montreuil experienced a growth rate higher than the regional average. Roubaix-Tourcoing 
showed the lowest employment rate among all HST sub-regions although its job loss had been 
stemmed. Two non-HST sub-regions are still relatively disadvantaged with the lowest employment 
growth. In addition, out-migration rates were generally higher than previous for most sub-regions 
except Berck-Montreuil. Some ex-coalfield sub-regions managed to stem serious population 
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decline, but due to the increase in out-migration. People continued to migrate to other places, 
either to Flandre-Lys, Artois-Ternois or Berck-Montreuil within NPDC or to southern regions in 
France like Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte d‘Azur (Chaillot, 2010). 
In brief, over the period from 1990 to 2006, Lille, Valenciennois and Lens- Hénin were the only 
three HST sub-regions with strong employment increases. Valenciennois benefited the most with 
the highest employment increases and was the second sub-region (besides Lille) to show positive 
net travel-to-work flow. Moreover, Valenciennois gradually became a sub core-centre, providing 
job opportunities for two adjacent non-HST sub-regions, Cambresis and Sambre-Avesnois (Deroo 
& Smuerzinski, 2008). Non-HST sub-regions showed the weakest performance, except for 
Berck-Montreuil, which demonstrated continuous employment growth above the national average 
and was an increasingly popular destination for migration. The exception of Berck-Montreuil may 
be explained by its accessibility from Paris by conventional train in two hours, equal to the road 
journey, in particular with the new arrival of the A16 connecting coastal sub-regions with Paris.   
 
Structural Change in Employment         
Table 5-12 shows the change of employment structure over the three periods, with the two highest 
percentages of employment again highlighted (the largest employment growth by a single 
underline and the second by double underlines). Unlike NWE, whereby group B had been the 
major economic base at the outset of the upgraded WCML, in NPDC, when the TGV-Nord arrived, 
the whole region was still industrially-oriented (group A). Between 1990 and 2006, these two 
largest economic structures (groups A and B) have continued to dominate both HST and non-HST 
sub-regions, albeit in parallel with a gradual transition in dominance from group A to B. In 
addition to the TGV-Nord, two new motorways seem to show significant influence on some 
sub-regions. The growth of employment in group B appeared significant in HST sub-regions 
served by the A26 and A16 motorways, in particular for Calais where the Eurotunnel portal is 
situated, with a 9% rise in group B reflecting the effect on developing trade and industry in NPDC 
(OBM, 2011). However, the former industrial trajectory still plays a key role in the process of 
economic restructuring. Notably, five HST sub-regions, Béthune-Bruay, Douaisis, Dunkerque, 
Sambre-Avesnois, and Valenciennois, retain a Group A-led employment base.  
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Table 5-12  Changes in Employment Structure in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
 
Source: INSEE 
 
The only exception is the regional core sub-region, Lille. Here, Group B was the major base of 
employment before the advent of the TGV-Nord. After the arrival of the HST, the second 
employment base changed from group A to C in 1999 and 2006. The apparent tendency of growth 
in public services (group C) in Lille was further confirmed in a recent report, which demonstrated 
that authorities and associations accounted for 21% of the total floor space in 2010 and over the 
past five years, from 2005 to 2010, the figure continually rose from 14.5% (OBM, 2011). In 
addition, most HST sub-regions had lower rates of knowledge-intensive employment than the 
regional average, except Lille and Roubaix-Tourcoing. Lille showed a big increase in group D 
(24.7-20.4=4.3%), higher than the regional average (17.4-15.3=2.1%). On the other hand, 
non-TGV sub-regions demonstrated a continued weakness in growing their knowledge-intensive 
employment base. In 2006, they became the bottom three in terms of group D employment.  
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5.7  Discussion  
 
Bringing these findings together, the evidence of the wider impact of HST is now discussed with 
specific reference to the research question and hypotheses posed at the outset. Based on two 
different HST approaches and two spatial-economic effects, two-hour (London-Manchester) and 
one-hour (Paris-Lille) respectively, the spatial-economic patterns of HST systems are presented.  
In NWE, the upgrade approach to HST development reduced the London-Manchester inter-city 
rail journey to two hours every 20 minutes, leading to a sharper north-south divide than had 
existed before the upgraded WCML. Four southern sub-regions had already been experiencing 
strong economic strength, led by Halton and Warrington. Then the advent of the upgraded WCML 
brought these four within two hours of London, triggering an internal shift of significance to 
Greater Manchester South, which shortened the gap between Greater Manchester South and 
Halton and Warrington, and gave the four southern sub-regions momentum to grow in 
knowledge-intensive services. In contrast, four other HST sub-regions (Merseyside, Greater 
Manchester North, Central Lancashire and Lancaster) presented weaker economic performance 
with high a proportion of public services, which seems to show their reduced attractiveness to 
knowledge-intensive services with train times of over two hours from London despite, being 
directly served by HSTs. Additionally, two non-HST sub-regions, West Coast Lancashire and 
Pennine Lancashire, not only in relation to the national capital (over three hours from London), but 
also to the regional capital (over one hour from Manchester), seem to be condemned to lingering 
economic disadvantage. The updated 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation for English Cities (2011) 
confirmed that intra-regional inequality had widened between metropolitan and peripheral 
non-metropolitan sub-regions within the North West. During 2007 and 2010, Metropolitan core 
cities served by HST improved, but towns in post-industrial Pennine Lancashire and West Coast 
Lancashire deteriorated. The number of most deprived neighbourhoods had fallen by 13% in 
Manchester and 9% in Liverpool, whilst figures for the same indicator had increased by 43% in 
Burnley and by 17% in Blackpool. 
The varying rail frequency between the core metropolitan sub-region and its sub-regions also 
reflects the constraints and opportunities for intra-regional development. The revived Greater 
Manchester South area consolidated its importance as the main agglomeration economy. For 
southern HST sub-regions, adjacent Cheshire East and Halton and Warrington, which have been, 
for a long time, decentralised economic centres from Manchester, show a stable relationship, 
whereas relatively remote Cheshire West and Chester and Lancaster maintained their weak 
relationship. In addition, intra-regional services from these sub-regions which are approaching 
Manchester Piccadilly station from the southern rail link actually are largely squeezed by 
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inter-regional Pendolino services. With regard to the remaining northerly HST sub-regions, 
namely Central Lancashire, Merseyside and Greater Manchester North, apart from the arrival of 
HSTs, the frequency of intra-regional services is enhanced through the Trans-Pennine Express 
services with Manchester Piccadilly and Airport. This coexists with the high percentage of public 
services in these places. One could expect that this could be explained by their preferable location 
for certain types of public services which could be accessed frequently from the metropolitan 
centre but not necessarily need to be located within the metropolitan core. On the other hand, for 
the non-HST sub-regions, their intra-regional and inter-regional services are both disadvantaged. 
Although directly served by intra-regional trains, West Coast Lancashire has not enhanced its 
intra-regional connectivity either through increased frequency or reduced train times. As for 
Pennine Lancashire, indirect and lengthy inter- and intra-regional train services discourage easy 
commuting into the economic agglomeration in Manchester as well as resulting in their weakness 
in accessibility which is a handicap in attracting inward local economic development. 
In NPDC, within one hour (previously two hours) from Paris, with high train frequency and high 
percentages of daily customers, Lille demonstrated the largest increase in knowledge-intensive 
employment above the national average and continued to grow in public services. This shows that 
the arrival of the TGV-Nord and the interconnection with Paris CDG Airport not only assisted 
Lille to develop its knowledge economy, but also drew Lille into a wider Parisian region within a 
one-hour commuting distance, which was reflected in the growth in public services. This situation 
echoes the third scenario presumed in the Livre Blanc du Bassin Parisien (DATAR, 1992) which 
hypothesised that, since it became within one hour from Paris, Lille has effectively joined the 
Parisian region with the localisation of high-valued economic activities, whereas within two hours 
from Paris, Lyon remains a centre independent from the Parisian Basin. Furthermore, the 
TGV-Nord brought a new perspective to the previously negative position of a frontier region; the 
international connection assisted by growth of a cross-border region centred around Lille. On the 
other hand, the interoperability of TGV trains onto the conventional tracks allowed most 
sub-regions served by TGVs to fall with two hours (previously three hours) travel time from Paris 
and reversed job losses for most HST sub-regions. However, employment change towards building 
a knowledge economy did not improve equally. Non-HST sub-regions, indeed, show the lowest 
percentages of knowledge-intensive employment. However, less-industrialised sub-regions, either 
with or without TGVs, seem to demonstrate fewer problems in their transformation process than 
others. In addition, the TGV-Nord and new motorways led to much-improved accessibility to this 
region, which seems to have generated a higher level of migration to other places.    
Similar to NWE, the revived Lille centre became a magnet for jobs for its surrounding sub-regions. 
The analysis of rail frequency suggests that the arrival of TERGV increased travel-to-work 
mobility from the coastal area to the regional centre Lille, while Sambre-Avesnois, despite 
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showing the highest increase in train frequency with Lille, has indirect transport connectivity over 
about one-hour rail journey and disadvantaged economic conditions.  
Comparison between the two regions shows that the transformation of two post-industrial regions 
and sub-regions towards a knowledge economy brought by HST has proved to be a complex and 
difficult process, but the similarity and difference between these two case study regions are 
manifest (Figure 5-5). The similarity lies in the fact that both regions have strengthened their 
representation of knowledge intensive industries, and the connection with the national capital by 
faster train services did economically strengthen Manchester and Lille, but did not necessarily 
have the same effect for nearby sub-regions, especially former industrial sub-regions. The 
difference is that the overall regional disparity between NPDC and Île-de-France has been 
progressively reduced, although a big gap remains, whereas uneven regional development between 
NWE and Greater London has widened. It suggests the transformation process of post-industrial 
regions is a long-term evolution and involves more than a HST connection. Further qualitative 
in-depth interviews and policy analysis is necessary to offer insights into the variations in the 
wider spatial-economic outcomes. 
From the findings of the two regions, a critical distinction needs to be made between directly 
served HST-sub-regions and non-HST sub-regions. The findings from this intra-reigonal study 
have revealed that regional capitals have benefitted the most from agglomeration economies, but 
the benefits have not necessarily spread into neighbouring sub-regions. It suggests that HST could 
facilitate the decentralisation at the national level with the revival of regional cities through 
efficient and much improved inter-city connectivity by HST within 1-hour and 2-hour from the 
national capitals. At the same time, HST tends to trigger the centralisation at the regional level 
around the regional capitals. Although there could be several other HST sub-regions within a 
region, their HST services usually do not have the same level as the regional capital has unless 
there are additional interventions at work to widely spread the benefits. Most importantly, it is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game because both inter- and intra- regional connectivity are essential. 
Therefore, for non-metropolitan sub-regions, intra-regional accessibility with the regional capital 
could prove to be more critical and practical than inter-regional connectivity. But then it suggests 
that strategic regional intervention would be needed to exploit the HST opportunity at the regional 
level. To understand further, all these depend very much on specific contexts with qualitative 
investigation. 
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Figure 5-5  A Summarised Comparison of Inter- & Intra- regional inequality between the Two 
Cases 
Inter-regional Comparison 
 
 
Intra-regional Comparison 
 
Source: reorganised from Table 5-4, Table 5-5, Table 5-10, & Table 5-11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  The Regional Impact: A Comparative Case Study  
 
197 
 
5.8  Chapter Conclusions 
 
These findings lead to the conclusion that the wider intra-regional impact of HST are challenging. 
Through the quantitative examination of a ―before‖ and ―after‖ situation for both post-industrial 
regions, it is found that the connection with the national capital by faster train services did 
economically strengthen the regional capital, but not necessarily for sub-regions around it, 
especially formerly industrial sub-regions. The transformation process of post-industrial regions 
involves more than connection with a high-speed train, significant as this may be, over a long-term 
evolution. Both post-industrial regions are still in the course of transition; in NPDC, wider 
economic transformation is just beginning to happen through improving the intra-regional 
connection, while in NWE, the laboriously-upgraded approach seems to demonstrate wider uneven 
patterns and limits to its transformative power. From the next chapter onwards, the second half of 
this research is devoted to teasing out the complexity and difficulties involved in exploiting HST 
opportunities via public intervention in these two regions over time. An analytical framework 
which presents the national context for local intervention is proposed and reviewed in Chapter 6 as 
a guideline for conducting the qualitative part of the study and consequent analysis. 
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6.1  Introduction  
 
Based on the potential of HST, Chapter 3 developed a theoretical framework for two empirical 
studies (Chapters 4 and 5) in order to understand the spatial-economic impact of the 
competitiveness of HST on economic strength and economic restructuring towards a knowledge 
economy in dynamic regional and urban development. Chapter 5 showed the arrival of HST 
services strengthens regional capital, but not necessarily in neighbouring sub-regions; this is 
particularly the case for post-industrial towns. Regional performance has been slowly improving in 
NPDC, but deteriorating in NWE.  
This chapter aims to develop an analytical framework in order to understand the role of 
government intervention in seizing the opportunities presented by HST to possibly reduce 
intra-regional inequality. It tentatively guides the following two empirical chapters with qualitative 
research methods based on in-depth interviews and policy analysis. By so doing, it could assist the 
comprehension of the varying impacts between the two regions and within them. The major 
question posed is sub-research question three (SRQ 3) proposed in Chapter 1.     
 
SRQ 3: How could the impact of HST be spread as widely as possible throughout a region by 
government intervention, which could ultimately reduce regional inequality?  
 
Since HST investment is generally a national decision, the wider impact of HST will involve 
interaction between the national and local governments during the transformation process. Both 
national contexts defined here refer to national spatial-economy planning approaches from the 
1980s to 2000s, which were adopted and modified according to national perspectives of the 
political economy on transport/urban/regional planning policies and government institutional 
systems/restructuring. Planning policies are closely interdependent with government systems and 
restructuring because they determine the most appropriate scales and levels of power at which 
policies will be implemented. They will be discussed in more detail later in both national contexts.      
This chapter is structured in six sections. Section 6.2 begins with an analytical framework which is 
further developed through a literature review and policy reviews for each element, before 
hypotheses are raised in the last section. Section 6.3 embarks on the national political economy 
perspective and modern capitalism and state intervention are discussed, namely the fundamental 
characteristics of the political economy embedded in society and the evolution of the political 
economy throughout the arrival of economic crises in the late 1970s. In section 6.4, styles of 
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transport investment are reviewed in relation to national political economies. In section 6.5, 
government systems and restructuring are examined via the way in which the institutional form 
was restructured by the national state, which possibly affected intervention at the local government 
level. In section 6.6, urban and regional planning policies are discussed. In section 6.7, with 
reference to each element suggested in this framework, a close examination of British and French 
planning approaches is hypothesised as the basis leading to two follow-up empirical chapters.  
 
6.2  Establishing An Analytical Spatial-Economy Planning Framework for 
Government Intervention 
 
The art of capitalising on transport investment varies in different contexts and involves public 
intervention in a strategic way that stretches beyond the original investment. In parallel with the 
arrival of HST, the decline in post-industrial regions and cities has resulted in the evolution of 
urban and regional planning policies and government restructuring in tackling these urban and 
regional problems. It is fundamental to envisage how local intervention would be shaped by or 
respond to the national context, which entails different national political economies and their 
consequent decisions regarding urban and regional planning policies, as well as institutional 
arrangements. This framework involves a series of literature and policy reviews in the following 
sections, which assist in understanding the wider impact of HST and the generation of hypotheses 
for this comparative case study.  
 
6.3  The Perspective of the National Political Economy   
 
6.3.1  Modern Capitalism and State Intervention 
The modern capitalist economy continues to be marked and propelled by rapid industrialisation. 
Classical economists proposed a new vision with a request of ―laissez faire, laissez aller‖, i.e. the 
removal of all restraints in order to reach a world of perfect competition because free market 
conditions were regarded as beneficial to society. This revolutionary claim exerted far-reaching 
influence in the era of the late 18
th
 century, when restrictions such as monopolies, tariffs, duties 
and other state enforced constraints were pervasive due to ―the destruction of what was and the 
rebuilding of the world according to a new ideal‖ (Strachey, 1994, p.42).  
However, the nature of the free market condition has been controversial. Polanyi argues ―the idea 
of a self-adjusting market implied a stark Utopia‖ (K. Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p.3) because land, as 
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one of three basic elements (in addition to labour and money), is particularly rooted in a specific 
milieu, and has unavoidably had to operate under certain regulations or customs. Instead, the state 
has played an indispensible role in relation to all the circumstances of market forces in a capitalist 
economy. On the one hand, he stresses that, far from exclusion from intervention, free market 
conditions are deliberately controlled by the state. ―The road to the free market was opened and 
kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism‖ (K. Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 146). On the other hand, the state has to deal with 
the negative consequences of free market conditions. Polanyi identifies ―a double movement‖, 
namely market expansion on a global scale as well as ―a network of measures and policies […] 
integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labour, 
land, and money‖ (K. Polanyi, 2001[1944], p. 79). Similarly, Scott echoes this view by 
emphasising the interdependent relationship between the national economy and the state because it 
is ―[…]the essential guarantor of those institutional underpinnings without which markets cannot 
work, and which help to stabilize the numerous inner disequilibria and imbalances of capitalist 
society‖ (Scott, 1998, p.13).  
Consequently, state intervention in order to readdress the imbalance between private and public 
power results in the prevention of dynamic capitalist systems from collapse. Like the concept of a 
―dual movement‖ coined by Polanyi, Scott states that ―capitalist society thus made its historical 
appearance as a system offering enormous flexibility and wide margins of manoeuvre for 
economic and political action‖ (Scott, 1998, p.13). 
 
6.3.2  Post-war Capitalism in Western Europe and Its Evolution  
This research context is set in post-industrial Western Europe in the 1980s when economic models 
adopted in the immediate post-war period were facing serious challenges after a thirty- year 
implementation. The Keynesian paradigm had profoundly shaped the ideological consensus on the 
active role of the state among many European countries, but a variety of national styles existed 
when it came to stabilising economies and addressing high unemployment.  
Social scientist scholars have attempted to identify different styles of national regimes with 
different specific concerns. Sociologists are particularly interested in state commitments to social 
welfare systems e.g. Richard Titmuss (1958), Esping-Andersen (1990). Three works are examined 
to identify three classic models of post-war capitalism in Western Europe, namely Shonfield 
(1965), Albert (1993) and Schmidt (2002, 2003). Firstly, British economist Andrew Shonfield 
pioneered the teasing out of different styles of capitalism in his invaluable work ―Modern 
Capitalism- The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power‖. He offered invaluable insights 
into the role of the state, the relationship between the private and the public sector and approaches 
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to economic planning through the lens of histories and cultural attributes. Secondly, French 
economist Michael Albert, in his work ―Capitalism against Capitalism‖
51
, classified three types of 
capitalist states, namely the Anglo-Saxon model, the Rhineland model and the French model. The 
focus of Albert rested on the role of the state in managing economic order. Lastly, with a special 
focus on European states, Schmidt (2002) and (2003) developed the same classifications as Albert 
with different labels for three ideal-typical models of capitalism, namely Market Capitalism, 
Managed Capitalism and State Capitalism. She attempted to systematically create a comparative 
framework to identify different styles of national states.  
Although each country is different, studying all the capitalist states in Europe is beyond the remit 
of this research. Based on the aforementioned scholars‘ work, three models (see Table 6-1) are 
distinguished and illustrated briefly in order to better understand the national differences between 
the two studied countries, the UK and France.   
 
 
 
 
Table 6-1  Three Models of Capitalism in Western Europe (Prior to the 1980s)  
 
Source: Adapted from Shonfield (1965), Albert (1993), and Schmidt (2002, 2003) 
 
 
                                                        
51 The original French version was published in 1991 and the English version was released in 1993.   
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Model 1: Market capitalism (the Anglo-Saxon model) 
 
Market capitalism, termed elsewhere as the Anglo-Saxon model, is characterised by the role of the 
state in setting rules (regulations). Like a liberal arbiter (or an umpire), the state makes judgements 
based on rules (regulations). In addition, even if the state offers aid to industries on an ad hoc basis 
and intermittently intervenes, it remains at arms‘ length from the private sector. Regarding 
investment, market capitalism has a short-term view which prioritises profits (as well as cost) from 
investment through the financial resources of capital markets. The UK is widely recognised as an 
example of this model.  
Model 2: Managed capitalism (the Rhineland model) 
 
Managed capitalism, also known as the Rhineland model or the social market economy according 
to Albert‘s classification, is remarkable due to the active role played by public authorities in 
guiding investment planning. Private enterprises are encouraged by public funding through 
banking systems; this is particularly the case for regional policies. The ―enabling‖ state facilitates 
―business activities through more targeted aid to industry by way of regionally provided subsidies 
and loans, support for research and development, as well as education, apprenticeship and training 
programmes, often leaving the rules to be jointly administered by economic actors‖ (Schmidt, 
2003, p. 529). The most exemplary country is Germany and some smaller European countries such 
as the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. Although a further distinction could be made 
between West Germany and Scandinavian countries, the shared features here are twofold. Firstly, 
a strong state manages capitalist economies through active social welfare policies. Secondly, the 
state does not particularly intend to nationalise all industries, but to lead national economic 
development under their guidance (German and Swedish models are illustrated further in 
Appendix 16).   
Model 3: State-led capitalism  
 
State-led capitalism represents the strong role of the state in capitalist economies. The dirigiste or 
interventionist state leads economic activities ―through planning, industrial policy and state-owned 
enterprises‖ and the rules are administered by the state (Schmidt, 2003, p. 529). The best example 
of this model is France, which distinguishes itself from most European countries. Spain and Italy 
take similar approaches and Perez argues post-Franco Spain, to some degree, resembles state 
capitalism (Schmidt, 2003). In addition, Lange and Regini opine that Italy, particularly northern 
Italy, is also counted since large firms and nationalised enterprises reside and operate in a 
―state-led by indirection‖ manner (cited in Schmidt, 2003, p.527).    
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The Evolution of Capitalist Systems  
 
Since the mid-1970s, after thirty glorious years (Les Trente Glorieuses) over the post-war boom 
era, national states in Western Europe have encountered more and more external and internal 
challenges due to this Fordist type of economic expansion with significant public expenditure. 
Externally, the rapid expansion of globalisation and Europeanisation has increasingly exerted 
common pressure on national states, which responded with a series of structural reforms towards 
greater market-oriented approaches e.g. deregulation and privatisation. Internally, massive 
deindustrialisation in the post-industrial era has resulted in economic restructuring towards a 
knowledge economy. Nevertheless, these national states have adapted themselves to the challenges 
based on their traditional political economy. Schmidt (2002) notes that British market capitalism 
has been further enhanced. As for managed capitalism in Germany, elements of market capitalism 
have been incorporated into the existing model with the on-going enabling role of the state. In 
France, state-led capitalism has been transformed with a less direct, but still active role of the state. 
Table 6-2 shows changes to models of capitalism prior to 2000.   
 
 
 
Table 6-2  Changes in Characteristics of Models of Capitalism (Prior to 2000)  
 
Source: adapted from Schmidt (2002, 2003)  
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6.3.3  The National Political Economy in the UK and France (1980s-2000s) 
The national political economy in the UK and France needs to be examined further to gain a 
comparative perspective. Firstly, a distinguished political culture, which could not easily be erased 
and converted, has developed and become embedded in society. The UK is the epitome of market 
capitalism due to its historical roots. The British style of capitalism can be traced back to its 
origins in the industrial revolution in the 18
th
 century. Andrew Shonfield notes that the British 
system ―was believed to be the impossibility of imposing any direction on it whatsoever-whether 
from inside the market, by the firms themselves, or from outside it by the authority of the 
government‖ (Shonfield, 1965, p.71). In addition, this deeply ingrained ideology in industrial 
Britain appears to profoundly determine the British planning approach, hence concern regarding 
cost and price and negligence of long-term investment. By the mid-19
th
 century, German 
economist Friedrich List had remarked that ―the British doctrines concentrating on cost and price 
factors, combined with an apparent indifference to the problem of long-term investment, were part 
of an intellectual trick perpetrated by a satisfied industrial nation‖ (quoted from Shonfield, 1965, p. 
81).  
In contrast, France has been a prototype of a strong state interventionist approach. There are at 
least four key elements underlying this methodology. Firstly, an elite ruling class responsible for 
national development has deep roots in history. The French essentially believed that ―…a nation‘s 
economic life must depend on the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of 
exceptionally able people, exercising foresight and judgement of a kind not possessed by the 
average successful man of business‖ (Shonfield, 1965, p.71). Secondly, ―highly skilled, technically 
trained civil servants‖ became the powerhouse leading a strong administrative bureaucracy with a 
strong state identity e.g. colbertisme, dirigisme, which can be traced back to the Napoleonic era, if 
not further (Schmidt, 1996, p.25). Since WW2, this elite corps has been deliberately produced and 
reinforced by their attendance at identical educational institutes (Ecole nationale d’administration 
(ENA)
 52
 or Polytechnique) and their associates in the grands corps of civil servants (Schmidt, 
1996). Thirdly, a close government-business relationship was forged out of civil service 
recruitment patterns and career histories. ―Pantouflage‖ denotes the mobile relationship between 
high-level positions among administration, politics and business (Schmidt, 1996, p.26). Finally, 
the national state has strongly leaned towards economic activities. It was observed that the French 
economic policy traditionally attempted to extend the range of national production (Shonfield, 
1965). Friedrich List, the inventor of ―national economics‖, describes the French industrial system 
as ―a system which has solely in view the founding of a national industry… without regarding the 
temporary gains or losses of value in exchange‖ (quoted from Shonfield, 1965, p.78).  
                                                        
52  ENA was created by Charles de Gaulle in October 1945. 
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The role of state intervention has been the major difference between the two countries. In reaction 
to external forces in the 1980s, the newly-elected political leaders in both countries implemented a 
series of reforms which signified their traditional distinctiveness. In the UK, under the regime of 
Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, massive public spending cuts, deregulation, 
privatisation and the withdrawal of public investment reflected the basic market-led approach 
which adhered to the belief that minimum public intervention could ensure efficiency and delivery 
by the private sector. The British Labour party‘s ideology towards the spatial distribution of power, 
wealth and status did not seem to prevail. Sharpe  (1982) states it was puzzling that the British 
Labour party presented an idea of centralism. In contrast, in France, the left-wing Socialist 
President François Mitterrand, elected in 1981, brought about the remodelling of a strong state, 
highlighting his concern for social welfare and inequality. One of his most significant reforms was 
the decentralisation law of 1982 which was pledged in the socialist party‘s manifesto in the 1970s; 
the objective was to allow greater local democracy and political participation against the 
bureaucratic system traditionally controlled by the centralised state (Bizet, 2002; Mazey, 1987). 
Mitterrand
53
 disagreed with the dichotomy of the two cultures of the French left: a centralised 
Jacobin culture and a decentralising culture, which is doubtful about state intervention. He firmly 
believed ―the necessity of conquering the state as a sine qua non of any transformation‖ (Cole, 
1994, p.62). As Cole comments, ―Mitterrand‘s actions, before and after becoming President, could 
be located firmly within the centralising tradition of French republican political culture‖ (Cole, 
1994, p.62). Despite the fact his successor, French President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), was 
usually classified as a right-wing leader in France, he still embraced the dirigiste 
political-economic model rather than adopting a lassez faire ―Anglo-Saxon ultraliberalism‖ 
(Alesina & Giavazzi, 2006, p.125).     
 
6.4  National Perspective: Styles of Transport Investment  
 
Encountering the growth of and competition from road transport, in the 1960s and 1970s rail 
services experienced a huge deficit. Since the 1980s, although characteristics vary among 
advanced countries in Western Europe, general trends have tended to promote the efficiency and 
competitiveness of transport sectors in response to external competition and fiscal deficit. Two 
general public policies have profoundly challenged conventional styles of transport investment. 
                                                        
53 “I have been labelled as a centraliser. That makes me smile. I am mayor of a small commune, president of a 
provincial departmental council, and I have always argued in favour of a thoroughgoing decentralisation, for the 
suppression of the institution of Prefect, and for increased powers and finance for local authorities. It is true, however, 
that I do not consider that a break with capitalism can come about by a collection of social experimentations. I firmly 
believe in the power of the [sic] state as well” (quoted from Cole, 1994, p.62).    
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Firstly, austerity measurements in public spending have had a major impact on transport 
investment. Since then, key questions have shifted from public provision to private participation 
regarding how infrastructure should be financed and how it should be priced (Banister and 
Berechman, 2000). Secondly, the efficiency of public provision and ownership has been 
questioned. Neoliberal critiques regard these circumstances as ―inefficiencies‖ of centralised 
public control and ownership, which led to infrastructural liberalisation and privatisation (S. 
Graham & Marvin, 2001).  
National styles of transport investment entailed national political ideology in the UK and France. 
In the 1980s, the British Government embraced deep-rooted neo-classical ideology to slash public 
spending; transport has been largely privatised since the mid-1980s. The French Government, 
however, implemented a Keynesianism approach by injecting public money
54
 into TGV 
construction which was intended to reduce unemployment and stimulate growth (Meunier, 2002). 
In the following sections, the two approaches to transport investment are further discussed. 
  
6.4.1  Transport Investment in the UK and France   
 
UK 
 
From the early 1970s onwards, although the role of transport was not abandoned publicly, a 
deep-rooted British ideology which valued cost, competition and efficiency has gradually been 
reflected in the transfer of transport investment from public to private hands. This is significantly 
different from post-war Britain, when the British Government injected massive investment in 
roads into disadvantaged regions
55
 (Hart, 1993). The evaluation of transport investment shifted its 
focus: from systematic analysis in the 1960s and 1970s of large-scale state-oriented investment 
projects to emphasising financial-driven policies (Banister, 1994).  
Firstly, there has been a shift in public expenditure in transport in two aspects, namely a move 
from investment to revenue subsidies and a change in resources from public to private road 
construction under the ideology of ―Roads for Prosperity‖ (Starkie, 1981). In 1976, less than one 
seventh of the transport resources of £20 billion was paid by governments (Department of 
Transport, Scottish Development Department, & Welsh Office, 1977). Although this shift did not 
demonstrate the relationship between a reduction in expenditure and an increase in efficiency 
                                                        
54 Meunier (2002) stresses that the first TGV line between Paris and Lyon did not rely on public money but a financial 
loan. However, under the Mitterrand presidency, public money was injected into TGV development.   
55 The first motorway section in the UK was the Preston bypass, completed in 1958; subsequently, North West 
England had the densest motorway network in the UK by the early 1980s. 
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(Starkie, 1981), the government appeared not to invest as much as they had in the past due to the 
unjustifiable cost of unpopular transport modes
56
. The 1977 Transport White Paper stated:  
―The Government cannot expect its own view to command uncritical support. But those who wish to see a 
significant increase in transport expenditure have a duty to say where the additional money should come from. 
Those who want to spend more in one area or another of  transport must show where, within the budget for 
transport, compensating savings should be found‖ (Department of  Transport, et al., 1977, p.3-4).  
 
The story of the construction of the Channel Tunnel is a classic example to illustrate the 
government‘s views on public transport. The oil crisis of 1973 led to the abandonment of this 
transport project from the British side. Although it was revived in the 1980s, the British Prime 
Minister at the time agreed to this project on the condition that no public funding would be 
involved
57
.  
Secondly, the privatisation of transport sectors was implemented from the 1980s with a series of 
Acts
58
. The Transport Secretary of State at the time, John MacGregor, aptly articulated the 
exemplary political ideology for this policy.  
―Privatisation is one of  the great success stories of  this Government. It has taken different forms in different 
different industries. But common to all privatisations has been the harnessing of  management skills, flair and 
and the entrepreneurial spirit of  the private sector to provide better services for the public. The time has come to 
to extend these benefits to the railways. This calls for a new approach. British Rail makes large losses. It cannot 
cannot therefore be sold as a complete concern in the same way as other industries which we have privatised and 
and there will not be substantial proceeds to the Exchequer. Our objective is to improve the quality of  railway 
railway services by creating many new opportunities for private sector involvement. This will mean more 
competition, greater efficiency, and a wider choice of  services more closely tailored to what customers want‖ 
(Department for Transport, 1992).  
 
                                                        
56 The implementation of rail privatisation in the UK has not only created a complicated contractual relationship 
between the public and the private sectors, but also among private companies. The split of British Rail into a large 
number of private companies is reminiscent of a model of “the competitive structure of Victorian times” (BBC, 2000). 
The role of the government was that of an umpire, to set up a regulatory framework with two regulatory bodies, 
namely the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) and the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR). However, the 
impact of rail privatisation has been controversial. The government believed that the introduction of competition 
involving private companies would increase efficiency and ease financial constraints by handing public assets to private 
hands. In order to make franchises attractive to the private, subsidies were guaranteed to cover their losses. It was 
argued to be “a sure way to ensure a speedy sale” (BBC, 2000). However, public expenditure in rail sectors increased 
instead. Roger Ford, editor of Rail Privatisation News, points out "There is now around £ 1.8bn in subsidy going into 
the rail industry, compared with £ 1.1bn before the restructuring ... We don't know whether we are going to get value 
for that extra money" (Wolmar, 1996). Similarly, regarding the Rail Value for Money study, a recent independent report 
completed by Sir Roy McNulty found similar evidence of “an efficiency gap” in the British rail industry “…the UK 
taxpayer is also paying at least 30% more than taxpayers elsewhere” (McNulty, 2011) and identified ten major barriers 
to efficiency, including fragmentation, the ways in which the main players are operated, roles of government and 
industry, incentives, franchising, fare structures, legal and contractual frameworks, supply chain management and 
relationship and culture. He suggests that these barriers can be overcome, with strong leadership and concerted effort.  
57 In 1984, the British and French Governments reached an agreement on a private investment approach, namely using 
private promoters for the construction and operation of a cross-Channel fixed link and related rail links. 
58 The Airport Act 1986, the Transport Act 1985 (for buses) and the Railway Act 1993.  
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In addition, rail services under privatisation in the UK are controlled and implemented at the 
national level. Rail services are provided, in line with rail routes rather than territorial boundaries 
such as regional or sub-regional areas. Therefore, there is no responsibility or resources at the local 
level to develop an intra-regional network for each region. The power is controlled by the state and 
private train operators.   
 
France 
 
In France, urban public transport returned to prominence in the 1970s after a massive programme 
of road investment
59
 resulting in an urban transport crisis e.g. financial limitations, congestion and 
quality of life (Lassave & Offner, 1989). A critical hypothecated tax (Versement Transport, VT
60
) 
was introduced in this period, which has proven to be significant in granting local authorities the 
power and resources to invest in and transform local transport systems. ―Urban transport policies 
in the 1970s can be analysed as local takeovers of national procedures‖ (Lassave & Offner, 1989, 
p.121).  
Efforts made in the 1970s towards urban public transport planning were further institutionalised in 
the 1980s (Lassave & Offner, 1989). In association with the decentralisation law introduced in 
1982, Charles Fiterman, the then Communist transport minister under a coalition government, 
introduced a series of transport reforms despite the fact that they ―all occurred against a 
background of economic crisis and deregulation‖ (Lassave & Offner, 1989, p.120). Firstly, a key 
transport law called The Future of Internal Transport (LOTI) was introduced in 1982 to highlight 
the wider perspective on transport in society e.g. social, economic and equality aspects. It initially 
targeted a revision of the statutory position of the SNCF which monopolised the national rail 
industry, but the outcome provided a comprehensive legal framework for transport planning. 
Shared roles were defined for the relationship between the central and local states and also that of 
the public authorities and the operators for all modes and at all spatial levels (Harman, I'Hostis, & 
Ménerault, 2007). In addition, LOTI explicitly illustrates a broader perspective on transport which 
is interwoven with other physical and social-economic environments. This system involves ―an 
overall policy associating direct and indirect partners around economically and socially effective 
objectives‖ (Lassave and Offner, 1989, p.126).  
                                                        
59 The fifth plan (1966-1970) demonstrated “a Buchanan like concern with the need to improve highways and to adapt 
the town to the car” (Banister 1994, p.108). 
60 VT was first introduced in the Parisian region. In 1973 VT was applied to towns with a threshold of 300,000 
inhabitants. In 1974, the threshold of VT was dropped to 100,000 inhabitants. The threshold of VT continues to drop 
significantly: 30,000 inhabitants in 1982, 20,000 inhabitants in 1992, 10,000 inhabitants in 1999. 
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Two objectives of LOTI are stated. One, public transport needs to ensure 'complementarity' and 
'fair competition' among different methods of transport. The other, the users have the right to be 
informed of Urban Travel Plans (PDUs). A PDU is the remit of a local transport planning 
authority (AOTU) given to local authorities to organise their urban public transport (Lassave and 
Offner, 1989). Most importantly, LOTI reflects a concern for equality within a capitalist society, 
promoting the mottoes of a ―right to transport for everyone‖, ―public services‖, and ―freedom of 
choice for the user‖ (Harman, et al., 2007). 
Secondly, public investment in transport was not withdrawn regardless of external and internal 
pressures. Global and national economic transformations after the late 1970s inevitably exerted 
severe pressure on the existing French approach to transport investment. Le Galès finds there has 
been an increased tendency towards a competition approach and fiscal cuts in the state funding 
available to local and regional authorities (cited in T. Marshall, 2009a). Nevertheless, the state has 
not remained hands off and left progress to the market (T. Marshall, 2009a). Transport investment 
still presented a critical mass in public spending. In 2005, transport investment in France 
accounted for 17 billion Euros, which was high by international comparison and represented an 
equivalent figure to Germany, despite the fact that France is smaller than Germany in terms of 
both population and economy; it is also a much greater amount than invested in the UK (T. 
Marshall, 2009a).  
Thirdly, similar to the UK, rail reform came about in the mid-1990s, but the method of 
restructuring differs. Two reforms comprised the separation of responsibility between rail 
operators and rail infrastructure, and the devolution of regional rail passenger services to regional 
governments. In the former, unlike the split of national rail into a number of private companies in 
the UK, SNCF was transformed into two separate state-owned companies in 1997: SNCF and RFF 
(Réseau Ferré de France), which are respectively responsible for train operation and rail 
infrastructure. Under the regulation of LOTI, SNCF must listen to and take local needs into 
account. According to the latter, in line with decentralisation measurement, regional governments 
have become the regional tier of transport authority since 1982 and regional rail passenger 
authority since 2002
61
. Regions have responsibility for defining regional passenger rail services by 
settling multi-annual agreements (2002-2007, 2008-2014) with SNCF (The North European 
High-speed Network, 2010).  
However, since 1997, disagreements between SNCF and regional governments have loomed large 
and, indeed, expanded from 2002. In its role as a state-owned private railway operator, SNCF 
focuses on commercial concerns about national and international long-haul rail journeys and so 
                                                        
61 After a period of experiments (1998-2002) and an appropriate cash flow to region was set up in 2002. Between 1998 
and 2002, a period of experiment was carried out in seven major regions. 
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tends to operate as fast as possible without many stops in order to compete with air transport and 
the expansion of its European market. This approach clashes with regional expectations, as 
governments hoped that HST services could be used to serve wider regions. SNCF and regional 
governments compete with each other to use rail tracks in order to organise their own services. In 
actuality, due to the scale of investment in rail rolling stock and running regional services, regional 
governments largely depend on SNCF which is still the dominant provider of rail facilities.  
Regarding the privatisation process, the two countries again reflect their different ideologies of the 
political economy. ―In France, privatisation was a centrally controlled, highly regulated affair‖ 
(Schmidt, 1996, p.52). The state in France ―remains embedded in French culture and embodied in 
its institutions, with change able to come only through the state, not against it… Governments 
have not stopped seeking to guide business, albeit in more indirect ways …and they as always play 
a primary role in deciding the direction of economic growth…‖ (Schmidt, 1996, p.442). In the case 
of Aéroports de Paris, the French Government Authority hold the majority shareholding (52.1%) 
(Aéroports de Paris, 2011b).  
 
6.4.2  HST Approaches in the UK and France 
 
Since the 1960s, rail sectors have encountered significant competition from road and air in terms 
of freight and passenger services in both countries. As mentioned already in section 5.2, the two 
countries adopted distinct HST approaches: the UK followed an upgrade approach vs. France‘s 
policy of building new HST lines. In addition to different national political economies, three major 
aspects shape these two models, namely technical, geographical and evaluation considerations.     
     
UK 
  
Despite recognition of the need for inter-city rail services, building new lines was not an option in 
that context for three reasons. Firstly, from a technical viewpoint, due to the high quality of the 
inherited Victorian rail infrastructure, it was possible to efficiently upgrade the lines to meet the 
needs of faster services. ―It stands as a permanent memorial to an extraordinary genius of 
engineering, whose vision leapt far into the future‖ (Hall, 2009b, p.59). Figure 6-1 shows a map of 
the British Railway Network. 
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Figure 6-1  The British Railway Network 
 
Source: author  
 
Secondly, geographically speaking, the construction of new lines in the relatively densely 
populated UK would be more costly than other countries. An increase in finance was particularly 
unjustifiable when the rail industry was declining (Barnett, 1993). The Beeching Report of BR 
modernisation plan in 1963 found inter-city rail passenger services were potentially profitable, but 
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the stopping services were poorly used. Therefore, the transport policy aimed to close uneconomic 
services by the ―discontinuance of many stopping passenger services‖ and the ―selective 
improvement of inter-city passenger services and rationalisation of routes‖ (British Rail Board, 
1963).  
Thirdly, evaluation of rail investment by the 1980s largely relied on financial appraisal 
supplemented with cost benefit analysis (ACTRA, 1977, p.125). Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has 
been a common method for road appraisal since the 1960s for an overriding need for road 
construction. With distorted bias towards time saving and the attempt to apply monetary terms to 
non-monetary situations, CBA has been problematic. The Roskill Commission (1968-1971) on the 
third London Airport is ―one of the most exhaustive cost benefit analyses ever undertaken‖ 
(ACTRA, 1977, p.123). Several scholars had cast doubts on CBA. Self (1970) stressed the lack of 
a planning framework which would involve conflicts and public debates on different sets of 
requirements. The extent of these conflicts could not be known and evaluated unless they are 
classified and analysed in the investigations. Adams (1970, 1974) maintained that the decision is 
not quantifiable and the value of human life is subjective far from a rational one. Lichfield (1971) 
argued that distributional benefits should be included. These problems aroused the concern that 
decisions should not be made based on CBA; instead, they should be modified by judgement 
(Banister, 1994; P. Hall, 1980). 
 
The assessment of transport investment was under rigorous review by the Leitch report (ACTRA, 
1977) signified a milestone on the evolution of CBA in the UK. A contemporary judgement 
described it as ―a bench mark in a field of general disorder…[T]he committee has attempted to 
deal systematically with a range of complex criticisms about the use of computerised cost-benefit 
economic assessments…‖ (Financial Times 11 January 1978, cited in Dudley & Richardson, 2000, 
p.133) and it ―clarified many issues previously obscure or unexplained‖ (Commercial Motor 3 
February 1978, citied in Dudley & Richardson, 2000, p.133). Consequently, it led to the 
permanent status of the Standing Advisory Committees on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRAs) 
which could advise and initiate any significant changes in transport appraisal and forecasting 
methods. Greater comparability with other modes of transport was proposed, such as the 
application of the SACTRA framework to rail investment (Colin Buchanan and Partners, 1984). 
Later on, cost benefit analysis became a basic method of economic appraisal as just one important 
common factor in the decision-making process for transport investment (Steer Davies Gleave, 
2004, p.19). 
 
Although the Leitch report suggested that investment in rail ―should be conducted on the basis of 
[CBA], within the framework, rather than financial appraisal‖ (ACTRA, 1977, p.137), the 
dominance of financial appraisal in rail investment continued to exist in the 1980s and the early 
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1990s: ―all rail investment had to be justifiable on the basis of returns from commercial revenues 
at the Government‘s then-standard 8% discount rate‖ (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004, p.19). But by 
the late 1990s, evaluation began to take into account the integration with other transport modes 
and land use. The White Paper ―A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone‖ (Department of 
the Environment Transport and the Regions, 1998a) led to a New Approach to Transport Appraisal 
(NATA) (Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, 1998b) for multi-modal 
appraisal. In addition, SACTRA (1999) noted that CBA is not capable of taking full account of 
wider impact (agglomeration) and regeneration impacts. In addition to NATA, Transport Appraisal 
Guidance Unit 2.8 has been developed to serve this purpose. This may improve the evaluation of 
the wider agglomeration and regeneration effects around a HST hub, but the distribution effects 
into a wider region have been not well addressed. As Rierveld (1989) has emphasised, ―This 
distribution issue receives little systematic attention in the models surveyed, which is regrettable 
since the regional incidence of infrastructure improvements depends strongly on it‖ (Rietveld, 
1989, p.273).  
 
 
France 
 
The French approach to HST is characterised by its progressive construction of new TGV lines, 
but the origin of this HST solution is far from inevitable and straightforward. Figure 6-2 shows the 
plan for the TGV network over the long-term. Firstly, from the technical aspect, in the aftermath of 
WW2 the existing conventional rail network was ―in a shambles‖ (Meunier, 2002, p.1); half of the 
network was unusable with fragmented sections. Over the immediate post-war period, the state 
rebuilt the rail system (T. Marshall, 2009a), but was reluctant to permit SNCF to take rail 
modernisation further by the end of the 1960s because SNCF was indebted (Meunier, 2002). 
Through tracing the origins of the TGV, Meunier (2002) argues that, quite contrary to the common 
impression of TGV as an example of far-sighted transport policy planning, until the inauguration 
of the first TGV-line the TGV favoured by SNCF was ―an unwanted child‖, encountering 
extensive opposition and alternative competition from train technology e.g. the oil-burning gas 
turbine propulsion system and Jean Bertin‘s Aérotrain. Meunier (2002) attributes the threat of 
technical competition from the Japanese Shinkansen to be the decisive factor in the SNCF‘s 
development of the TGV
62
.  
 
                                                        
62 SNCF created a new research department two years after the arrival of the Shinkansen and there was a change in 
attitude by the end of 1960s that believed TGVs have certain economic and commercial advantages over slower 
conventional trains (Meunier, 2002). 
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Figure 6-2  The Long-term Plan for the TGV Network 
 
 
 
Source: Amended from Arduin & Ni (2005, p.28) 
 
 
 
 
But all the doubts and fears appeared groundless when the TGV Sud-Est line was successfully 
inaugurated in 1981, which unified the whole of the country and psychologically motivated the 
newly-arrived Socialist President to change his attitude towards TGV. The development of TGV 
was undertaken before socialist President Mitterrand came into power, and the attitude of 
Mitterrand towards the TGV was negative at that time. The French press Le Monde revealed that 
Mitterrand said to a colleague, when he was the deputy of the National Assembly, that ―Between 
us, this TGV is only going to cause headaches and will do nothing for our départements‖ (cited in 
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Meunier, 2002). However, later Mitterrand became especially proud of the French technology 
inherent in the TGV which was regarded as a victory for French industry. An increase in R&D 
funding for TGV was endorsed to maintain its leading position in this field. The TGV has become 
one of the ten favourite brands of France (Pepy and Leboeuf, 2005) and ―a symbol of modern 
society‖ (Arduin and Ni, 2005).  
Despite the uncertainty of the controversial and troublesome process before the arrival of the first 
TGV-line, under the Mitterrand Presidency, the long-term development of TGV gained more 
justifiable support. The further expansion of the TGV network (TGV-Atlantique and TGV-Nord) 
forged ahead soon after the first appearance of the TGV. It starts with individual lines between 
Paris and major provincial cities and later evolves to allow direct rail services between provincial 
cities with an integrated HST network around Paris. In order to provide TGV services to Paris 
CDG Airport for the TGV-Nord project, an interconnection line (Le Jonction) was ingeniously 
proposed by a civil engineer, R. Rudeau, to transform the initial TGV model (Pepy & Leboeuf, 
2005). Synergy of rail journeys was achieved: interchange at the junction stations enables direct 
services between provincial cities without the need to change terminal stations in central Paris, 
with TGV seats used by two successive travellers (Pepy & Leboeuf, 2005). 
In addition, the SNCF introduced a remarkable publicity slogan ―progress means nothing unless it 
is shared by all‖ (Meunier, 2002, p.7). Also, with a Keynesian approach, the endorsement of the 
TGV was believed by Mitterrand to assist in the creation of jobs (Meunier, 2002).    
Secondly, the famous book ―Paris and the French Desert‖ written by Jean- François Gravier 
(Gravel, 1947) vividly reflected the geographical features of the uneven and thinly populated 
French territory outside the Parisian region. Paris and its Île-de-France location in the northern part 
of France has an over-dominant population, industries and productivities in a relatively small area, 
whereas other major French regional cities are relatively distant from the capital. Most are more 
than 400 km away (the exception is Lille which is 200 km from Paris), so such features are 
particularly suitable for the commercial operation of HST in competition with air. The 
competitiveness of TGV services diverted half a million passengers from air to rail per annum 
(Thompson, 1994). The arrival of the TGV Sud-Est line resulted in the transformation of Lyon into 
an HST hub city because of the logic of the TGV service; passengers from several intermediate 
towns which previously had direct trains to and from Paris first had to travel to Lyon to catch the 
TGV to Paris (Meunier, 2002). Therefore, the logic of the French HST system suits the 
geographical features of the country in terms of connecting major provincial cities with Paris as 
fast as possible without the need for frequent stops. At the same time, the interoperability between 
new TGV lines and conventional lines enables faster rail services to serve a wider network into 
various towns beyond the new lines (Arduin and Ni, 2005). In addition, since the mid-1990s, the 
arrival of the TGV-Nord has brought about an innovative solution to progress French HST 
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operation into an effective system with the creation of interconnected lines and stations around 
Paris to avoid inconvenience in the Paris central termini and to increase accessibility between 
provincial cities.   
Thirdly, a broader assessment approach was adopted to consider wider issues e.g. regional 
development and environmental impacts in addition to financial and economic CBA. The 
progressive investment in TGV could be attributed to the possibility of political judgement on 
projects based on public utility (Déclaration d’utilité publique). ―[C]ost-benefit analysis is 
intended to inform, but not to substitute, the political decision‖ (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). This 
investment concern could also be attributed to its academic trajectory of transport planning. 
Benwell believes many French researchers have extended their interests into transport fields from 
other disciplines and tend to focus on the behaviour of individuals, the role of cultural factors and 
the organisation of society. Therefore, there is an inclination towards the conceptual links between 
transport and land-use dynamics (quoted in Banister, 1994). This approach is sharply different 
from the modelling approach to problem-solving found in the UK.  
 
6.5  National Styles of Local Governmental Systems and Restructuring    
 
Local government systems are associated with the spatial scale and power divided within a country 
to delegate the responsibility of the national state into lower tiers of local government. In addition 
to the service function, local economic development is another responsibility delegated to local 
authorities. However, with the increasing expansion of spatial economic territory and widening 
spatial inequality, local authorities cannot deal with economic development and deliver services 
alone. The support of a political coalition or governmental reorganisation is necessary to deal with 
many of the common issues involved in a wider territory.  
The constitutional division and hence the capacity of local government are occasionally 
restructured by the national state. Reforms have a significant impact on local intervention because 
the ideology of the national state is reflected in the resulting changes. For instance, the national 
state may decide to restructure and empower regional government and municipalities through 
devolution, which allows local governments to combat regional and urban inequalities e.g. 
encourages positive agglomeration and growth in poorer cities and regions. On the contrary, the 
national state may squeeze local discretionary power and resources and create difficult conditions 
for local intervention. 
The following two sections examine the sharing of power amongst different tiers of government. 
Section 6.5.1 focuses on the formation of sub-national governments: metropolitan and regional 
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governments and their interaction and section 6.5.2 outlines local government systems and 
restructuring in the UK and France. 
 
6.5.1  The Formation of Sub-national Governments  
 
6.5.1.1  The Formation of A Metropolitan Government  
A mismatch between municipal administrative territories and interdependent city-region economic 
territories has progressively widened. As national capitals and provincial cities gather diverse 
urbanisation economies, they tend to grow and become co-dependent on neighbouring cities and 
towns beyond their existing boundaries. Widespread travel-to-work patterns and the 
de-concentration process of economic activities have given rise to the need for larger scale 
city-regional planning to sustain agglomeration economies and also to allow for continuing growth. 
However, the nature of individual municipalities is fragmented, so it is not a simple matter to 
achieve wider territorial development at the metropolitan scale. Political consideration shapes the 
formation of metropolitan governments, which involves the reallocation of existing power held by 
municipalities. As Cheshire and Gordon (1996) stress the achievement of a collective action will 
encounter political obstacles. The eventual results of organising wider territorial co-operations are 
relatively weak (Brenner, 2003) e.g. the coverage of fewer individual municipalities than initially 
planned (Hampton, 1991).   
 
6.5.1.2  The Formation of A Regional Government  
Regions are definite sub-divisions of a nation, while metropolitan areas are less definite and may 
be likened to agglomerated hilly areas within a regional plain. A regional boundary normally 
incorporates one or two metropolitan areas. There is an inherent difference in responsibility 
between regional governments and metropolitan governments. Inevitably, the legitimate 
metropolitan boundaries do not reflect the real spatial-economic landscape. Rather, the real 
catchment area (hinterland) of the core metropolitan city is much wider than its administrative 
zone. According to constitutional responsibility, unlike the role of metropolitan governments in 
managing urban growth and its legitimate hinterland, the mission of a regional government 
critically consists of taking care of everyone and every place within the region, no matter how poor 
or how rich. In this vein, regional government carries out a critical role in the rebalancing of 
uneven intra-regional development. In order to achieve that, it has been suggested that there is a 
need for a countervailing power. Keating notes ―As the regional planning and development 
policies became more ambitious and more politicised, there was an argument that they could only 
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effectively be carried through by multi-functional authorities with the political weight provided by 
direction election‖ (Keating, 1998, p.58).  
 
6.5.1.3  The Interaction between Different Levels of Government 
The interaction between nation states, regional governments, metropolitan governments and 
municipalities is dynamic and relies on specific forms of government moulded in different 
countries and localities. There are inherent differences in the concerns of different government 
tiers. Although national government may not be willing to devolve its power to regions, devolution 
also pushes down to the regional level ―the difficult questions of distribution and priorities‖ 
(Keating, 1998, p.59). For a regional/ metropolitan nexus, it could be argued that tension between 
regional and metropolitan governments is unavoidable if both are present within a region. If 
regional government plays a more active role towards the more vulnerable places, it could have a 
more a positive impact than the opposite situation. The interaction between different government 
tiers may play a key role in determining the outcome of opportunities offered by HST.   
 
6.5.2  Local Government Systems and Restructuring in the UK and France 
 
6.5.2.1  British Systems and Restructuring  
 
 
Traditional Local Government in the UK 
 
There is a traditional separation between central and local government in the UK. Redlich and 
Hirst remark that self-government by UK local authorities has been admired by Britain‘s European 
neighbours (cited in Goldsmith & Page, 1987). This feature is conceptualised by Bulpitt as the 
―dual polity‖
63
, which has also been termed as ―divided administrative systems‖ (Ashford, 1982, 
p.4). This characterisation has a close association with the traditional ideology of the national state. 
As Ashford (1982) denotes, this self-government by British local states results from the 
19
th
-century liberal democratic state with its prevailing laissez-faire values in society. Therefore, 
the local government system in the UK was quite heterogeneous by the late 19
th
 century. Every 
                                                        
63 The dual polity thesis maintains that “British national political elites had traditionally shown little interest in the 
more mundane activity of municipal government. In order to relieve themselves of this task they delegated, or rather 
failed to appropriate for themselves, large areas of state services to the local authorities. In particular, the authorities 
were given responsibility for fulfilling a wide range of state functions and were allowed a high degree of discretion in 
delivering local services. In turn, central elites became relatively unencumbered by demands for central intervention in 
local services- a position congruent with their desire to relieve the pressure to become embroiled in unglamorous “low 
politics” so that they might devote their attention to issues of “high politics”, such as foreign affairs, defence and 
taxation” (Goldsmith and Page, 1987: pp. 68-69). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6  Towards An Explanation: Establishing An Analytical Planning Framework 
 
220 
 
municipal corporation had a separate and different character (Hampton, 1991). This traditional 
dual polity leads to a general separation of national from local politics and the subordination of 
local aims to national party strategy and priority. ―Local authorities have no powers except such as 
defined by statue‖ (cited in Goldsmith and Page, 1987, p. 71) and ―local politicians tended to lose 
community ties once elected to Parliament‖ (cited in Goldsmith and Page, 1987, p.82).  
 
Local Government Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
The post-war welfare state resulted in a massive increase in expenditure on local service provision, 
so local government in the UK took responsibility for a wide range of government functions. Two 
major impacts of reforms were the political weakness of local states and the further dismantling of 
strategic spatial structures for governance. Firstly, a new style of centralised state broke down the 
traditional dual polity model. The Conservative Government reduced government expenditure and 
local spending with a series of radical reforms which allowed the central state to intervene in the 
affairs of the local state and reduce the capacity of local discretion
64
. Despite the national state 
becoming more directly involved in local policy making, it did not bridge the political gulf 
between the two arms of government. Goldsmith and Page (1987) stress that the traditional 
characteristics of local governments in the UK could explain the political weakness of this tier, 
which made it relatively easy for the national state to intervene. Secondly, due to the Local 
Government Act of 1985, the abolition of metropolitan counties (including London and provincial 
metropolitan counties) resulted in two negative outcomes for strategic structures. Firstly, the 
official role of strategic planning at the metropolitan level disappeared. Secondly, power passed 
from metropolitan counties to metropolitan districts (Hall, 2002). Metropolitan districts became 
single-tier Unitary Authorities (UAs) which were granted the combined functions of a county 
council and a district council. With the advent of the Local Government Act 1992 and consequent 
Local Government Commission for England (1992), some non-metropolitan districts in England 
were further given power to act as single-tier unitary authorities
65
. The consequences of these 
institutional changes led to the weakening of the concept of a strategic planning authority at both 
the metropolitan and non-metropolitan county level.  
The division of ―region‖ largely catered for statistical purposes and planning guidance without 
integrating planning power and resources. In the early 1990s, a regional concern was pushed 
forward after the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992. The selection of members for the Committee of the 
                                                        
64 Such as the introduction of the centralised Audit Commission to replace the office of district auditor in 1980, a new 
grant system replacing a block grant with reduced grants, targets, claw backs and penalties and “rate-capping” 
(Goldsmith and Page, 1987). 
65 From 1992 to 2002, 46 unitary authorities were created out of non-metropolitan counties. In 2009, another wave of 
UAs was created. 
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Regions fostered the creation of regional divisions in England. In 1994, the Government Offices 
for the Regions (GORs) in England were set up (then abolished in 2010) for the purpose of 
effective coordination between various regional offices of central government departments.  
 
Local Government Reforms from the Late 1990s 
 
After the Labour Government took power in 1997, a new institutional system for regional 
development was proposed. The new regional system envisaged that a directly elected mayor was 
given a leading and responsible role with regional strategic authority to integrate crucial functional 
bodies, corresponding to a grand strategic plan
66
. This regional strategic authority would be 
scrutinised and monitored by an elected London Assembly. This attempt succeeded in London, 
Scotland and Wales, but other regional strategic authorities in England failed after a rejected 
referendum in the north-east in 2004. However, three regional bodies co-existed in provincial 
regions (GORs, Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), and Regional Assemblies (RAs)). 
RDAs and RAs were respectively in charge of Regional Economic Strategy (RES) and Regional 
Planning Guidance (RPG), which was later replaced by Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS). On the 
one hand, RDAs were assigned the power of land assembly and compulsory purchase in order to 
function as a developer in delivering investment for regional economic growth and regeneration in 
compliance with the Regional Economic Strategy on a long term basis. On the other hand, RAs 
which comprised local authorities and other social and business partners, were granted regional 
planning power. Nevertheless, all these regional tiers and planning mechanisms were abolished in 
2010 when the conservatives returned to be the ruling party.    
In brief, following dramatic government reforms, local government in England
67
 has become 
largely controlled by the central government with very limited local financial discretion. In 
addition, a mixture of two government systems (a single-tier unitary authority and a two-tier 
system (non-metropolitan counties and districts)) and fragmented regional organisations and 
responsibility could likely generate inconsistency and fragmentation of urban and regional 
development. These circumstances, with the traditional separated relationship between the central 
and local state, may lead to difficulties in local intervention caused by the dominance of the 
powerful centralised state.     
 
                                                        
66 In the case of Greater London, there are four functional bodies associated with transport, police, fire and emergency, 
and economic development. 
67 Devolution in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Greater London was achieved by 2000. Only England was the 
exception.    
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6.5.2.2  French Systems and Restructuring   
 
 
Traditional Local Government in France  
 
France was a synonym of a centralised state. Two traditional administrative divisions were created 
after the French revolution, namely the large unit (département) and the small unit
68
 (commune). 
However, both structures are inadequate to manage and develop the territory. The large unit 
département was recognised as being insufficient to cope with the growth of local initiatives, 
which led to the birth of the concept of a region (Hackett & Hackett, 1963). Similarly, individual 
small unit communes were too fragmented to effectively deal with common issues with the 
growing inter-relationship between municipalities. Therefore, there has been a continual process of 
decentralisation in France from the late 1950s through various inter-communal and regional 
reforms.     
There are two distinctive features of French government systems. Firstly, despite the presence of a 
hierarchical framework, none of the sub-national levels is superior to others. There is thus a greater 
requirement for cooperation and negotiation than would be necessary in a largely centralised state 
before consensus is forged. Secondly, another feature which is deeply associated with the 
centralised state is the traditional centre-periphery relations, the ―cumul des mandates‖ (multiple 
political office holding) (Colomb, 2007; Mény, 1987). This tradition which has persisted since the 
third republic means that the mayor of a municipality could be a minister in central government, 
and the president of a region, and the president of an inter-communal cooperation at the same time.  
 
The Formation of Inter-communal Structures (EPCIs)  
 
In order to address the problem of the over-concentration of Paris, the designation of métropoles 
d’equilibre in 1963 brought about the creation of CUs in eight major French regional cities. CUs 
were given power and resources by the national state to take over key responsibilities and fiscal 
resources from individual municipalities (Farthing & Carrière, 2007) and form a upper-tier 
framework for a wider urban community with the responsibility for a range of strategies such as 
spatial economic planning, urban transport and cohesive territory master planning. Since the 1960s, 
three major EPCIs
69
 have come into being, namely ―communautés urbaines‖ (CU), 
                                                        
68 The small administrative unit commune in France represents a unit of a municipality with its own directly elected 
mayor. A French municipality is relatively much smaller than the British equivalent. The population of the smallest 
English municipality has at least 30,000 inhabitants (2001 census), while the median population of a French 
municipality is 380 inhabitants (1999 census). 
69 A single function cooperation (SIVU) between municipalities had come into being by the end of 19th century, 
followed by multiple function cooperation (SIVOM) since 1959. However, little was achieved between 1959 and 1961 
because of a variety of issues of a political and financial nature. According to Hackett and Hackett (1963), the following 
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―communautés de communes‖ (CC), and ―communautés d’agglomération‖ (CA), in line with the 
degree of integration. In 1992, the second EPCI known as CCs was created without a minimum 
threshold of population except geographical continuity. Later on, CCs were modified in 
compliance with the Chevènement Law of 1999 which gave rise to the third EPCI (CA) with a 
minimum threshold of population. In January 2011, the total number of EPCIs reached 2,599, 
covering 95% of the communes and 91% of the population. To suit the nature of small communes, 
the boundary of EPCIs is not fixed because it depends on successful cooperation and fusion with 
neighbouring communes. As Breuillard et al. (2007) note, French government style is ―territorial 
democracy‖ based on local interests while the British approach shows a ―functional democracy‖- 
the local government provides local services under the direction of parliament and the control of 
central administration‘s rationalisation.  
 
The Formation of the Regional Tier in France 
 
A new geographical layer known as ―programme regions‖ was created by a decree in 1956. Since 
the mid-1950s, regions have become a key spatial unit for investment under the Contrat de Plan. 
The major change which took place in the 1980s was the decentralisation law in 1982, which 
marked an adjustment in this decentralisation process. Four local governments (region, 
département, EPCIs, commune) were given respective competences within their responsible 
territories. In contrast with the traditionally British self-governing local authorities, the habitually 
small and weak French local authority commune went through a process of creating new 
governance structures, as well as delegated responsibility and financial resources to local levels. 
Governance restructuring could not be separated from its delegated responsibility and resources in 
the French system. French planning approaches will be discussed further in section 6.6.2.    
In addition, despite the limits that were placed on cumul des mandates
70
, the centre-periphery 
relation in France is characterised by ―osmosis‖ rather than ―separation‖ (Mény, 1987), or ―a very 
strong mutual influence‖ instead of ―division‖ (Colomb, 2007). ―The interpenetration between 
centre and periphery is linked with constant exchanges and overlap between the administrative and 
political sphere‖ (Mény, 1987, p.99). With the two traditional features mentioned earlier, the series 
of government restructuring involved an intensive process of negotiation, compromises and 
cooperation in order to seek consensus among different tiers for mutual interest. Otherwise, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
solutions were proposed by the commission: (1) Reinforcing the power of urban districts with the provision of 
financial resources. The district could be given any of the functions of the communes. (2) Harmonising activities, 
drawing up an overall plan for urban development. (3) A newer and more appropriate local government system which 
is needed to deal with the inadequacy of the traditional form of local government.  
70 Since 1986, politicians are only allowed to hold two offices. But the rule excludes mandates in cities with a 
population smaller than 20,000 (Mény, 1987).   
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relationship between the tiers would be combative in essence and it would be an arduous task to 
reach agreement. Positively, it also allows holders of local political office direct access to national 
government (Booth, Nelson, & Paris, 2007), the chance to nationalise local affairs and special 
consideration accorded to peripheral interests (Mény, 1987).  
 
6.5.3  Local Transport Authorities  
In the UK, each local level has a different degree of transport responsibility, including districts, 
unitary authorities, counties and regions. However, local authorities in the UK have little control 
over public transport; rail is controlled at the national level. It does not mean there are no new 
urban transit systems in the UK, but they rarely exist because of the limited funding available to 
local authorities, unless local authorities participate in a vigorous funding campaign process for the 
central government. In actuality, the majority of limited funding available at the local level is used 
to fund unpopular bus routes or make accessibility improvements to bus and railway stations 
(Harman, et al., 2007). In France, as mentioned earlier in Section 6.4.1, local transport authorities 
are termed AOTUs. Within a region, there may be four types of AOTUs, namely regions, 
departments, AOTUs which are the same as EPCIs, and AOTUs that differ from EPCIs. At the 
inter-communal level, AOTUs are not necessarily identical to inter-communal organisations 
(EPCIs), although most AOTUs are associated with EPCIs. Each AOTU has its own financial 
resources, which enables them to develop their own transport systems. In order to enhance 
cooperation between AOTUs, the arrival of the SRU law encouraged the creation of SMTs to 
better deal with the wider travel-to-work patterns and agglomeration economies by fiscal 
incentives. However, with all these different tiers of AOTUs, coordination has become difficult 
because no AOTUs have control over any others (Harman, et al., 2007).       
 
6.6  National Styles of Regional and Urban Planning Approaches  
 
6.6.1  The Co-ordination between Spatial-Economic and Transport Planning  
In addition to government systems and their restructuring, local interventions to make the most of 
opportunities presented by HST are closely associated with urban and regional planning 
approaches shaped by the national political economy. There may or may not be an enabling and 
co-ordinated environment in which local authorities can take action. Urban and regional planning 
approaches in this study have focused on the co-ordination of spatial-economic planning and 
transport planning. The current debate discussed in section 2.4 and two empirical findings in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 strongly suggest that transport itself is not a sufficient condition for urban 
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and regional development. The issue is that the nature of public intervention needs to be 
co-ordinated rather than being isolated. ―…[t]his sort of intervention, in any of its institutional 
guises, has little resemblance to traditional urban policy, with its emphasis on infrastructure, 
housing, transportation and urban public finance; it is instead oriented toward the problem of 
coordination of urban production systems‖ (Scott & Storper, 2003, p.587). In the following section, 
regional and urban planning approaches in the UK and France are reviewed to understand the 
essentially different approaches.  
 
6.6.2  Urban and Regional Planning Approaches in the UK and France  
 
6.6.2.1  British Planning Approaches  
With the background of being the earliest and most rapidly industrialised country in the world, 
British approaches to spatial-economic planning have developed to tackle regional/urban problems 
rather than national/regional problems. The landscape of industrial urbanisation is evident in 
several well-established industrial core cities across the counties, particularly in northern and 
midland England. These industrial cities eclipsed London in their heydays. Overspill problems in 
all industrial core cities resulted in a series of planning initiatives such as Green Belt, New Town 
development, and the construction of motorways; in other words, key public interventions.  
Spatial-economic planning policy at the national/regional scale was formulated in the early 1960s, 
but this attempt at emulating the French economic planning approach soon failed in 1969 when 
inter-departmental conflicts caused difficulties
71
. The nature of economic planning itself involved 
the need to integrate different departments on complex issues. It could be argued that the absence 
of a cross-department board with a higher position above departmental level brought about the 
rival mentality among departments. As Hall (2002) illustrates, the boundary between short-term 
economic planning (the Treasury) and long-term economic planning (the DEA) proved difficult to 
delineate. In addition, the uneven prosperity between regions resulted in different spatial and 
economic planning requirements for each region, which also led to uneven responsibility between 
departments
72
. The failure of the economic planning initiative suggested a reasonable link to the 
deep-rooted national style of political economy discussed already in section 6.3.3. Shonfield (1965) 
                                                        
71 At the national level, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was established to prepare a national plan. 
Additionally, at the regional level, regional economic planning councils and regional economic planning boards were 
created for regional coordination. O’Hara argues in his book titled “From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and 
Social Planning in 1960s Britain”, due to the uneasy and shifting compromise, co-ordinated planning was relinquished 
to “individual, piecemeal, and reactive initiatives” (O'Hara, 2007, p.128). 
72 For instance, the more prosperous south-east region would request stronger physical elements of planning because 
development would still take place anyway, whereas other declining regions would demand economic, educational and 
social measures, in addition to physically-led planning. 
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expresses his suspicion of this experiment, based on the observation of a period of 20 years in the 
evolution of British planning approach after WW2: 
―The approach to planning involved a long and unwilling apprenticeship. It was the frustration caused by the 
series of  ad hoc interventions, forced upon the government by its desire to control the business cycle, maintain full 
employment and at the same time keep a weak balance of  payments from running into deficit, which led to a new 
and sympathetic interest in economic planning. The development is all the more striking because it was the 
erstwhile ideological antagonists of  a planned, as opposed to a market, economy who in the end created the 
machinery of  planning‖ (Shonfield, 1965, p.123). 
 
In the 1980s, the active market-led approach significantly determined modern planning practice. 
The spatial-economic planning policy was targeted at the urban level in order to tackle the 
inner-city problem which persisted in the late 1970s and urban riots in the early 1980s. As for 
regional planning, the role of regional planning at this stage was implemented as guidance for 
local planning permission rather than controlling planning resources allocated at the regional level. 
After the Labour Government was re-elected in 1997, urban regeneration strategies were further 
implemented. A commission report ―Towards An Urban Renaissance‖ (Urban Task Force, 1999) 
recommended the concentration of resources in urban areas and the solution to urban sprawl by 
supporting higher-density residential development in run-down urban areas. In line with this vision, 
a series of key urban regeneration initiatives were implemented e.g. Urban Regeneration 
Companies (URCs), New Deal for Communities (NDCs), Market Renewal Pathfinders (MRPs). 
Most importantly, regional planning operations were introduced to assist tackling regional 
inequality. Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) brought massive funding for northern 
regional development. 
Four broad aspects of British planning approaches could be identified. Firstly, the role of private 
sectors in these regeneration programmes and the physical reclamation and reuse of derelict land 
in the inner-city area were highlighted (Fraser & Lerique, 2007). A series of physical and 
economic regeneration programmes and subsidies were intensively employed by the Conservative 
Government to regenerate urban derelict areas e.g. Urban Development Corporations (UDC), 
Enterprise Zones (EZ). UDCs which bypassed local authorities were given planning power directly 
from the central state. Under the Labour Government, a novel aspect was introduced. URCs which 
were granted funding and commercial elements operated in partnership with private sectors and 
local governments, albeit without planning power.  
Secondly, a competition approach to government funding and grants was implemented for local 
regeneration projects. City Challenges and Single Regeneration Budgets are typical schemes. 
These competition bids allocated resources to capable local authorities which could present a 
demonstrable outcome, whereas the places which were vulnerable and in need of help were not 
always capable of proving their potential for change.   
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Thirdly, the British planning system is guidance-led between the central and local states. Since 
1947, the Town and Country Planning Act has long established in-house planning expertise and 
planning mechanisms at the local level. Figure 6-3 demonstrates a change in planning policy 
framework in England between 1980 and 2004. Before 2004, the regional tier had no actual 
planning power, but provided guidance in line with the ―material consideration‖ of PPG with 
which lower tiers of governments must comply regarding their structural and local plans including 
UAs, counties and districts. The impact of the separate central-peripheral relationship discussed in 
section 6.5.2.1 on this guidance-led relationship is apparent. After the 2004 reform, the strategic 
role of planning was transferred from counties to Regional Assemblies which could prepare their 
own RSSs (including RTS) as strategic upper plans for guiding UAs and districts‘ LDFs.  
 
Figure 6-3  The Planning Policy Framework in England between 1980 and 2010  
 
Source: adapted from Cullingworth and Nadin (2006) by author    
 
Fourthly, the co-ordinated relationship between public transport planning and spatial-economic 
planning was weak. As mentioned in section 6.4.1, under Margret Thatcher‘s regime, investment 
in public transport was massively slashed and it was largely privatised. Except for road 
construction, public transport was not a tool for change. Transport policies were targeted to be 
improved after 1997 under the Labour Government. A series of transport policies were introduced, 
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namely a transport White Paper ―A new deal for transport: better for everyone‖ in 1998, the 
Transport Act 2000 introduced the local transport plan (LTP) and Transport 2010, and another two 
white papers in 2004 reviewed the rail administration and the future of transport- Network 2030. 
There was an attempt to integrate transport and land use planning through planning policy 
guidance PPG12 in the 1998 White Paper. Nevertheless, there have been practical problems. 
Harman et al. (2007) point out that under the two-tier system, counties still have transport 
responsibility, but the accountability for LDF was transferred to the district authorities. In addition, 
the different durations of LDF (10 years) and LTP (five years) were difficult to integrate.         
Additionally, regarding central government‘s responsibility, planning was closely associated with 
local governments, but had a weak relationship with transport planning except for a short period of 
experiments. Over the period 1951-1970, planning was under the remit of the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government. In 1970, it shifted to the Department for the Environment, linked to local 
government, but expanded to include transport. In 1976, a lack of integration between planning 
and transport emerged again when the Department for Transport was separated from Department 
for the Environment. From 1997-2002, however, under the labour regime, a short attempt to 
re-integrate transport, local government and planning was made under DTER until ODPM was 
created in 2002 (Breuillard, Stephenson, & Sadoux, 2007).  
 
6.6.2.2  French Planning Approaches  
In contrast with early industrialisation in the UK, France is remarkable for its late industrialisation, 
much slower urbanisation, thinly populated territories and over-dominant capital, which resulted in 
a state-led decentralisation process via spatial-economic planning approaches from the 1960s, with 
a critical watershed in the early 1980s. National spatial development was regarded as an 
interdependent system consisting of cities and regions and an attempt was made to integrate and 
channel resources into national/regional and national/urban networks. The French 
spatial-economic planning approach has a direct link with institutional reorganisation with 
designated competences, as discussed in section 6.5.2. The review below emphasises the evolution 
of planning policies.         
After WW2, up to 1982, strong state-led intervention initiated national plans
 
invented by Jean 
Monnet in 1947, with a planned period of four years. Although initially the geographical 
distribution of investment was not the core concern for economic planning, regional and urban 
elements
73
 were gradually taken into account in the evolution of the national plans (Loughlin, 
                                                        
73 Hackett and Hackett (1963) explain three reasons behind the emergence and the role of regional and urban planning. 
Firstly, the national state which is responsible for all citizens is a relatively recent concept. Secondly, there is a natural 
tendency for political representatives to campaign for the interests of their electors. Thirdly, the concept of welfare and 
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2008). A regional dimension was formally incorporated from the Fourth National Plan onwards. In 
the national/ regional nexus, employment differences between regions were targeted. In order to 
close the gap between national and regional plans, propulsive policies were used for declining 
regions with high unemployment, while complementary policies were designed for growing 
regions where labour was in demand. Operational tranches were used as a key interactive tool, the 
procedure for which was laid down by the General Planning Commissariat (for the operation of 
this tool see Hackett and Hackett (1963)). Throughout this operation, the national and regional 
government formulated a coherent investment plan for the next four years, which had the potential 
to result in a concerted effect i.e. it provided the private sector with a broader picture of the 
direction of development so it could adjust itself to governments‘ priorities (Shonfield, 1965, 
p.129).  
In addition to the national/regional nexus, urban planning was simultaneously regarded as 
indispensably complementary to regional development. The ever-increasing dominance and 
concentration of the Paris region reflected a knotty problem. On the one hand, considering fierce 
external competition, weakening the status of the Paris region which was the greatest industrial 
zone in France was not an option. This view was expressed explicitly in a speech given by the 
Commissaire General in the National Assembly (Hackett and Hackett, 1963). On the other hand, it 
indeed revealed the need for an urban development policy to implement de-concentration and 
introduce new industries to solve the problem of inequality, which was regarded as the 
fundamental problem of regional development. In 1963, with the national intervention of 
métropoles d’equilibre, seven major regional cities were designated as regional growth engines. At 
the same time, DATAR
74
 was created to further reinforce co-ordination between different sectors 
and departments for territorial development. As Keating notes, the concept of ―Aménagement du 
Territoire‖ denotes ―an integrated view of spatial development, incorporating economic 
development, land use planning and infrastructure provision‖.  
Over this period, despite resources
75
 allocated by the state for urban and regional development, 
the competences of cities and regions were still limited to decision-making for local interests. It 
was argued that regions could not really enter into a contractual relationship with the state because 
of their limited resources and the fact that their chief executive was the regional prefect, who was 
designated by the state (Balme & Bonnet, 1995).     
                                                                                                                                                               
the distinction between the private and the social gave regional and urban planning an intellectual respectability which 
intensive liberalism denied for a long time. 
74 Three main functions were engendered, namely providing the secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee, 
co-ordinating the activities of the various public departments, and helping the General Planning Commissariat to draft 
the operational tranches of the national plan (Hackett and Hackett, 1963). 
75 contracts for medium-sized cities (contrats villes moyennes) in the 1970s and regional programmes (Programmes d’Action 
Prioritaire d’Innitiative Régionale). 
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The 1982 decentralisation reform, in addition to LOTI 1982 and a series of reforms, marked a 
huge change in planning approaches. In comparison with the British planning approaches reviewed 
above, French planning approaches include four special aspects.  
Firstly, in contrast with the private sector led and competition-oriented planning policy in the UK, 
the most important feature of the French system is the wide application of a public-led and 
contractually-oriented planning
76
 agreement between the national state and local states (including 
EPCIs). Contracts are made through a bargaining process to organise central-periphery 
relationships in the realm of public policy, with the aim of defining common objectives and 
securing public financial cooperation on a multi-annual basis. At the regional level, coupled with a 
new tier of local government, a new national/regional planning mechanism with generous public 
funding created Contrat de projets É tat-région (CPER)
77
. It is argued that over 25 years of this 
kind of contractual practice, there has been a transformation in the role of regions from a top-down 
relationship inferior to the state to an active and strengthened partnership role (Loughlin, 2008; 
OECD, 2007a). This is also the case for cities. In 1989, cities were given resources for major urban 
projects through ―Contrat de Ville‖ or ―Contrat d’Agglomeration‖ between the state, local 
governments and private partners. Urban riots in 2005 resulted in the replacement of Contrat de 
Ville with Contrat de Cohésion Sociale in 2006 under the management of Public Agence Nationale 
de Cohesion Sociale et pour I’Égalité des Chances (Fraser & Lerique, 2007). 
Secondly, there has been a process of capacity building at the local level (Cole, 2006) and major 
reform to government machinery (Breuillard, et al., 2007). A series of urban planning reforms 
were introduced. In 1983, based on the decentralisation of planning law (the décentralisation du 
droit de l'urbanisme), municipalities (communes) were given responsibility for taking initiatives in 
preparing POS (Plan d’Occupation des Sols- local plans) and participating in inter-communal 
syndicates for SDAU (Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme)
78
. Those new 
competences which were previously controlled by the state cultivated the vision and capacity of 
local authorities to develop their own territories (Booth, et al., 2007). In the late 1990s, three 
significant pieces of legislation were introduced to enhance local planning. Loi Chevènement and 
Loi Voynet (called LOADT) in 1999 respectively improved inter-communal cooperation and 
strategic development. Loi SRU 2000 was further introduced to improve the coherence of strategic 
and operational policy and foster local responsibility in the development of planning policy (Booth, 
                                                        
76 Balme and Bonnet (1995) argue that there are three forces underlying the creation of contractual planning, namely 
the French national plan (1946), regional policy by DATAR (1963), and the decentralisation reform of 1982. Loughlin 
(2008) adds that the CPER corresponded with the EU’s mode of governance, based on partnership and subsidiarity.    
77 CPER has evolved over time. The first two CPERs were for four years (1984-1988; 1989-1993), then for five years 
(1994-1999), followed by six years (2000-2006; 2007-2013).  
78 Both POS and SDAU were introduced in 1967 with the arrival of LOF (Loi d’Orientation Foncière). 
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et al., 2007). Each CA/CU has to prepare a SCOT (a strategic planning document) and each 
commune is then responsible for a PLU (a detailed planning document)
79
. Figure 6-4 illustrates the 
planning policy framework in France.    
 
Figure 6-4  The Planning Policy Framework in France 
 
Source: author, illustrated based on Brevillard et al. (2007) and Harman et al. (2007) 
 
Thirdly, transport planning plays a much broader role in potential spatial-economic development. 
As discussed in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, the expansion of the HST network was endorsed by the 
central government after the debut of the TGV-Sud-Est and the introduction of VT in the 1970s. 
Thirty years on, more and more connections are made at major TGV stations with growing urban 
and regional light/ heavy rail networks; this proves that transport investment in France can 
transform cities and become a model for other French cities to follow. By 2010, more than twenty 
French cities (including major and small-to-medium-sized metropolises) had implemented new 
tramway systems into city centres with this financial innovation (P. Hall, 2013a, forthcoming ). 
However, this approach does need collective negotiation among joined communes with local 
capacity and among different transport authorities. There is the risk of disintegration of transport 
                                                        
79 A prerequisite for both SCOT and PLU is the PADD which sets the objectives for planning policies. 
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and land usage planning if AOTUs and EPCIs are formed to cover different territories. Also, 
coordination between different tiers of transport plans is problematic (Harman et al., 2007).  
In addition, transport has played an indispensably leading role in territorial development and 
planning in the sphere of central government. Despite the frequent shift in ministers, urbanism, 
planning and housing have been the remit of the Secretary of State for Transport. The close 
relationship between transport and territorial development and planning has been enhanced 
continually over time. In 1974, the Ministre d’État, Ministre de l'Aménagement du Territoire, de 
l'Équipement et des Transports was created to show the connection forged among territorial 
development, construction and transport. After the 1982 reform, in 1984, the Ministre de 
l'Urbanisme, du Logement et des Transports was specifically created to further link urban 
development and housing with transport. More recently, the Ministre d'É tat, ministre de l'Écologie, 
du Développement et de l'Aménagement durables
 
has been designated to embrace ecology and 
sustainable development. Finally, the grand urban projects (GPUs) which was initially proposed 
by Comité Interministériel des Villes (CIVs) became the responsibility of the transport department 
in 1994 (Breuillard, et al., 2007).  
 
6.7  A UK-France Comparison of the Spatial-Economy Planning Framework 
for Government Intervention 
 
Following the review of each element in the framework, a major national difference can be 
identified. The synthesised comparison of each element between the UK and France will lay 
significant foundations for two different spatial-economic planning frameworks prior to two 
empirical chapters in order to further understand the varying effects of HST on the two countries 
and within the two regions. Table 6-3 summaries the results of the literature review.        
Firstly, the political ideology of national states underlies the nature of government intervention. It 
is evident that, in many ways, the role of rail transport investment was grasped more 
enthusiastically and received stronger commitment in France than in the UK. Traditionally, the 
political economy of the UK has been characterised by a market-led approach in contrast to a 
state-led approach in France. Despite the fact that both countries have encountered increasing 
external pressures in the forms of deregulation and marketisation since the 1980s, a state-enhanced 
approach with a concern for equality (for instance: LOTI 1982) has been implemented in France. 
Two distinctive views of government towards investment in transport infrastructure persist. The 
British market-led ideology presents a reactive perspective that ―infrastructure is following private 
investment‖. The conditions for infrastructure investment are set only when serious bottlenecks for 
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growth occur. This is in contrast with another view, that ―infrastructure is leading private 
investment‖, which the French public-led perspective maintains. Thus, National Condition One is 
that, in line with this national difference, the opportunities provided by HST would be more 
appreciated and better exploited in France than in the UK. 
Secondly, dynamic reformation and decentralisation of government systems generates specific 
possibilities and difficulties in planning and taking action. In addition, different concerns among 
government tiers (national/ regional/ sub-regional government) mean inherently different agendas. 
Therefore, the redistribution of benefits within a region will heavily depend on a more balanced 
inter-relationship between different government actors in these dynamics. Although the UK and 
France are unitary countries, there has been a consolidated decentralisation process for regional, 
metropolitan, and inter-communal governance over time in France (including transport authorities, 
particularly for devolution of regional rail services) whereas an increasing centralisation process 
has taken place in the UK, with a reduction in local financial discretion and fragmented local 
government structures. Hence, National Condition Two is that the decentralised local 
government system in France appears more inclusive and appropriate than that in the UK, with 
legitimate authority given to tackle intra-regional inequality. 
Thirdly, given that HST investment is a large-scale national transport planning project, a positive 
wider impact on cities and regions relies on co-ordination between transport and spatial-economic 
policies.   
British planning approaches to spatial economy planning and resources allocation have 
demonstrated an approach led by the private sector, competition and guidance. In the 1980s, the 
prevailing political economy insisted on a reduction in public spending and the shrinkage of local 
financial capacity. The private sector was encouraged to participate in urban regeneration schemes. 
Local governments participated in competition bids were encouraged by central government. The 
spatial focus was on urban initiatives, but the redistribution of regional prosperity attracted less 
attention. The experiment of French-style indicative regional planning failed in the 1960s, so 
regional planning played the role of giving planning guidance in the 1980s and most of the1990s 
until the late 1990s. At this point, the Labour government attempted to address regional inequality 
by granting more resources for intervention and by seeking to develop a regional economic and 
transport strategy. A series of planning reforms was introduced in the late 1990s including an 
attempt to integrate transport and land use through PPG/PPS, but the coordination between 
transport and spatial-economic development seemed weak and difficult under these conditions.  
Over the same period of time, in France, planning approaches have been influenced by the public 
sector, contractual agreements and capacity-building, resulting in significant public funding 
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through contractual agreements between the state and a range of local government structures 
(regions, departments, EPCIs, communes) and planning reforms.  
In the 1980s, public transport investment was a strong tool for spatial economic development. 
Each of these local government structures had its own transport competence for its territory along 
with transport funding resources, which allowed local authorities to develop their own transport 
networks. Within each territory, the integration of spatial economy and transport with strategic 
planning and resources was highly encouraged to achieve a holistic planning Aménagement du 
territoire. Likewise, under the responsibility of DATAR and Ministry of Transport, the French 
method presented a transport-led planning approach, that brought about transformation through 
investment in public transport. Furthermore, concern for equality has been more evident in France 
than in the UK. Consequently, National Condition Three is that, in seizing HST opportunities for 
transformation, the French planning approach seems more conducive than the British for local 
interventions and achieving a wider impact.   
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Table 6-3  The UK-France Comparison of Spatial-Economic Planning Framework, 
1980s-2000s 
 
Source: author 
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6.8  Chapter Conclusions 
 
In summary, this chapter has developed a national spatial economy planning framework which is 
constructed by examining public policies over a period of time from the 1980s to 2000s within 
which the opportunity of HST roughly arose in the two countries. The framework reviewed and 
discussed above identify three national conditions will inherently shape local intervention. Firstly, 
the political ideology of national states differs in their attitudes towards transport investment. With 
a series of reforms in deregulations and privatisation, British market-led ideology contrasts with 
the French state-led perspective, which was reinforced by a concern for equality. Secondly, 
government systems and their restructuring play a critical role in generating enabling or 
constraining conditions for planning and taking action at the local level. Although the UK and 
France are both unitary countries, over the same period of time, the UK has gone through an 
centralisation process with limited local financial discretion and a lack of strategic government 
structure, whereas in France there has been a decentralisation process, devolving power and 
competence to the local level. In addition, the central-peripheral relationship is characterised by a 
―separate‖ approach in the UK vs. an ―osmotic‖ technique in France. Thirdly, national planning 
policy including transport and spatial economic development is directly relevant in areas reflecting 
national concerns with resources allocation. British planning policy has shown a private-, 
competition- and guidance-led approach, which is in contrast with a public-, contractual-, and 
capacity-building-led approach. In addition, transport resources has played a critical role in leading 
spatial economic development in France. Because of the existence of VT, several local 
government tiers have the capacity to develop local transport plans and the financial capacity to 
implement them. In contrast, transport resources in the UK has been largely controlled by the state. 
Considering these different contexts and approaches between the UK and France, local 
intervention in the UK could be much more frustrated than in France without available financial 
resources and power and inclusive institutional governance unless local conditions could possibly 
conquer the constraints for any possible transformation. How local interventions operated (re-acted, 
pro-acted, or did nothing) with respective national contexts to seize the opportunity of HST is the 
focus of following two empirical chapters to understand better the transformation process and the 
differential wider impacts of HST. The next two chapters will unveil the empirical evidence from 
both regions with the British case first.  
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7.1  Introduction  
 
As quantitative findings showed in Chapter 5, the wider impact of the WCML modernisation has 
been limited to areas around regional metropolitan cities in concurrence with the widened 
intra-regional and ultimate inter-regional polarisation. In order to understand and explain the 
quantitative results, following the establishment of a comparative national planning framework in 
Chapter 6, this chapter is dedicated to exploring national and local interactions and interventions 
employed to seize the opportunities presented by HST, which contributed to the transformation 
process in North-West England for around 30 years between the 1980s and the 2000s.  
This chapter is organised in five main parts. Under the national spatial-economic framework 
constituted in Chapter 6, section 7.2 examines how the WCML modernisation was implemented 
and perceived at the national level. Regional intervention is first explored in section 7.3, followed 
by different interventions at the sub-regional level. The opportunity of the WCML modernisation 
seized under multi-level interaction and interventions are summarised in section 7.4 prior to the 
concluding remark in section 7.5.  
 
7.2  National Intervention in the WCML Modernisation 
 
National intervention in the WCML modernisation proves to be market-led, private-led, profit-led, 
and intercity-prioritised. With an obsolete infrastructure and increasingly unreliable services, the 
implementation of the WCML modernisation did not begin until rail privatisation and finally 
arrived in 2004 and 2008. There are four key features underlying this belated investment at the 
national level.    
Firstly, the WCML modernisation was essentially a national decision, but as discussed in Chapter 
6, under the Thatcher administration in the 1980s, the ideology was waiting for private money to 
invest in public transport. British Rail made several failed attempts to kick-start the project, 
causing serious problems at later stages. The former Managing Director of InterCity Rail services 
and the former CX of Virgin Trains, Mr Chris Green, explains why.  
Over the last 10 years of  British Rail, between 1984 and 1994, a strong effort was made to invest in 
modernising the WCML because we knew the assets were getting old and, above all, because we knew we would 
need more capacity as time went by. We completely failed. The Treasury would not give us money…It (Pendolino) 
started running with passengers in 2004, but it should have been running in 1986/1987. All our problems 
come from that long time gap.   
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Secondly, although the state expected private money to be invested in the WCML, the whole 
process reflected a lack of national intervention until RailTrack went broke. The state played an 
arbiter‘s role, with regulation governed by OPRAF scrutinising rail time between London and 
Manchester, but a big decision maker was not nominated to negotiate between infrastructure and 
various train operating companies until the bankruptcy of Railtrack. In order to win the franchise, 
Virgin trains proposed an ambitious objective for speed at 125 mph which beat other bidders
80
. In 
order to achieve the 140mph promised by Virgin Group, Railtrack adopted an untested signalling 
technology (Butcher, 2010). However, coordination between Virgin and Railtrack was absent. Mr 
Green recalls,  
Virgin tried to say what they wanted, but Railtrack said this is not possible… it is not possible to make 
compromises. Luckily, at that point, everything stopped and the government took over and we got what we 
wanted.  
 
After Railtrack went broke, the government intervened to take direct control and wrote the 
timetables. The key concern for the government was to ensure inter-city connectivity rather than 
concentrate on commuting and freight. Mr Green states,  
They broke the promise and said ―no 140 mph an hour… not 14 trains an hour on the fast line…we wanted 
to share with what is now London Midland…We the government would write the timetable‖. They did it well. 
So you now have a timetable where the government has moved all the trains out of  the way… the freight train 
is moved, the local train is moved, we have got very fast to Scotland. It would not have been possible for Virgin. 
Virgin could not move other people’s trains.  
 
Therefore, the problematic WCML modernisation demonstrates something went wrong in the 
privatisation process. As Professor Peter Hall argues, ―the UK seems not to have the same 
tradition as in other places of putting together public and private sector planning and investment‖. 
Likewise, the former chief planner in NWDA, Mr Ian Wray, opines ―the British civil service really 
regards itself as a body which regulates the British economy, which doesn’t plan developmental 
planning properly‖. Mr Wray argues the whole process was ―a planning disaster with an 
over-extended time period, overrun budgets, and extremely unreliable services‖. Consequently, the 
modernisation of the WCML was literally perceived and treated as a problem rather than an 
opportunity.    
 
 
                                                        
80 Interview with Mr Chris Green (the quotation is in Appendix19-CG-1) 
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Thirdly, the upgraded WCML did not involve the construction of new stations, so decision making 
regarding HST stopping patterns and timetables is based on market-led and profit-oriented factors, 
which Virgin Trains took into account. According to Mr Green
81
, there are four main concerns for 
the service pattern. The first one is existing spatial-economic strength. Nine out of twelve HST 
stations are located within the prosperous southern part of the region, which has been 
demonstrated in section 5.5. This spatial-economic pattern was explicitly suggested by the 
business model used for decision making. Secondly, British Rail‘s experience assisted the 
arrangement of three trains per hour between Manchester and London without blocking track 
capacity for local train services. Thirdly, the technical aspect of electrification is critical, but the 
business model is superior to other factors. This can be illustrated by the contrast between Chester 
and Blackpool. Despite the fact that both are located on non-electrified conventional lines, through 
services to and from Blackpool were cancelled in 2003 in contrast to Chester, which continued to 
be served by Virgin Voyager diesel trains because Chester is a more buoyant business and tourist 
destination than Blackpool. Finally, market share is another factor which is revenue-centred. 
Fourthly, the WCML exploits the existing rail capacity for a mixed traffic railway, including 
long-haul HST, intra-regional commuting trains, and freight. The priority of inter-city travel 
squeezed the capacity for commuting and freight services, but no investment was made on 
improving the intra-regional network to reduce the deterioration of local services. The deficient 
capacity has become more problematic when the full completion of the WCML modernisation 
arrived in December 2008 with three trains per hour between London Euston and Manchester 
Piccadilly stations. The lack of network capacity has impeded the development of additional 
services even though there is huge demand. The only exception was places which are already 
located on the WCML and served by Pendolino services
82
.  
 
7.3  Local Intervention in the WCML Modernisation  
 
Due to the separate central-peripheral relationship in the British institutional system, the local level 
has not been influential in the national decision making process. However, as soon as the WCML 
modernisation was completed in 2008, the more frequent and reliable services between major city 
cores would certainly have an impact on those HST cities. The level of wider impact would 
depend on what local intervention was either consciously or subconsciously made before the 
                                                        
81 For detailed quotations from interviewee, please see Appendix 19- CG-2, CG-3, CG-4, and CG-5.    
82 Interview with Mr Dave Whyte (the quotation is in Appendix 19-DW-1) 
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arrival of the WCML modernisation. Local intervention at the regional and sub-regional levels is 
reviewed as follows. 
 
7.3.1  At the Regional Level   
 
7.3.1.1  From the 1980s to the Mid-1990s: Regional Campaign Groups Urged 
Transport Investment in the WCML  
Regardless of a private-led approach at the national level, there was a strong regional campaign to 
upgrade the WCML, although there was no regional government. The key cause for this campaign 
was a great fear that the peripheralisation of NWE might occur if the UK did not upgrade its 
national rail network to connect with mainland Europe. This view was highlighted in the manifesto 
booklet "Capitalising on the Channel Tunnel: Action for North West England‖
83
. Two major 
campaign groups
84
 were formed collectively in 1990 when agreement to establish a 
Trans-European network was reached. According to the transport advisor to the North-West 
Business Leadership Team, Mr David Thrower, who was closely involved with both campaign 
groups, two stages of the campaign could be distinguished. In the first stage, the purpose was to 
highlight the need for transport investment in the WCML and to keep the campaign going. The 
campaign argument was based on a comparison with two existing upgraded mainlines: the East 
Coast Main Line (ECML) and the Great Western Main Line (GWML). When the Channel Tunnel 
opened in 1993/4, the second stage of the campaign began and concerned beyond technical 
improvements to aim for a link through to Europe in addition to significant improvement to the 
WCML
85
.  
Nevertheless, these campaigns could not influence central government‘s decision, the whole 
project was held back until rail privatisation took place. In addition, in order to realise the network 
link through Europe, the campaign groups supported the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project (CTRL) 
and campaigned for the location of the CTRL stations on the northern side of London for a better 
interchange to Northern England. Afterwards, when the new CTRL project was completed in 2007, 
the upgraded WCML modernisation was not finished until December 2008, let alone Eurostar 
services to the NWE which have not been realised.  
                                                        
83 Source: House of Commons, Deb 24 May 1990, Vol. 173 cc406-18. 
84 According to Mr Thrower, there was one more campaign group called North-West Regional Consortium which 
does not exist any longer. The first group was “Channel Tunnel North-West Group” with full support from a range of 
business groups and some local authorities across the North-West (House of Commons, Deb 24 May 1990, vol. 173 
cc406-18). The other group was “West Coast Rail 250” organised completely by major local authorities, led by Cumbria 
Council.  
85 For quotations from interviewee, please see Appendix 19- (DT-1).    
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7.3.1.2  After the Mid-1990s  
 
Problematic Regional Planning and Institutions 
The construction work to modernise the WCML began in 1998 when regional planning was 
introduced to better address regional inequality by a re-elected Labour Government as discussed in 
section 6.5.2.1. However, the failure to directly create an elected regional government resulted in 
three indirect regional institutions being in charge of different parts of regional planning. The 
whole experience of regional operations has proved to be ineffective and indirect regional 
institutions are not particularly capable of delivering effective strategies
86
. Firstly, the difficulty of 
balancing local and regional interests for members of the North West Regional Assembly (NWRA) 
hampered the strategic regional vision. When the North West Development Agency (NWDA) 
produced a draft of a Regional Economic Strategy (RES) in 2000, there was disagreement 
regarding the designation of strategic sites between NWDA and NWRA (Wray, 2011). Secondly, 
although the need for improving intra-regional transport rail services was identified in regional 
planning documents
87
, the Department for Transport had final decision making power from a 
national perspective and regional bodies had no decisive influence. According to the Transport Act 
2000, an integrated local transport plan (LTP) was reflected to cooperate with the regional 
transport strategy (RTS) as a basis for funding preparation for an Annual Progress Report (APR), 
but the whole funding review procedure was strictly controlled and allowed little freedom to 
coordinate or negotiate (Harman, et al., 2007). Thirdly, there is a fundamental lack of regional 
consensus in NWE, which is problematic. The combination of a lack of effective regional 
mechanism and collective regional consensus means it is difficult to tackle regional inequality and 
improve intra-regional connectivity within a wider regional concern beyond a city-regional 
territory. As Mr Wray recalls that the NWDA made several attempts to seek support for the 
electrification of the Liverpool-Manchester line and Preston-Chorley-Bolton-Manchester line, but 
could not attract Greater Manchester‘s interest
88
. In particular, a historical rivalry between 
                                                        
86 Interview with Professor Alan Harding (the quotation is in Appendix 19- AH-1).  
87 In regional planning Guidance for the North West (RPG13), it was mentioned as “The West Coast Main Line 
should be developed so as to make certain that the proposed improvements for long-distance passenger movements 
are realised whilst ensuring that sufficient capacity remains to meet the future aspirations for regional and local 
passenger services and the movement of freight” (GONW, 2003, p.126). In retrospect, these links are critical to the 
regional development and were proposed already in the Regional Planning Guidance in the 1970s (North West Joint 
Planning Team, 1974). The impact of the WCML on local rail services was pointed out as a serious concern in the 2008 
Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS). “The quality of many local services and infrastructure leaves much to be desired, and 
congestion on some rail routes, both in terms of the number of trains and passengers, is now a serious concern” 
(Government Office for North West, 2008, p.11). But more than 30 years later, this electrification scheme has only just 
been approved by the British central government and will not be realised until 2013 at the earliest between Manchester 
and Newton-le-Willows. Three lines are included, namely Newton-le-Willows – Liverpool and Huyton - Wigan (in 
2014), Preston- Blackpool (in 2015), and Manchester-Bolton-Chorley (in 2016). 
88 Interview quotation is in Appendix 19-IW-1.  
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Manchester and Liverpool explains this lack of regional consensus. Professor Sir Peter Hall 
illustrates this point with an anecdote.   
Quite early on in the New Labour era, it must be around 1998, there was a big conference in Bridgewater Hall 
in Manchester and I was asked to speak. And it was really big. John Prescott was going to open it. It was to 
launch a new concept called ―Mersey Belt‖ that the local authority would come together to promote this Mersey 
Belt between Manchester and Liverpool including also Warrington as a unified planning concept… It was 
chaired by Felicity Goodey. She said, and was only half  joking, that ―no one in this room goes up there 
mentioning the Ship Canal‖ … A hundred and four years later, you couldn’t mention the Ship Canal because 
with two city leaders the memories were too painful.  
 
The Regional Strategy- The Northern Way  
Regional inequality has been simplified and widely emphasised as a north/south divide at the 
inter-regional level. ―Making It Happen: The Northern Way‖ (ODPM, 2004) was published in 
February 2004 as a growth strategy for three post-industrial northern English regions, which were 
identified as suffering a £35 billion gap in productivity compared to the national average. In 
September 2004, Moving Forward: the Northern Way Growth Strategy was published (Northern 
Way Steering Group, 2004) and clearly stressed that any boost in the productivity of the northern 
economy would lie in the development of eight city-regions across the north. The improvement in 
transport linkages between eight city regions was regarded as fundamentally important to achieve 
the vision of ―The Northern Way‖ in Strategic Direction for Transport
89
 (The Northern Way, 
2007). 
This east-west artery connected by canal from Hull, Leeds, Rochdale, Manchester to Liverpool 
was central for the world‘s first industrial urbanisation. Since the 1970s, a campaign for Pennine 
identity has been attempted on the basis of ―political regionalism that looks for a northern unity‖ 
(Hebbert, 2000). In the 1990s, addressing the barrier of the Pennine Chain complied with the 
policy objectives of the European Spatial Development Perspective. The Trans-Pennine corridor 
had ―a role to play in developing the northern arc trading axis from Ireland across North Germany 
to the Baltic and Eastern Europe, [which] will both generate growth and deflect trade from the 
congested south‖ (cited in Hebbert, 2000, p.386).   
However, in the railway age, the Pennine Chain between Lancashire and Yorkshire has historically 
determined a Y-shape of economic geography in England (Hebbert, 2000). Economic 
interdependence between the two sides of the Pennine Chain has proved to be weak. A study 
conducted by Robson et al. (1995) found static migration flows since the 1960s, limited 
travel-to-work patterns and a marked separation in economic activities. Similarly, an 
environmental assessment of the M62 Corridor demonstrated the corridor is ―a pair of 
                                                        
89 Three transport investment priorities were pinpointed, namely an improvement to access to the North’s airport and 
ports, and between and within the North’s city regions. 
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back-to-back activity systems‖ (cited in Hebbert, 2000, p.386). Again, the findings were similar in 
a more recent study titled ―Connecting the North‖ (2008): three northern regions have separate 
markets with very little evidence of trade in services across the Pennines. ―The pattern was 
compounded by a tendency for firms in the different regions of the North to prefer relationships 
with business service providers in their regional centre and to secure additional services from 
London, rather than elsewhere in the North, if the required expertise was not readily available 
regionally‖ (Coates, Institute for Political and Economic Governance, et al., 2008, p. 29). As a 
result, the geographical barrier (the Pennines) and cultural identity has historically limited 
east-west interdependence. The ancient rivalry between the White Rose of Yorkshire and the Red 
Rose of Lancashire still holds.  
Even so, the demands for the connection of northern cities to Manchester Airport have gradually 
demonstrated the need to overcome this east-west rail barrier. SURF et al. (2006) stress its 
importance for business between key economic clusters and Manchester Airport. In order to pave 
the route for further development, the issue of congestion has been emphasised. An associated 
constraint on the Trans-Pennine corridor from Hull, Leeds and Manchester to Liverpool was 
identified in Network Rail‘s Business plan (2007) and the Rail White Paper (2007).  
Gradually, the regional concept was superseded by a city-regional concept (J. Harrison, 2010). 
Furthermore, when the North-East Referendum failed in November 2004, the regional concept 
became elusive. The inter-regional inequality of the north/south divide has, to some extent, drawn 
more attention at the expense of persistent intra-regional inequality.  
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7.3.2  Varying Local Interventions at the Sub-regional Level 
 
Given ineffective intervention at the regional level, attention naturally shifted to the lower levels. 
Since the market-led approach of HST services, three types of sub-regions are distinguished to 
understand differential local intervention, namely metropolitan HST sub-regions, non-metropolitan 
HST sub-regions and non-metropolitan non-HST sub-regions (Figure 7-1). Four sets of 
transformation processes are identified and each is examined as follows.       
 
Figure 7-1  Typologies of Sub-regions in NWE 
 
Source: author  
 
7.3.2.1  The Re-centralisation of Regional Hegemony around Manchester  
 
Up to the mid-1980s, Manchester suffered from a process of decentralisation, losing population 
and new economic activities to adjacent prosperous sub-regions in the southern part of NWE. The 
depressing situation was observed by Tom Bloxham, the chairman of Urban Splash Ltd as follows.  
―I first came to Greater Manchester 20 years ago as a student. My first impression was of  an unhappy place, truly 
truly full of  ―dark, satanic mills.‖ The city had a huge stock of  under-valued buildings, a centre that seemed to shut 
shut down at 5:30pm and a shaky local economy struggling to figure out where to go next‖ (Northwest Regional 
Development Agency & Centre for Cities at ippr, 2006, p. 25).  
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No proactive action directly linked to the WCML was noticed in Manchester. Apart from the 
reason that local governments hardly have a dominant role to play in the national transport project, 
the perception is much less conscious towards this upgraded approach than a new dedicated 
approach, regardless of its notorious fiasco. Mr Stephen Clark and Darren Kirkman from GMPTE 
Rail Programme recall,     
I am not aware of  any plan drafted by the city council or regeneration team who said this was because of  
this arrival, so we did this…Effectively, what was already there on the west coast was upgraded …Whereas 
if  you take any place where HST has been built and it has a new station, you have to redevelop a bit of  the 
city centre in order to make that place fit, and that wasn’t the case with the west coast. It just fitted in with 
what was already there. 
 
Although Greater Manchester did not involve the decision making of the WCML modernisation, it 
proactively and strategically responded to urban and regional planning policies and institutional 
changes initiated by the national state. From the mid-1980s onwards, local intervention was made 
to address the decline in the metropolitan area through strong and stable leaderships in fulfilling 
political and economic strategy and handling crises, active development of external and internal 
transport links, and progressive redevelopment of urban centres on a polycentric city-regional 
scale. 
 
I. Strong and stable leaderships 
A long-term collaboration between political and bureaucratic leaders of Manchester city council 
critically orchestrated Manchester‘s transformation. Key leaders are Manchester city leader 
Graham Stringer (1984-1996), Richard Leese (1996- to now), and Chief Executive Howard 
Bernstein (1998- now). Their internal unification acting as an active team for 25 years is an 
important factor underlying the transformation
90
 and ensuring strong and stable political 
leaderships. This character is argued to be associated with cultural coherence in Manchester. 
Humphrey Chetham (1580-1653), a Mancunian textile merchant and entrepreneur, founded 
Chetham‘s School of Music and Chetham‘s Library, the first public-lending library in the English 
speaking world in 1653. Mr Wray observed that this illustrates ―the sense of cultural cohesion‖ 
embodied in ―intellect and capability of people who run and work in Manchester that actually 
drove the industrial revolution and the revival since the mid-1980s‖.    
In the 1980s, a central-local political conflict intensified (Hampton, 1991) because several radical 
instruments were seen as attempts to constrain the power of local authorities. Manchester was one 
of the original cities against the national government. But after Thatcher won a third successive 
                                                        
90 Interview with Mr Dave Whyte (the quotation is in Appendix 19- DW-2). 
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election, Manchester implemented ―a Manchester Model‖ (Robson, 2002). Firstly, its 
political/economic strategy was revisited to welcome national initiatives and operated in 
partnerships with the public and private sectors to attract inward investment for turning 
Manchester‘s economy around
91
. Secondly, in response to the abolition of Manchester 
Metropolitan County in 1986, an informal framework for ten metropolitan districts, the 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), was alternatively established to maintain 
strategic function for economic development, transport, housing and planning at the city-regional 
level (Harding, Harloe, & Rees, 2010). Twenty-five years later, AGMA further evolved to become 
the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA), established on 1
st
 April 2011.      
Apart from tackling economic crises, strong leaderships reflect in dealing with unpredictable crises. 
The IRA bomb was a negative event, but Manchester‘s reaction to it with calmness and confidence 
seized the opportunity to rebuild that part of the city centre. This reminds one of Harold 
Macmillan‘s famous political dictum ―events, dear boy, events‖. As Professor Sir Peter Hall notes,      
You could have a political plan, but it was entirely blown off  the course by an event like an IRA bomb…It 
will force you to change your course. The interesting thing in Manchester is that they made a negative event 
work for the most positive effect. So IRA bomb is as negative as you can get, but immediately the next day 
they said this is positive. We can rebuild the city centre.  
 
In turn, the bomb speeded up the transformation process
92
 and remarkably transformed the 
perception of Manchester. Professor Brian Robson argued, ―The real spur was that bomb, which 
just changed the readiness for people to act, to deliver and also changed the Central 
Government’s perception of what Manchester can do‖. Likewise, two failed bids for Olympic 
Games turned out to be the successful Commonwealth Games in 2002. Harding et al. (2004) 
argued the two Olympic Games bids demonstrated Manchester‘s approach was proactive to 
redevelop the most problematic part of a city with a long-term vision rather than passively 
arresting decline.    
Moreover, their tenacity in securing public funding is remarkable. This can be demonstrated by the 
funding for the Metrolink extension Phrase 3b. It essentially relied on a congestion charge project 
as part of a bid for Government's Transport Innovation Fund of a £3-billion package. Although the 
congestion charge referendum failed in December 2008, this financial crisis was eventually 
overcome. Sir Howard Bernstein argued that ―There’s no magic bullet that’s going to give us £3 
billion pounds to spend on transport. That being the case we’re having to re-evaluate where our 
                                                        
91 Interview with Professor Alan Harding (the quotation is in Appendix 19, AH-2) 
92 Interview with Mr Dave Whyte (the quotation is in Appendix 19- DW-3). 
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priorities lie” (Shanahan, 2009). Five months later, Transport Secretary Geoff Hoon endorsed 
£195 million for the extension project (BBC News, 2009). Mr Wray provided this anecdote,   
They are persistent…. The government did not want to pay for this special link of  extension. Howard 
Bernstein was taken to a meeting with Robert Devereux… I think he was the deputy at the time, Devereux 
told him he would not give him this money. Bernstein gathered his papers in a bundle, stood up, said ―so this 
means war, does it not?‖ and walked out... And of  course, after 12 months’ time, he got the money for the 
Metro link extension. He got it. 
 
The Development of External Transport Links: Manchester Airport and its Regional 
Connections  
Without a reliable inter-city rail service, Manchester Airport
93
 naturally appears to be a 
controllable asset to attract investment, not only from the domestic field, but also from abroad. In 
response to an airport privatisation policy, Manchester City Council, along with nine other district 
councils, unusually and strategically kept ownership as a municipal enterprise. The development 
of Manchester Airport demonstrated the ambition of Manchester to become an international 
competitor through international connectivity to attract international inward investment. As the 
Planning Director of Manchester Airport, Mr John Twigg, notes, ―…so many businesses are 
located in Manchester and North West. One of the reasons that brought them here is the ability to 
get international connectivity out of here, whether that is for goods or people”.  
Since the 1980s, Manchester Airport has progressively expanded and established its ground 
transport access. In order to reach a wider catchment, rail linkages became a priority due to 
increasing motorway congestion
94
. In addition, cooperation with Trans-Pennine Express TOC 
further assisted the expansion of the network to key northern cities beyond NWE, including Leeds, 
Hull, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Thanks to Manchester‘s role in hosting the 
Commonwealth Games in 2002, two transport gateways were created to significantly enhanced 
Manchester‘s connectivity and external image. These were an integrated transport interchange for 
buses, coaches and rail at Manchester Airport and the remodelling of Manchester Piccadilly. The 
integration of the rail and urban transit systems in a remodelled Piccadilly station generated a good 
psychological effect for Manchester in its quest to become an important European city. As 
Professor Sir Peter Hall confirms,  
It is a very good psychological message, since decision makers arrive by trains. It embeds itself  in the brain. 
Putting that metro link into the underground was pretty good because you can argue that the tram system 
creates the image of  an important large European City.  
 
                                                        
93 A consortium of local authorities with 55 per cent ownership resting with Manchester City Council and the 
remaining 45 per cent split evenly among nine councils of other nearby towns. 
94 Interview with Planning Director of Manchester Airport, Mr John Twigg. 
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Figure 7-2  Rail Connections from Manchester Airport to its catchment  
 
 
Source: Manchester Airport 
 
The Development of the Metropolitan Internal Transport Link- the Metrolink Network   
Apart from the development of external transport linkages through an airport hub, the Metrolink 
light rail system has crucially assisted the expansion of labour market areas in a city-regional 
territory beyond the City of Manchester. Evolving from an idea to connect two mainline stations 
that was mooted in the late 1960s, the plan for a light rail system in Manchester was first proposed 
in the mid-1980s. The initial phase began with construction in 1988 and the project was fully 
completed in 1992 in order to connect Manchester with Bury and Trafford (Altrincham). Phase 2 
further extended the network to serve Salford (Broadway in 1999 and Eccles in 2000). Phase 3 
(divided into 3a and 3b, still under construction and partly completed) massively stretches out to 
Oldham, Rochdale, Manchester airport, Tameside and eventually Stockport.   
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Figure 7-3  Metrolink Future Network 
 
 
 
Source: Transport for Greater Manchester 
 
 
 
 
 
Redeveloping Metropolitan Urban Centres     
In addition to boosting Manchester‘s external and internal transport connections, a wide spectrum 
of urban redevelopment projects were implemented to create new spaces for diverse economies 
with a polycentric structure. Firstly, the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC) in 
1988 operated as a tipping point between the collapse of manufacturing and the growth of a 
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service-based economy
95
. Likewise, Trafford and Salford embarked on inner city redevelopment 
schemes. Secondly, the aftermath of the IRA bomb in 1996 led to the redevelopment of the 
Arndale shopping centre and a newly built museum and exhibition centre, Urbis, for cultural and 
creative inspiration. Thirdly, Spinningfields commercial office development was marketed as ―the 
region‘s premium financial and business services destination‖ (Hebbert, 2010) to diversify the 
post-industrial economy and compete with London‘s office rental market. ―The whole picture of it 
is that the office area could compete with London Broadgate or that sort of equivalent urban 
development‖
96
. The Piccadilly Partnership (2003) is a similar development. Fourthly, a new wave 
of massive government funding was implemented from the late 1990s to a few large-scale urban 
redevelopment projects, namely East Manchester URC (1999), Media City in Salford in relation to 
the BBC relocation (2006), the relocation of GONW to Piccadilly Gate (2009), and the 
Government Quarter plan- ―The Whitehall of the North‖ (2009)
97
. The case of MediaCity in 
Salford has resulted in rectifying not only a London-centric, but also a Manchester-centric 
ideology. As Professor Michael Hebbert remarks, the BBC project represents ―a combination of 
two advantages: the relocation from London of various services and relocation within Greater 
Manchester from Manchester to Salford‖. Nationally, MediaCity confirmed the reality of the 
north/south divide and was expected to make efforts to shrink the gap. Sub-regionally, the BBC 
relocation to Salford significantly presented a chance to rectify the existing patterns which 
displayed a concentration of high value-added economic activities in Manchester city centre. Even 
so, it is still confined to the boundary of Greater Manchester South rather than a wider region. In 
addition, higher education development assisted to diversify spatial-economic progress through a 
knowledge capital partnership (2003), namely the merger of Manchester University (the former 
university of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST) and the University of 
Manchester (2004), which enhanced links between the university and local/regional activities
98
.  
 
II. Challenges 
Regardless of the extraordinary transformation Manchester has demonstrated, the city‘s success 
has not spread equally within the boundary of the City of Manchester. As Professor Peter Hall 
points out,  
                                                        
95 Interview with Professor Brian Robson and Mr Ian Wray.  
96 Interview with Professor Michael Hebbert. 
97 A decentralisation policy of moving government offices from London was proposed by the Labour Government. 
“The plans are part of a wider push to relocate 24,000 civil servant posts outside London” (BBC, 2009). 
98 Interview with Professor Brian Robson.  
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I think Manchester did brilliantly, but was not entirely successful because we know it is still a divided city. 
It is a half-successful and half-disaster city. … But if  you go down to Wythenshawe, to an area called 
Baguley, which is still recorded as one of  the most deprived areas in the whole of  Britain, you would not see 
that Manchester is as successful as everyone makes it out to be. It is a really divided city - between people 
who made it and people who haven’t made it.  
 
Likewise, inequality is perpetuated within the Greater Manchester metropolitan area. The 
quantitative findings in Chapter 5 and Manchester Independent Review show a striking divide 
between Greater Manchester South (GMS) and Greater Manchester North (GMN). Five 
post-industrial towns in GMN are economically dependent on Manchester, but have been suffered 
during a difficult transformation towards the knowledge economy, as they still depend on 
manufacturing activities (MIER, 2009b).  
However, the development of the Metrolink with GMS have demonstrated positive effects on 
housing prices in some towns in GMN which become pleasant commuting towns. Bury was found 
to be one of three local districts with the highest proportion of highly-skilled workers who 
commute to Manchester, Salford, and Trafford (MIER, 2009b). Bury‘s experience has boosted the 
continual expansion of the Metrolink because a similar effect has been anticipated by other local 
authorities with a similar economic trajectory to Bury‘s
99
.This result implies that by being 
connected by the internal city-regional transport system, these post-industrial towns could 
alternatively explore a commuting function to serve the metropolitan city in parallel to their own 
economic restructuring, in particular when local labour skills are not yet competitive enough to 
attract inward investment. In addition, this also reflects a coordinate city relationships that exists 
within Greater Manchester. Bury‘s development strategy as Manchester‘s commuting town is a 
good example. Mr Paul Hildreth conveyed the idea of Bury city council in the study of City Link 
Relationship, 
We went to talk to Bury before we came out of our conclusions. They said: ―well, the way we positioned ourselves not 
trying to be a great important centre. We see ourselves actually as a nice place to live with people can commute easily to 
Manchester. This is where we are positioning ourselves‖.  
 
7.3.2.2  A Catch-up Process in Liverpool/Merseyside  
 
Similar to Manchester, Liverpool city council did not hold specific discourses or develop targeted 
strategies towards the modernisation of the WCML. It was regarded as a technical issue that was 
part of national responsibility rather than an apparent opportunity for local action
100
. However, 
                                                        
99 Interview with Professor Alan Harding (the quotation is in Appendix 19-AH-3). 
100 Interview with Professor Michael Parkinson (see Appendix 19- (MP-1)).  
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when Manchester made the conscious intervention in exploiting national regeneration funding to 
redevelop its declining city centre and keeping its own airport, invest in it, expand it, link it with 
other transport networks and develop a light rail network, Liverpool did not demonstrate a strategy 
for redevelopment. Liverpool Airport and Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) were 
privatised and it appeared difficult to develop a constructive relationship between privatised 
infrastructure providers and the local council. Although the Loop & Link transport project was 
completed in the 1970s in Liverpool city centre, rail on its own could not save Liverpool (P. Hall 
& Hass-Klau, 1985). Instead, the whole city centre was left deteriorated in the 1980s until the 
mid-1990s. 
 
I. The Rediscovery of Political Leadership 
 
 
Urban Blight in the 1980s 
Regarding the decline in metropolitan cities, Liverpool which possessed specified and less diverse 
economies encountered a greater challenge than Manchester (Chape, 2009). Moreover, its political 
conflict with the central government paralysed the local economy. Liverpool City Council did not 
seize the great opportunity to redevelop its city centre in parallel with the significant physical 
transformation made in the docklands by Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC). As Mr 
Wray notes in his interview ―The place was run by extreme left-wing politicians who just brought 
it into dispute‖. Also, there was a lack of vision for long-term development by short-sighted local 
politicians (Harding et al, 2004). ―Too often it was seen by local politicians as less important than 
other parts of Liverpool, because the votes were not there in the city centre…[I]t was backward 
looking and introspective‖ (Parkinson, 2008, p. 15). What is more, the higher-level 
central-peripheral dispute could not justify Liverpool as the leader of Merseyside. Neighbouring 
councils in Merseyside were embarrassed by Liverpool. ―Other places won’t have anything to do 
with Liverpool. And they don’t mind calling it Merseyside, as long as it’s not Liverpool.‖
101
 ―No 
stable majority could be constructed‖ (Harding, Deas, Evans, & Wilks-Heeg, 2004). As a result, 
the unstable political situation between central and local government alienated potential investors 
(Couch, 2003), so it depended heavily on public investment (Parkinson, 2008). The development 
of Manchester and Liverpool diverged in the 1980s. By then, Liverpool was known as ―a 
destination for those seeking out urban blight‖ (Wilks-Heeg & Jones, 2004), and the decline of 
Liverpool led to the assured dominance of Manchester in the region
102
.  
 
                                                        
101 Interview with Professor Michael Parkinson.  
102 Interview with Mr Ian Wray (the quotation is in Appendix 19-IW-2).  
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A Sign of Revival from the Mid-1990s 
The blight in Liverpool began to change in the mid-1990s. A sharp rise in private sector 
investment in the city occurred from the late 1990s (Wilks-Heeg & Jones, 2004). Four key changes 
contributed to a ―catch-up‖ performance in Liverpool. Firstly, Merseyside Objective One (MOb1) 
European funding evoke an active and strategic thinking mode within Liverpool The requirement 
for the funding scheme raised the agenda to the future in terms of economic development and 
governance at the city-regional scale. It provided ―a very positive experience for collaboration in 
Merseyside‖ (The Northern Way, 2009d, p. 12). Secondly, with the assistance of the MOb1 
funding (Harding, et al., 2004), public and private partnerships were gradually forged in Liverpool 
from the early 1990s. The Mersey Partnership (TMP) was established in 1993. This effectively 
helped to make Liverpool attractive for businesses. But without government support and resources, 
this voluntary and informal structure has not become a very powerful city-regional agency. 
Professor Michael Parkinson from Liverpool John Moores University stresses that ―For Liverpool, 
I think it’s a vacuum. We are making progress. It is getting better. It is possible. But I would not 
hold your breath: we’re not politically mature enough”. Thirdly, Liverpool participated in the 
Core Cities Group which was founded in 1995 to promote the role of core cities in driving 
economic growth. Professor Parkinson states that ―Liverpool recognised they needed to play with 
the big cities…with European cities - hence the sense of Liverpool as part of an urban lobby 
group”. After 1997, the relationship between central and local government improved. The change 
of local politics and mood was conducive to repositioning Liverpool as a European city
103
. Finally, 
critically required local leadership was exerted in 1998. It was widely regarded as a key factor 
contributing to these politics of ―catch-up‖ (Wilks-Heeg & Jones, 2004). A new council leader, 
Mike Storey, and a new chief executive, David Henshaw, were both ―entrepreneurial, innovative, 
modern, and outward-looking‖
104
. Thus, the improvement in Liverpool has been multi-faceted, e.g. 
politically, economically and strategically. A recent debate on a second crossing for the Mersey 
demonstrates collaboration among local authorities within Liverpool city-region for wider strategic 
economic benefit
105
.  
 
Regenerating Liverpool City Centre before the Arrival of the WCML Modernisation 
A series of strategies and tranches of funding was orchestrated and utilised by the new governance 
team to revitalise neglected city centre and its waterfront. Firstly, Liverpool Vision Urban 
Regeneration Company (URC) was established in 1999 and did function as ―a useful interface‖ to 
interact with private investors effectively and strategically (Biddulph, 2010, pp. 103-104). 
                                                        
103 Interview with Professor Michael Parkinson (see Appendix 19- (MP-2)). 
104 Interview with Professor Michael Parkinson.  
105 Interview with Professor Michael Parkinson.  
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Secondly, the regeneration strategy capitalised on Liverpool‘s rich cultural assets. The vision was 
stated explicitly in the strategic regeneration framework (2000). In line with this culture-centred 
vision, two cultural initiatives were actively implemented. The first initiative was the bid to hold 
European Capital of Culture (ECOC) in 2008.
 
The successful bid reconfirmed a strategy involving 
partnerships and fresh governance and bringing new life into Liverpool. Chief Executive of City 
Council, Mr David Henshaw, said " [I]n the past we've been prisoners of our history" and ―It's a 
momentous day for Liverpool because it's about looking forward" (BBC News, 2003). The second 
cultural initiative was a designated status as a World Heritage Site, which was actively pursued by 
the City Council. In January 2003, Liverpool‘s waterfront and commercial district were confirmed 
as Britain's only new nomination for World Heritage Status (Liverpool Vision, 2003),which might 
have boosted Liverpool‘s ECOC bid before the decision made in June 2003. To no great surprise, 
Liverpool Maritime Mercantile City was inscribed by UNESCO in July 2004 as "The supreme 
example of a commercial port at the time of Britain's greatest global influence."
106
 Thirdly, these 
cultural strategies also brought about the transformation of the city centre and waterfront. The core 
city centre, including the waterfront area, was classified into eleven targeted zones covering a wide 
range of large and small projects involving physical, social, economic and environmental 
programmes. Among these interrelated and indispensable projects, the most remarkable elements 
of the physical transformation were the gateway to Liverpool Lime Street station, the waterfront 
transformation and a large retail scheme named Liverpool One. Through these recreated urban 
spaces, the connectivity and permeability between the waterfront areas and the city centre were 
largely enhanced before the arrival of the WCML modernisation.    
 
II. Challenges  
However, major transformation in Liverpool focused on the city centre and the gap between the 
city centre and outside areas widened, including the poor north and posh south. In terms of 
transport connectivity, Professor Parkinson indicates that Liverpool has four important challenges 
which are still a long way behind Manchester, namely: Liverpool Airport (a tourist-oriented rather 
than business travel and low-cost European destinations rather than long-haul international 
destinations), rail services to London (less frequent than Manchester-London route and it is still 
not certain whether HS2 will link with Liverpool), the regional rail network (which occupies a 
peripheral location among eight major northern cities while Manchester is the core of the northern 
hub), and the tramway system at the city-regional level (Liverpool could not achieve a tramway 
project in the city centre).  
 
                                                        
106 The website of the world heritage site http://www.liverpoolworldheritage.com/  
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7.3.2.3  A Stable, Less Strategic, and Path-dependent Process in the 
Non-Metropolitan HST Sub-regions  
 
The investigation was further conducted into three types of non-metropolitan sub-regions, namely 
new towns, well-established medieval towns, and overspill suburbia. Similar to the two 
metropolitan cities, these sub-regions did not intervene into the decision-making process of the 
WCML modernisation. However, it is worth noting that metropolitan cities have implemented 
major physical transformations supported by tranches of national funding in the city centre where 
HST services will be delivered; whereas these towns which benefited from decentralised economic 
activities from metropolitan cities were not targeted by national policy and did not make serious 
attempts to improve their city centres. In his interview, Mr Aidan Manley, the Head Operating 
Officer for the support team in Cheshire & Warrington LEP Board confirms that,      
We have got three centres (Warrington, Chester, or Crewe) which have direct rail links to London, but none 
of  them have actually secured major town centre office occupiers to capitalise on their faster rail links to 
London. That hasn’t happened.  
 
Similarly, in Preston, the HST opportunity was not explored either. As City Centre Planning 
Manager of Preston City Council, Mr John Crellin states,  
Preston hasn’t had any new office development for many years. We don’t have any Grade A office 
development in the centre…I don’t think there was public intervention before the arrival of  the upgraded 
WCML…. I think in many ways the investment in the rail network hasn’t been harnessed in a way 
perhaps it could have done or should have been done in the past. 
 
I. Sub-regions with New Towns 
The first type is one with new town development. Warrington, within one hour 46 minutes from 
London with a non-stop HST service, has the shortest journey time to London in the North-West. 
However, this faster link with London did not reinforce Warrington‘s strength. Instead, as 
quantitative findings in Chapter 5 have showed, there was an apparent decrease in economic 
strength measured by GVA per head, closely followed by Greater Manchester South. Interview 
findings suggest that two major factors could explain this change.   
Firstly, a coherent new town with the existing city centre has not been accomplished due to 
political conflict and policy shift. Warrington and Halton and Central Lancashire are two new 
towns designated alongside existing towns rather than placed in isolated green-field sites. To some 
extent, both benefit from new town investment and possess good transport accessibility in the form 
of the WCML and motorway, but development patterns were incoherent and segregated. In 
Warrington city centre, conflict between new town development cooperation and the local council 
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led to a development concentrated on the edge of town which left the city centre a mess
107
. 
Likewise, Central Lancashire New Town suffered from a fragmented landscape, only achieving 
bits of development around motorway junctions in Leyland and north of Preston because of the 
shift of national funding resources towards inner city regeneration
108
. Secondly, there was a lack of 
strong local intervention to insist on redeveloping the fragmented city centre. Concerns over cost 
led to the abandonment of the interchange project in Warrington. Mr Manley recalls,      
At one time, it was actually planned to combine both Warrington Bank Quay and Warrington Central into 
one major interchange. That would cost many millions of  pounds. That is now being dropped….Warrington 
Bank Quay hardly sensed its arrival and its surrounding area. It is awful…I think it is local authority’s 
responsibility to invest in the environment around those stations. Clearly they haven’t, have they?  
 
In retrospect, if an active role had been implemented by the local authority, the whole economic 
trajectory could possibly have been redrawn. As Professor Hall argues ―If Warrington had the 
leadership that Manchester had, it would have gone to it and said we need another Urban 
Regeneration Corporation. We have got to build the city around the Bank Quay station.” As a 
result, in comparison with the previous motorway-led development, Warrington did not explore 
the opportunity of HST and the train station and the city centre remained neglected. Both 
Warrington and Preston are on the list of ten worst railway stations in the UK (C. Green & Hall, 
2009). It demonstrated a case which stuck to its dependency on the motorway and did not exploit 
the opportunities presented by HST. Professor Hall remarks that,   
It benefited hugely from the construction of  the motorway system in the 1960s and 1970s. It advertised 
itself, I remembered everywhere in London, as the crossover town...That really made it. They got huge 
inward investment especially firms needing good access for logistics. But then it just settled down and it never 
exploited the railway… The train station was a total disaster area. Warrington really failed to benefit.   
 
 
II. Sub-regions with Well-established Medieval Towns 
The second type is one with well-established medieval towns. Chester has developed its historical 
town centre to become a pleasant and attractive tourist destination. The development of the 
industrial revolution did not have much of an impact on Chester; instead, the locality developed its 
prosperity through retailers, relying on income from the elite classes in the surrounding 
countryside and the professional and service sectors influenced by the powerful Grosvenor family 
(Ward, 2009). Chester, as a trade and clerical city in medieval times, achieved a reputation as a 
                                                        
107 Interview with Professor Peter Hall (the quotation is in Appendix 19-PH-1) 
108 Interview with Professor Peter Hall (the quotation is in Appendix 19-PH-2) 
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pleasant place to visit and to shop during the 18th century and further capitalised on its streetscape, 
a rich urban exhibition of architectural styles (Ward, 2009). When metropolitan cities in NWE 
were suffering from overcrowding and economic restructuring, the Insall report published in 1968 
crucially decided to capitalise on Chester‘s historical heritage for economic development and 
maintain this unique quality (Ward, 2009, p. 117). The modernisation of the WCML assisted 
Chester to reinforce a tourism-based function within a two-hour journey from London and 
out-of-town business parks for financial service sectors. As Mr Wray confirms,     
Over the last 10 or 15 years, Chester has been remarkably buoyant. It’s developed financial service sectors, 
the kind of  offices which are normally expected to be an hour away from central London. One, this has to 
do with tourism because this is a very nice place. It has all the characteristics of  towns in the South-East. 
People want to live there; two, because you’ve got two hour rail service to London. So I think Chester has, I 
think, benefited very substantially and unknowingly. Tourism also benefits from the WCML improvements, 
even though the line from Crewe to Chester (the final line) is still not electrified.  
 
III. A Sub-region Characterised by Overspill Suburbia  
The third type is one which has major overspill towns. Cheshire East is a sub-region without a 
single dominant town, but instead has a constellation of scattered towns acting as industry 
premises for R&D activities and favourable residential areas for those commuting into Manchester. 
In addition, some towns (i.e. Wilmslow and Macclesfield) located on the WCML routes have 
directly benefited from the favourable direct faster services to and from Manchester. The arrival of 
the WCML simply reinforced this area‘s existing favourable conditions and further attracted 
knowledge intensive economic activities to locate in these towns. This reflects the economic 
structural change presented in Chapter 5, namely that Cheshire East has devoted a high percentage 
of its economic structure to the knowledge economy. As Professor Cecilia Wong highlights in her 
interview,     
North Cheshire is very prosperous and very successful largely because of  people commuting into jobs in 
Manchester. Also you’ve got some local industrial and R&D activities in north Cheshire itself, places like 
Wilmslow.  
 
7.3.2.4  An Arduous but Frustrated Process in Peripheral Non-HST Sub-regions     
 
In contrast to HST sub-regions which are chosen for revenue purposes, two non-HST sub-regions 
which experienced a difficult and frustrated process were neglected due to their poor economic 
adaptation after massive deindustrialisation. Regardless of their intervention in improving their 
attractiveness, intra-regional inequality has widened in parallel to their poor transport connectivity 
in a peripheral location.   
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I. West Coast Lancashire 
    
West Coast Lancashire (WCL) is a sub-region defined in this study by an aggregation of four local 
authorities. Blackpool, which is the major town in WCL, was a thriving seaside resort. ― People 
saved up 50 weeks of the year in order to be able to afford to come to Blackpool for two weeks‖ 
(BBC, 2011a). Blackpool used to have good rail connectivity with London to cater for a massive 
number of visitors, once being the busiest railway station in Europe with 26 platforms. However, 
with changes in economies and transport conditions, Blackpool and its surrounding towns became 
disadvantaged and further peripheralised. Economically, massive deindustrialisation and the 
growth of overseas tourism since the 1970s and low-cost flights since the 1990s have had a serious 
impact on its specialised leisure economy. In line with declining leisure activities, the shopping 
market has shrunk dramatically. Blackpool had the lowest amount of domestic internal shopping 
activities in the mid-2000s. Hotels, restaurants and theatres suffered too. Major annual political 
conferences are not held in Blackpool any more due to a lack of modern conference facilities and 
are now held in Manchester and Liverpool. Moreover, Blackpool city council failed to capitalise 
on a historical association with the aviation industry to diversify its economic base
109
.   
 
Transport Disadvantage 
 
Furthermore, transport change significantly led to the decline of Blackpool and the rise of Preston. 
In contrast with Preston which becomes a major transport hub on the north-south backbone of the 
WCML and the M6 motorway, Blackpool has been progressively peripheralised. In the early 
1960s, the replacement of steam traction by electrification bypassed Blackpool, which resulted in 
rail services to Blackpool being a technological and operational inconvenience. In 1975, the M55 
finally reached Blackpool outskirts and the last extension of the M55 to reach the city centre was 
not completed until 1983 on an old excursion line. There is a weak internal road system which 
results in the difficulty in travelling north-south in Blackpool
110
, Mr David Bayliss points out, 
regarding tourist catchment in the North-West, road access is rather more important because 
nowadays tourist activities in Blackpool reply on coaches and cars
111
. Moreover, due to declining 
local economies, the modernisation of the WCML removed previous direct rail services to London. 
Direct rail services continued until 2003 when Virgin trains transferred to cross-country services, 
before the completion of Phase 1 of the WCML modernisation (Blackpool Gazette, 2003). An 
interchange had to be made in Preston to continue a journey. The contrast between fast inter-city 
                                                        
109 Interview with Mr David Bayliss. 
110 Interview with Mr David Bayliss (the quotation is in Appendix 19-DB-1).  
111 Interview with Mr David Bayliss (the quotation is in Appendix 19-DB-2). 
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services and intra-regional services further resulted in Blackpool acquiring a negative image in the 
mind of anyone who changed trains at Preston to Blackpool. As Mr Bayliss honestly describes, 
Although the Pendolinos aren’t the nicest rail trains in the world, they’re not bad….You then get off  at 
Preston, and there’s a contrast between the nice, shiny London train to Preston and the rather dreary train, 
particularly on the South Fylde Line, to the Pleasure Beach in Blackpool South; the contrast there is quite 
stunning. And you feel like you’re stepping from a first-class world into a third-class world…it is a 
psychological thing.  
 
Failed Regeneration Attempts: A Combination of the Ideology of National Political 
Economy and A Lack of Political Leadership   
 
Regardless of the transport disadvantage, a major attempt to diversify Blackpool‘s economy was 
not made until the creation of ReBlackpool URC. During the conservative regime (1979-1997), no 
major urban regeneration funding was allocated to the area, except the Lancashire Manufacturing 
Partnership
112
 to enhance the manufacturing economy. Under the re-elected Labour Government, 
a major attempt was made to improve Blackpool as a tourist destination. ―ReBlackpool‖ URC was 
created in 2003, built on cooperation between Blackpool Council, NWDA, and then English 
Partnerships, with large investment commitment to major physical transformation and conference 
facilities in the town centre and promenades, with an ultimate idea of creating a Las-Vegas style 
Super-Casino. In line with this idea, various transport schemes were planned and proposed. 
Blackpool airport would have needed to be significantly redeveloped as a key external transport 
hub to accommodate people from the UK and abroad, mainly Europe. For urban transit, Blackpool 
applied for funding to upgrade its tramway system between Starr Gate and Fleetwood, but there is 
no linkage between tramway and railway. Meanwhile, during the process of the WCML 
modernisation and the discussion of railway timetables, there was an attempt to campaign for a 
resumption of the national rail services between London and Blackpool. Mr David Bayliss, an 
independent professional advisor who was involved in this attempt on behalf of ReBlackpool URC, 
states  
There was an attempt to re-establish a through service with one or two main trains a day each way between 
Blackpool and London… We spoke to the people in the department of  transport to see whether or not 
trains would run as far as Lancaster, because I think one train a day going up to just Lancaster and 
turning back could go to Blackpool rather than up to Lancaster.  
 
                                                        
112 This included the coastal area of West Lancashire containing the towns of Morecambe, Lancaster, Blackpool and 
Preston, and the former traditional textile area of East Lancashire comprising towns such as Blackburn, Burnley, 
Accrington, Nelson and Colne and Rossendale. The scheme received £8.1million of SRB funding, with a further 
£8.3million from other public expenditure and £15million levered in from the private sector.   
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These attempts failed as soon as Blackpool lost to Manchester in its bid for the Super-Casino, 
which was a major argument in support of the need for faster rail services
113
. Only the tramway 
project was later approved by the Department for Transport
114
. This national decision demonstrates 
the value judgement at the national level that there is little confidence in Blackpool which is able 
to deliver. ―In our view the regeneration benefits of the proposal before us are unproven‖ (Casino 
Advisory Panel, 2007, p.108).   
However, the national decision proves a serious crisis for Blackpool and a critical test on its lack 
of political leadership to deal with this crisis. The ―no plan B‖ attitude responding to the national 
decision expressed by Mr David Weaver from Blackpool Borough Council was questioned by the 
panel. ―It seems to us that the reliance for several years on the resort casino concept has inhibited 
the production of other ideas for addressing decline‖ (Casino Advisory Panel, 2007, p.41). 
Similarly, the former ReBlackpool Chairman Professor Hall confirmed the local council‘s attitude 
and argued that it is normal and also occurred in other parts of the country.  
―We have no plan B‖... When the day came and Blackpool City Council found out Plan A had gone and said he had 
no plan at all. That was a major crisis for Blackpool. I think ReBlackpool never recovered. We devoted almost all our 
activities to that super-casino and some associated schemes which also unfortunately didn’t get any money…. But I 
think it was normal: it more or less happened in other parts of the country. 
 
Fragmented Governance 
 
In addition to the lack of political leadership, sub-regional governance has been weak and appears 
to be problematic after the institutional reform brought about by Local Government Act 1992. 
Blackpool was granted the status as a Unitary Authority in 1998, which resulted in a barrier for 
Blackpool to cooperate with other authorities within WCL. Blackpool‘s indulgence in this new 
power impedes the cooperation ―because it feels it might be dominated by Lancashire which it was 
part of for a long time so it fends off Lancashire and dislikes Preston‖
115
. And the mentality of 
Blackpool is described as ―We are Blackpool; we are a unitary authority; No, we can look after 
our own affairs; No, keep away- you’re our rivals”
116
.Given that Blackpool is such a small UA 
―with relatively little clout‖ alongside major metropolitan cities, it is worth pondering whether 
Blackpool could benefit more under regional operation which recognises its problems. Although 
bringing these rival authorities together had not been easy, regional funding resources provided the 
                                                        
113 Interview with the former Chairman of ReBlackpool, Professor Peter Hall (the quotation is in Appendix 19-PH-3) 
114 This was approved with the assistance of professional consultant Mr David Bayliss, who sat round the table with 
the Blackpool representative in the meeting with DfT and brought in his experience in building the Croydon tram line 
and the Docklands Light Railways to make the case in Blackpool more compelling in order to secure funding. 
115 Interview with Mr David Bayliss. 
116 Interview with Mr David Bayliss. 
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incentive for local authorities to work together. The relationship between NWDA and local 
authorities could be acutely presented like this. ―Look, we’ve got to work together. If you work 
together with us, we’ll make sure we provide funding for you; there’ll be some differences as to 
who gets what, but we’ll make sure we can support your priorities‖
117
. As soon as the regional 
operation is abolished in 2010 and there is little money available for current LEPs, old rivalries 
will resurface.  
 
II. Pennine Lancashire  
 
Pennine Lancashire (PL), which has a constellation of six small towns
118
, is remotely located in the 
north-east part of the region. A large number of rail lines were closed or converted to single tracks 
in the 1960s (British Rail Board, 1963) and two major rail links remain, from PL to Preston and 
Manchester respectively. Over the years, rail transport connectivity with these two major rail hubs 
has remained unimproved. The east-west rail link with Preston, which is a single track with two 
old train coaches, provides unreliable and lengthy services
119
. The other rail link with Manchester 
runs from Clitheroe to Greater Manchester through Blackburn. The Blackburn-Bolton section was 
converted to a single track in the 1960s. Given the polycentric nature of the PL settlement, this rail 
link to Manchester is extremely unsatisfactory and provides uneven cover for the wider territory 
within PL
120
. Blackburn has the best accessibility to both Preston and Greater Manchester. The 
final section of the M65, Burnley-Colne, was completed in 1988 and brought a sign of hope for PL, 
functioning as a life line. 
Historically, each town has its own strong identity instead of a whole. Inequality exists within PL. 
The northern part of the M65 such as the Ribble Valley is a pleasant and sleepy place without 
serious issues of deprivation but a lot of structural problems need to be addressed just over the hill 
in Nelson, Burnley or Accrington. For these southern post-industrial towns, difficulty in adapting 
to and attracting new types of economic activities has resulted in continual decline, with associated 
                                                        
117 Interview with Mr David Bayliss. 
118 The six towns comprising PL are Blackburn with Darwen, Burnley, Hyndburn, Pendle, Rossendale and the Ribble 
Valley.  
119 This rail link competes with bus services by serving every stop. It takes about one hour to reach Preston from 
Nelson, which is about half the time from London to Preston. In an interview with Mr Brian Cookson, the executive 
director for regeneration from Pendle local authority, he stated: ―It can take half the time it would take you to travel from 
Preston to London and not a very pleasant experience I guess- rottenly old train, two coaches. You were lucky if you didn’t break down or 
stop at Burnley and not come through to Nelson and so on‖. 
120 Apart from the journey time from Blackburn to Manchester, the time travelling from any village in PL to Blackburn 
for interchange services either by car or rail would take at least another 30-40 minutes. In this circumstance, it is easier 
for people living near Blackburn to commute into Greater Manchester rather than to the wider territory of PL.  
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serious problems such as high levels of unemployment, low incomes and poor educational 
attainment (EKOS, 2008), a spin-off young generation with low aspirations
121
, the deterioration of 
housing stock and an oversupply of two-bedroom terraced housing, a peripheral location and poor 
transport connectivity with the whole region. Thus, the external perception of PL was very 
negative without positive investment cases. As Mr Lingard
122
 states, ―That affected the way the 
potential investors saw it. They didn’t see it as somewhere they could do – they saw it as a rural 
backwater, rather than somewhere where they could bring impact‖. 
In order to stimulate inward investment, in the 1980s, the intervention was made by the national 
level for manufacturing activities, such as the designation of North-East Lancashire Enterprise 
Zone (1983-1998) (Downey, 1986; Potter & Moore, 2000) and the Lancashire Manufacturing 
Partnership. Since the non-metropolitan area was not the main target area by national urban 
programme, very limited funding for urban regeneration was available to PL. The Blackburn City 
Challenge fund in 1993 was an exception made a successful bid (Mann, 1998).  
From the late 1990s, several funding schemes were employed to assist the most deprived 
communities, dealing with not only economic transition but also housing, physical transformation, 
skills and education. Firstly, the bid for Elevate East Lancashire Pathfinder (‗Elevate‘) was 
approved in 2004 to address housing problems and deprivation (Committee of Public Accounts, 
2008). Not only the physical refurbishment of housing, but also the remodelling of housing types 
and sizes were carried out to diversify housing choices. The performance of Elevate had been 
regarded as a success (The Audit Commission, 2005, p. 40). However, the whole process of 
housing market renewal was stalled just less than half of the way through because funding was cut 
due to the recession in 2008, which seems to put those efforts down the drain. As Mr Lingard 
describes,  
There are many hectares of  undeveloped land that are left empty right in the middle of  the communities 
affected. So if  you were living in one yourself, you might not think that anything had got any better.  
 
Secondly, two reports, the Urban Strategy Initiatives study (The Audit Commission, 2005) and 
―Dreaming of Pennine Lancashire‖ report (Livesey Wilson Ideas Management, 2005), proposed a 
wide range of innovative ideas covering culture, social, economy and transport infrastructure 
initiatives to diversify the economy. In order to implement this long wish list, the East Lancashire 
Chief Executives Group (ELCHEX) was formed to develop a coherent strategy for PL in 
                                                        
121 Interview with Mr. Brian Cookson (the quotation is in Appendix 19-BC-1).  
122 Interview with Mr Lingard (Interview quotation in Appendix 19-SL-1) 
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partnership with local communities, key regional and sub-regional stakeholders and potential 
private investors (The Audit Commission, 2005).  
Thirdly, higher education and skills were substantially improved. The significant expansion of 
Blackburn University College delivering accredited university courses in a number of subjects and 
a new campus of the University of Central Lancashire in the centre of Burnley accomplished a 
huge physical transformation right in the city centre and directly provided access to higher 
education on the doorstep. As Mr Lingard describes 
That’s more likely to make people think: this is something I can do, or this is something I can 
aspire to. It’s not something on the TV or something I read about in the newspaper, this is 
something for me.  
 
Fourthly, a request for an improved rail connection with Manchester was made by local authorities. 
Two separate campaign camps for two rail lines were formed; one campaign group was organised 
by Blackburn with Darwen UA, which asked for the track comprising the Blackburn-Bolton 
section to be doubled. The other was marshalled by Burnley borough council with regard to the 
reinstating of the Todmodern Curve which would enable direct rail services from Burnley to 
Manchester. For PL, the prime issue is not a direct rail service by HST, but the need for 
intra-regional transport improvement with the large regional city in order for them to access their 
regional centre. As Mr Brian Cookson from Pendle council expresses, “The point I am making is 
those hubs are no good for us unless the linkage is there as well.”  
It is argued that with the advance of information and communication technology, the possibility of 
running business from home presents a great opportunity for these small towns adjacent to outdoor 
activities to arrest the decline
123
. In line with this view, there is an essential need for transport 
connectivity to open up any possibility because, with improved connectivity, a multiplier effect 
could be generated that high-income workers could be attracted to live in these small towns and 
spend money locally. Over time, the character of and labour skills in a place could improve and 
become attractive to inwards investment. However, this proves to be a chicken-and-egg problem 
because this potential contradicts with a conventional view that transport investment in linking 
these poor towns could not be the cure for the local economy and are likely to have negative 
effects. This conventional view assumes the weakness of places as a fixed condition rather than 
allows transport improvement to be an opportunity for change. As Mr Brian Cookson in Pendle 
local council argued,   
 
                                                        
123 Interview with Mr. Lingard (the quotation is in Appendix 19- SL-2)  
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If  you have a better link there whether it is road or rail, it is a two-way link, isn’t it? Not only you give 
right education and you allow your people to live here to go there to get jobs, but also the area of  the city 
centre whatever people are saying: it is a quite nice area to live and nice villages around there, I am going to 
go that way as well. You do both. So you get high wealthy individuals thinking I am coming to live here 
rather than there. Those people who get high-paid jobs in Manchester then chose to live in Pendle, spend 
more on the local economy, employ people with low skills, doing certain jobs in retail or anything from 
painting to decorating to garages and so on: so all these spin-off  benefits… We could develop as a commuter 
town to Manchester and so on. Over a generation or two, the population would adjust and we would get 
people with more disposal income here and that would help the shops and town centres and so on. 
 
However, local intervention in campaigning for intra-regional links to Manchester was fragmented 
and ineffective. As Mr Lingard states,  
East Lancashire as a whole did not punch above its weight. Its lobbying is inefficient and it adds up to less 
than the sum of  its parts in the way it manages to influence governments. It frequently gives many different 
messages instead of  one clear message… there’re others to make the best of  what one has to do is speak with 
one voice and to say to the government: ―These are our three priorities‖ and to keep saying ―These are our 
three priorities – this is what we want.‖   
 
Fragmented and ineffective campaign could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, a mismatch of 
leadership and power resulted in an uncomfortable tension growing between local authorities and 
Elevate, which was the only organisation which was responsible for the whole PL regarding 
housing market, but not for other things like government services, education, social services, and 
transport. Although Chief Executive of Elevate Max Steinberg realised housing alone is not 
enough and began to organise and lobby for other improvement, he did not have overarching 
administrative power. As Mr Lingard reveals,     
In fact, the people that did have the power weren’t necessarily really happy in having Max implying that they 
weren’t doing the best job. Of  course, he is very effective and perfectly charming and not at all a 
confrontational character, but that was the way it was received.  
 
Secondly, there is a fragmented institutional structure. Similar to Blackpool, with a mixture of one- 
and two-tier systems in Lancashire County, Blackburn with Darwen was administratively 
separated from Lancashire County whose power in transport connectivity is limited to county-own 
transport, such as buses and highways, not for rail investment. In this circumstance, it is up to each 
local authority‘s lobbying and influence with evidence to approach Network Rail and the Central 
Government in order to get their rail investment on the list of prioritised rail investment. Even 
though Burnley managed to get approved for the Todmodern Curve
124
 in 2011, it was achieved by 
                                                        
124 In October 2011, the reinstatement of the Todmodern Curve and the redevelopment of industrial heritage of 
Weaver’s Triangle which costs £8.8m were announced by the coalition government as part of the Regional Growth 
Fund.  
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the interest of partial local authorities- ―doing what’s best for Burnley, not by giving up a bit of 
them for the bigger area”
125
. Mr Lingard the argued this fragmentation is the major cause for 
ineffective use of public and private resources.        
PL’s ability to deal with that – to make the best of  the public resources and the private resources that it 
might attract, I think, is fundamentally constrained by the local government system that operates within the 
area of  one unitary authority – Blackburn – and the county council based 35 miles away in Preston…and 
then a series of  small district authorities – each of  which is tiny. 
 
This lack of leadership in local authorities was evident in the way of arranging budgets when 
public spending cut arrived in 2010, which resulted in the termination of the Elevate based on an 
understandable thinking of prioritising budget for social services rather than a strategic perspective 
in maintaining the Elevate for the whole PL in a long term process. Mr Lingard stated,  
It takes an awful lot of  vision, far-sightedness and leadership to say ―no, we’re not cutting our economic 
development, we’re not cutting our branding and our marketing, because these are the things that are going to 
help us out of  this mess‖. But that’s not what happened. We (Elevate) were gone within months of  the 
conservative government taking over.  
 
Overall, despite many attempts and improvements made in non-transport initiatives within PL,  
poor rail connectivity with Manchester could not produce synergetic effects of intervention and 
has resulted in PL‘s relatively self-contained travel-to-work patterns and its economic weakness, 
as demonstrated in Lucci and Hildreth (2008). Without unified will (under the lack of leadership 
and fragmented governance), individual local authorities in deprived places have been unable to 
improve their transport connections with stronger places as they have weak power under the 
centralised funding control by the state. In the case of Mr Lingard‘s office, his colleagues did not 
want to live in PL because they could not go to Manchester or Liverpool easily by public 
transport
126
. Similarly, for local economic development, the risk is not only that an area may be 
unable to adapt to a knowledge economy, but also that it may fail to maintain existing 
manufacturing companies. Mr Brian Cookson is aware of their predicament and the concerns of 
investors.  
If  you are from Japan or Korea or wherever and want to invest in factories in England, why would you 
build it here? You wouldn’t. So in terms of  our economic development, I think we are more likely to become 
successful by helping those companies we already have to grow and expand and help people who are already 
living here to become more entrepreneurial and develop the skills to grow their businesses and so on. Let’s 
make it easier for those businesses to grow rather than wasting lots of  money chasing around the world.  
                                                        
125 Interview with Mr Lingard. 
126 Interview with Mr Ste Lingard (the quotation is in Appendix 19–SL-3) 
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7.4  Discussion: Multi-Level Interventions  
 
The British case demonstrated that the national state did not intervene to seize the opportunity 
presented by the WCML modernisation. Instead, the project was held back by the Treasury and 
implemented under rail privatisation. The fiasco of the WCML modernisation with over-run 
budget and serious delay had been perceived as a technical problem rather than a strategic 
opportunity. Moreover, HST service patterns on this upgrade project honestly reflect a revenue- 
and profit-led perspective with major metropolitan cities, thriving tourist places, better-off places, 
and places conveniently located on the WCML are preferred whereas poor and peripheral places 
have been left out. The inequality within the region has been reinforced. In addition, the 
decision-making process of the WCML modernisation presents a separate central-local 
relationship and was treated as a pure national transport project. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
local does not traditionally have a legitimate role to play in the national decision-making process. 
The interview findings confirm this point because no apparent intervention was made to do with 
the WCML. The only exception is Blackpool‘s failed attempt to resume previous direct train 
services with London.  
On the other hand, national spatial-economic planning contexts have generated an exclusive and 
constrained environment for local governments to make local interventions on transport and 
non-transport initiatives for seizing the opportunities of HST. Under the Conservative 
Government‘s reform, there was a process of weakening local financial discretion and dismantling 
strategic planning counties with competition-led funding schemes and prioritised metropolitan 
issues. Although the Labour Government concerned more about regional inequality by pouring 
much more funding resources into poor regions and attempting to reintroduce strategic regional 
planning, institutional and planning reforms were fragmented and ineffective as investigated in 
section 7.3.2. The focus naturally shifts to the lower levels: the municipal and sub-regional.  
Local intervention is closely affected by market-led and private-led national contexts but varies 
from one place to another. As soon as the WCML modernisation was completed at the national 
level, albeit the reduction of time was not as great as specially-built new lines, faster services 
between major cities and London are secured and prioritised. Therefore, whether or not the 
opportunity of HSR could be seized lies in to what extent and what local intervention has been 
made before the WCML modernisation was completed and is likely to be a reactive rather than 
proactive effect. Two key local capacities accounted for the wider impact, namely: economic 
trajectory and political leadership.  
Firstly, the economic trajectory which is closely associated with the wider effect of HST reflects 
varying need for the opportunity of HST. Among three types of sub-regions, two metropolitan 
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sub-regions have significantly redeveloped their city centres before the completion of the WCML 
modernisation. In Manchester, local attractiveness with a great city offering (cultural, high-end 
retail, top-ranking university, well-connected transport network, the quality of life etc.) has been 
improved and provided a conducive environment to attract knowledge intensive activities. In 
Liverpool, the European Capital of Culture 2008 was a showcase to convey to the world what had 
been significantly transformed in the city centre. There is still a lot to do outside city centre and the 
transport connectivity within and outside the city-region. For non-metropolitan HST sub-regions, 
with less difficult situation in economic restructuring, major urban funding programmes in the 
1980s and 1990s had little to do with them. HST accessibility in the city centre were not 
capitalised, just existing patterns are reproduced: city centres of two new towns Warrington and 
Preston are left unimproved in a poor condition; a well-established town, Chester, benefits from its 
faster rail link with London for tourist activities; spill-over towns in Cheshire East have been 
located in the southern region between London and Manchester, so the WCML modernisation 
enhances their existing development. These all well explained their economic performance shown 
in Chapter 5. As for two non-HST sub-regions (WCL and PL), there is no chance to exploit HST 
in the same way as those HST sub-regions can do, but it is not just about a key hub but how the 
hinterland could be better connected to the hub. Both suffered from poor transport connectivity in 
different ways. For WCL, the earlier direct train between London and Blackpool was taken away 
with the introduction of Virgin Pendolinos while PL has been remote and isolated in transport with 
its regional centre. Thus, regional inequality had been widened without proper improvement of 
intra-regional rail connectivity between sub-regions and their regional centre which in particular 
benefited from faster rail services with national capital. 
Secondly, the political leadership and governance demonstrated the differential effect. In response 
to all the national conditions, Manchester demonstrated its strong political leadership and 
governance to achieve significant revival as a solid regional capital. In response to institutional and 
financial crises in the 1980s, a cooperative relationship with the national state, a city-regional 
political coalition, and a public-private partnership was created to ensure a political and economic 
strategy. Moreover, encountering the pervasive privatisation of airports and unreliable inter-city 
rail services, Manchester Airport was kept under the ownership of ten municipalities to ensure its 
external transport connectivity for attracting inward investment. In line with positioning itself as a 
competitive European City, under a stable and strong leadership and governance which ensured a 
virtuous cycle, it successfully made the most of national resources to achieve physical 
transformation, diversify local economies with the recreation of new economic space in a 
polycentric city-regional territory, and extend external and internal public transport network. 
Therefore, it was argued that good rail connection to London as well as the international airport 
has become a very important marketing factor to attract some prestigious companies locating in 
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Manchester
127
. In Merseyside, this factor explain the catching-up performance in Liverpool. In the 
early 1980s, Liverpool had all these adverse conditions to Manchester‘s. The performance gap 
between Manchester and Liverpool was thus widened. This negative situation had not be altered 
until a cumulative effect deriving from a series of good efforts made from the mid-1990s in a way 
emulating Manchester‘s successful model. Similarly, the differential performance between 
Warrington and Manchester has the most demonstrative effect in the high-valued economic 
activities that path dependence on a model of motorway-based R&D business parks in Warrington 
which did not exert leadership and vision to reconnect its fragmented city centre and resulted in 
high-value economic activities concentrating in the well-transformed metropolitan centres. 
Likewise, in the two remote post-industrial sub-regions, local intervention was made to improve 
their attractiveness and arrest decline, but both lacked sub-regional leadership with fragmented 
governance. ReBlackpool‘s request for resuming direct trains to and from London closely linked 
with a bid for super casino. The bid failed because national ideology showed little confidence in a 
declining resort town which lacks strong political leadership in response to the crisis. The lack of 
political leadership is also unveiled with the shorted-sighted interest of enjoying the power of 
Unitary Authority rather than concerning strategic sub-regional intervention. In PL, the un-unified 
campaign for improving intra-regional transport link to Manchester reflected the depressing 
situation for the peripheral place to have possible transformation. Without an inclusive and 
capacity-building assistance from the regional and national level, the efforts made so far could not 
have a synergetic effect and these two sub-regions reflected their constraint within this market-led 
national context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
127 Interview with Mr Dave Whyte (interview quotation in Appendix 19, DW-4) 
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7.5  Chapter Conclusions  
 
To sum up, through the examination of multi-level government interventions, this chapter shows 
that, in line with a traditional central-local separate relationship, the modernisation of the WCML 
was purely implemented at the national level with a market-led approach. Waiting for private 
money and the fiasco of the project under rail privatisation caused serious problems in securing 
effective transport connectivity. During the absence of reliable inter-city rail services for nearly 30 
years from the 1980s to late 2000s, there was a shift from rail to air, which led to the development 
of Manchester Airport and progressive development of its rail connectivity within the region and 
beyond. The arrival of the WCML has seen traffic shifted back from air to rail. A combination of 
the international airport and HST services between London and Manchester does consolidate the 
central role of Manchester for North-West England and even the whole Northern England. 
Meanwhile, the British national spatial-economic planning framework during the 1980s-2000s led 
to a constrained and city-led transformation process in NWE. At the sub-regional level, four 
varying local interventions were found closely associated with national and different local 
conditions, and central-local and local-local interactions.   
It suggested that the separate process of the WCML modernisation has resulted in a reactive 
impact of the WCML for the transformation of sub-regions. The polarisation of HST services in 
better-off sub-regions in the southern part of NWE, but the upgraded WCML appears to best fit 
renewed metropolitan centres. It explains the re-centralisation of regional hegemony around 
Manchester and a catch-up process in Liverpool and Merseyside. A lack of active intervention in 
the non-metropolitan HST sub-regions shows a stable, less strategic, and path-dependent process. 
For non-HST sub-regions, an arduous but frustrated process was persistent. There is little wonder 
that the intra-regional and inter-regional inequality had widened. The next chapter will turn to the 
HST experience and findings in NPDC.  
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8.1  Introduction  
 
Following the British case presented in Chapter 7, this chapter is devoted to the French case 
associated with the opportunities presented by the TGV-Nord for Nord-Pas-de-Calais (NPDC) 
over the same period of time from the 1980s to the 2000s. This chapter is structured in five 
sections. Section 8.2 examines the TGV-Nord from a national perspective. In section 8.3, the focus 
sequentially shifts to lower level-regional and sub-regional intervention: three major economic 
zones, namely the Lille metropolis, the coastal area and the coal mining area, are chosen for 
further investigation. A discussion on multi-level interaction is featured in section 8.4. Section 8.5 
summarises the conclusion.  
 
8.2  National Intervention in the TGV-Nord  
 
The TGV-Nord was explicitly endorsed by the French state ( Figure 8.1 shows the position of the 
Lille Metropolis in the heart of the TGV network in Northern Europe). As mentioned earlier in 
section 6.4.2, the successful debut of the TGV-Sud-Est in 1981 resulted in the determination of the 
newly-incumbent Mitterrand administration to develop successive TGV lines. Naturally, it 
immediately led to the re-opening of dialogue regarding developing a feasible case for the Channel 
Tunnel project between the UK and France. As Fraser and Baert (2003) argue, the process began 
in 1982 when the French and British Prime Ministers at the time, Pierre Mauroy and Margaret 
Thatcher, agreed to reconsider construction of the Channel Tunnel. Both sides finally signed the 
Canterbury Treaty in 1986. Soon after the construction of the Channel Tunnel was officially 
declared, the French transport ministers, along with their counterparts from Belgium, Germany and 
Holland, agreed to construct the northern European TGV network in October 1986 (RFF, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the French government announced their decision to construct the TGV-Nord and 
commissioned a study of possible HST routes.  
National intervention in the TGV-Nord has to balance three major concerns, namely rail market, 
national spatial-economic strategy, and local needs. According to the head of major infrastructure 
projects in SNCF, Michel Leboeuf, these concerns shaped this third TGV line
128
. Firstly, the 
potential to exploit an international rail transport market was a key driver. The TGV-Nord would 
create an attractive potential rail market between Paris and London because, prior to the 
TGV-Nord, air was a dominant travel mode. But air travel between Paris and Lille was not popular 
                                                        
128 Interview with Mr Michel Leboeuf (the quotation is in Appendix 20- ML-1, ML-2, ML-3,& ML-4).  
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and the Lesquin airport had been operating with a much lower level of usage than its original 
intended capacity since the journey time between Paris and Lille by rail was already only two 
hours, which was not too onerous. Similarly, regarding rail revenue, business travellers are 
targeted rather than commuters. The SNCF reasoned that when the distance is short, more and 
more people travel by rail. Consequently, more season tickets would be purchased and less 
revenue would be generated from rail services. For instance, the domestic route between Paris and 
Lille is less profitable than that between Paris and Lyon because the TGV line between Paris and 
Lyon did successfully beat the air market when rail travel time was slashed from four hours to 
around two hours.  
Secondly, in addition to the rail market, there is a spatial concern regarding rebalancing the 
concentration around Paris and improving the connectivity between provincial regions. Gradually 
a national high-speed transport system has taken shape. The French TGV system adapts to a 
historical Paris-centred spatial structure with the creation of a super transport hub system around 
Paris. Except for the rail services which terminate in Paris central station, the current French HST 
system is progressively developing a high-speed rail loop link around the outskirts to connect 
provincial TGV links through Charles de Gaulle international airport (later also be connected to 
Paris-Orly Airport) from where the provincial cities could easily connect each other. As a result of 
the efficient synergy of traffic around Paris, the transport structure comprises a national transport 
system through the integration of air and HST systems. This involves using TGV lines to link 
provincial cities with Paris so the HST system and international airports can work together to 
exploit their own niche markets. As a result, the function of provincial airports within two hours 
by TGV from Paris has largely diminished and been replaced by HST and international flights are 
concentrated around Paris.  
Thirdly, the law LOTI ensures the negotiation mechanism between the national and the local levels. 
Rail services provided by SNCF need to take the needs of local authorities into account. The initial 
TGV-Nord route proposed by SNCF was intended to route through the western outskirts of Lille 
metropolis, avoiding Lille city centre, and directly link Paris with Calais through Amiens. 
However, this initial idea encountered local opposition during the decision-making process and it 
was eventually decided to locate a new TGV station, Lille-Europe, in the city centre where the 
locals preferred. Mr Michel Leboeuf explains why SNCF agreed to change the original plan for the 
TGV-Nord.  
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In French law, ―Law for orienting internal transport‖, the SNCF has a monopoly over rail services. This 
means the SNCF cannot design rail services only on the basis of  its own interests and has to pay attention 
to the local government. On the one hand, it has the benefit of  local competitors. On the other, it is necessary 
to make concessions. That is the deal. 
 
Figure 8-1  Lille Metropolis in the Heart of the TGV Network in Northern Europe  
 
Note: The first phase of the TGV-Est Line (Paris and Strasbourg) was opened between Paris and 
Nancy/Merz in 2007.  
Source: http://www.lille-metropole-2015.org/schemdir/pages/cartes.htm 
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8.3  Local Intervention in the TGV-Nord 
8.3.1  At the Regional Level 
The NPDC regional government was created before the re-dialogue of the Channel Tunnel project 
and the TGV-Nord. A proactive role has been played by the regional government over the past 30 
years with three major interventions on the opportunity which the TGV-Nord presented. With the 
arrival of rail reform in 1997, these interventions could be classified in two phrases illustrated in 
Figure 8-2.     
 
Figure 8-2  Regional Intervention Processes in Exploiting the TGV-Nord 
 
Source: author 
8.3.1.1  Phase One- A Paris-oriented TGV Services 
 
A Collective Campaign for Wider Regional Benefit    
 
A collective regional campaign critically influenced the route of the TGV-Nord line and the 
location of the TGV stations. When SNCF plotted the possible TGV-Nord route, a choice needs to 
be made between two regions (Picardie or NPDC). On the one hand, the route 
Paris-Amiens-Sangatte in Picardie would prove a shorter route, but this route would 
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simultaneously lengthen the route from Brussels to London and from Paris to Amsterdam and 
Cologne. The proposed route through Lille was favoured by SNCF and the political compensation 
for Amiens was a TGV Haute-Picardie station (Siino, Laumi re, & Leriche, 2004) and an unclear 
long-term commitment to build the Amiens ―cut-off‖ route (Assemblee Nationale, 1988. quoted 
from Mawson, Holliday, & Vickerman, 1990). On the other, a strong coalition within NPDC in 
seizing the HST opportunity was demonstrated. First, it was formed to oppose the claim of Amiens, 
since this route would sabotage the economic restructuring strategy for the City of Lille and the 
whole region. Secondly, it was further provoked by SNCF‘s proposed route avoiding Lille city 
centre. In 1987, a coalition group RAFHAEL (Réseau des Agglomérations de Flandre, du Hainaut, 
de l’Artois Et du Littoral) which was formed within ―TGV-Gare de Lille‖ association. Regional 
consensus was made based on both benefits to Lille and the wider region. As Professor Philippe 
Menerault stressed,  
The notion was that Lille would have a driving role in the redevelopment of  the whole region. This was 
apparently understood from the beginning…The bargain was that we would support Lille if  we had a 
guarantee that we would be reached directly by TGV. 
 
This collective intervention in NPDC was in sharp contrast with the decision of a TGV 
Haute-Picardie station; the political operation proved a constraint for wider regional benefit. The 
rivalry between the two regional cities (Amiens or Saint-Quentin) ended with a compromise of a 
―beetroot station‖, which could not bring about the full potential of wider regional development
129
.  
 
The Electrification of Conventional Rail Tracks and the Addition of Two New Branches 
 
In order to fulfil the promise of TGV services for the wider region, the first intervention was to 
electrify lines and add two branches to enable the interoperability between TGV and conventional 
lines. Concerning the regional economic geography, the two additional branches were best 
employed to serve medium-sized cities. Professor Didier Paris, from Lille 1 University and the 
current President of the Development Council of Lille Metropolis, explains how two additional 
branches could serve many medium-sized cities with around 300,000 inhabitants. 
The aim of  this coalition was to persuade French national company SNCF to build each station (in 
Boulogne, Calais, Dunkerque, Béthune, Lens, Douai, Arras, Valenciennes)…These two small branches 
have a main role. So it was very good to build and provide transportation for all the medium-sized cities. 
 
                                                        
129 Interview with Professor Philippe Menerault (the quotation is in Appendix 20- PM-1)  
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Ms Anne-Sophie Legendre from the Regional Transport Department stated that this regional 
concern did not fit SNCF‘s priorities, so the regional government paid for these rail 
improvements
130
. At this stage, the wider benefit was assumed to lie in the faster rail services with 
Paris. As Professor Philippe Menerault points out that ―The arrival of the TGV encouraged the 
improvement of the existing network within the region. The aim of the region was to ensure that its 
main cities could have a direct TGV link to Paris‖.  
 
8.3.1.2  Phase Two- A Lille-oriented TGV Services  
 
The Launch and Expansion of Regional TGV Services (TERGV)  
 
Rail reform resulted in the devolution of regional passenger rail services to the hands of the 
regional transport authority. A second intervention was made with the sheer novelty of regional 
TGV services (TERGV), which were launched in May 2000. It involves the exploitation of 
available seats on underutilised domestic TGVs, for which a regional subsidy was paid to SNCF 
(Torchin, et al., 2008), bringing most sub-regions within one hour of Lille, specifically remote 
coastal areas such as Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne. The TERGV services were further 
extended to serve Arras in 2003 and Berck-Montreuil in 2010.  
In contrast with the previous intervention, the launch of TERGV significantly shifted the 
developmental relationship from being Paris-oriented to Lille-oriented. SNCF specifically devotes 
itself to long-haul national and international rail services and the regional government are given 
authority to develop regional rail services. The regional government had to pay for the 
intra-regional link to and from Lille. Ms Legendre explains how the TGV lines were exploited to 
provide the TERGV service.  
What we have developed with SNCF is HST running at high speed using a high-speed network, but for 
regional purposes. That is what we call TERGV…There were two possibilities: either we had special 
HST running for us or we had HST which were going, for example, from Lille to Paris. Instead of  leaving 
from Lille, they would leave from Dunkerque running high-speed to Lille and then high-speed to Paris, but 
we would only pay for the Dunkerque-Lille connection.  
 
 
                                                        
130 According to Ms Legendre, between 1989 and 1994, the investment by the regional council for the arrival of the 
TGV-Nord amounted to € 239M. (1.Financing of part of the additional costs to establish the HST in Lille (€150 M), 
2.Programme to electrify classic lines to expand HST trains (€71 M : Cambrai-Douai €9 M, Boulogne-Calais €52 M, 
Lille-Baisieux €10 M), 3.Connecting High Speed lines (€18 M) to provide HST access to Arras and Dunkirk (junction 
line at the north of Arras €8 M, junction line at Cassel €10 M)). 
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8.3.1.3  Two Models of Exploiting the TGV 
 
These two phases of TGV services to serve the wider regional territory critically manifest two 
kinds of models exploiting HST for wider regional development: the first phase (the extended 
TGV service) is known as ―the irrigation approach‖ and the second phase (the TERGV model). 
The first model which provides TGV services between small regional towns and Paris has the 
issue of little commercial popularity and are unlikely to be robust in the long term. As Mr Alain 
L‘Hostis from Le Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport (LVMT) argues that the irrigation of TGV 
services within a region is a fragile approach.  
This has proved to be a fragile approach because it is a big vehicle with a hundred people in two trains. 
When there are 55 hundred people in the train of  400 seats… you have to serve big cities to make it worth 
serving the smaller cities. This system is not suitable for regional services. 
 
The second model, coupled with a TGV model, appears to utilise rail services better than the 
irrigation approach. However, its current development has encountered problems for long-term 
development. Firstly, the extensive expansion of TERGV services has brought about a conflict 
between the national TGV and TERGV services. For SNCF
131
, the concern is competition for 
―capacity‖ with regard to intra-regional and inter-regional purposes. What is more, it was regarded 
as unfair competition because the regional transport authority receives funding from regional 
government to pay for the services whereas SNCF runs services without state funding. Secondly, 
the excessive cost of paying SNCF for TERGV has been a serious problem for the regional council. 
This unsustainable public funding issue is stressed by Mr Christopher Bartholeyns from Chamber 
de Commerce and Industry (CCI) for NPDC.   
The problem with this service is that perhaps the region didn’t consolidate the cost of  this service. The service 
is paid for by public money and not enough is paid by private investment. So it is developing very fast, but 
there is a restriction because you cannot pay more than you have in your pocket.  
 
It was suggested that the current TERGV system is potential but not yet very well-articulated and 
should be improved. Mr Alain L‘Hostis said,  
I think the most important thing is how we articulate the HST dedicated systems which serve the 
long-distance bigger agglomerations with existing regional trains …I think the Lille case shows that there is 
the potential for TERGV, but it is rather limited in space and there has to be very strong articulation with 
the regional system. I think this articulation can still be improved.   
 
                                                        
131 Interview with Mr Michel Leboeuf (the quotation is in Appendix 20- ML-5, and ML-6). 
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8.3.2  Varying Local Intervention at the Sub-regional Level  
 
Three major industrial agglomerations (see Figure 8-3) in NPDC are chosen from for further 
investigation, namely Lille Metropolis (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing), the coastal area (Dunkerque) 
and the former mining area (Lens- Hénin and Valenciennois).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-3  Typologies of Sub-regions in NPDC 
 
Source: author 
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8.3.2.1  Lille Metropolis- A Process of Developing A Polycentric Metropolis 
from A HST Hub    
 
 
Lille Metropolis
132
 is a border metropolitan city in France. Although it is not far from Paris, it was 
situated at a neglected position. The north-ish location of Paris in the country resulted in Lille 
being hidden behind Paris, which faces the majority of regional cities in the south. Fraser and 
Baert (2003) argue the major problem with Lille Metropolis is its peripherality and remoteness 
from its cultural heart, ―the mountains of the Pyrenees‖. Perhaps because of this inherited 
geographical disadvantage, it has long envisaged that being closely connected to the Channel 
Tunnel and European HST network, Lille could possibly to reverse the situation with a European 
hub strategy. From the 1920s onwards, a few attempts were already made to develop a through 
station, namely Dubuisson‘s plan (1921), Théo Leveau‘s plan (1951), and the OREAM-Nord 
(1971) (Menerault, 2009). However, the plan in the 1970s could not immediately be carried out 
because the Channel Tunnel project was abandoned in 1975. Before the decision to introduce the 
TGV-Nord project in the 1980s, Lille Metropolis had experienced an evolutionary process of 
consolidation since the 1960s, as mentioned in section 5.2.2, to curb over-agglomeration in the 
Paris region. But the turning point was still yet to come. Professor Didier Paris remembers Lille‘s 
previous image when it was hit hard by economic restructuring. 
It is very important for all these industrial cities to be proud of  ourselves and to be more confident. You 
know when I was young, it was the beginning of  my career and it was just the worst moment of  this region 
from an economic point of  view at the beginning of  the 1980s… no vision…and it was hard for young 
people to show interest in the territory. 
 
I. Strong Political Leadership and Governance   
Although strategic planning was imposed in the late 1960s and VT became available for local 
AOTUs to organise urban transport systems in the 1970s, it would not be possible to exploit the 
wider impact of HST without the strong leadership and governance of Pierre Mauroy as the 
president of LMCU from 1989 to 2008. He is widely regarded as a key figure in seizing the 
opportunity of the TGV-Nord. As Dr Alain L‘Hostis stresses that, ―I could not start without 
mentioning what Pierre Mauroy has done in Lille, basically put HST inside the city as opposed to 
outside the city, which was the most important decision taken locally‖. 
                                                        
132 Lille Metropolis has a polycentric city-regional structure that embraces four major cities: three municipalities that 
were previously textile conurbations, namely Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing, and Villeneuve-d’Ascq. Along with 81 
smaller municipalities, a new tier of strategic local government (LMCU) comprising 85 towns was officially created in 
1966, with a population of 1,091,438 inhabitants as calculated in 1999 (Colomb, 2007, p. 18). 
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The ―osmotic‖ centre-local relationship is best exemplified in Lille. Pierre Mauroy has been 
Mayor of Lille (1973-2001), Prime Minister (1981-1984), and the President of LMCU 
(1989-2008). When he negotiated with the British government for the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel, he was also the Mayor of Lille. This approach of cumul des mandates enabled him to 
combine national interests with local interests from a broad perspective by ―[drawing] together the 
various strands of the coalition and ensure consistency in its direction‖ (Newman and Thornley, 
1995, cited in Newman and Thornley, 1996, p.193). In line with those historical attempts 
mentioned above, Mauroy envisaged the rediscovery of Lille‘s historical niche from an 
industrialised metropolis to a powerhouse of services, a ―turbine tertiaire‖ with a critical location 
in the European crossroads. A lobby office was established in Brussels and Lille actively promoted 
itself as ―a European city‖ (cited in Newman and Thornley, 1996). Significant interventions were 
carried out under his leadership and are discussed further as follows.   
 
The Redevelopment of a TGV Hub with Large-scale Urban Projects  
Firstly, a large urban redevelopment project was instigated to create a new European HST hub on 
former military land to accommodate the arrival of new international traffic flows, the interchange 
function between different transport modes (road, metro, tram and conventional rail), and to 
provide new space catering for new service activities. A research firm, Euralille-Métropole, was 
set up in 1988 to oversee the development of the whole area. As a result of the decision to locate 
the new TGV station in the city centre, a financial issue arose because local and regional 
authorities needed to compensate for any associated costs.  
After Pierre Mauroy acceded to be President of LMCU, the Euralille project was accepted with the 
political support of LMCU (Newman and Thornley, 1996). He officially launched the EuraLille 
project in 1990 with the creation of the SEM (Sociétés d’Economie Mixte) Euralille company, a 
French tool for implementing major urban development schemes with a majority or shareholding 
held by the public sector. As Newman and Thornley state ―Euralille is a mixture of smaller 
projects funded by private investors within a master plan defined by the public sector and 
co-ordinated by a nominally mixed, though public sector controlled, management agency‖ 
(Newman and Thornley, 1996, p.193).  
Two phases of development (see Figure 8-4 for the boundary of Euralille 1 and 2) critically 
generate a psychological effect with a revamped image that caught the attention of the outside 
world. The first step of transformation was made by Euralille. Multiple spatial functions i.e. spaces 
required for economic activities, culture and leisure, were built within this critical transport hub, 
including two landmark office blocks, a large shopping centre (Euralille centre), a student hall of 
residence, a business school, an urban park and Le Corbusier viaduct. To the south of the Euralille 
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project, Lille-Grand Palace was created as a large cultural complex for the various functions of 
conferences, exhibitions and entertainment. After the Euralille1 construction period of 1990-1995, 
the physical transformation of this large scale and high-density urban complex was manifest. To 
sustain the momentum ten years later, Euralille2 launched in 2000, a second phase with a new 
orientation is extended from Euralille1 The idea of ―renforcer le pôle directionnel‖ was clearly 
defined as the general objective of this phase (Vermandel & Prévot, 2009). A mixed-use scheme 
was dominated by a housing project including 700 housing units of various typologies and 
densities, amid other functions, namely the HQ of the NPDC regional council, the extension of 
Lille Grand Palais, offices, hotel, sport facilities and social-educational facilities. The total floor 
space of Euralille2 amounted to 170,000 m
2,
 about half of the spread of Euralille1. The key feature 
of ―Bois Habité ‖ was highlighted as the key concept of the scheme, which directly evoked an 
ideal urban setting created by green architecture which echoed the present environmental concern 
(Vermandel & Prévot, 2009). Later, a further redevelopment site was extended from Euralille 2 
and in 2006, ZAC Porte de Valenciennes was created (Paris & Mons, 2009).  
Nevertheless, a single seamless super-transport hub was not achieved. The new TGV through Lille 
was constructed in close proximity (500 meters) to the existing regional terminal station 
Lille-Flandres. Largely due to financial reasons, the idea of a people mover was not pursued and 
transit movement between the two stations became a nagging problem for passengers with 
baggage (Menerault, 2009). In addition, the new Lille Europe station, located in the north of the 
city, did not manage to secure a stop on the Metro line 1 (P. Hall, 2013a, forthcoming ). A better 
interchange between the new HST and urban transit system was made possible by the Metro line 2 
and the renovation of two tram lines in the early 1990s.  
 
Figure 8-4  Urban Projects (Euralille 1 & Euralille 2) 
 
Source: Paris and Mons (2009, p.254)  
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The Creation of A Strategic Planning Agency 
Secondly, a strategic planning agency ADULM (L’Agence de Développement et Urbanisme de 
Lille-Métropole) was created outside LMCU in 1989. This crucial agency effectively exerted its 
strategic overview in the transformation process of Lille Metropolis over a period of 20 years. The 
LOF in 1967 brought about the creation of a planning agency at the local level. However, due to 
political objections, planning power was vested within LMCU prior to 1989. ADULM functioned 
under a management structure involving various government agencies including the central state, 
Direction Regional, Departement du Nord, NPDC regional council and LMCU. Most importantly, 
this management structure was closely associated with the French contractual planning approach 
mentioned in section 6.6.2.2. A forum was set up comprising these government agencies and the 
state bank, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, to agree the financial plans of the metropolis 
(Contrat d’Agglomeration) which could then be integrated with the physical plans set up in the 
Schéma Directeur (Fraser and Baert, 2003). In addition, there was a special need for this specific 
agency to maintain a neutral position in order to draw strategic master plans and to bring various 
actors together in an acceptable venue. Mr Thierry Baert from ADULM explains this tacit 
situation.        
It is much more difficult within the Communauté Urbaine. If  we invite Communauté Urbaine, chamber of  
commerce, chamber of  crafts, trade unions, and so on, there is no problem because the place is neutral. 
Chamber of  commerce goes to Communauté Urbaine, always in a way that says I am entering the enemy’s 
fortress. Also, there is more freedom for everybody including civil servants from Communauté Urbaine.  
 
The Linkage between HST Stations and Expanded Urban Transit Systems 
Thirdly, with the political consensus within LMCU, the expansion and renovation of the urban 
public transport network was pushed forward to allow the wider city region to connect with the 
TGV hub. Prior to 1989, due to a lack of political consensus, expansion and improvement of urban 
transit systems are difficult to proceed. For instance, although the decision to construct a second 
line between Lille and Roubaix and Tourcoing was planned as early as the end of the 1970s, it was 
fruitless. Likewise, when the ―Mongy‖ tramway system suffered from huge financial deficits in the 
1960s and 1970s, it was seen to be too difficult to take action on tramway issues (Pradeilles & 
Chapoutot, 1981). As ―an operational compromise‖, Roubaix and Tourcoing accepted the backing 
of Euralille and marketing under the Lille Metropolis banner, so in return LMCU poured huge 
investment into a renovated tram line in 1991-1994 and extending Metro line 2 to Roubaix and 
Tourcoing in 1999 as well as funding urban renewal in these two cities (Colomb, 2007). Thanks to 
the introduction of two metro lines and two tramlines, four major cities and some intermediate 
stations within Lille Metropolis are evolving from industrial conurbations to a modern polycentric 
city-region in the 21st century.  
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The Distribution of Economic Growth in Polycentric Economic Centres  
Fourth, in parallel with the continual expansion of the urban public transport network, the benefit 
of a TGV hub was exploited to distribute economic opportunities across a wider metropolitan 
territory beyond Lille‘s urban core. In 1989, a new map of future ―Excellence Poles‖ attained 
consensus in Lille Metropolis and was incorporated into the strategic master plan Schéma 
Directeur in 2002. The polycentric projects were devoted to a wide range of knowledge economy 
activities, with functional specialisation at different poles: executive and international business 
functions in Lille, communication technologies and textiles in Roubaix and logistics and transport 
in Tourcoing (Colomb, 2007). It is worth noting that both government structure and leadership are 
indispensable. This awareness of the necessity to rebalance the city-regional economy would not 
have been possible without the city-region competence granted by the national decision in the first 
place. Without strong leadership at both metropolitan and municipal levels, historical rivalry 
would have dominated and strong city-regional consensus would not have been possible. In the 
case of LMCU, after Pierre Mauroy became President of LMCU in 1989 and René 
Vandierendonck ascended to Mayor of Roubaix in 1994, the relationship between Lille and 
Roubaix improved and a ―metropolitan compromise‖ was reached. LMCU had a strong will to 
tackle the unbalanced development within the city region by helping deprived areas; meanwhile, 
the deprived area, in the case of Roubaix, accepted Lille as the capital of the city-region (Colomb, 
2007).       
Widening Territorial Cooperation  
Fifthly, cross-border cooperation was pursued in order to proactively consolidate Lille‘s position 
as a hub at the centre of the European crossroads. In 1991, an informal cooperative structure, the 
COPIT (Conférence permanente intercommunale tranfrontalière), was first formed between 
France, Wallonia and Flanders (Colomb, 2007). The territory for cooperation covered Lille 
Metropolis Urban Community (1.1 million inhabitants) and four Belgian inter-municipal entities 
(700,000 inhabitants). In line with the policy of European cohesion (Regulation 1082/2006/EC), a 
new structure for cooperation, Eurométropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, the first European Grouping 
of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), was officially created to cover 145 municipalities consisting of 
two million inhabitants in a territory of 3,550 km², which formed the largest cross-border 
conurbation in Europe. Even though cross-border cooperation inevitably involved different 
institutional regulations, European cross-border development took shape and was reinforced 
(URBACT, 2010) .  
At the national level, in 2004, DATAR set up a programme calling for proposals to create a 
metropolitan area (Aire de coopération métropolitain) and Mauroy talked to local actors and 
created an informal steering group to work on different common fields i.e. transportation, 
employment etc. Lille Metropolitan Areas (LMA) involved 23 partners, nearly 500 municipalities 
and three point four million inhabitants in a territory of 75000 km
2
 (SPIRE, 2005). This wider area 
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had a much larger cooperative territory than the COPIT and EGTC, embracing the whole area of 
EGTC, the former coal mining area, and non-industrial sub-region, Arras. However, in 2006, 
DATAR suspended the initiative without further state funding to support this LMA structure. In 
response, Mauroy created a new association (LMAA) in 2007 to continue the process, despite the 
lack of government funding
133
. A new president, Mayor of Roubaix and Vice-president of LMCU, 
René Vandierendonck, carried on the development of this territory. Figure 8-5 shows the boundary 
and location of LMA. 
 
 
Figure 8-5  The Boundary of the Lille Metropolitan Area and its Location at the Heart of 
Northern Europe 
 
 
Source: LMAA (2012, p.31) 
 
 
 
                                                        
133 Interview with CEO of MBM.  
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The aforementioned large-scale urban development projects with the extension of the transport 
network and polycentric growth poles, the collective image created by these projects shapes the 
general perception of places. Although it is not the only cause of transformation, such perceptions 
are important in influencing the decision-making of private investors. Dr Alain L‘Hostis (LVMT) 
used research findings in his institute to reveal that, 
Company representatives said TGV was important to them even though they don’t use it themselves on a 
daily basis. It gives a positive image, so you want to be associated with this. This is especially important in 
the knowledge economy framework, and should not be neglected. 
 
A commercial property recession took place in the mid–1990s (1995-1998). Although this 
recession did not appear to be a big problem in Lille Metropolis in contrast with other French cities 
(Newman & Thornley, 1996), Euralille was affected to a certain degree in the short term because 
there was a direct association between the vulnerability of the commercial property market and the 
type of economic space which Euralille would like to develop. During the recession, it attracted 
―more tourists than business men‖, as pointed out by Professor Philippe Menerault in his interview. 
He argues that the cultural policies implemented in Lille Metropolis significantly attracted tourists 
to the city centre via TGV services, which was not the original intention. As soon as the economic 
recession was over, new dynamics occurred and projects were reinitiated around Euralille. For 
instance, the Euralille project produced around 45,000 square metres of office floor space, 70% of 
which was sold out by 1998 and 95% by 2001 (Colomb, 2007). Over the long term, the evaluation 
is positive. In the words of Dr Alain L‘Hostis during his interview,  
If  you want to assess the public sector intervention, we should look at how the area around Euralille is now 
in 2010 and the choice that was made about the location of  the station. So it is a positive ex-post 
evaluation.  
 
II. Cultural Initiatives  
In addition to physical transformation made to seize the HST opportunity, cultural initiatives 
continue to exploit the opportunity of the TGV-Nord and the key turning point was hosting 
European Capital of Culture (ECOC) in 2004, which is a follow-up attempt to an unsuccessful bid 
for the 2004 Olympic Games attempted in 1996. Despite its failure, the whole bidding process 
covered by national and international media proved to be a success for Lille as its impressive 
transformation story helped it rise to fame, in particular for its outpacing of Lyon as the legitimate 
representative of France. Paris and Stevens (2000) argue that this experience of bidding for the 
2004 Olympic Games did successfully transform Lille to become an emerging, internationally 
recognised European metropolis. Later on, it led to a successful bid to be the ECOC in 2004 with 
wider cross-border partners. Yaari (2008) opines the presentation of the mayor of the Belgian city 
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of Kortrijk
134
 in the opening celebration of ―Lille 2004‖ alongside the Lille Mayor Martine Aubry 
indicated the indispensable financial aid, active participation and support from the entire 
Métropole Transfrontalière in making this mega-event happen (Yaari, 2008, p. 181).  
The year long tenure of Lille as ECOC brought signs of changes in society as the city capitalised 
on its rich traditional assets and continued to invest in its culture. The award‘s contribution to the 
boosting of civic pride and confidence was widely praised and stressed by interviewees. Mr 
Thierry Baert (ADULM) stresses that the huge success of this event reflected the fact that ―the 
whole local society is still full of resources and potential for creative industries‖ and cultural 
development and fondness in Lille continued to grow after 2004. Building on the legacy of Lille 
2004, a cultural event ―Lille 3000‖
135
 takes place every two years. Mr Baert (ADULM) also 
talked about the tremendous popularity of cultural events is soaring much faster than expectation.  
There is a Saatchi exhibition at the moment and the museum of  modern art opens with the biggest 
collection…In five weeks, we reached the number of  visitors we were expecting in the first three months. So 
there was something like three times the number of  visitors we were expecting. It is really important because 
it shows society is changing.  
 
These changes in society reflecting a deep revival of cultural policy seem to be conducive to the 
development of a knowledge economy, in particular for Lille as a post-industrial city; however, it 
clearly demonstrates that HST is essentially the first step in revitalising a region, but is not 
sufficient by itself. As Professor Paris argues in his interview,   
For the size of  the city, [Lille] is one of  the cities in Europe where cultural activity and the level of  interest 
is very high. We could not compare ourselves with Brussels because Brussels is a capital. But as I 
understand it, it is quite equivalent. And this point is very important for the knowledge economy and more 
important than TGV. Of  course, TGV supports transportation, which facilitates the links and 
connections for people. But for the development of  a knowledge economy, you have a former industrial area 
and you need to have revolution in your mind for each person and for local society. It is why we use this term 
―bifurcation‖. You had metropolitan bifurcation, so it was an old story and an old industrial city. At the 
moment, there is a quiet revolution. 
 
III. Challenges 
The TGV Nord has been exploited by Lille Metropolis to diversify its economic base with a 
prestigious HST hub position in the European train network and to rebalance economic growth in a 
wider city-region. However, three issues are identified as constraints in the current situation 
regarding the building of a genuine European dynamic hub and a more balanced metropolitan area.   
                                                        
134 Kortrijk is located in the Flemish Region of Belgium. 
135 “Lille 3000” was initiated to take the momentous journey forwards into the future. In 2006, Bombaysers de Lille 
took place, an event about India. In 2008, the topic of the event was central Europe. 
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Social Inequality within Lille Metropolis  
Firstly, an increase in mobility and economic polycentricity within a wider metropolitan area did 
not guarantee a reduction of social inequality, especially with regard to the difference between 
Roubaix-Tourcoing and Lille. ―A paradox of Roubaix‖ has occurred (Colomb, 2007). Roubaix has 
the second largest number of jobs within LMCU and there are more jobs available than can be 
filled by the working age population (1.1 jobs for one resident of working age in 1999); however, 
it has the highest unemployment rate (ADULM, 2004, cited in Colomb, 2007, p.14) and was the 
poorest city in France in 2009 with a highest poverty rate of 46%, compared with 15% in the 
national average (Cousseau, Maurin, & Mazery, 2012). This reflects the ―inadequate match 
between supply and demand and skills mismatch‖ (Colomb, 2007). In particular, this problem 
became worse when the improved transport network significantly led to an increase in the 
travel-to-work catchment area and the separation of place of residence and workplace. This 
demonstrates that transformation is a long-term process, combining two critical battles. As Mr 
Baert points out, the battle is for attractiveness (retention of local skills and investors) and social 
cohesion (cited in Colomb, 2007, p.78). The initial outcome has been visible and positive after 10 
years of proactive local intervention but it is not enough. Although it is suggested the time scale 
for a positive, long-lasting transformation is a 20-year horizon (Colomb, 2007), it could possibly 
need much longer time.      
 
The Development in the Knowledge Economy 
Secondly, the quantitative evidence in Chapter 5 suggests that the arrival of TGV in Lille has 
given rise to the decentralisation of public services to Lille (mainly) from Paris, whereas 
employment in knowledge intensive services in Lille is still lower than public services and 
commercial services. It suggests that it takes time for a newly created HST hub to become a 
dynamic knowledge hub attracting an influx of open-minded talent and an increase in private 
investment in knowledge intensive activities. At present, private businesses which are located in 
Lille at the European level, such as European research centres and commercial and logistic 
decision centres, are attracted by the efficient transport hub function. Mr Bartholeyns (CCI) uses 
the example of Tate & Lyle, a British-based multinational agribusiness, which opened a European 
innovation centre in Lille in 2008 to demonstrate this point. However, regarding the attitude and 
the language skills of local people, the capacity of the labour force does not yet seem sufficient to 
attract greater scale of private investment in the knowledge economy. This is illustrated by Mr 
Christopher Bartholeyns‘ (CCI) words.   
The problem is that we have to change ourselves. The people (inhabitants) in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the 
Metropolitan area have to change their habits and their culture to be more open and connected. For us, the 
Chamber of  Commerce and Industry, it is a big trial and it is difficult to progress because the majority of  
people consider the region NPDC to be their territory and they consider only one location to be important - 
Paris. 
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The Weakness of Lille in the Expansion of the European HST Network 
Thirdly, transport connectivity is important but HST service pattern determines the significance of 
cities. Despite proximity to two large European Capitals and good interconnectivity between HST 
and the airport, the weakness of Lille‘s position looms large in the increasing expansion of the 
European HST network. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the layout of the TGV-Nord system 
placed Lille in a disadvantageous situation. In order to overcome this drawback, the regional 
government proposed a new TGV station in NDPC outside Lille, but a huge debate erupted. 
Although this controversial proposal did not proceed further, these different viewpoints between 
the central, regional and metropolitan government clearly illustrate that there are complex 
negotiation processes at different government levels.   
From the viewpoint of the regional government (including CCI for NPDC), a new TGV station on 
the existing TGV-Nord line near the former coal mining area could allow the Thalys trains to stop. 
This would better prepare the area for the future in terms of an expanding European rail network 
and increased traffic. In addition, it would provide a better connection with Lille airport and the Le 
Louvre museum in Lens
136
. But this regional view was strongly opposed by Lille Metropolis. The 
proposal was regarded as a threat to the current hub status of Lille. Professor Philippe Menerault 
from Lille One University, advisor to the Mayor of Lille, Martine Aubry, offers three main reasons 
for the opposition to this proposal, namely: the location of this third HST outside the city centre 
which would be difficult to reach except by car, the risk of weakening Euralille which has not 
performed so well and still has potential to explore, and the excuse for train operators (SNCF) to 
completely bypass Lille city centre. He further uses the HST station in Den Haag as an example to 
illustrate that there would be no sense in serving a brand new stop at the expense of political 
capitals.  
In contrast to the worry expressed by regional and metropolitan governments, SNCF, the national 
train operator and a partner of the Railteam European train operator alliance, regards the expansion 
of the European rail network and competition within rail markets as an opportunity. Alternatives 
could be the application of the Swiss model in developing better connections and cross-border 
HST services with more intermediate stops. As Mr Michel Leboeuf (SNCF) notes, ―even we have 
direct services to Belgium that do not stop in Lille. It is not the end of Lille at all.‖ In this respect, 
instead of suggesting long-distance European trains to stop in Lille, SNCF proposed a 
joint-venture with regional government in the development of cross-border regional TGV 
services
137
.  
                                                        
136 Interview with Ms Anne-Sophie Legendre, a transport officer in the regional government. She explained the idea 
behind this proposal 
137 Interview with Mr Michel Leboeuf (the quotation is in Appendix 20- ML-7) 
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However, cooperation is contingent and difficult to be secured. Mr Christopher Bartholeyns (CCI) 
stresses that “The potential and the limits are governed by how we can succeed through 
cooperation. We could have some cooperation and then it would be a competition. There are more 
chances that we might lose than succeed through cooperation. Cooperation is difficult to build”. 
Similarly, Mr Thierry Baert uses the example of the short-lived Lufthansa air service in Lille 
Lesquin airport to demonstrate how powerless the local government was when the logic of the 
market did not support local development
138
.  
 
8.3.2.2  Dunkerque in the Coastal Area- A Process of Exploiting Three 
Transport Assets: The Channel Tunnel, Motorways, and HST  
 
The coastal area (La Côte d'Opale) resides in proximity to the densest area of north-western 
Europe, less than 300 km from Paris, London and Brussels. Traditionally, this peripheral area had 
been quite remote and isolated with its poor transport connectivity to its regional capital and 
national capital. The arrival of the Channel Tunnel brought about significant improvements in 
transport to the coastal area in the form of the TGV-Nord with Paris and two motorways (A16 and 
A26) to the UK and the central part of Europe. Additionally, with the arrival of the TERGV, 
coastal cities became much more efficiently connected to Lille.  
Regardless of this much improved transport condition, Dunkerque has experienced huge 
population contraction, high migration, and slow employment growth to be the most problematic 
situation in this coastal area. Thus, Dunkerque is chosen to investigate further to understand the 
wider impact of HST on its transformation.  
 
I. Economic Trajectory: Urban Fragmentation Inherited from the 1960s   
Firstly, economic trajectory from the 1960s significantly shaped Dunkerque‘s future development. 
As introduced in section 5.5.2, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, with state intervention, 
Dunkerque rapidly expanded as an industrial port. It resulted in the dramatic restructuring of urban 
form through the expansion of the industrial complex towards the west and away from the city 
centre in the east. Dunkerque city centre was peripheralised and neglected and, from the 1980s 
onwards, Dunkerque began to suffer from the decline of heavy industries. The crisis hit home 
when the heavy manufacturing industries withered. A major shipyard, Les Ateliers et Chantiers de 
France, was closed in 1987. 
                                                        
138 Interview with Mr Thierry Baert (the quotation is in Appendix 20- TB-1) 
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II. Local Capacity and Political Leadership    
Secondly, before the arrival of three new transport assets, there has been the existing of active 
local capacity and strategic planning authorities through the experience of a central-local conflict 
between the 1960s and 1980s. The confrontation cultivated local capacity in the exertion and 
exploitation of planning power. The arrival of a steel company USINOR imposed by the state 
caused the municipalities to join forces to protest and express the local power against the state 
without fearing a loss of independence (Oddone, 2011, p.5). The Communauté Urbaine de 
Dunkerque (CUD) was created in 1968, succeeding in the creation of an urban planning agency 
(AGUR) in 1972. The creation of CUD was initiated by local actors, in contrast with LMCU 
which was imposed by the state. The process paved the foundations of local capacity in strategic 
planning; as Ratouis describes, there was ―a full-blown local system‖ with ―procedures, 
institutions and actors‖ in the 1990s in Dunkerque (Ratouis, 2001, p.6). In addition, as another 
example of cumul des mandates, soon after the construction of the TGV-Nord line, Michel 
Delebarre, who was elected as Mayor of Dunkerque in 1989, turned over a new leaf for Dunkerque. 
Mr. Joncquel from AGUR comments ―A lot of work was done in the 1970s and 1980s, but the 
revival of Dunkerque was because of the arrival of Michel Delebarre in our territory, which was 
really the beginning of something else‖. Around the time of the campaign, Mr Delebarre was the 
Minister for Transports and Sea (1988-1989) and Minister for Equipment, Housing, Transport and 
the Sea (1989-1990); he thus emphasised his capacity to manoeuvre his national resources and 
network to redevelop this area
139
. Prat (2006) argues that “by focusing his campaign on his 
national status and economic support, there was a way out of the crisis" (Prat, 2006, p.49). Over 
the past 20 years, Mr Delebarre has been a major politician in Dunkerque and throughout the 
whole coastal area.   
 
Local Interventions in the Opportunity of the TGV  
 
Redeveloping the City Centre of Dunkerque  
In contrast with the excessive expansion of peripheral areas (in the west) during the 1950s and 
1970s, Michel Delebarre firstly shifted the focus back to Dunkerque city centre. A series of 
regeneration projects and strategies in relation to the arrival of the TGV were implemented and 
proposed under his leadership.  
Firstly, the refurbishment of the TGV station was completed by the advent of TGV services in 
1993; however, the TGV station is very disconnected from the city centre. Secondly, change was 
                                                        
139 Such as meetings with senior management of the SNCF for the development of the station for TGV, and meetings 
with the Directorate for Inter-City on the rehabilitation of certain housing projects (Prat, 2006, p.50). 
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underway on the other side of the city. From 1989 onwards, in order to diversify the local 
economy, repopulate the city centre, improve public space and mend the urban fabric, three major 
urban regeneration projects were implemented. The first was the Neptune project on the outskirts 
of the city centre, which targeted over 35 hectares of abandoned shipyard and reclaimed 180 
hectares of port wasteland. The Neptune project involved the creation of a new university- 
l’Université du Littoral Côté d’Opale (ULCO), offices, commercial, cultural and leisure facilities, 
new housing for rent and for sale and new public spaces to link these buildings and facilities 
(Division Transport et Deplacements Urbains, 2002, p.35). The allocation of a new university in 
the city centre reflected the strategy through which a state-led decentralisation policy- Le plan 
Université 2000
140
- could be capitalised to suit local regeneration purposes. Again it demonstrated 
the influence of Mr Delebarre. Ratouis and Segaud reveal that direct interaction between Mr 
Delebarre and his colleague Lionel Jospin who later became the Prime Minister of France 
(1997-2002) was the real impetus behind the decision to site ULCO in Dunkerque (cited in Prat, 
2006, p. 66). The second phase of the Neptune project started in 2005. A project entitled ―Grand 
Large‖ and based on abandoned shipyards was targeted to provide good quality urban space, 
including housing, sport, community, and cultural facilities. The third project, ―Cœur d'Agglo‖, is 
scheduled to be completed by 2020-25 and aims to provide housing and retail space and improve 
accessibility throughout the main city centre from the TGV station to the beach. Regarding the 
poor connectivity between the TGV station and Dunkerque city centre will be addressed in this 
third phase
141
.   
 
The Implementation of TERGV between the Coast and Lille  
Due to the peripheral location, the rail route for commuting between the coastal area and Lille had 
traditionally been less popular than that running between the former mining area and Lille. In 2000, 
Mr Delebarre who was holding two posts as the president of the region and the president of CUD 
asked SNCF to develop regional HST services with the available track capacity of the TGV-Nord 
between Lille and the coast area. The arrival of the TERGV potentially brought the coastal area 
within the commuting zone of Lille Metropolis. The popularity of the TERGV services was 
demonstrated by a significant increase in passengers. The number of seasonal tickets had risen 
from 151 in 2001 to 4242 in 2010
142
. For Dunkerque, the transport link of TGV/TERGV gave 
coastal cities an opportunity to play a complementary rather than a competitive role to a larger 
                                                        
140 It was initiated in 1992 by the Ministry of Education to create two new universities in NPDC for the coast and the 
former coal mining area. The two new universities were implemented with polycentric campuses due to concern that 
urban density in these places was not capable of accommodating a single university (CNE, 1996).  
141 Interview with Mr Nicolas Joncquel (the quotation is in Appendix 20-NJ-1) 
142 Source: NPDC regional government.  
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place. It was acknowledged that without a proper link, the opportunity to diversify economies 
would not have been possible. Mr Joncquel opines that, 
The regional TGV is a good thing for the territory of  Dunkerque. It has strengths, but also has 
weaknesses because we saw that TERGV would be more positive for the strongest places. So HST is better 
for Paris than for Lille. Then it is better for Lille than for Dunkerque. We have to be strong to give people 
opportunities to stay in Dunkerque and to work in Lille, but not to leave Dunkerque. With the TGV 
link, we can develop a complementary role with Lille. We could not compete with Lille. We would lose. We 
are little. But we need to be complementary….I don’t know whether TGV helped the development of  the 
knowledge economy in Dunkerque, but I know if  we didn’t have this link, it would not help us to develop 
our economy. If  we did nothing, it would not help us. People would find work and activities to do elsewhere. 
If  you link transportation with the attractiveness of  projects, we will win more activities than if  there was 
no improvement in transport.    
 
A Strategy of Exploiting the Channel Tunnel, Motorway, and Port Activities 
However, the TGV is just one of three key transport assets in the territory with which to diversify 
the local economy. The arrival of A26 and A16 significantly connects these sub-regions in the 
coast. In order to exploit the arrival of the Channel Tunnel and motorway, the Syndicat Mixte de la 
Côte d’Opale (SMCO) was officially created in 1996 by Michel Delebarre (Paris, 2007). As Mr 
Joncquel (AGUR) reveals,  
The arrival of  the A16 occurred in 1993. Before, all the cities were not quite connected. With the A16 
highway, SMCO emerged. This is part of  the SMCO history…. All the sub-regions have been grouped 
together. If  we are working alone, we are too little to be a part of  the European competition. So we try to be 
a metropolitan area. Together we are almost one million inhabitants….We have to work together.   
 
With the coastal geographical feature, port activities played a key economic role and will continue 
to do so. Nicolas Joncquel argues that “The port is really Dunkerque’s strength. Dunkerque port is 
the third largest in France and one of twenty ports in Europe. So it is a really good thing for 
Dunkerque to have this port and to develop it.” However, innovative evolution of the industrial 
legacy is a key challenge. Mr Delebarre expresses his view of the economic future in this territory.  
―I do not think we can move from the industrial complex and port which establishes the existence of  this city. 
It is essential to consider the evolution of  the sector, a major part of  which is related to the industry. We 
need to strengthen the relationship with research and the universities on the coastline. Hence my commitment 
to making this country a laboratory for sustainable development is in no way inconsistent with the presence 
of  a powerful energy industry‖ (translation from French) (Le Mag', 2011). 
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III. Challenges   
Over past 20 years, new motorways which instantly helped to connect the scattered structure of 
nearly one million inhabitants in the coastal but the arrival of the TGV-Nord has failed to trigger 
the arrival of good public transport network for the coastal area. As Mr Nicolas Joncquel argued 
that  
I think [the new highways] are the most important transport improvement in 20 years. TGV to Paris and 
to Lille is still the other really important point, but is not on the same scale. I think the highway puts 
Dunkerque on the European axis. The TGV for Dunkerque is more related to the national rail network. 
 
Three disadvantaged conditions are identified. Firstly, on the international scale, the Calais 
Fréthun TGV station, 7km distant from Calais city centre, has received very limited international 
rail services under the general rule of serving European capitals as fast as possible. Therefore, 
people need to travel to Lille for better international rail services. Secondly, direct national TGV 
services to Paris and other French cities have been progressively reduced. However, when the 
coastal area is more and more dependent on Lille for TGV through TER and TERGV services, the 
poor connection between national and regional rail services at Lille is problematic for the coastal 
area. This reflects the fact that under the separate responsibility between regional and national rail 
services, the concerns of SNCF have largely concentrated on major cities and ignored other 
peripheral towns. Mr Joncquel explains the difficulties.  
SNCF gave us new timetables and now there are fewer and fewer direct trains from seashore cities to Paris. 
Most of  the time, we have to change in Lille. The regional timetables are not always efficiently linked with 
national timetables. Sometimes you can arrive in Lille and the train for Paris left two minutes earlier, so 
there is no good connection. The SMCO district has to tell the national government that we exist. If  we 
have HST across our territory without any stops, we are not interested. So we have to link national services 
with regional services. But it is quite difficult sometimes…The infrastructure is there, but sometimes the 
service is not there because the target at the national level is to go as fast as possible from Paris to London.   
 
Thirdly, poor rail connectivity within the SMCO has been largely ignored. The TGV line and 
TERGV services have made these coastal cities more accessible to outside regions rather than 
between themselves. The rail lines connecting various cities are either inadequate (the 
Calais-Dunkerque line is single track and non-electrified
143
), or non-existent (no line between 
Dunkerque and Saint-Omer; the line between Belgium and Dunkerque closed in 1994). The lack of 
littoral linkages (Boulogne-Calais-Dunkerque) was stressed by Dr L‘Hostis as a significant missed 
opportunity for the coastal area. Mr Joncquel outlines the resulting problems and the need to 
develop public transport system within SMCO.    
                                                        
143
 The electrification of Dunkerque-Calais line was confirmed by SNCF in 2007, but will not come into effect until 
2014 (source: (Delta FM, 2011). 
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If  I want to go to Calais Frethun now by train, it will take two and a half  hours from Dunkerque, but by 
car it will take 25 minutes. ... All the services are well-developed from the seashore to Lille, but not between 
our seashore cities…We have to keep strong links between regional centres i.e. Dunkerque, Boulogne, and 
Calais because different groups of  people use cars or trains…A big metropolitan area cannot work without 
any public transportation network…the highway is not enough to link. We need to develop public transport 
between our cities.      
 
Fourth, these vulnerable transport conditions have been identified by the SMCO with a strategy to 
reconnect the SMCO through public transport links. However, there are practical difficulties in 
coordination for the implementation of a major transport hub in Calais Fréthun for the whole 
coastal area. Firstly, there is a lack of a planning agency in the Calais sub-region to participate in 
this strategy
144
. Secondly, due to politics and traditional rivalry which have played a role in the 
obstacles of co-operation. The different political parties
145
and traditional competition between 
Calais and Dunkerque cause difficulties, although the complementary roles have been identified in 
SMCO. As Mr Joncquel emphasises,  
Historically there was competition between Calais and Dunkerque... Calais will never be an industrial port 
like Dunkerque and we will never be in the Channel like Calais. So we need to find complementary uses for 
the three ports of  the SMCO such as Boulogne for fishing and all the transport of  fish food, Calais for the 
Channel and the freight from the UK to Europe, and Dunkerque could be an industrial port 
complementary to other two ports for the South of  the England… The SMCO needs one port with three 
specifications. But it is easier to say than to work on it!   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
144 Interview with Mr Nicolas Joncquel (the quotation is in Appendix 20-NJ-2) 
145 Interview with Mr Nicolas Joncquel (the quotation is in Appendix 20-NJ-3) 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8  The Arrival of the TGV-Nord in Nord-Pas-de-Calais: Lille vs. its Sub-regions 
 
296 
 
8.3.2.3  The Former Coal Mining Area   
 
The quantitative findings in Chapter 5 have suggested that with the arrival of the TGV-Nord, the 
massive unemployment in the former coal mining has been arrested and even reversed in 
Valenciennois and Lens-Hénin. However, both have shown varying effects. Valenciennois 
experienced the least decline in manufacturing jobs and its public services increased less than 
other coal mining cities, whereas Lens-Hénin had the highest decrease in manufacturing jobs and 
the highest increase in public services. In this section, Lens-Hénin and Valenciennes are 
investigated further to understand their differences in performance when seizing the opportunities 
presented by TGV (for a map of this area, see Figure 8-6).  
 
 
 
Figure 8-6  The Territory of the Coal Mining Area 
 
Source: MBM (2008, p.81) 
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I. Economic Trajectory and Initiatives  
Although both are classified as part of the coal mining area, Valenciennois and Lens-Hénin have 
quite distinct histories and traditions. Valenciennes was a medieval city with urban traditions 
before the coal and steel industry arose, whereas Lens is a city born out of the coal mining 
industry
146
. Since the mining heritage is stronger in Lens than in Valenciennes, the challenges and 
problems are bigger in Lens. The fundamental issue for Lens is the capacity to devise local 
initiatives, as there had been a lack of decision-makers. In the heyday of the coal industry, these 
coal mines were privately owned by the stock exchange, not by local people. In the 1960s, 
economic restructuring through the introduction of the car industry was developed by the state. A 
change of innovative culture is much more difficult than physical transformation. As CEO of 
MBM, Yves Dhau Decuyper outlines this difficulty.     
The difficulty is to make these people become creators, to create new businesses. It’s very difficult, because over 
the last two centuries they became used to obeying. They were very courageous, but they had to obey. They 
didn’t take the initiative. Now a new economy exists, so they must be creative and this change in culture is 
more difficult than physical changes.  
 
A comparison between Lens-Hénin and Valenciennois does reflect the contrast regarding whether 
or not local strategies existed. As Professor Didier Paris (Lille 1 University) argues that these 
medium-sized cities in the coal mining areas, except for Valenciennes, lacked local projects in the 
centre of the agglomeration in parallel with the opportunities presented by HST
147
.   
 
II. National, Regional and Metropolitan Interventions  
In addition to the arrival of the TGV-Nord, the coal mining area as a whole has been assisted by 
government interventions from other levels. Firstly, the University of Artois was created in 1992 
by the Ministry of Education. Similar to the coastal area, with the initiative ―Université 2000‖, 
University of Artois is another newly-branded university which was intended by the national state 
to address the growth in demand for higher education. The structure of the University of Artois is 
polycentric, distributed over eight sites within five cities: Arras, Béthune, Lens, Douai and Liévin. 
Arras was selected to avoid the conflict which may have happened if the major campus had been 
located in one of the coal mining towns (CNE, 1996). Secondly, the NPDC regional government 
led a series of symposiums known as the Conférence Permanente du Bassin Minier (CPBM) on 
the development of the coal mining area in 1996. The discussion mobilised local society to debate 
economic, cultural, environmental and social development in this territory. In 1998, the collective 
                                                        
146 Interview with Mr Yves Dhau Decuypere (the quotation is in Appendix 20- YDD-1) 
147 The quotation is in Appendix 20- DP-1. 
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ambition was published in a white paper and became part of the Contrat de Plan 2000-2006 
(continued 2007-2013). The Mission Bassin Minier (MBM) was subsequently created in 2000 by 
the national state and the regional government to assist this area to find a new method of 
development after coal and to solve the common problem of this area rather than local problems. 
Mr Decuypere stresses the aim of this mission,   
Our task is to find new ways to develop after the coal. The problems are the coal, the state of  mind, the 
structure, and the economy of  this area, which are the constraints to redevelopment in new fields of  economy. 
They’re trying to make this land look more attractive because the image is very black, it’s not attractive at 
all. 
 
Thirdly, an inclusive structure was created to assist the transformation of the coal-mining area, 
which is especially beneficial for Lens. The coal mining area has been included in the new 
cooperative structure of Lille Metropolitan Area (LMA) since 2005, as mentioned in section 
8.3.2.1. Although it has been very challenging to make different parts of this extended territory 
work together, it is regarded as the right thing to do for a better common future.  
 
III. Local Intervention: The Contrast between Valenciennois and Lens-Hénin   
Apart from being part of the initial RAFHAEL campaign group to influence the decision to locate 
the new HST station in Lille city centre and later secure their TGV services, these two sub-regions, 
Valenciennois and Lens-Hénin, had demonstrated two distinct local interventions.  
 
The Valenciennois Sub-region   
 
Prior to the arrival of the TGV-Nord, three local initiatives taking place in Valenciennes had laid a 
good foundation for local transformation through local mobilisation. Firstly, with the advent of 
LOF in 1967, a local strategic plan (SDAU) was drawn up in 1967 at the arrondissement level with 
assistance from a ―study groups and programming‖ (GEP) team set up by the Nord Département. 
GEP was composed of open-minded young people who specialised in sociology, economics and 
geography with new ways of thinking and doing. The team worked closely with various local 
elected officials in collaborative relationships (Frère & Richer, 2005). Secondly, 25 years earlier 
than the national decision to found a new university in the coal mining area, a new university was 
created in 1968 by the relocation of laboratories from Lille One University; it was collective local 
will and effort which led to the establishment of higher education in Valenciennes (Frère & Richer, 
2005). Later this university was expanded to incorporate two neighbouring south-east sub-regions 
and was renamed the University of Valenciennes and Hainaut-Cambresis. Thirdly, a 
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well-connected motorway system was built around Valenciennes in the 1970s to tackle 
developmental problems and economic modernisation. It was the result of local intervention in the 
1960s by the CCI of Valenciennes in the construction of A2 motorway connecting Paris 
to Brussels through Valenciennes (cited in Frère & Richer, 2005). For local business, ―highways 
are there to bring in business" (Philippe Subra, cited in (Frère & Richer, 2005). Subsequently, the 
A23 linking Valenciennes with Lille and a bypass around Douai were constructed.  
 
Political Leadership and Local Initiatives 
 
Similar to Lille and Dunkerque, with the arrival of new leadership by Jean-Louis Borloo 
(1989-2002), Valenciennois transformed. ―Before him, it was a sleeping beauty
148
.‖ Firstly, a 
cluster specialising in car and railway manufacturing gradually took shape in Valenciennes after 
the establishment of Sevelnord in 1994, Bombardier and Toyota in 1997. Furthermore, in 2003, 
the European Railway Agency headquarters decided to locate to Valenciennes, despite the fact that 
its international conferences are held in Lille (Frère & Richer, 2005).  
Secondly, the idea of a tramway project in Valenciennes emerged after the INRETS Vulcain study 
in 1991, which demonstrated that Valenciennes needed a high-capacity transport system and had 
the resources to build one. The realisation of this tramway project was not straightforward or 
without troubles. The Valenciennes Joint Municipal Transport Association (SITURV) was formed 
in 1976 with an initial group of 28 municipalities around the largest town. Over time, the boundary 
of SITURV greatly expanded to cover 65 municipalities in 1989. By then, almost the entire 
arrondissement was included. The Loi ATR (1992) led to a large number of smaller CCs being 
created primarily based on political relationships and divisions (Subra, 1996 quoted from Frère 
and Richer (2005)). So the inter-communal cooperation for implementing the tramway project 
became difficult and the fear of cooperation in turn led to defensive actions among them. 
Nevertheless, events started to improve when the municipality of Valenciennes realised the 
opportunity of a tramway was a strategy to revitalise the city (Frère and Richer, 2006). The 
tramway project ―Transvilles‖ (phase 1 and 2) involved reorganising public transport between 
communities, reorganising the bus routes and introducing urban regeneration projects along the 
tramway line; it was finally completed in 2006.  
The new tramway was used as a tool to restructure cities. Urban projects which amounted to 70% 
public space were defined along the tramway path. Through the tramway project, the image of the 
territory changed and it provided a better quality of life for its inhabitants. Since the construction 
of the tramway happened at the same time as the renewal of the local economy, the local officer 
                                                        
148 Interview with Yves Dhau Decuypere CEO of MBM (Mission Bassin Minier).   
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from SITURV, Mr Antoine Plard, makes it clear that the opportunity presented by TGV may have 
saved the city from continuing decline, but the local transport project changed the city rather than 
TGV.  
In the case of  Valenciennes, it is not that the arrival of  TGV changed the city. Rather, the local transport 
projects did so in the sense that local politicians decided the TGV would come to Valenciennes. We had to 
change the city in decline, so the tramway project was implemented to link the small cities around 
Valenciennes. The impact of  TGV on Valenciennes is less than the impact of  the tramway. If  it hadn’t 
occurred, perhaps the city would be just a poor city…a periphery of  Lille. TGV is just a trigger for the 
renewal of  the cities.  
 
Again, the integration of local projects with the arrival of TGV is heavily dependent on local 
strategic capacity. As Professor Menerault argues,  
Everything depends on the city’s ability not to think that TGV is the end of  the redevelopment, but to see it 
as only a larger part of  the project which involves players and actors other than just the TGV. So in 
Valenciennes, they were able to do that. The local authority was able to integrate the TGV in a much wider 
project and to use it as a sort of  launch pad.  
 
 
The Lens-Hénin Sub-region 
 
In contrast, due to a lack of local initiatives and strong leadership in Lens-Hénin, key interventions 
were made by the state, regional government and MBM to assist the transformation in Lens. The 
most demonstrable case is the establishment of Le Louvre-Lens. President of NPDC regional 
government, Daniel Percheron strongly and quickly responded to the proposed decentralisation of 
the Louvre Museum in 2003 (Musée du Louvre, 2008) and agreed to be the owner and the main 
source of funds for Louvre-Lens. The region funded up to 60% of the estimated total cost of the 
construction of the Louvre-Lens (around 127M euros in 2007), organised the international 
competition, and will finance the operational costs of the museum in the future. The local urban 
district (la Communauté d’agglomération de Lens-Liévin) and the city of Lens financed 10% of 
the cost and started to redevelop the area around the station. Lens was chosen because of its 
geographical location and the transformation challenges. It is located in the heart of the coal 
mining area and has good transport links through TGV (from Paris and Lille) and the motorway 
(the junction of A26 (Calais-Reims) and A1 (Lille-Paris)). However, weak local capacity has been 
revealed by the slow transformation progress. The decision to build a museum in Lens was the 
beginning of the transformation process, but the inter-communal responsibilities are too new for 
the local municipalities to be able to deal with these changes properly. As Mr Decuypere states,  
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The new council and the local institution were not ready at all, so it took several years of  difficult work for 
the local authorities to appropriate the project. The museum is built and will open at the end of  the year 
(2012), but the development of  territory around here is very slow.  
 
The new branch of Le Louvre Lens is located in proximity to Lens TGV station. It was not until 
2009 that an association called ―EuraLens‖ was created by the regional government. The President 
of EuraLens is Mr Daniel Percheron, who intended to create a second metropolis within NPDC
149 
. 
With advice from MBM, a new development project took shape around Lens TGV station, 
designed with new functions by good architects and urban planners. The slow progress of the new 
development means that it was not complete when Le Louvre opened at the end of 2012. ―The only 
thing we can show is maps with new projects, but when you are on the ground, you can’t see it. It 
will be five years until you can see it.‖
150
 The situation is well-illustrated by Ms Pauline Cassette, 
who is responsible for transport mobility for MBM. ―It’s really sad, I think, to see these closed 
shops and everything when you think, at the end of the year (2012) when you leave the station, the 
first thing that you will see is so depressing.‖ 
The contrasting trajectory and intervention between Valenciennois and Lens-Hénin shows that, 
wihout local initiatives attempting to seize the opportunities presented by HST for local economy, 
there is no chance of an automatic wider effect of HST. Although both are still 
manufacturing-based, Valenciennois which had actively made several transformation interventions 
is more attractive to private services than Lens-Hénin. Thus far, the wider impact of TGV in Lens 
is limited and less direct for economic restructuring. It demonstrated that HST services are more 
directly linked with the tertiary sector than the manufacturing sector which needs good transport 
systems for goods more than for business men. As Mr Decuypere opines, 
I think the high speed train is directly related to the tertiary sector which has relationships with the wider world and the 
businessmen who have to be in Lille, in Brussels, in London etc. very quickly, so the high speed train is very important. 
For the production of activities in Lens or in Douai, it’s not so important – it’s very important to have a good internal 
connection. For the Lens region, they need a very good transportation system, but not by TGV. It’s a good 
transportation system for goods because most of the car industry had to have very good logistics. And for logistics, we 
need growth and a good railway system for goods and a good motorway system, this is more important than TGV.  
 
IV. Challenges  
Three transport issues are challenging regarding the wider impact of HST for the coal mining area. 
The first one is associated with intra-regional rail services with Lille. Based on both historical and 
current reality, which is reflected in patterns of travel to work, resident migration and the 
                                                        
149 http://www.villedelens.fr/rubriques-a-la-une/euralens/euralens.html  
150 Interview with Mr Decuypere (CEO of MBM).  
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relocation of companies (see Figure 8-7), the demand for intensive communication between Lille 
and mining areas is apparent. But the intra-regional transport capacity between them is not 
sufficient to meet the demand. 80% of the travel between the two is made by car, but the 
motorway is not sufficient; current worsening congestion every morning between Lille and the 
coal mining areas is a proof
151
. A new regional RER system between Lille and the former mining 
area has been proposed by regional government to enhance connectivity within the Lille 
Metropolitan Area (Nordéclair, 2010), but it has been strongly rejected by Lille Metropolis due to 
its incompatibility with the existing rail network and the separate location of stations outside city 
centres. LMCU argued that the proposed RER system along A1 and the TGV-Nord line could not 
integrate with current conventional links between Lille and the coal mining area. Dr. L‘Hostis 
(LVMT) similarly emphasised that the need to improve the existing TER system (LibéLille, 2010). 
In addition, a political conflict between the Regional authorities and LMCU because LMCU hopes 
for an opening of the long-waited tram-train links in 2020-2022 and there will be a financial and 
spatial competition between the two systems
152
. Conventional regional trains are currently used by 
commuters in the early morning and the evening rather than running every 30 minutes between 9 
am and 4pm. From a long-term perspective, it is not possible to achieve a genuine LMA with this 
service pattern. Mr Thierry Baert (ADULM) explains,  
The regional trains are good for daily commuting flows, but we don’t have the resources to offer trains every 
30 minutes between Valenciennes and Lille. There are a lot of  people between seven and eight o’clock in the 
morning, but afterwards nobody between nine and four in the afternoon. So there is a mismatch.   
 
Secondly, with the arrival of an internationally-renowned cultural facility in the Lens sub-region, 
the problem of external accessibility to Le Louvre emerges. There is serious concern regarding the 
current insufficiency of TGV services to Lens. Despite the fact that these sub-regions are served 
by TGV, the speed is the same as regional trains since the TGV trains run on a considerable 
distance on conventional lines. In addition, the TGV service from Paris offers only two trains to 
Lens: one in the early morning at 6am and another in the evening at 8pm
153
. Mr Decuypere 
explains the issue of accessibility.   
At the end of  the year, the Louvre will come to Lens- it’s a problem, will we be connected to the high speed 
train because it’s an international destination? All of  these problems are not solved now and we have to 
work on this. How to develop a regional metropolitan area with only one door to go in and out of  the 
metropolitan region– it’s a problem. 
                                                        
151 Interview with Mr Decuypere (CEO of MBM). 
152 Email communication with Ms Cassette, responsible for transport mobility in MBM.   
153 This was the rail timetable at the time the interview was conducted in March 2012. Due to the need to add more 
trains for the opening of Le Louvre, SNCF now provides four direct trains from Paris to Lens and six direct trains 
from Lens to Paris (November 2012).     
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Figure 8-7  The Evolution of the Travel-to-Work Pattern between Lille and the Coal Mining 
Area (1999-2006) 
 
Source: MBM (2011, p.20) 
 
 
The third issue is a danger that over-concentration towards Lille and a deficiency in internal 
transport network within the coal mining area would widen polarisation within the region
154
. There 
are two underlying challenges. Firstly, two different transport systems compete for the same 
journey with stopping patterns. This is most evident between rail services and bus services. The 
stopping train service patterns need to be adjusted
155
. Secondly, there are service and integration 
gaps between different AOTUs in the coal mining area because each develops their own transport 
systems and transport plans (PDUs) (see Figure 8-8). A proposal for two new tramway lines, 
Béthune- Bruay-La-Buissiere and Liévin - Hénin- Beaumont- Lens is an example illustrating how 
local authorities do not have a strategy for transport and how difficult it is to make them work 
together. Mr Decuypere who was involved with these local authorities in an advisory capacity, 
argues that reinitiating the tramway project triggered them to consider integration between 
different systems because it was not thought out properly earlier.  
What we want to say is that it’s not purely a transport problem, but that transport is part of  the planning 
system that we must study together: transportation and urban-planning should be combined, to see the links 
between different parts. We can’t study trams only at this scale, but we must understand the relationships 
                                                        
154 Interview with Dr Alain L’Hostis (the quotation is in Appendix 20- AL-1) 
155 Interview with Mr Decuypere (the quotation is in Appendix 20-YDD-2)  
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with Douai and the relationships with Lille…The tram at this moment is a part of  the regional system too, 
because many people will take the tram to go to train stations… You can have a different transportation 
system here and here, but the problem is to connect them to the hubs, which is obviously very important. 
 
Figure 8-8  Various Transport Authorities and Territories within the Region in 2008 
 
Source: Richer (2009) 
 
This situation relates to an inherited complexity within the French government system. 
Traditionally, under a centralised French national state, local municipalities were very small and 
fragmented with very little power. The decentralisation process is too new and immature. The coal 
mining area used to have 160 local authorities and now they are grouped into seven 
inter-communities. From the experience of Mr Decuypere, this history explains why these local 
authorities cannot work together.        
I think this is French institutional heritage, which I think is very different from British heritage. France is a 
good example of  a very centralised state: the decentralisation process initiated in 1981/82 by François 
Mitterrand when he came into his Presidency and it’s something very new. This new institution was created 
after 1980, and the local authorities were created in 2000. When they were created, they were proud of  
their new power and very glad to manage their own competences and now we say to them: ―it’s not a good 
skill‖. I think cooperation is a new process and they were very busy trying to organise themselves inside, and 
forming inter-relationships between the different institutions was something that was not a priority for them. 
So it’s difficult for them to learn this process and to cooperate on different fields like transportation.  
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Also, the cooperation between Lille and the coal mining area is contentious. LMA was created 
under the leadership of Pierre Mauroy, when he was the president of CU. Local authorities 
respected Pierre Mauroy and believed in his leadership, but fundamentally Lille‘s strong 
performance makes local authorities in the coal mining area hesitate to communicate with Lille. 
Mr Decuypere explains this controversial relationship.  
Lille is strong and sometimes they think that talking with Lille and trying to make agreements with Lille is 
something difficult and they are too weak to talk with Lille. Sometimes they want to talk with Lille, 
sometimes they are reluctant, so it’s not something very obvious. Mission Bassin Minier and Lille 
Development Agency work together in many fields. We work at this scale and we try to promote this scale 
with the president of  the association of  the metropolitan area. 
 
8.4  Discussion: Multi-Level Interventions  
 
The French state actively intervened in the decision-making of the TGV-Nord and this was 
conducive to proactive intervention regarding the opportunity presented by HST for territorial 
redevelopment. The immediate endorsement and announcement of the construction of the 
TGV-Nord reflected the continual commitment to developing a strategic HST network. Given the 
osmotic central-local relationship by Cumul des Mandates and the concern for transport equality 
by LOTI in the French context, the decision-making process of the TGV-Nord was closely 
involved with and shaped by local interventions to influence the location of a new HST station in 
Lille city centre with collective regional consensus under strong political leadership of Pierre 
Mauroy. Meanwhile, regional government in return electrified conventional lines and constructing 
short branch lines to allow the TGV services to serve a wider region. For NPDC, it is not only 
about HST. The construction of A16/A26 is critically important to improve the transport 
connectivity for this post-industrial region for manufacturing sectors. At the same time, the 
traditional centralised state had experienced major reforms in government institutions and urban 
and regional planning approaches since the socialist President François Mitterrand was elected in 
1981 to empower municipalities. Reform enables a strong association between government 
institutional structures with equivalent competence and resources at different levels.  
Varying local interventions reflected three key local capacities accounted for these wider impacts, 
namely: political leadership and fragmentation, economic trajectory and transport need (the role of 
TGV), and constitutional capacity and policy priority with an inclusive, cooperative structure.       
First of all, sub-regions in this study which were argued to have presented good political 
leadership throughout the process are those with strong links to the central power and the unique 
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French rule of cumul des mandates. Mr Joncquel insightfully emphasised the importance of this 
good relationship for local development.   
The key point in France is that the government is really centralised in Paris. We had good opportunities 
when Michel Delebarre was the mayor of  Dunkerque and was part of  the French government. So at the 
beginning of  the 1990s, he was the Minister of  Transportation for France, so it was really convenient. It is 
like Lille. Lille had the TGV when Pierre Mauroy, the Mayor of  Lille at that time, was Prime Minister. 
In France, if  you want to have something, you need to have a strong link with centralised power. It is the 
same now with Valenciennes. The Mayor of  Valenciennes was Jean-Louis Borloo who was a member of  the 
Sarkozy government on the right side of  the political field. It is the same. You need to have the link with the 
centralised power. It is easier to develop. The network, the state services are working in the same direction.  
 
In line with this condition, decentralisation is a double-edged sword. It assisted in cultivating the 
capacity of local authorities, though it is still a new process. Once political leadership is absent or 
immature, new structures with new competence became a hindrance for cooperation and lead to 
fragmentation and incapacity. As Cole (2006) finds that, NPDC has ―a long tradition of urban 
rivalry, fractious state-region relationships and poor relationship between local politicians and 
business actors traditionally produced sub-optimal local outcomes‖ (Cole, 2006, p.41).     
The second local condition is the economic trajectory which accounts for varying effects with 
different transport needs. The character of local economies has changed significantly after national 
intervention in the 1960s. Lille was invested with status, power and resources to develop a 
knowledge economy, whereas Dunkerque, Valenciennes, and Lens possessed manufacturing-based 
industries. This significantly resulted in these sub-regions‘ transport needs. For Lille, the 
TGV-Nord is the exact type of transport infrastructure needed to cater for the knowledge economy. 
For Dunkerque, two motorways and the TGV were both exploited, but two new motorways have 
proven to be more instantly useful for the extensive industrial development than the TGV which 
could assist to diversify the declining urban centre in a long-term transformation. Firstly, by the 
time when the TGV and TERGV services are available to Paris and Lille, urban regeneration 
projects had just begun to be implemented, which could not be apparently conducive to any 
immediate effect. Secondly, the motorway network is much more well-connected than the rail 
network. New motorways internally improve the transport link between coastal sub-regions and 
externally to a wider European level whereas the conventional rail linkage within SMCO was very 
problematic and did not well integrate with TGV and TERGV, which could not spread the wider 
HST effect widely.  
In the coal mining area, similar to Dunkerque with its strong industrial characteristics, for Lens, 
the arrival of A26 and HST services were not actively exploited until regional intervention in 
creating a prestigious cultural branch of Le Louvre museum to assist Lens‘ transformation. For 
Valenciennes, its motorway systems have been well developed before the arrival of TGV. The 
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efforts were made to build a tramway to link all the regeneration sites with the TGV station. It 
could explain why Valenciennes‘ manufacturing base could be enhanced through a better image 
with physical transformation projects in city centre and a better transport integration of tramway 
and TGV. Thus the need of imposing public services was reduced. While, Lens lacked intervention 
in its transport opportunity with local transformation projects, which may lead to its 
unattractiveness to existing private manufacturing base and the increase of public services.  
Thirdly, these different trajectories reveal that the existence of appropriate government structures 
endorsed with competence and resources in an inclusive approach led to the reduction of regional 
inequality through active interventions to spread the benefit. Under the national structural 
framework, an inclusive multi-level government intervention was made. On the one hand, NPDC 
was entitled to the legitimate status and resources of a region. It involved the decision making 
process of the HST route and station location and the TGV services for a wide range of regional 
towns outside Lille. After NPDC became the regional passenger rail authority, it further pioneered 
the development of TERGV by exploiting the available capacity of the TGV-line between Lille 
and coastal areas. On the other hand, it assists problematic sub-regions which are not used to 
taking initiatives such as Université 2000, MBM, Le Louvre-Lens, and a UNESCO candidate to 
celebrate the mining legacy in addition to transport projects. In addition, wider territorial 
cooperation was further encouraged by the state. Lille further evolved from Lille metropolis to 
Lille Metropolitan Area which embraces part of Belgian territory and the former coal mining area. 
But the transformation process is far from easy and instant. The co-existence of various 
government levels without hierarchy in the French system resulted in intensive negotiation and 
unavoidable conflicts of perspectives for different interests. Hence it takes time and needs 
consensus for any progress. 
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8.5  Chapter Conclusions   
 
In summary, the French case suggests that the wider impact of HST in reducing the regional 
inequality is closely associated with multi-level interventions. The in-depth qualitative study found 
that the national TGV-Nord project was exploited in different ways based on constitutional 
capacity, policy priority, political leadership and governance, and local economic trajectory.  
The French state demonstrated a state-led approach with a close central-local relationship in 
seizing the opportunity of the TGV-Nord. Meanwhile, various reforms in constitutional capacity 
and policy priority presented a conducive and inclusive approach: from a centralised to a 
state-enhancing approach with concerns for inequality through empowerment and decentralisation. 
Several institutional structures have been newly granted resources to tackle territorial development 
at the most suitable scale. The in-depth study of three economic zones demonstrates how local 
economic trajectory and political leadership and governance influenced the wider impacts of HST. 
The creation of a HST transport hub in Lille city centre enhanced the development of Lille 
metropolitan area towards the knowledge economy, strengthened the regional status of Lille, 
diversified local economies and expanded territorial cooperation in the wider metropolitan area, 
but it will take a long time to genuinely transform from a transport hub to a more 
knowledge-intensive hub. Beyond Lille Metropolis, the effect of TGV for the wider impact in 
these industrial sub-regions is less direct and apparent. The exception is Valenciennes which was 
making deliberate intervention in a tramway project alongside with urban regeneration projects. 
Dunkerque actively exploited HST and motorways, but the economic restructuring and physical 
transformation in its neglected urban centre takes a long time to have effects of TGV. The absence 
of active intervention in Lens leads to fragmentation and stagnation and is difficult to have the 
wider impact of TGV without regional intervention.  
With the decentralised resources and responsibility, regional intervention critically exploited the 
TGV-Nord for regional development. It first intervened in enabling TGV services to a wider 
region and then significantly changed a Paris-oriented network to a Lille-oriented TGV network 
with the introduction of TERGV services. In addition, it intervenes to assist problematic 
sub-regions which did not actively take initiatives. For Lille metropolis, it is vital to include those 
sub-regions which are closely related within a metropolitan scale. However, these negotiation and 
communication between multi-level governments are always controversial, contested, and taking a 
long time to evolve and reach a step change. At least, these interventions and efforts made so far 
could explain why the regional inequality had been reduced in NPDC with slow economic 
progress (demonstrated in Chapter 5).  
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9.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is devoted to a synthesised discussion that draws together key conditions in relation 
to the role of government intervention both in the national and local contexts in previous two 
chapters. There are two main parts in the discussion (section 9.2). Firstly, based on research 
findings, section 9.2.1 highlights five conditions, which played critical roles in both national and 
local interventions with various combinations and interactions between five conditions. Secondly, 
section 9.2.2 explores how the HST opportunities have been exploited differently for regional 
development. A chapter conclusion is summarised in section 9.3 to answer the SRQ3.  
 
9.2  Towards A Model of Government Intervention for the Wider Impact of 
HST  
In the following section, each element is discussed in the light of research findings from the two 
studied regions. The interaction between these five conditions shapes the transformation process in 
relation to the opportunities of HST (see Figure 9-1).   
Figure 9-1  A Model of Government Intervention for the Wider Impact of HST 
 
Source: author 
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9.2.1  Key Conditions  
 
Based on the comparative case studies, five key conditions (highlighted in red in Figure 9-1) are 
found to be critical in seizing the opportunities presented by HST for regional and urban 
development, namely three national conditions (1. national political economy, 2. constitutional 
capacity (structure and competence), 3. planning priority and resources) and two local conditions 
(4. city types and economic trajectory and 5. leadership and governance).  
 
9.2.1.1  Condition 1- National Political Economy 
First of all, national political economy proves to be the most fundamental condition which 
explained the varying wider impact of HST in both cases. As mentioned in section 6.3.2, the UK 
and France have presented distinctive traditional political culture and models of capitalism. In 
section 6.3.3, during the 1980s and 2000s, the UK‘s market-led and France‘s state-led approaches 
are particularly marked under two newly-elected political regimes. The British ideology signifies 
minimum public intervention, deregulation, and privatisation of transport investment, which 
determined the perception of the WCML modernisation as a technical issue as discussed in section 
7.2. In contrast, the French state-led approach has been reinforced with a combination of 
state-enhanced and decentralised features. In addition to the concern of expanding rail market, the 
TGV-Nord project is fully supported by the national government as part of the long-term national 
high-speed network to properly serve the uneven economic geography as discussed in section 8.2.            
               
9.2.1.2  Condition 2- Constitutional Capacity (Structure and Competence) 
Condition 2- constitutional capacity (structure and competence) is associated with organisation, 
function, and power allocated between the central-local government, which is determined by 
Condition 1 and indicated by national law. In line with governmental restructuring discussed in 
section 6.5, a change in constitutional capacity has critically shaped national and local 
interventions.   
The comparative case study shows a contrary situation. In the British context, rail privatisation 
reinforced the centralised rail authority and private rail operating companies at the national level 
and the traditional central-local separation. At the same time, the abolition of metropolitan county 
councils and the fragmentation of the regional mechanism resulted in the increased centralisation 
of power with direct control over local budgets (Banister, 1994). Capable local authorities have 
achieved transformations within their own territory, whereas, without appropriate regional 
apparatus, the transformative effect is harder for vulnerable places to bring about. These changes 
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led to a city-led intervention and an exclusive process in the British case. In contrast, in France, 
partial privatisation and progressive decentralisation has allowed more power to be delegated to 
multi-level local governments, in particular to elected regional governments. With multiple 
governance structures and without a fixed hierarchical order, the traditional osmotic relationship 
between the central and local levels has become more intensive than before.       
Findings of the comparative study suggest that constitutional capacity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. On the one hand, proper regional operation is necessary. As shown with the 
British experience, a city-led transformation not only encourages competition, but also causes 
fragmentation and discourages spatial thinking among local authorities. Later on, under the Labour 
Government, a fragmented regional operation with three overlapping organisations and limited 
power has not been effective. Despite the fact that the regional planning operation in the 
North-West has been not effective, there was at least a responsible body which thought of the 
region as a whole and considered how different parts could be connected. As Professor Michael 
Parkinson emphasises, ―There was a kind of framework and some principles. Because they had 
money, people had to do something, even if they didn’t believe it.‖ Once the regional level does not 
exist, the responsibility of taking care of disadvantaged sub-regions will be given to the state itself. 
In the French case, with its resources and power, NPDC regional government exploited the HST 
services and assisted the weakest sub-regions for a regional territory as illustrated in section 8.3.1.    
On the other hand, constitutional capacity itself is not sufficient to determine the conducive 
transformation, which also closely depends on Condition 5 (political leadership and governance). 
As Professor Michael Parkinson vividly annotates that, it is not just about institutions, but also 
political culture; otherwise, the created institution could not deliver.     
Well, you know, if  you ask what makes a city region successful economically, it’s the politics… These people 
have to like each other; they have to trust each other; they have to be willing to say: ―you first, me second, or 
you take the credit.‖ So in a way, it’s not really about institutions, it’s about political cultures, leadership, 
trust, and ambition…Until you’ve got the individuals and the politics and the relationships and the 
processes right, you can create any number of  institutional arrangements and they won’t deliver. 
 
The British case demonstrated that although the metropolitan county was abolished, Manchester 
used strong political leadership and governance to actively integrate ten metropolitan districts 
within Greater Manchester (section 7.3.2.1), which is absent in other sub-regions. The exception is 
Liverpool which improved its leadership and governance with a catch-up process (section 7.3.2.2). 
Both well-established metropolitan cities have shown more apparent leadership than other 
sub-regions. However, the rivalry between Manchester and Liverpool has been hard to erase and 
their concern on the city-regional scale prevented a more inclusive regional development. In 
addition, the creation of UAs in England has effectively prevented sub-regional development such 
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as Blackpool in WCL and Blackburn with Darwen in PL when new power is exploit within UAs 
rather than sub-regions. Similarly, in the French case, although local authorities have been vested 
more power than before and regional government has intervened to assist weaker sub-regions, 
places which previously lacked the decision-making capacity do not know how to exert the new 
power; instead, they tends to enjoy the power for a narrow rather than strategic perspective. This is 
best demonstrated in the coal mining sub-region, Lens (section 8.3.2.3).   
 
9.2.1.3  Condition 3- Planning Priority and Resources  
Condition 3 is related to planning priority and resources. Similar to Condition 2, the national 
political ideology (Condition 1) manifestly shapes this condition. This is of serious concern for 
national political leaders, reflected in major initiatives, grants and subsidies. As indicated in 
section 6.6, Condition 3 is very different in the two contexts. British planning priority and 
resources demonstrate a period of massive reductions in public spending (including transport) with 
a guidance-led, competition-led and metropolitan-led approach. In contrast, French planning 
approaches have showed a revival of public transport with a concern for inequality. Additionally, 
progressive decentralisation has brought equivalent resources to multi-level local governments 
with contractual-led approach for capacity building at the local level. Again, it significantly 
influences national and local interventions during the process.   
 
The Variation in National Political Judgment with Regard to Intra-regional Inequality   
The comparative study reflects a critical planning priority based on value judgement at the national 
level towards inequality through a ground-breaking intervention; in other words, whether or not it 
is worthwhile to assist the most disadvantaged places. This condition should closely take 
Condition 4 and 5 into account because political leaderships and economic trajectory vary with 
places in capitalising upon the opportunities brought by HST. The fundamental difference between 
the British and French experiences is that in France, the regional council helped disadvantaged 
sub-regions with funding and prestigious projects; whereas in the UK, those incapable sub-regions 
are consequently suffering from further decline. The best examples are Blackpool in NWE versus 
Lens in NPDC. Blackpool lost its casino bid in 2005 because of the stated ideology ―regeneration 
benefits of the proposal before us are unproven‖ (section 7.3.2.4 I), while the decision to relocate a 
branch of Le Louvre to Lens involved ―a challenge that was the biggest and the most difficult!‖
 
(section 8.3.2.3 III). 
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9.2.1.4  Condition 4- City Type and Economic Trajectory   
Fourthly, the wider impact of HST was found to differ with city type and economic trajectories, 
which reflects transport needs and path dependency. HST inclines to serve major hubs, in 
particular major metropolitan sub-regions where high-value agglomeration economies tend to 
develop. The time-space shrinkage by HST enables them to embrace a knowledge economy and 
reinforce urban dynamics. For other sub-regions, they play a supplementary role to metropolitan 
sub-regions and are dominant in manufacturing activities or dependent on a motorway-based mode 
of development. Thus, HST is not be as useful or appreciated as an improved regional and 
sub-regional network for people to access jobs outside their places of residence. Similarly, 
regarding a broader context of transport conditions, in addition to the arrival of HST, other 
transport improvements made in parallel would influence the wider impact of HST.  
The comparative case study demonstrates that, in the British case, before the arrival of the WCML 
modernisation, NWE had a well-developed motorway system to serve the majority of sub-regions 
and since then, major motorway construction in this region has not been implemented further. 
Quantitative findings in Chapter 5 show that only metropolitan sub-regions Greater Manchester 
South and Merseyside (including Liverpool) have improved their economic strength after the 
completion of the long-delayed WCML modernisation. Although both are metropolitan cities, 
Condition 5 determined the difference between Manchester and Liverpool. Manchester which 
exploited its own international airport and extended the Metrolink system consolidated its role as 
the major regional centre for the knowledge economy and demonstrated its significant shift of the 
largest structure of employment from public services to knowledge intensive services after the 
arrival of the WCML modernisation. Liverpool caught up later. For other sub-regions, the WCML 
modernisation did not have similar positive effects but only reinforced existing uneven north-south 
divide within the region. In contrast, in the French case, the TGV-Nord was implemented with the 
Channel Tunnel and two new major motorways which significantly improve road connectivity in 
particular for the coastal area and part of coal-mining area. For Lille and Valenciennes, motorways 
had been well-developed before the TGV-Nord, so they aptly exploited HST with urban transit 
projects to develop the hub function of HST to benefit further its wider sub-region. For Dunkerque 
and Lens, although both HST services and motorways are improved, motorways have more instant 
effects of connectivity for these post-industrial sub-regions to be put on the international map than 
HST which did not trigger an integrated rail system yet for these sub-regions (challenges are 
discussed in section 8.3.2.2). Thus, differential effects of HST between metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan sub-regions are evident. Lille has the majority of public-led knowledge intensive 
activities (R&D), whereas other sub-regions have witnessed employment increase with a still 
manufacturing-led economic structure. 
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A related issue is worth noting that there is a significant difference between manufacturing-based 
sub-regions in the two regions. In NWE, with much disadvantaged transport connectivity, Pennine 
Lancashire is unpopular in terms of not only attracting service activities but also retaining 
manufacturing jobs. As illustrated in section 7.3.2.4 II, the role of rail improvement for them 
would be to develop a commuting sub-region related to large metropolitan cities. Thus, as long as 
the transport link is improved, efforts of housing renewal could pay off in improved quality of life 
with relatively cheaper property prices to attract skilled workers to live in PL and commute into 
Manchester. These high-income earners will spend their incomes in the local area. This 
development pattern is exemplified by towns within Greater Manchester North (GMN) (section 
7.3.2.1 II); such towns have a similar economic trajectory to those in PL. But the difference 
between GMN and PL is the institutional territory and the geographic barrier. GMN is included 
within the political coalition of Manchester and is closer to Manchester than PL. As for NPDC, 
industrial activities still amount to a large proportion of the economic structure. The new 
motorways and the Channel Tunnel have assisted the industrial development. The arrival of TGV 
in these manufacturing sub-regions has a psychological effect to prevent manufacturing-led 
companies from moving to Lille.  
 
9.2.1.5  Condition 5- Political Leadership and Governance      
Fifth, the capacity of local political leadership and governance determines whether the 
opportunities presented by HST can be seized strategically or just wasted. This comparative case 
study has demonstrated the Condition 5 as a decisive factor. In addition to the service function of 
local authorities defined by law, these authorities have encountered direct pressures from local 
economic development involving job creation or losses. Strong leadership and governance display 
via proactive initiatives and a collective consensus to initiate a wider local economic strategy and 
local transport network before and after the arrival of HST.  
The concept of political leadership has been captured from two perspectives. The first one argued 
that political leadership is a cumulative effect of historical trajectory, which is closely associated 
with Condition 4- city types and economic trajectory as mentioned earlier. Friedmann (1966) 
points out that local economic entrepreneurship and political leadership are associated with the 
historical trajectory of the region (Dawkins, 2003, p.140). Likewise, Judd and Parkinson (1990) 
who conducted several case studies of cities in North America and Europe argue that there is a 
close relationship between local leadership capacity and the type of regeneration strategies that 
cities pursue. They reveal that a local authority with a divided, unstable political structure and 
weak private-public partnership is associated with reactive policies, whereas an authority with a 
united, stable political structure and strong private-public collaboration implements aggressive and 
targeted policies. These findings led them to conclude that leadership is,  
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not a static, but a developmental phenomenon. Past experience matters a great deal. In cities with a history 
of  development efforts, political battles encourage the creation of  a rich institutional context (Judd and 
Parkinson, 1990, p. 296) (Judd, 2000).   
 
The second perspective maintains that political leadership and governance are not universal and 
need to take a combination of local and external factors into account, which further captures the 
interaction between political leadership and its contexts. DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999) argue 
that, although urban leaders have the ability to make choices, they are confined to the parameters 
imposed by external forces and local political arrangements. Economic restructuring 
(decentralisation towards the knowledge economy) and state restructuring (national policy and 
inter-governmental relations) will impose constraints on options for cities and consequently 
political arrangements evolve within cities (cited in Judd, 2000). This perspective highlighted the 
relationship between Condition 5 and Condition 1, 2, and 3.   
Both perspectives have been critical in explaining the wider impact of HST. Through this 
contrasting comparative case study, the relationship between the two perspectives could be further 
comprehended with a new meaning. In the British case, Manchester‘s strong political leadership 
was argued to be a ―cultural coherence‖ (section 7.3.2.1 I). However, under the negative external 
forces in the 1980s, Manchester was not confined. Instead, a new path has been recreated to 
reverse negative conditions resulting from the national state. Nonetheless, this strong leadership 
and governance is within the domain of Greater Manchester rather than operating at a wider 
regional scale. Other sub-regions which have no strong leadership and governance were 
understandably restricted to negative circumstances.  
In the French case, strong political leadership is shown associated with the rule ―cumul des 
mandates‖ and historical trajectory of cities. It is best demonstrated by Lille, Dunkerque, and 
Valenciennes (discussed in section 8.5). The national state has played a guiding role in planning 
and governance initiatives which significantly promote capacity building at the local levels. For 
the rest of sub-regions in NPDC, regardless of the benign decentralisation, it was found that 
French local authorities used to be small and tended to lack strong political leadership. But at least, 
the multi-level government structure creates an inclusive approach to help those disadvantaged 
sub-regions, so the regional inequality could be addressed. A summary of the British-French 
comparison is presented in Figure 9-2.  
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9.2.1.6  Other conditions  
An intervention process involves more than these five conditions which were discussed in more 
detail above. Other important issues which are not highlighted are worth noting. Firstly, apart from 
national influence, funding mechanisms developed at the European level have increasingly played 
a decisive role in influencing national transport planning and large infrastructure projects; the 
European Regional Development Fund, European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, European 
Investment Fund, European Coal and Steel Community loans (Banister, 1994). In addition, for 
European integration, the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) was defined in 1996, 
within which, a Trans-European HST network has been drawn and continually implemented. For 
example, a new rail terminal in UK Port of Felixstowe was highlighted by TEN-T Executive 
Agency (2013) as an illustration of TEN-T financing impact.  
Secondly, the links between the public and the private sectors are critically underlain in these 
interventions. In section 6.6.2, the differing planning approaches in the UK and France have 
displayed a market-led/regulatory approach in the UK versus a public-led approach in France. 
Therefore, this difference manifests in the section 8.3.2.1 where a typical public-led 
redevelopment company (tool) was created in Lille to guide and channel private investment. 
Whereas, in the UK, the private and public partnership has been evolving through and closely 
related to the debate of the central-local relationship. The fiasco of the WCML modernisation was 
investigated in section 7.2 and was found to result from the traditional lack of putting public and 
private sector planning and investment together. On a smaller scale, due to huge controversy, there 
has been a decentralisation tendency of transferring redevelopment power from the central 
government to the local authority, as from Urban Development Co-operations (UDCs) to Urban 
Regeneration Companies (URCs).  
Thirdly, the participation and inquiry process before the decision-making on investment is also 
influential. In the UK, taking all sorts of steps and procedures into account, a large transport 
infrastructure project like HS2 is usually expected to be completed in 20 years‘ time in contrast to 
a shorter period in other countries. In France, the ―public inquiry stage is limited to debates on 
actual routes and the use of expert advisors is standard practice… Proposals are agreed and then 
discussed locally. The final decision of the Minister can only be challenged by instituting action in 
administrative courts, which could result in more protection without altering the layout‖ (Banister, 
1994, p.113); while in the UK, the proposals are produced for local reaction and debate, and the 
final decision is made centrally. However, the British style of national decision-making and its 
consultation process have been increasingly challenged. A recent case is related to plans for future 
wind farms in the UK. A UN legal tribunal determined that ―the UK Government acted illegally by 
denying the public decision-making powers over their approval and the ―necessary information‖ 
over their benefits or adverse effects‖ (Pagano, 2013).  
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In the case of HS2, there have been several legal challenges made regarding this controversial 
project. Although only one of ten legal challenges was upheld in a High Court judgement
156
, the 
government has decided to re-run the consultation process with further consideration of alternative 
compensation models. The Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd. stated that ―…property 
compensation consultation had been carried out, not the merits of the policies. In order to save 
time and public money and to limit the impact on residents affected, the Secretary of State for 
Transport has decided that instead of appealing this decision the government will re-run this 
consultation in line with the judge’s finding that further consideration should have been given to 
other potential compensation models‖ (DfT & HS2 Ltd., 2013). In this way, for a transport project 
as large and as controversial as HS2, the debate at the national level is fierce. No wonder the 
estimated period is much longer. Moreover, this decision-making difference is closely associated 
with the possibility of multi-level public intervention and to what extent, the opportunity offered 
by HST could be exploited more widely by different levels of government.  
 
                                                        
156 The decision of High Court Judge was made 15 March 2013. 
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Figure 9-2  A Summarised Comparison between British and French Interventions  
  
Source: author  
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9.2.2  Government Intervention in Capitalising on HST in Reducing Regional 
Inequality 
 
The comparative study demonstrated these five key conditions collectively shape the wider impact 
of HST during the transformation process. The following discussion is focused on the interaction 
between national and local interventions which contribute to the reduction of regional inequality 
(the central part delineated by blue dotes in Figure 9-1).   
 
9.2.2.1  National Intervention 
 
1. HST Investment: A Short-term Solution vs. A Long-term Spatial-Economic 
Strategy 
HST investment is, by default, a national decision. Whether HST investment is based on 
short-term problem-solving or the opportunity for long-term strategic development is a 
fundamental distinction of governmental reactions and perceptions between the two case studies.  
The British upgrade approach demonstrates the problem-solving role of HST investment from a 
short-term perspective, constrained by an abundant railway network created in the 19
th
 century. In 
the national context of the 1980s, central government cut public investment and expected the 
private sector to provide funding for transport services, which led to the privatisation of public 
transport services. In the case of the modernisation of the WCML, the whole process presented a 
lack of proper government involvement under rail privatisation and encountered serious technical 
obstacles, which were perceived and treated as a problem rather than an opportunity with 
over-extended construction period, overrun cost, reduction of the planned journey speed, and 
extremely unreliable services. In addition, the WCML upgrade involved modest transport 
improvement without physical transformation of new routes or new stations, which appeared to 
raise little awareness of this opportunity for local actors and demonstrated a separate central-local 
relationship. 
In contrast, since 1981, French HST approaches have proved to be a long-term strategy associated 
with a spatial-economic concern for an over-concentrated Île-de-France and the rest of a thinly 
populated territory. In this context, investment in a new dedicated TGV-Nord, which demonstrated 
an immediate reaction to the construction of the Channel Tunnel, was in sharp contrast with the 
British reaction, displaying ―essential coherence‖ (Mawson, et al., 1990). Moreover, there has 
been an evolution from separate HST lines radiating from Paris to an integrated HST network with 
international airport hubs around Paris, optimising transport resources over the national territory. 
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In addition, the newly dedicated TGV-Nord involved the issue of locating new HST 
stations/services, drawing local attention, and multi-level interventions to seize this opportunity. It 
displayed a close central-local relationship since it regarded as an great opportunity for the 
creation of an international HST rail market, the services for an uneven national spatial-economic 
geography, and a long-awaited opportunity for this European crossroads to transform its 
manufacturing economy towards ―la turbine tertiaire‖.  
 
2. HST Services for Regional Development: A Market-led vs. A State-led Approach 
Different national political economies determined condition 2 and condition 3, which shaped 
whether and how HST could be exploited to serve a region in three aspects, namely HST service 
pattern, purpose, and prioritised orientation. In NWE, the modernisation of the WCML took place 
when British Rail had just been privatised under the conservative regime. WCML service patterns 
which were proposed by the private operator Virgin Trains and agreed by the state demonstrated a 
market-led (profit-oriented) approach. Virgin Trains served existing popular places, but skipped 
unprofitable stops. This point could be best exemplified by the different service patterns for 
Blackpool and Chester (see section 7.2). Furthermore, in order to compete with air, Virgin 
Pendolino services were prioritised for London-oriented inter-city travel, squeezing the overloaded 
capacity for intra-regional commuting services. The negative impact of the WCML on 
intra-regional rail capacity was highlighted in regional spatial strategy, but could not be actively 
addressed because the centralised authority of rail services and institutional conflicts and the 
ineffective operation of three non-elected regional bodies (see section 7.3.1.2 I). Thus, the existing 
uneven north/south intra-regional inequality has been reinforced. 
On the contrary, in NPDC, in the early 1980s, a socialist president brought about two critical laws 
which enabled the opportunity of the TGV-Nord to be seized for urban and regional development. 
The first one was LOTI 1982 alongside the traditional osmotic centre-local relationship ―cumul des 
mandates‖. Local actors collectively changed the national decision to suit local interests of 
locating Lille Europe TGV station in the city centre. The other is the decentralisation law 1982, 
which gave regions a legitimate position as another tier of local government with authority and 
resources for regional transport planning. The newly dedicated TGV-Nord line was meanwhile 
exploited by funding electrification of existing conventional lines to serve the region. Initially, 
many sub-regions, including peripheral areas, are directly served by HST to Paris (see section 
8.3.1.1). Later on, after regional rail passenger services were decentralised to regional 
governments, NPDC introduced TERGV, for which the NPDC regional government pays a 
subsidy to SNCF. Since then, Paris-oriented HST services have been largely modified into 
Lille-oriented services, in particular for the peripheral coastal area (see section 8.3.1.2). However, 
two major issues arose. Firstly, the extended HST services in most sub-regions have encountered 
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worsening financial issues. Secondly, there has been an increasingly divided perspective regarding 
HST services between SNCF (an international and national view) and regional governments (a 
regional view).   
 
9.2.2.2  Local Intervention: Transport Accessibility and Non-Transport 
Initiatives   
On the other hand, local intervention in improving attractiveness played a critical role in the wider 
impact of HST. Two aspects, namely transport accessibility (hubs and transport networks) and 
non-transport initiatives (education, housing and physical transformation) prove to be essential to 
open up any opportunity for redevelopment. As discussed in section 3.5, the dynamic economic 
relationship between different types of cities could be better articulated through different levels of 
transport connectivity interchanged at key hubs for a more sustainable spatial-economic 
relationship in a region and thus the reduction of regional inequality. In the following section, the 
comparative discussion will begin with different levels of transport accessibility, which includes 
the creation of regional transport hubs, intra-regional rail network, sub-regional rail network 
(urban transit systems), and followed by the interlocked and indispensable relationship between 
transport and non-transport initiatives.   
 
1. The Development of A Regional Hub Strategy: A City-led vs. A System-led 
Approach  
Both metropolitan sub-regions have implemented a hub strategy, but through two distinctive 
approaches under varying conditions: city-led vs. system-led (state-led plus local intervention). In 
NWE, Manchester established its hegemony through an airport hub strategy which serves wider 
neighbouring regions, even beyond the north-west boundary. With the national context of 
privatising airports, abolishing metropolitan counties, and delaying WCML modernisation for rail 
privatisation, the City of Manchester was not constrained by these structural disadvantages. It 
exerted its strong leadership and governance by forming informal AGMA, keeping ownership of 
Manchester International Airport and developing it from the 1980s to enhance its external 
accessibility to the outside world, as well as its internal rail link with Manchester Piccadilly and 
beyond in order to expand the catchment of the airport. When the WCML modernisation was 
completed in 2008, bringing Manchester within two hours of London, a HST/airport hub strategy 
took shape and resulted in a noticeable decline in the London-Manchester air market
157
. In turn, 
this was a win-win situation for Manchester since the reduction in domestic flights provided 
available space for the growth of long-haul flights and a HST/air hub strategy strengthened 
                                                        
157 Interview with Mr John Twigg from Manchester Airport (the quotation is in Appendix 19-JT-1).   
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9  The Synthesised Discussion of the Comparative Case Study 
 
323 
 
Manchester‘s competitiveness and attractiveness to inward investment
158
. As the importance of 
Manchester International Airport has evolved to be indispensable to Northern England, an 
outward-looking cross-city regional growth strategy, ―The Northern Way‖, was further promoted 
to combat north/south regional inequality. However, within the discourse of ―The Northern Way‖ 
and an ineffective regional operation, inter-regional inequality was emphasised rather than 
intra-regional inequality. Disadvantaged peripheral sub-regions like Pennine Lancashire and West 
Coast Lancashire were excluded.  
By contrast, the HST hub strategy in NPDC proved a good fit for the logic of the European 
high-speed transport system (HST lines connecting secondary cities with national capitals). The 
Lille HST hub is well-connected, with two large European capitals (Paris and Brussels) and their 
international airports within one hour, which exploits this locational advantage rather than its own 
international airport. Over time, this HST hub status has helped Lille to develop decentralised 
functions from two European Capitals. This cross-border metropolitan area has a centripetal 
attraction for its neighbouring area beyond Lille Metropolis, including the Belgian and the French 
territories. The decisions of the state have been instrumental in the transformation process of 
creating a regional hub around Lille, such as CU of Lille Metropolis created in the 1960s, the 
decision to build the Channel Tunnel, the TGV-Nord in the 1980s and the creation of the Lille 
Metropolitan Area (LMA)
159
 promoted by DATAR in 2004. The LMA embraces coal mining area 
and non-industrial sub-regions such as Arras and neighbouring Belgian partners. Under this 
inclusive governance framework, developmental projects around transport and economic issues 
could be discussed on a broader scale to help disadvantaged sub-regions.  
 
2. The Role of the Intra-regional and Sub-regional Transit Network Connecting with 
A HST Hub 
 
Improving Intra-regional Rail Networks    
Both Manchester and Lille show apparent benefits from developing knowledge intensive activities 
around their hub strategies, but this is not necessarily true for their neighbouring sub-regions. In 
order to encourage spill-over effects of HST, when large cities are served by HST, the critical 
issue is whether these sub-regions either with or without HST services could be connected to an 
improved intra-regional transport rail network.  
                                                        
158 Interview with Mr Dave Whyte (the quotation is in Appendix 19-DW-5).  
159 This enlarged Lille Metropolitan Area involved 23 partners, nearly 500 municipalities, 3.4 million inhabitants within 
a territory of 75000 km2 (SPIRE, 2005). 
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In NWE, the intra-regional rail network has largely been ignored and the condition was worsened 
when the capacity was squeezed by prioritised inter-city Pendolino services. The problematic 
intra-regional system and the bottleneck problem around Manchester were stressed in ―The 
Manchester Hub railway study‖ (Network Rail, 2010). On the other hand, due to a lack of an 
equivalent regional rail authority, the attempts of improving intra-regional rail services with the 
revived centre around Manchester have been made by individual local authorities. However, 
funding is strictly controlled by the state and the fragmentation of local attempts has proved 
difficult in achieving any intra-regional rail improvement. The frustrated experience is illustrated 
by Pennine Lancashire (section 7.3.2.4 II). What is more, the historical rivalry between 
Manchester and Liverpool has impeded possible rail link improvement for a wider regional 
perspective (section 7.3.1.2 I).  
In contrast, in NPDC, the regional government has gradually become responsible for regional 
transport investment and rail passenger services for an improved intra-regional network although 
there is still much to be done. The most ambitious intervention is the electrification of existing rail 
links to allow interoperability with HST lines and the introduction and extension of Regional TGV 
(TERGV) between Lille and the coastal area. However, the current commuting demand between 
the former coal-mining area and Lille reveals an insufficient rail capacity and the need for 
transport improvement to make a genuine LMA possibility a reality. The improvement of the 
intra-regional link between Lille and the coal mining area demanded intensive negotiation and 
communication facilitated among several structures such as MBM, ADULM and LMAA. The 
findings show that the whole decentralisation process is still new. Many French local authorities 
are proud of their new powers and tend to look inside their EPCIs rather than outside, so the 
cooperation is limited and not automatic (section 8.3.2.3 IV). It therefore involves lengthy 
negotiation process among multi-level organisations under an inclusive approach.   
 
Developing Sub-regional Networks  
In addition to the intra-regional rail network, the development of a sub-regional rail system with a 
form of either metro or tramway from a HST hub could further extend the wider impact into 
sub-regions. Although the development of urban transit systems could be found in both contexts, 
structural conditions have been distinct.  
In the UK, centralised funding control has proved difficult for local authorities to organise their 
local transport systems. The metro link network in Greater Manchester has been implemented and 
expanded by political leadership and governance in securing transport funding with the respectable 
capacity in efficient delivery (section 7.3.2.1 I). Thus, it has resulted in a significant boost for 
Manchester‘s image as a successful European city. But this is not the case for the second 
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metropolitan city, Liverpool. With the early completion of the Loop & Link transport project in the 
1970s, it has proved difficult to convince the Department for Transport to fund a new tramway 
project in Liverpool city centre.    
On the contrary, in France, the national policy is beneficial and open to the development of local 
transport systems. But the key issue is how to exert political leadership in tackling fragmentation 
and securing a consensus among political partners for collective territorial development. In Lille, 
although the first VAL metro system was made possible by VT to link Lille with Villeneuve 
d‘Ascq new town, only when the political leadership of Pierre Mauroy secured metropolitan 
consensus, was it possible to realise the subsequent extension of the metro system and the 
refurbishment of the tramway system to enhance Lille‘s connectivity with two post-industrial 
towns, Roubaix and Tourcoing (section 8.3.2.1 I). Likewise, political leadership overcame 
difficulties to bring about a second tramway system in NPDC, developed in Valenciennes. 
However, problems occurred in two new tramway schemes developed within the coal mining area. 
The lack of political consensus and leadership called a halt to the process. Recently, negotiation 
has restarted with assistance from MBM and regional government (section 8.3.2.3 III).     
     
3. The Relationship between Transport Accessibility and Non-Transport Initiatives  
Lastly, the findings demonstrated the interlocked relationship and need for both transport 
accessibility and non-transport initiatives to extend wider effects of HST. For both major regional 
centres, there is a match of transport improvement with urban projects. Several urban regeneration 
projects have created a new image with new economic space and quality of life in the transition 
from an industrial metropolis to a knowledge economy. A polycentric spatial-economic structure is 
efficiently linked with urban transit systems.  
The difference between British and French cases lies in the relationship between the central and 
local interventions and whether it is a conscious or a subconscious association. In Britain, central 
and local interventions were separate. The arrival of the WCML modernisation proves to have a 
reactive impact whereas in France the central-local intervention was closely interacted, so there is 
a proactive intervention. Similar effects are found in small sub-regions such as Valenciennes, 
Roubaix, Tourcoing, and Dunkerque. All were implemented with urban redevelopment projects 
and transport schemes in city centres.  
Two situations which were seen as incomplete interventions are classified as only having either 
transport improvement or non-transport improvement. Firstly, it is worth reiterating that transport 
accessibility of places is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for wider effects. Examples 
were found in both regions. The ignorance of the HST opportunity in Warrington, Preston and 
Lens were typical examples. Secondly, without transport accessibility, local regeneration alone 
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could not make any significant change either. This is best exemplified by local intervention in 
Pennine Lancashire in NWE. Although considerable efforts were made with a housing market 
renewal scheme and other improvements such as education and training in the local area, prospects 
are still bleak without any improvement in transport to provide a commutable ―city-offer‖ (BBC, 
2011b) to attract more highly skilled residents to commute to work in larger cities. This is widely 
anticipated by the local regeneration officer as a possibility for change in the long term. In addition, 
there is a common belief from local authorities in the importance of rail improvement with large 
regional cities for local regeneration. Jake Berry (MP for Rossendale and Darwen) admits the 
economic driver of Manchester resulted in a need for people in his constituency to work in 
Manchester and spend in the local area (House of Commons, 2012).  
Vulnerable sub-regions in both regions exactly display these two contrasting conditions. Both 
interviewees (CEO of MBM and the regeneration officer in Pennine Lancashire) point out that 
most staff working in the office do not live in the locality. For PL, the reason is because of the 
isolated location. If PL was easily accessible from the large city, the staff would consider living 
locally. For the former coal-mining area, however, the reason is because of a lack of attractiveness. 
As the CEO of MBM expresses, if the infrastructure is not good, they will not be able to work 
there. Transport is the first step to break the limitation, but transport alone is not enough.  
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9.3  Chapter Conclusions   
 
In response to the SRQ3: How could the impact of HST be spread as widely as possible 
throughout a region by government intervention, which could ultimately reduce regional 
inequality? Chapter 6 demonstrated contrasting national conditions in both cases. Findings from 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 further illustrate how the opportunity presented by HST was perceived, 
and at the same time, how multi-level intervention in the transformation process over 30 years 
varies with different national and local conditions, which explains the contrasting economic 
performance demonstrated in Chapter 5 in reducing regional inequality both on the inter- and 
intra-regional scales. Through the lens of the comparative findings, there are four major 
conclusions.  
Firstly, this has to begin with the national state, which regards HST as a long-term strategy rather 
than a short-term solution. HST investment is a major national transport planning decision and 
needs to integrate high-speed transport planning with a long-term strategy, which could respond to 
the existing spatial-economic patterns and future need. This is illustrated by the two cases: the 
British ―market-led‘ perspective providing a short-term solution to the need for HST services 
versus the French ―state-led‖ approach in implementing a long-term spatial-economic strategy 
progressively developing HST hubs in regional capitals and integrating the HST network with 
long-haul airport hubs.     
Secondly, a conducive national spatial-economic planning framework enables local governments 
to intervene and negotiate with local interests supported by constitutional responsibility and 
resources. In the two cases, national political economy significantly influences national reforms 
which determined planning priority and resources in two distinct ways, namely fragmented local 
government structure and tightened local responsibility and resources in the UK versus the 
decentralisation policy for multi-level local governance and a contractual approach of building 
local capacity with available funding resources. As a result, two distinct kinds of central-local 
relationship present themselves: a ―separate‖ relationship with a ―profit-oriented‖ pattern of 
Pendolino services in the NWE and an ―osmotic‖ relationship with a ―equality-oriented‖ pattern of 
TGV services in NPDC. Thus, during the decision-making process, the intra-regional inequality 
has been widened in NWE but has been addressed in NPDC.  
Thirdly, the focus shifts to local interventions on both transport and non-transport initiatives. Local 
intervention needs to seek regional-wide consensus with the recognition that a complementary city 
relationship is vital within a region between different types of cities. Then, a wider impact on 
intra-regional inequality could be achieved with reconstruction of a spatial-economic landscape by 
a hub strategy in regional major centres, with simultaneous intra-regional and sub-regional rail 
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network linking with HST hubs, and efforts made on urban regeneration. This is particularly 
contrasting in the two regions.   
In NWE, due to the separate central-local relationship and a constrained national spatial-economic 
framework, the regional transformation process proves to be city-led without regional consensus 
and inclusive regional governance. Firstly, a city-led Manchester hub strategy, the extensive 
Metrolink network, and the polycentric city-regional transformation were achieved by 
Manchester‘s strong leadership and governance in response to the national context. The arrival of 
the WCML modernisation well matched with efforts made on regeneration and transport 
connectivity in the city-region, so Manchester became an air/HST hub with renewed economic 
growth. Liverpool also showed apparent improvement. However, the prioritised intercity rail 
services had squeezed the capacity for intra-regional rail services and no serious improvement was 
made to alleviate the problem. The cross-regional rail link from and to Manchester Airport is 
based on the expansion of the airport catchment rather than a concern for regional development. 
Secondly, for other HST sub-regions, local intervention had little to do with the HST opportunity. 
For instance, a lack of leadership and sticking to a motorway-based development mode in 
Warrington helps to explain why the economic performance of the Warrington sub-region was 
overtaken by the Manchester sub-region. Thirdly, the disadvantage of transport connectivity in 
non-HST hinterlands has further widened the intra-regional inequality. Despite efforts to 
implement regeneration projects, both peripheral Pennine Lancashire and West Coast Lancashire 
were relatively powerless, suffering from poor transport accessibility and weak leadership without 
effective improvements.  
In NPDC, the national context resulted in decentralised, state-enhanced, capacity-building, and 
inclusive approaches to local intervention. Firstly, a Lille hub has been established through a 
conscious and collective intervention on a HST opportunity. Lille metropolis has physically 
transformed with city-regional wide economic strategy supported with the expansion of urban 
public transit network, in particular for the large-scale urban redevelopment project- Euralille 
intermingled with the HST hub. Meanwhile, regional consensus led to a series of intervention on 
spreading the wider impact of HST for regional development. Further, a cross-border metropolitan 
cooperation was initiated by the state, but was conducted and continued by local leadership. 
Secondly, the wider impact of HST has to consider the impact of new motorway development and 
to be examined in a long term. For some manufacturing-led sub-regions like Lens and Dunkerque, 
the arrival of TGV is not as immediately useful as new motorways for its restructured 
manufacturing economy. However, the intervention in seizing the opportunity of the TGV with 
urban redevelopment projects has largely created a good image for Dunkerque and Valenciennes 
in a long-term transformation. Thirdly, a lack of local intervention has been a problem for the 
wider impact. In the case of Lens, despite being served by TGV, these local authorities lack 
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initiatives to capitalise on the opportunities presented by HST, so transformation effects are 
limited. But at least these vulnerable and weak sub-regions have been assisted by regional and 
national special missions over the years, focusing on a transformation in their attractiveness and 
capacity building over the long term.  
Lastly but not least, the comparative finding suggests the ignorance of intra-regional inequality 
may explain the worsening inter-regional inequality. No matter how conducive the national 
spatial-economic framework may seem, strong political leadership and the concern for poor 
sub-regions in reducing intra-regional inequality for a regional territory is very fundamental. The 
British case has demonstrated that the absence of strong regional government has led to a city-led 
approach on a city-regional scale for the best without a serious concern for a regional perspective. 
In contrast, the French case has displayed that a multi-level intervention in this opportunity is 
complicated but inclusive, which needs a long term to allow regional transformation to transpire.     
Nevertheless, despite the fact that government intervention is essential, genuine equilibrium 
appears difficult. As Hirschman (1958) reminds us, ―it is illusory to think that a balanced 
development is possible. Given the lumpiness of transport infrastructure projects, one will often 
have relatively long periods of excess supply or demand‖ (quoted in Rietveld, 1989, p.255). 
Similarly, Richardson reveals that ―even when peripheral regions have economically converged 
and achieved partial equilibrium, inter-regional growth differentials can persist‖ (Prestwich & 
Taylor, 1990, p.98). 
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10.1  Introduction  
 
It is time to conclude. This thesis has aimed to tease out the controversial relationship between 
HST investment and wider spatial-economic development. The main research question and three 
sub-research questions have been answered in the preceding chapters. This concluding chapter will 
first highlight concluding remarks in section 10.2, followed by a summary of detailed findings in 
section 10.3 and a short re-examination of research methods adopted and recommendation for 
future research in section 10.4, prior to a final thought in section 10.5.    
 
10.2  Concluding Remarks  
Within the wider context of a post-industrial society in which uneven inter- and intra-regional 
development has been pervasively widened. The arrival of HST offers a major opportunity to 
reshape uneven spatial-economic development, because once less prosperous places are served by 
HST, they could potentially attract businesses which value F2F (face-to-Face) contacts for tacit 
knowledge during their economic restructuring towards the knowledge economy. The research 
journey started by identifying the enduring debate and research gaps in the wider spatial-economic 
impact of HST and justifying the need to deepen our comprehension through (Aim 1) conducting 
new empirical research to gain hard evidence and (Aim 2) the adoption of a planning approach to 
unveil the significant role of government intervention.  
In the course of the research, a conceptual spatial-economic framework for HST in reducing 
regional inequality has been proposed. New empirical evidence has been produced through a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, based on the British experience of IC125/225 
and British-French comparative practice from the WCML modernisation and the TGV-Nord. The 
research culminated in generating a model of government intervention in seizing the opportunity 
of HST in the transformation process for regional development. The research findings significantly 
enrich the literature in this field, leading to the following three key concluding remarks.  
First, gains from the arrival of HST does not automatically and necessarily lead to losses 
elsewhere and the wider effects of HST for regional development need to be understood at least on 
two inter-related spatial scales. At the national level, the findings suggest that HST has had 
demonstrable and varied effects on cities within 1 hour and 2 hours from the capital city, thus 
helped to generate renewed economies. However, these effects have not been automatic or 
universal. 1-hour HST accessibility from the national capital could benefit from exploiting both 
commuting and economic functions, while 2-hour HST accessibility from the national capital 
could benefit mainly from exploiting economic functions. Beyond a 2-hour distance, the effect 
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appears weak (Here, the 1-hour or 2-hour classification could be slightly variant in specific 
contexts).  
At the regional level, the findings show that major regional cities have been reinforced by their 
HST hub position, but the effects have not been necessarily spread to surrounding sub-regions. 
Although there may be several sub-regions which are served by HST, in addition to their regional 
centre, the nature of HST systems tends to reinforce the inter-city connectivity. A distinction needs 
to be made between those sub-regions with direct HST services and those without. Hence, HST 
should well-integrate with urban and regional transport networks, so that a spatial-economic 
relationship between a regional centre and its hinterland could be fostered to produce and magnify 
the wider effects.  
Secondly, it is worth reiterating that transport alone is not sufficient to determine the wider effects 
in reducing regional inequality. HST is just the central piece of infrastructure in a comprehensive 
development package. In particular, path dependency is problematic for post-industrial places to 
easily adapt to HST opportunities, or even not to be peripheralised if bypassed by HST. 
Complementary measures are indispensable. Five conditions are found and highlighted to be vital, 
namely national political economy, constitutional capacity, planning priority and resources, city 
types and economic trajectory, and leadership and governance. In DATAR‘s latest publication 
(2013) on the territorial effect of HST, a vital message with a vivid analogue echoes the findings 
and arguments in this thesis: whether HST will have ―irrigation‖ or ―assèchement (dewatering)‖ 
effects essentially depends on interventionist approaches including the mobilisation of local actors 
and strategic policies for territorial development. 
Thirdly, one of major inherent challenges of carrying out a transport impact study is the net effect 
and causality. Since the nature of a developmental process is complex, dynamic and long-term. 
There is a need to emphasise synergetic measures which could lead to anticipated effects instead of 
discerning net effects.  
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10.3  Summary of Key Findings 
Detailed research findings to answer three sub-research questions are summarised below in order.  
Re-SRQ 1: What is the potential relationship between HST and the development of 
a knowledge economy?   
Following an extensive literature review, the first findings addressing SRQ1 were presented in 
Chapter 3 with a conceptual spatial-economic framework of HST in the era of the knowledge 
economy. The unprecedented time-space shrinkage of HST representing ―the second railway age‖ 
has continued to coexist with pervasive economic restructuring in major advanced industrial 
countries since the 1970s. The definition and the evolution of the knowledge economy were 
reviewed in section 3.2.2. Three major types of knowledge intensive activities were identified to 
discern changes in developing the knowledge economy over time, namely (1) financial and 
business services; (2) high-tech and medium-high tech manufacturing (science and technology); (3) 
cultural and creative industries. Then, the chapter moved to distinguish the locational 
characteristics of knowledge-intensive and routine-oriented activities and disentangle the cluster 
development through examining factors leading to both centralisation and decentralisation of 
spatial patterns. The driving forces for concentration include cost-productivity, social relationship, 
and innovation and creativity (section 3.4.2.1), whereas decentralisation forces are technology, 
investment in infrastructure, product-profit cycle, and other changes caused by public intervention 
(section 3.4.2.2). Despite this, economic restructuring towards the knowledge economy involves 
the diffusion of innovations which need both technological and socio-institutional conditions 
(section 3.2.1). Similarly, path dependence could hamper places from adapting to economic 
restructuring (section 3.4.2.3).      
The relationship between economic connection and dynamic spatial development has been 
demonstrated in the Polynet study (Hall and Pain, 2006) and the City Relationships study (The 
Northern Way, 2009a). These findings clearly show that market forces tend to favour 
agglomeration economies and thus increase uneven development. Government intervention in 
assisting the redistribution of spatial-economic functions is indispensable through improved 
transport connectivity and other interventionist policies. The wider impact of HST in reducing the 
regional inequality implies a two-sided feature at major transport hubs, highlighting the 
importance of transport connectivity and a need for two spatial scales in studying the wider impact 
of HST. This conceptual framework effectively directed the quantitative and qualitative data 
collection and analysis to answer SRQ2 (for Aim 1) and SRQ3 (for Aim 2). 
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Re-SRQ2: Whether and to what extent has HST accessibility boosted a knowledge 
economy and led to a reduction in regional inequality?  
SRQ2 is answered on two spatial scales (national and regional, or inter- and intra- regional) with 
quantitative findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respond to four hypotheses generated in section 
3.5.   
Firstly, the inter-regional impact of HST was reported in Chapter 4. In response to hypothesis 1 
and 2, the findings present varying effects on local economic strength and knowledge-intensive 
development not only between HST and non-HST serviced towns but also within HST towns. The 
potential time-space effects are illustrated with three train time zones, namely, one-hour, one-two 
hours, and over two-hours journey time. Within one hour of London, spillover effects appeared 
favourable in places with HST services. These were decentralised locations like Reading, Swindon 
and Peterborough. Non-HST towns such as Chelmsford, Colchester, Basingstoke, Winchester and 
Ashford largely showed an attraction to high-income commuters rather than economic 
decentralisation. Cambridge was the exception. Within two hours of London, different HST effects 
were present. Well-established regional capitals such as Bristol, Leeds and Cardiff revived from 
decline with a growth in high-GVA activities and aggregated highly knowledge-intensive 
industries; but there were exceptions. Doncaster and Newport, both old industrial towns, continued 
to suffer from path dependency. Non-HST towns were characterised by weaker economic 
performance, but Southampton and Bournemouth were exceptions because these places are within 
two-hours from London with a high-frequency train service and have established a long-lasting 
close economic relationship with London prior to the arrival of IC125/225. Beyond the two-hour 
limit, HST effects appear weak. Darlington, Swansea and Newcastle upon Tyne showed relative 
economic weakness, while Edinburgh, more than three hours from London by HST, displayed 
strong economic performance, along with a significant growth in air travel to London.  
Secondly, the intra-regional impact of HST was reported in Chapter 5. In response to hypotheses 3 
and 4, through a quantitative examination, the wider intra-regional impact of HST has proven to be 
challenging. The findings show both similarities and differences in this comparative study. The 
similarity is that the connection with the national capital by faster train services did economically 
strengthen both regional capitals (Manchester and Lille) in developing the knowledge economy, 
but not necessarily the sub-regions around them, especially former industrial sub-regions. On the 
other hand, there are three major differences between the two regions. Firstly, knowledge-intensive 
activities in Greater Manchester South have been the largest sector of employment since 2004, 
whereas in Lille Metropolis, although the growth in the knowledge economy has been apparent 
after the arrival of HSR, public services account for the largest part of the economic structure. 
Secondly, the intra-regional inequality was widened in NWE but reduced in NPDC. Thirdly, 
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although a big gap remains, the overall inter-regional disparity between NPDC and Île-de-France 
has been reduced, whereas the uneven regional development between NWE and London has 
actually widened. These variations strongly suggested that the wider impact of HST involves more 
than a HST connection and naturally lead to an in-depth qualitative study. 
Re-SRQ3: How could the impact of HST be spread as widely as possible throughout 
a region by government intervention, which could ultimately reduce regional 
inequality?   
The comparative study further delved into the in-depth qualitative study of the development 
process to answer SRQ3 on the strategic relationship between HST opportunities and multi-level 
government interventions. Prior to the in-depth empirical chapters in Chapter 7 and 8, Chapter 6 
reviewed both British and French government systems and planning approaches during the 1980s 
and 2000s to establish an analytical spatial-economic planning framework for local government 
interventions and suggest three critical national conditions (section 6.7). Firstly, regarding national 
political economy, British market-led ideology contrasted with the French state-led perspective, 
which was reinforced by a concern for equality (section 6.3.3). Thus, the opportunities presented 
by HST could be appreciated and realised better in France than in the UK (section 6.4). Secondly, 
government systems and their restructuring played a critical role in generating enabling or 
constraining conditions for planning and taking action at the local level. Although the UK and 
France are both unitary countries, over the same period of time, the UK had gone through a 
centralisation process with constraining conditions (section 6.5.2.1) while France had implemented 
a decentralisation process with enabling conditions (section 6.5.2.2). This suggests that the 
decentralised local government system in France appears to be more capable of generating 
appropriate tiers of government to enable competence than that of the UK. Thirdly, concerning 
national planning priority and resources, British private-, competition- and guidance-led approach 
(section 6.6.2.1) is in contrast with French public-, contractual-, and capacity-building-led 
approach (section 6.6.2.2). In addition, transport resources are more available for local levels in 
France than in the UK where transport resources have been largely controlled by the state. 
Therefore, the French planning approach appears to be more conducive than the British one for 
encouraging local intervention and achieving the wider impact as a result of HST.  
Chapter 7 presented the multi-level government interventions in the British case. Complying with 
a traditional central-local separate relationship, the modernisation of the WCML was a pure 
transport project, which was delayed and implemented under rail privatisation to solve the 
bottleneck problem at the national level. Based on a market-led approach, the WCML service 
pattern catered to better-off places and withdrew services from poor places. The prioritised 
capacity for the inter-city long distance service pattern has squeezed the capacity of intra-regional 
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services and reinforced regional inequality (section 7.2). The British national spatial-economic 
planning framework during the 1980s-2000s demonstrated a weak regional intervention from 
absence of regional government (1979-1997) to ineffective regional governance (1997-2010) and 
led to a city-led transformation process (section 7.3.1). At the sub-regional level, four varying 
local interventions were found closely associated with the central-local separate process with two 
different local conditions (political leadership and economic trajectory). This explains the 
re-centralisation of regional hegemony around Manchester (section 7.3.2.1) and a catch-up process 
in Liverpool and Merseyside (section 7.3.2.2). A lack of active intervention in the 
non-metropolitan HST sub-regions shows a stable, less strategic, and path-dependence process 
(section 7.3.2.3). For non-HST sub-regions, an arduous but frustrated process was persistent 
(section 7.3.2.4). There is little wonder that the intra-regional and inter-regional inequality had 
been widened.  
Chapter 8 next reported the multi-level government intervention in the French case. Under a 
state-led approach, the TGV-Nord line was regarded, beyond a pure perspective of transport, as a 
part of a long-term spatial-economic strategy and was strongly supported by the French central 
government (section 8.2). The osmotic central-local relationship has proven to be advantageous in 
influencing the national decision making process for local interests i.e. locating a major new HST 
station in Lille city centre, which was supported by collective regional consensus. At the regional 
level, with decentralised resources and responsibility, regional intervention critically exploited the 
TGV-Nord for regional development. It began to enable TGV services for a wider region (section 
8.3.1.1) and then significantly changed a Paris-oriented to a Lille-oriented TGV network with the 
introduction of TERGV services (section 8.3.1.2). In addition, it intervened to assist problematic 
sub-regions which did not actively take initiatives. At the sub-regional level, although various 
reforms presented an enabling approach for local intervention, negotiations between multi-level 
governments are always controversial, contested, and taking a long time to evolve and reach a step 
change. And the in-depth study of three economic zones demonstrates that local economic 
trajectory and political leadership and governance influenced the wider impacts of HST. Strong 
political leadership in Lille metropolis led to the creation of a HST transport hub in Lille city 
centre which has enabled Lille to develop the knowledge economy, diversify local economies and 
expanded wider territorial cooperation into an European metropolitan area, but it will take a long 
time to genuinely transform from a transport hub to a more knowledge-intensive hub (section 
8.3.2.1). Beyond Lille Metropolis, the wider effect of the TGV in these industrial sub-regions is 
less direct and apparent. The exception was Valenciennes which made a deliberate intervention in 
a tramway project alongside with urban regeneration projects. Dunkerque actively exploited HST 
and motorways, but the economic restructuring and physical transformation in its neglected urban 
centre takes a long time to show effects of the TGV (section 8.3.2.2). The absence of active 
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intervention in Lens leads to fragmentation and stagnation and is difficult to have the wider impact 
of the TGV without regional intervention (section 8.3.2.3).  
Chapter 9 brought together key conditions (section 9.2.1), exploring how HST investment was 
exploited by national and local interventions to reduce the regional inequality in the two regions 
(section 9.2.2) to answer the SRQ3 in the concluding remark (section 9.3). In the light of the 
comparative study, the resultant model of exploiting HST for reducing regional inequality can be 
further examined and applied to other contexts. Four aspects need to be taken into account. Firstly, 
a strong state-led approach with vision and concern for equality is fundamental. Secondly, a 
conducive/inclusive spatial-economic framework enables local governments to intervene and 
negotiate with local interests supported by constitutional responsibility and resources. Thirdly, the 
opportunity of HST should be exploited to reconstruct regional spatial-economic landscape with a 
hub strategy in regional major centres, with simultaneous intra-regional and sub-regional rail 
network linking with HST hubs. In addition, local interventions should combine transport and 
non-transport initiatives. Lastly, regional transformation is a long-term process, in particular for 
post-industrial regions. Local conditions vary with their city types, economic trajectories, 
leadership and governance. A regional consensus recognising the complementary relationship 
between centres and sub-centres is essential. In the absence of a regional apparatus, strong local 
authorities would need to expand outward to include weaker sub-regions first in order to avoid 
sub-regional rivalry, because less capable sub-regions need help. Otherwise, a struggle against 
path dependency in disadvantaged sub-regions will persist.  
 
10.4  Revisiting Research Methods and Recommendation for Future Research    
10.4.1  Revisiting Research Methods  
This thesis has embarked on a long-term impact study of British upgraded HST systems and a 
cross-county (UK-France) comparative case study. The inherent difficulty and weakness of this 
research in claiming causality, data availability, and comparability have been well-recognised and 
discussed at several places in Chapter 2, 4, and 5. Here, a brief summary is made. The difficulty, 
firstly, lies in the selection of a group of non-HST cities to be exactly equivalent to HST towns. 
Since HST towns largely enjoy major agglomeration economies in large settlements, they tend to 
have motorway accessibility so it appears difficult to claim causality. More than one line in each 
category is selected to give a better understanding. Secondly, due to the 30-year long term 
assessment of impact, harmonised data at the same geographical level through time was not 
available. The research methods are largely descriptive statistics by analysing several collected 
datasets with careful classification and due judgement rather than applying statistical modelling to 
interpret data. Although the findings are not absolutely clear-cut, the process of analysis involves a 
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certain degree of qualitative research which is useful in providing plausible explanations for the 
presented findings. Thirdly, the comparative study in two national contexts poses major challenge. 
Section 5.4.2 illustrates in more detail the issue of data comparability such as the definition of the 
NUTS 3 level which was different in the UK and France, so the key point is to ensure the 
consistency of the statistical data used for comparison among sub-regions within each context. 
Similarly, the strength of research methods adopted here should be emphasised. Firstly, it looks 
beyond a conventional way of conducting empirical studies (―before‖ and ―after‖, ―HST‖ and 
―non-HST‖ cities at the urban level). Instead, it traces the development process with more than two 
reference points in time if suitable, and looks at differential effects within each group. Secondly, 
the different spatial catchment or influence between HST and other urban transit systems is 
highlighted through two major studies on two interrelated scales. Thirdly, through in-depth 
interviews and policy analysis between two post-industrial regions in two countries respectively 
(the UK and France), this research has vividly unveiled how different spatial-economic planning 
systems have created enabling or restrained circumstances for public intervention to make possible 
changes during the process. In particular, varying central-local interactions led to differential 
achievements, difficulties and problems. In turn, the synthesised discussion explains the severe 
divergence of intra- and inter- regional inequality in the British case and the slow convergence of 
inequality in the French case.  
 
10.4.2  Future Work  
This thesis has made a step forward by providing new empirical evidence and focusing on the role 
of government intervention. In comparison with forecasting approaches based on modelling, there 
are still relatively few empirical impact studies of HST. More empirical evidence is needed for 
further comprehension. Here I list a few possible directions for future work in this field.  
 
1. Empirical research at the micro (firm) level based on a long-term perspective should be useful, 
as in Bonnoufous (1987). There could be a cross-national comparison over a long period of time. 
This type of research could provide critical insights into practical business location, agglomeration 
in relation to the opportunity offered by HST for technological breakthroughs and dynamism. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods could be applied to look at the other factors such as types of 
firms, the location of businesses and their relationship with rail and other transport modes, the 
reasons for relocation, the links between their branches and business partners, the link with public 
policy or other factors, the national difference or local contexts. Geographical and visualisation 
tools such as Arc-GIS could be applied to present the changed patterns of urban or regional 
settlement (forms) in addition to the statistical results.  
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2. Currently, varied impact and development processes for different HST station locations - e.g.   
inside or outside the city centre - have emerged as a symbol of good or bad decision-making, 
because those located outside have exhibited a slow property development process, in particular in 
western Europe. For most cases, this may be true. However, the type of development around the 
HST station is not necessarily and should not be treated uncritically in the same way as for a metro 
or LRT station. Some other issues such as the geography between a group of cities and the 
different development strategic process to serve a wider area should be taken into account. All 
these issues are worth exploring.  
 
3. Instead of trying to isolate the net effect of HST, investigating specific factors influential in 
relationship to territorial development should be emphasised. This will involve the development of 
a new tool of evaluating transport investment which could look beyond the traditional indicators 
used in traditional cost-benefit analysis. The issue is how the wider effects could be properly 
evaluated and applied over a wider territory within which the impact of HST could be induced, 
even though some of these effects are not necessarily taking place as an effect of using the 
infrastructure. More in-depth case studies would be beneficial. 
 
4. The development process closely involves multi-level transport governance and funding 
mechanisms. With wide implementation of rail reform, more and more rail authorities are not in 
the public sector. Privatization and rail reform have significantly changed transport policy, with 
critical consequences in exploiting HST for regional development, due to the interactions and 
negotiations among different perspectives and a need for cross-level intervention and integration. 
A planning approach, teasing out the relationships and concerns among these evolving transport 
authorities at different levels, could prove very insightful. 
 
5. A related issue, suggested by this thesis, is that the widespread perception of inter-regional 
inequality in the UK (i.e. the North-South divide) needs to be re-examined and disaggregated at 
the intra-regional scale, because there is a derived hypothesis from the empirical findings that 
ignorance of intra-regional inequality is responsible for inter-regional inequality.   
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10.5  A Final Thought  
 
HST involves a certain degree of disturbance to the existing environment (both urban and rural), 
which results in costly and sometimes controversial transport investment. This controversy is hard 
to avoid. The wider impact of HST on regional development is an inter-disciplinary subject. HST 
could play a role as a supply-led long-term strategy, but, at any rate, HST by itself will not be a 
sufficient condition for reducing regional inequality. The findings of this research take on 
importance for evidence-based policy, strategy, and decision-making. By the time of completing 
this thesis in early 2013, both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of HS2 had been announced and undergone 
initial stages of the long-term project. Regarding arguments for and against HS2, a timeline of 
developing the HS2 proposal, and the implications for HS2, more details are summarised and 
discussed in Appendices 22, 23, and 24.  
There is an acute dilemma at the heart of the HST controversy: the deep scepticism that HST can 
help lagging regions. This thesis urges a long-term planning perspective and the need for academic 
attention to look beyond traditional forecasting modelling and a single-scale investigation of 
empirical research. Active public policies and intervention are indispensable and should be devised 
to achieve this long-term vision of reducing regional inequality by HST. A closely relevant 
implication could be learnt from a recent review of LRT/ MRT impact by Feitelson and 
Rotem-Mindali (2014). They argue that  
―…This is often the case, as LRT and BRT systems are bundled with other measures as part of wider policy 
packages...Thus, while it may be possible to try and discern the net effect of transit systems on the urban and 
metropolitan structure, the utility of doing so can be questioned. As transit use is enhanced by coupling the improvement 
of such systems with complementary measures, its spatial effects are likely to be enhanced by the combination with 
synergic measures. The emphasis should thus be on identifying the synergic measures which will augment the desired 
effects on the urban structure rather than on discerning the net effects of LRT or BRT systems…‖   
 
Given the nature of dynamics and complexity in conjunction with transport connectivity, 
spatial-economic relationship and institutional governance, a new research dimension in the field 
of transport and development needs to emerge in order to advance the current state of debate.  
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Appendix 1: Semi-structured Questionnaire  
 
(For the British Case) 
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees  
 
(For the British Case)  
No. Title Name  Sector Role Date of 
interview 
1 Prof. Michael Hebbert Academia 
 
School of Environment and Development, 
University of Manchester 
14 Oct 2010 
2 Dr. Martin Hess Academia 
 
School of Environment and Development, 
University of Manchester 
15 Oct 2010 
3 Mr. Dave Whyte Public City team leader, City of Manchester 15 Oct 2010 
4 Prof. Brian Rubson Academia 
 
School of Environment and Development, 
University of Manchester 
15 Oct 2010 
5 Prof. Cecilia Wong Academia 
 
School of Environment and Development, 
University of Manchester 
15 Oct 2010 
6 Prof. Alan Harding Academia 
 
Director of IPEG, University of Manchester 18 Oct 2010 
7 Mr. Ian Wray QUANGO 
 
(Former)Chief planner,  North West Regional 
Development Agency 
19 Oct 2010 
8 Mr. Paul Hildreth Academia 
 
Visiting policy fellow, University of Salford 20 Oct 2010 
9 Mr. Chris Anslow Public Group manager of Public transport policy, 
Lancashire County Council 
20 Oct 2010 
10 Mr. Brian Cookson Public Regeneration director, Pendle Borough Council 25 Oct 2010 
11 Mr. John Crellin Public Planning manager, Preston City Council 26 Oct 2010 
12 Mr. Stephen Clark QUANGO Rail programme director, GMPTE 12 Nov 2010 
13 Mr. Darren Kirkman QUANGO GMPTE 12 Nov 2010 
14 Prof. Sir Peter Hall Academia Regeneration Professor,  University College 
London 
10 Feb 2011 
15 Mr. Chris Green Private 
 
Former CX of Virgin Trains 9 May 2011 
16 Mr. David Thrower Private Transport advisor to North West Business 
leadership team 
22June 2011 
17 Mr. Aidan Manley QUANGO 
 
Head operating office for the support team in 
Cheshire & Warrington LEP 
19 July 2011 
18 Mr. John Twigg Private Planning and Infrastructure director, Manchester 
Airport Group 
22 July 2011 
19 Prof. Andrew 
McNaughton 
QUANGO 
 
Chief Engineer, HS2 limited 20 July 2011 
20 Mr. David Bayliss Private An independent professional advisor 18 Jan 2012 
21 Mr. Ste Lingard QUANGO 
 
Director of Corporate, Regenerate Pennine 
Lancashire 
8 Feb 2012 
22 Prof. Michael 
Parkinson 
Academia Director of the European Institute for Urban Affairs, 
Liverpool John Moores University 
8 Feb 2012 
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(For the French Case)  
No. Title Name  Sector Role Date of interview 
1 Mr. Reg Harman  Private  Interfaces (consultancy) 15Nov 2010 
2 Mr. Thierry Baert Public  Head of international affairs, ADULM 17Nov 2010 
3 Prof. Didier Paris Academia Professor and Conseil de 
développement of Lille Metropole 
17Nov 2010 
4 Ms Anne-Sophie 
Legendre 
Public  Direction des transports service cellule 
d‟appui stratégique, NPDC 
18Nov 2010 
5 Dr. Alain L‟Hostis Public  Researcher, INRET 19Nov 2010 
6 Mr. Christophe 
Bartholeyns 
Public  Responsible pôle Aménagement du 
territoire, CCI  
19Nov 2010 
7 Prof. Philippe 
Menerault 
Academia Professor and director of 
L‟Aménagement et Urbanisme de Lille 
19Nov 2010 
8 Mr. Antoine Plard Public  Chargé de mission Plan de 
Déplacements Urbains , SITURV  
19Nov 2010 
9 Prof. Hugh Clout  Academia Professor in Department of Geography, 
UCL 
3 Dec 2010  
14 Prof. Philippe 
Marliere 
Academic Professor of French and European 
Politics at University College, London 
6 Jan 2011 
10 Mr. Michel Leboeuf Public  Head of Major Infrastructure Projects, 
Passenger Department, SNCF 
26May2011 
11 Mr. Nicholas 
Joncquel  
Public  Chargé de mission urbanisme/ mobilité 
référent Littoral Côte d‟Opale 
23 Jan 2012 
12 Mr. Yves Dhau 
Decuypere  
Public CEO Mission Bassin Minier Nord - Pas 
de Calais 
1 Mar 2012 
13 Ms Pauline  
CASSETTE  
Public Chargée de mission 
Transport-Déplacement, Mission 
Bassin Minier Nord - Pas de Calais 
1 Mar 2012 
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Appendix 3: Two Types of Agglomeration Economies 
 
Two forms of agglomeration economies (localisation and urbanisation economies) can be found in 
dynamic city-regional territory. Hoover (1937) highlights the distinction between the two in the 
era of manufacturing economy. Localisation economies denote ―all the firms in a single industry at 
a single location, consequent upon the enlargement of the total output of that industry at that 
location‖, while urbanisation economies account for ―all firms in all industries at a single location, 
consequent upon the enlargement of the total economic size (population, income, output, or wealth) 
of that location, for all industries taken together‖ (Hoover, 1937, pp. 90-91). In the era of the 
development of the knowledge economy, these two agglomerations co-exist, but their definitions 
and the relationship between the two need to be re-examined.  
    
Localisation economies 
 
As early as Alfred Marshall‘s time, localisation economies existed and were identified as similar 
or related small firms working together for a dominant industry in particular places such as steel 
industries around Sheffield or cotton industries around Manchester. Manchester served as the 
commercial hub of a production system built on the cotton industry, which was operated in an 
interwoven network and experienced ―a unique synergy‖ (P. Hall, 1998, p. 344) between the core 
city and its surrounding towns. 
 
The discourse of a ―new industrial district‖ (Best, 1990; Goodman & Bamford, 1989; Scott, 1988a, 
1988c) emerged as a new concept inspired by regional industrial development in the 
Emilio-Romagna region of Italy under economic crises and uncertainty and the rise of technology 
based production zones in the USA and elsewhere (Hutton, 2008, p. 50). The key concept is that 
small, innovative firms enhance regional economic growth through highly cooperative and 
collaborated networks, which allowed them to adapt, flourish and expand into a mature industry 
(Hutton, 2008; Markusen, 1996). Storper and Walker describe the ―dematurity of an industry‖ and 
argue ―[i]ndustries can be renewed through dramatic product modifications, revolutions in 
production methods, or complete reorganisations‖ (Storper & Walker, 1989, p. 91). Similarly, 
―flexible specialisation‖ (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Storper & Christopherson, 1987) parallels the 
concept of ―new industrial district‖ and it is argued that the economic crises in the 1970s stemmed 
from dependence on the mass production of standardised goods by semi-skilled workers (Piore & 
Sabel, 1984, p. 4). When the situation turned to become unknown and unstable, stable mass 
production was unable to precisely fit the dynamic situation (Storper & Christopherson, 1987, p. 
105).  
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Through the study of industrial districts in Brazil, Japan and the US, Markusen (1996) classifies 
alternative types of industrial districts as ‗sticky places‘, defining that an industrial district is ‗a 
sizable and spatially delimited area of trade-oriented economic activity which has a distinctive 
economic specialisation, be it resource-related, manufacturing, or services‘ (Markusen, 1996, p. 
296). The criteria for this classification centres on firm size, interconnections and internal versus 
external orientations; she identifies four types. In addition to the Marshallian industrial districts 
and its variant: the ‗new industrial district‘ or ‗flexible specification‘, the three other types are (1) a 
hub-and-spoke industrial district, (2) a satellite platform district, and (3) the state-anchored district. 
A hub-and-spoke industrial district indicates the regional industrial structure hinges on one or 
more chief vertically integrated firm in one or more sectors, surrounded by smaller and less 
powerful suppliers. A satellite platform district is a congregation of unconnected branch plants 
within the region, embedded in external organisation links. These districts are often assembled at a 
distance from major conurbation initiated by entrepreneurial governments to trigger regional 
development outside the centres by offering attractive incentives to lower business costs. The 
state-anchored district focuses on the regional economy which is anchored by one or more public 
sector institutions, such as a capital city, a key military installation (see Markusen, Hall, Campbell, 
& Deitrick, 1991), research facilities, or public corporations. Markusen (1996) stresses these four 
types of industrial districts are not fixed; rather, they might evolve or mutate from one to another, 
concluding that the success of industrial districts should not only focus on local institutions and 
behaviours because sticky places are complex products of multiple forces: corporate strategies, 
industrial structures, profit cycles, state priorities and local and national politics. Both cooperation 
and competitiveness are essential to their commitment and success.      
 
However, Malmberg and Maskell (2002) argue that cooperative and complementary relationships 
within localisation economies have been very much adopted, while competitive relationships seem 
to be relatively ignored. They state that there are two types of agglomeration process in localised 
economies, namely horizontal (similar) and vertical (complementary), but the horizontal process of 
agglomeration has been largely ignored and should be distinguished from the vertical process. 
They maintain that knowledge spillover should not merely concern specialisation, interaction, 
exchange, coordination and collaboration between complementary firms (the vertical process); 
rather, variation, observation, comparison, selection and rivalry between similar firms (the 
horizontal process) are equally important. Malmberg and Maskell (2002) opine that co-located 
firms that are similar could be observed to establish the small differences in the solutions they 
choose. Hence, within localisation economies, it is reasonable to suggest that similar industries 
have a greater need to be in close spatial proximity than complementary industries because, 
regarding complementary functions, F2F is crucial, but does not demand the degree of spatial 
proximity for close observation.  
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However, the spatial scale for localisation economies is problematic. Malmberg and Maskell (2002) 
argue that the definitions of ‗local‘ and ‗regional‘ are extremely elastic and they are often used as 
synonyms in the literature. Furthermore, ‗local‘ could indicate several geographical scales 
including a local neighbourhood (a street, a block in the city), a city, an entire nation, or a group of 
nations (such as a core area of heavy industrialisation during the 19th century). Since it is not 
possible to precisely define a specific geographical scale for agglomeration economies, they 
suggest that it is reasonable to allow the scale to vary in accordance with the type of analysis. 
 
Urbanisation economies 
 
Urbanisation economies entail the collocation of diverse industries in a parasitic relation. Even 
though Hoover (1937) obeys the neo-classical tradition, namely citing cost as the main criterion 
for agglomeration, he discerns the difference between ‗transfer cost‘ and ‗production cost‘ for 
industries. He goes into greater detail than Weber‘s (1929) main focus of transfer cost (distance) 
due to awareness of the effect of locational factors on different types of industries such as those 
that are market-oriented, labour-oriented or material-oriented. The principle is that high land value 
in the city centres stimulates the de-urbanisation of manufacturing industries, which demand large 
spaces rather than urban locations to develop specialised centres of production. Therefore, cities 
attract market- and labour-oriented industries which benefit from flexibility and a diversified 
labour supply, despite the high operating costs. 
 
In the trajectory of economic restructuring towards a knowledge economy, urbanisation economies 
have placed more emphasis on the increasing concentration of the diversity and knowledge 
intensity of economic activities in large cities. Jacobs (1969) argues ―urban diversity is central to 
certain kinds of economic creativity because of specific advantages of unplanned and haphazard, 
inter-network contact‖ (quoted from Storper & Venables, 2004, p. 365). In the work of Four World 
Cities (Llewelyn Davies Planning, 1996), four groups of advanced service industries were 
identified by their co-location in large world cities where cross-fertilisation takes place, not only 
among these driving sectors, but also ancillary industries. The four groups of advanced service 
industries include: (1) finance and business services (banking, fund management, securities and 
insurance); (2) power and influence (government, headquarters, trade associations and 
international agencies); (3) creative and cultural industries (fashion, design, publishing, film/ TV, 
music and the arts); (4) tourism (hotels, visitor attractions and entertainment).  
 
Furthermore, knowledge production and strong networks between key sectors are evident. Storper 
and Venables (2004) use ―Buzz‖ to stress that the close interaction between high technology and 
government gave rise to a major high-technology region in Washington DC; similarly, 
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cross-fertilisation between design/entertainment/communication is found in New York, Los 
Angeles, London and Paris, and there is also a network between higher education, finance and 
government. Similarly, important linkages between inner city clusters and other agglomerations 
within a metropolis contribute to regional growth and development (Hutton, 2004a). Two primary 
sets of flows operate from new inner city production spaces: inward (or ‗centripetal‘) linkages to 
corporate clients within proximate CBD and ‗centrifugal‘ connections between subcontracting 
firms in the inner cities and major advanced technology corporations on the urban periphery. 
These inward flows can be illustrated by the exchange of information and services between firms 
in London‘s City fringe and corporations in the City proper, while the centrifugal flow could refer 
to the growth impetus for software developers and Internet providers to the south of the Market 
Area of San Francisco, in association with their subcontracts for large corporations in Silicon 
Valley (Hutton, 2004a, p. 100).  
 
Three of the four economic sectors in ―buzz cities‖ (Storper & Venables, 2004) are highlighted by 
Llewelyn Davies Planning (1996), and the only different aspect is the identification of localised 
economies such as ―science, technology and high technology, and research‖ in urbanisation 
economies (Acz, 2002; Darby and Zucker, 2002 Storper & Venables, 2004, p. 365). The difference 
could be explained by the matter of scales. If the scale zooms into the core city centre, this 
economic group of ―science, technology and high technology, and research‖ is not necessarily 
situated within it. But as soon as the scale zooms out, that group of economic activities is evidently 
located within a wider city-regional territory, particularly in the case of large R&D institutions. A 
typical example is Silicon Valley, which was initially founded in Santa Clara Valley between San 
Jose and Palo Alto by venture capital, using knowledge of R&D from the university and scientific 
infrastructure of the area. Rather than being confined in a large city centre, it thrives in a place 
which possesses three key features: ―the general atmosphere of scientific excitement and advance‖, 
an agreeable physical and social environment, and external economies of agglomeration (P. Hall, 
1985). Meanwhile, it is located within the wider mega-city region of the San Francisco Bay Area, 
within one hour by car to and from UC Berkeley University on the east side of the bay and the 
large metropolitan city San Francisco.      
    
The relationship between localisation and urbanisation economies  
 
In order to distinguish clearly the features of the knowledge economy, the diagram below suggests 
the evolution of agglomeration economies via two different models. In Hoover‘s time, based on 
the demand-supply relationship of dealing with ―goods‖, urbanisation economies represent a major 
cluster for consumption activities, while localisation economies focused on production activities. 
Both were separately situated. Hoover (1937) suggests that, in urbanisation economies, the 
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concentration of one primary industry would give rise to a subsidiary concentration of dependent 
industries. Several kinds of relationship exist between primary and dependent industries, such as 
suppliers (dependent)-consumers (primary) or vice versa. The dependent industries might be 
located within or outside the city to carry out the linkages. As Hoover (1937) observes, in some 
cases the auxiliary growth to the primary industry in the city is an important element for 
localisation economies. But, in his discourse, localisation economies of shoe and leather 
manufacturing are separated physically from urbanisation economies, but still have industrial 
linkages between the two (referring to the left hand side of the diagram below).  
 
Diagram- The evolution of agglomeration economies (localisation and urbanisation economies)  
 
In contrast with the separation of production and consumption functions in the era of the 
manufacturing economy, large cities contain both consumption and production functions in the era 
of the knowledge economy. Each knowledge intensive economic activity identified in section 3.3 
is actually a form of localisation economy consisting of similar and related industries producing 
immaterial knowledge or vital information nearby. Localisation economies are literally located 
within urbanisation economies, forming a larger urban milieu rather than being separate from one 
another. A shared pool of ancillary industries co-exists as shared resources for these knowledge 
intensive sectors to support both production (accounting, law, marketing, advertising and media) 
and consumption (restaurants, retail, tourism and entertainment) functions. Take financial and 
business services, for example; the increasing globalisation, digitalisation and liquefying of 
illiquid assets provokes innovations in the financial industry, enhanced by coordination with other 
supporting producer services such as legal services, accounting, software design, insurance and 
others (Sassen, 2001, p. 112). In the city of London, the agglomeration of large banks, insurance 
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and law companies in physical proximity is evidently important to enable F2F contact and 
relationship-building (Cook, Pandit, Beaverstock, Taylor, & Pain, 2007, p. 1341). Overall, an 
increasingly sophisticated division of labour (Mensch, 1975; Scott, 1988b) produces specialised 
innovative activities clustered in different locations. In contrast, manufacturing and routine 
activities like clerical processing, routine sales and convenience shopping have decentralised from 
them (P. Hall, 2006; P. Hall & Pain, 2006; Llewelyn Davies Planning, 1996). 
 377 
 
Appendix 4: British Transport Networks and 
Passenger Traffic 1900-2007 
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Appendix 5: Travel-to-Work by Distance (1981-2001) 
Part 1 
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Appendix 6: Travel-to-Work by Distance (1981-2001) 
Part 2 
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Appendix 7: Travel-to-Work by Transport modes 
(1981-2001) at Residence Place 
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Appendix 8: Travel-to-Work by Transport modes 
(1991 & 2001) at Workplace  
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Appendix 9: Employment around Rail Stations at 
Workplace (1981, 1991) - Part1 
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Appendix 10: Employment around Rail Stations at 
Workplace (1981, 1991) - Part 2 
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Appendix 11: Changes in population density around 
stations at residence place (1971, 1981, 1991, 2001) 
 
Part 1 
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Appendix 12: Changes in population density around 
stations (0.5km, 1km, entire LA) at residence place 
(1981, 1991, 2001) 
 
Part 2 
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Appendix 13: Average Distance Travelled by Surface 
Rail and Purpose (Part 1) 
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Appendix 14: Average Distance Travelled by Surface 
Rail and Purpose (Part 2) 
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Appendix 15: Defining Unit of Analysis for the 
Comparative Case Study 
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Appendix 16: Post-war Capitalism in Western Europe 
(Germany and Sweden)  
 
Post-war capitalism in Germany   
Unlike the UK and France as a unitary state, after WW2, the territory of Germany was divided into 
several Länder (states) and a federal government was formed. Large enterprises and banks were 
split into smaller versions. Regarding management of the economy, the power of the state was 
deliberately weakened. This effort was consciously made by the Minister of Economics at the time, 
Dr. Erhard, who envisaged economic liberalism as a way of limiting the overweening power of the 
state and thus future economic activities could be kept small, divided and competitive (Shonfield, 
1965).             
Despite the intention to develop a system of liberal capitalism, historical characteristics and 
trajectory determined the unique German model. As BBC reporter Steve Rosenberg was informed 
by German economist Ralph Brugelmann: "There's definitely something in our history and 
philosophy that makes us Germans demand more regulation" (Rosenberg, 2009). Shonfield (1965) 
argues that the most striking characteristics were the overwhelming instinct to centralise economic 
decisions based on four key elements underlying a well-organised industrial system. Firstly, the 
country has hierarchical industrial associations dating back from imperial Germany. Secondly, it 
has well-established industrial collaboration. Industrial associations traditionally play a critical 
public role in managing the long-term interests of national industries and guiding the consensus of 
industrial decisions. Thirdly, commercial banks play a very important role in the centralisation of 
economic decisions with a close relationship between banks and their industrial clients through the 
representation of bankers on the supervisory board of important businesses. Fourthly, industrial 
collaboration is further encouraged by powerful trade associations in certain industries, which are 
given an unusual consultative status with regard to general practices in governmental ministries in 
the German constitution. From the government‘s side, the arrival and the operation of Marshall 
Aid led to a model which was characterised by the collaboration between public authorities and 
banks in leading and implementing national investment planning and the development of a modern 
system of public finance. A special institution, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction 
Loan Corporation, hereafter as KfW), was created to be a ―banker‘s bank‖, namely a source of 
extra funds in addition to the resources of commercial banks. This type of public enterprise played 
a critical role as an adjunct of national economic policy, in particular with regard to those 
economic activities which were overseen by commercial banks and areas requiring special 
assistance under the government‘s regional development schemes (Shonfield, 1965).  
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Post-war capitalism in Sweden   
Due to their late industrialisation processes, Sweden and other continental European countries 
avoided the rapid industrialisation process that occurred in Britain and which brought about a 
widespread industrial urbanisation pattern; instead, Sweden attracted capital investment from large 
firms and experienced a highly efficient industrial process (P. Hall, 1998). Although Sweden is 
classified in the same category of Rhineland model as Germany, its complete welfare state model 
is the best example in the world. Unlike three key elements in the German model, namely trade 
associations, banks and the state, the Swedish model put the industrial unions (workers), 
employers and a social democratic government as its core of operations, which achieved a three 
decade period of post-war prosperity. As Hall notes, its originality was such that ―its political 
leaders and its business elite and its bureaucrats constituted a very coherent group…tried to create 
a different kind of society‖ (P. Hall, 1998, p.842). Most importantly, cultural and historical drivers 
determined its direction. Hall (1998) stresses that the national characteristics of Swedish society 
are: collectivity, equality, people‘s homes and caring for the weak.  
The first critical element is the honourable actions of the social-democratic party government, 
which are rooted in the policy of full employment, which Shonfield calls ―manpower planning‖ 
(Shonfield, 1965, p.199). The Swedish government rejected total socialisation and realised there is 
no necessary causality between the nationalisation of industries and the management of a capitalist 
economy. Instead, the focus of national economic policy is on the full use of the labour force, 
namely an ―Active Manpower policy‖, ―how to increase its size, how to improve its quality, how 
to achieve its more rapid deployment in response to changing needs‖ (Shonfield, 1965, p.201). 
Two measures were implemented to achieve this goal. First of all, an important agreement was 
signed in 1938 between industrial unions and employers. Secondly, an annual bargain regarding 
the level of the national wage was conducted (P. Hall, 1998).  Meanwhile, many active social 
welfare policies were implemented, such as social security programmes, housing benefits, social 
benefits, housing loans, etc. The role of the government was characterised by an active search for 
consensus, which was regarded as a preliminary to any important action through an extended 
dialogue between experts from a variety of bodies. Despite unavoidable compromise among these 
different bodies, Shonfield stresses that the Swedish government managed to ―act in a decisive 
fashion when circumstances require it‖ with innovative policies which ―boldly lead, rather than 
follow public opinion‖ (Shonfield, 1965, p. 200).  
The second key element is employers. Apart from agreement with the industrial unions, the 
government introduced a policy of tax exempt investment funds. The tax could be used for further 
investment in businesses. The employers would not tend to squeeze the workers‘ wages for their 
business as a result. ―Firms which make good profits in times of boom are given the opportunity of 
avoiding tax on them if the money is frozen in a special reserve fund, to be used later for 
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investments whose content and timing have been approved by the authorities‖ (Shonfield, 1965, 
p.202).   
The third key element is industrial unions and workers. Unlike elsewhere, where the trade unions 
were acting largely as followers and resisters, a trade union movement in Sweden made a 
significant intellectual contribution to the development of the system. Shonfield argues that the 
leaders of the trade unions seem to actively adapt their doctrines to the social needs of a mixed 
economy of the modern capitalist type. Another reason was political; ―The circumstance of having 
its allies in the socialist party running the government at the same time favoured the effort‖ 
(Shonfield, 1965, p. 200). For the workers, wage bargaining enabled wages to be increased for 
low-paid workers and social wages to be subsidised; this therefore reduced the requests for wages 
from the employees.   
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Appendix 17: National Styles of Transport 
Investment and HST Approaches in Western 
Europe (Germany and Spain)  
 
The UK and France are illustrated as the main content of the thesis. Here two other major 
countries in Western Europe are explored: Germany and Spain.    
Germany  
 
Germany’s style of transport investment   
With the pressures of economic crises and external forces, Germany was not an exception to 
privatisation and deregulation measures. Widespread privatisation took place step by step (Streeck, 
2009), but was introduced a little late in the early 1990s (Schmidt, 2002). Despite these continuous 
pressures, Article 72 of the Basic Law which emphasises the value of ―the uniformity of living 
conditions‖ over the whole state territory plays an important part in justifying the role of the 
federal government (T. Marshall, 2010). The German federal government manages to maintain 
central decision making power with regard to inter-regional transport accessibility, including roads, 
railways and waterways.   
Privatisation in 1994 converted the national rail sector from a governmental institution to a private 
company, Deutsche Bahn (DB), which is still 100% owned by the federal government and receives 
massive subsidies from the federal and regional governments for running rail services and 
managing rail infrastructure (T. Marshall, 2010). Unlike France and Spain, which divided 
infrastructure and train operation into two separate companies, the German federal state retains 
overall control and responsibility under Deutsch Bahn AG. This incorporates DB Reise & 
Touristik which is responsible for all long distance passenger services and DB Netz for all 
infrastructure, despite the fact that the operation of some local and regional services has been 
outsourced to private sectors (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004).  
From the 1990s onwards, although ownership of DB is still held by the federal state and the 
investment plan, the changed character of DB as a private company resulted in a shift of focus to a 
business mentality that maximises profit and minimises costs with expanded markets. Firstly, since 
1994, 455 stations have been closed and the rail network has reduced from 42,787 to 33,896 km. 
Secondly, domestic rail investment has been neglected due to the expansion of global logistics 
ownership. Rail operation only accounts for 40% of its turnover (cited in T. Marshall, 2010). Also, 
it was reported that a lack of investment by the state-owned enterprise was responsible for the 
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winter maintenance problems of Berlin‘s commuter services, which could not exceed 60kph (The 
Economist, 2011).  
The financial crises in 2008 suspended a further plan for radical privatisation. Despite privatisation 
still being listed on the government‘s agenda, the implementation of privatisation has been 
controversial. The German Transport Minister, Peter Ramsauer, publicly voiced his doubt over 
privatisation of DB. ―Privatisation at every cost often proves to be the wrong path‖ because 
―Deutsche Bahn has a societal duty to guarantee standards of rail traffic.‖ Thus, the federal 
government was determined to invest in transport infrastructure. In 2011, investment in the railway 
was promised to be €3.9 billion ($5.2 billion), roughly the equivalent of its annual revenue (The 
Economist, 2011). A managed capitalism model through coordination and negotiation still 
maintains this balance, despite emerging pressure from competitive federalism (T. Marshall, 
2010).  
Furthermore, the commercial priorities of DB has stirred doubts regarding its negligence of wider 
social needs and long-term strategies, which has resulted in conflicting ideology between DB and 
the federal transport ministry. For instance, a route between Leipzig to Nürnberg was regarded as 
important by planners, but not by DB due to poor returns (T. Marshall, 2010). Similarly, Engartner 
criticises that DB tends to serve major corridors rather than linking up other cities, which do not fit 
the geographical features of Germany- a wide scatter of urbanisation (cited in T. Marshall, 2000). 
Improving the situation without a coherent overall transport strategy at the national level is a 
dilemma. As Marshall (2010) opines ―the government fails to make a coherent overall transport 
strategy, and DB pursues its own, not public interests. The failure is double sided and systemic‖ (T. 
Marshall 2010, p.36).  
 
The development of an HST network 
Second to France, work on the first German new HST line between Hannover and Würzburg (327 
km) launched in 1973 and it opened in sections between 1988 and 1991. Around the same time, 
the second new HST between Mannheim and Stuttgart (100 km) opened between 1987 and 1991. 
After the reunification in 1990, the Berlin-Hannover line (258 km), which was prioritised over the 
Cologne-Frankfurt (177 km) line, operated in 1998 and was followed by the Cologne-Frankfurt 
line which opened in 2002.  
HST development in Germany has gone through three major stages. According to German federal 
transport plans (Bundesverkehrswegeplan, hereafter BVWP), in the 1970s (1973 BVWP) when the 
division of West and East Germany remained, a north-south oriented network was proposed. The 
aim was to tackle the congestion problem on the conventional rail line through 2,225 km of new 
lines up to 300 kph and 1,250km of upgraded lines up to 200 kph (Ebeling, 2005). The 
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Hannover-Wurzburg, Mannheim-Stuttgart and Cologne-Frankfurt lines were originally proposed. 
In the 1980s (1985 BVWP), the focus shifted to competition between rail and air. The commercial 
concept was ―half as fast as an aeroplane - twice as fast as the car‖ (Ebeling, 2005, p.42). In the 
1990s (1992 BVWP), the reunification of Germany brought about significant geographical 
changes and political consideration. The role of the federal government was important to rebalance 
the uneven development, which was an overall benefit for all the citizens in Germany. As Schmidt 
argues, the poorer Länder in the north outnumbered the richer Länder in the south, which gave the 
federal government space to manoeuvre (cited in T. Marshall, 2010). The classic example is the 
aforementioned priority of the Berlin-Hannover line over the Cologne-Frankfurt line.  
 
The HST approach: Existing quality, geography, assessment   
Investment in the HST network has been continuous since the 1970s. It could be argued this is due 
to three major reasons. Firstly, there is a systematic need for investment. The original railway 
construction in the 19th century was built without sustainable quality. ―In mainland Europe most 
railways were built more cheaply, with far sharper curves and frequent at-grade crossings that 
severely limited operating speeds‖ (P. Hall, 2009b, p.60). Secondly, WW2 caused severe damage 
to the railway network, which needed comprehensive investment to fix (Ebeling, 2005). Thirdly, 
evaluation of the HST investment was applied using a multi-criteria method. In addition to 
traditional CBA, the evaluation of HST investment encompasses spatial and environmental 
impacts. These three aspects constitute the major appraisal for the BVWP investment. The 
consideration of spatial and environmental multi-criteria analysis avoids the neglect of potential 
impacts which could not be quantified and given a monetary value during the decision making 
process (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). As Rothengatter (2005) opines ―the treatment of the spatial 
and environmental elements shows that the German method is on the way to a more system-based 
analysis. The interdependence analysis for interrelated projects also tends in this direction‖ 
(Rothengatter, 2005, p.33).  
But the style of investment has been implemented in a piecemeal manner through point-to-point 
sections of lines using a combination of two approaches: upgrading lines and building new lines. 
This pattern could be attributed to urbanisation. Germany‘s geographical characteristics of 
urbanisation and dense population have critically determined how the HST network should be 
developed and how HST serves the territory. No single city has a dominant position over other 
cities. Instead, there are a number of competitive city-regions with populations of more than half a 
million inhabitants such as Hamburg, Munich, Berlin, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Stuttgart 
and Hannover. Only three cities have a population of more than one million (Berlin, Hamburg and 
Munich) and only one of these (Berlin) has a population of more than two million. In addition, the 
German urban distribution is presented in a scattered form. Between these major cities, there are 
several vital small and medium sized cities along the corridors (Knapp, Scherhag, & Schmitt, 2006, 
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p.154). As a result, long distance trains need to make multiple stops to serve the potential market 
and this tends to increase journey times. The high-speed train between Munich and Hamburg 
makes a minimum of seven intermediate stops (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). 
 
The decision-making process 
Despite the fact that HST investment has been strongly supported and promoted by the public and 
politicians (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004), its decision making process demands longer negotiation 
and discussion involving many stakeholders, due to the nature of the federal system. Traditionally 
German was a country with several states until the unification of the national state by Otto von 
Bismarck in 1871. Knapp et al. (2006) argue that several trade relationships forged in the Middle 
Ages and the decentralisation of the federal system of government follow this pattern. At the same 
time, the German federal system has three fundamental political levels in Germany, namely federal, 
region (Länder) and community. With the nature of the federal political system, decision-making 
power is largely decentralised to the hands of the regional government (Länder) in Germany. Since 
the federal government holds the power to make major decisions, there is a distinctive feature of 
the German decision making model, which involves the establishment of consensus among all 
stakeholders including different government levels, political parties, NGO groups and local 
communities etc. (T. Marshall, 2010). Pressure groups in Germany have been influential in public 
policies since the rise of environmental groups in the 1970s. In 1987, the Green Party became the 
3rd largest political party (Banister, 1994). Therefore, the decision making process of a federal 
transport master plan requires the participation of all three levels and thus needs a great deal of 
time before a plan can be finalised. In addition, the issues raised by stakeholders (land owners and 
even citizens) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could further lengthen the whole 
process (Rothengatter, 2005). 
 
Spain 
 
Spain’s styles of transport investment  
When other countries reduced their public investment and ownership in transport sectors in 
response to economic crises and market forces in the 1980s, Spain showed little inclination to 
follow that direction. Instead, the role of government intervention has been maintained and 
enhanced. ―The composite state of centre and regions together retains public control of some of the 
main infrastructure levers, often through public ownership‖ (T. Marshall, 2009c, p.540). The 
strong role of the state in transport provision has historical origins stretching back three hundred 
years ago. In the early 18
th
 century, after the War of Succession of Felipe V, Spain adopted French 
models in building the country and attempted to construct a capital like Paris (Bel, 2011). Bel 
(2011) examined the trajectory of transport infrastructure development in Spain from 1720 to 2010 
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and argues that Spanish transport infrastructural policies were developed to maintain the national 
control of territory (road building in the 18
th
 century, railway creation and building in the 19
th
 
century, motorway expansion in the 20
th
 century and high-speed train development in the 21
st
 
century).  
The state-led intervention in transport investment has its origins in three aspects, namely assisting 
the development of tourism, the geographical position in the EU context and beyond, and 
achieving economic convergence among the EU countries. Firstly, tourism plays a key role in the 
Spanish economy with around 11% of GDP and 13% of employment in this sector; such figures 
are the highest among OECD and non-OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Spain, only second to 
France, has stabilised its status as a popular destination for tourists. In 2008, there were 97.8 
million foreign visitors and tourism receipts of nearly €41.9 billion (OECD, 2010). Secondly, the 
linkage of the Spanish national transport network to the Trans-European Transport Network was 
regarded as a strategic priority for Spain. In the state‘s view, ―our location as a peripheral country 
makes access to central European markets more difficult and makes transport less competitive; the 
economic importance of tourism means that Spain requires good transport links; and our location 
on the southern borders of the European Union makes us a transit country for the Maghreb region‖ 
(Izquierdo, 2005, p.55). Thirdly, the catch-up resolution by the state fuelled the development of 
transport infrastructure in Spain. As Spanish scholar Rafael Izquierdo states, ―[I]nfrastructure has 
now become a major tool of economic policy. For Spain, the main objectives of that policy today 
are to achieve real convergence with our most developed community partners and full employment, 
making up the historic lags in infrastructure construction which have accumulated over the years‖ 
(Izquierdo, 2005, p.46).  
From the 1980s onwards, strong government intervention in transport investment has been clearly 
demonstrated. In 1982, when the socialist party came into power, a model of budgetary finance 
was implemented to build new motorways planned in the General Road Plan (PGC) from 1984 to 
1991. This model was in contrast with the model for constructing toll roads in the 1960s. It was 
argued that high taxes in Spain and available funding from the EEC were the two main reasons for 
this change (Bel, 2011). As a result, a massive expansion of the motorway network was achieved 
in 1993. A length of 3,045km of PGC toll-free motorways radiating from Madrid was completed.    
A change in financial models with regard to developing transport infrastructure came inevitably in 
the late 1990s, but the state managed to retain its dominance in these developments in compliance 
with EU criteria and the progressive construction of the transport network. On the one hand, this 
large-scale transport investment gave rise to a deepened budget deficit, which violated the 
regulation of the EU and forced Spain to change its financial model of transport infrastructure in 
1996 for concession models to replace the budget-financed model. On the other hand, the 
implementation of this new approach involved the creation and development of public corporate 
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bodies financed by the state or other financial resources and encouraged the participation of the 
private sector. By offering a diverse and flexible financial mechanism, the infrastructure master 
plan was expected to be implemented efficiently with greater private involvement (Izquierdo, 
2005). A new Public Works Concession Contract Regulatory Act came into force in 2003, which 
amended the concession model introduced in 1996 and emphasised the inclusion of diverse 
funding methods, namely expanding the wide range of approaches to public financing and joint 
public-private financing, the revenue from additional commercial or industrial activities, etc. The 
improvement in the financial mechanism and contracting methods appeared to speed up the 
implementation of the national infrastructure plan. Izquierdo (2005) shows the plan was 7% ahead 
of schedule as the result of the reform.  
Despite flexible financial mechanisms in transport investment with private participation, 
governments still largely owned and managed the majority of the airport market and rail network. 
In the railway sector, compliant with European law and similar to the French and German models, 
the separation of train services and infrastructure was maintained. RENFE is the national rail 
passenger operator and is a state-owned company, controlled by the ministry of public works 
(Ministerio de Fomento). ADIF took over all of Spain‘s rail infrastructure (Steer Davies Gleave, 
2004).  In addition to RENFE, there are other rail operators; only FEVE runs long distance 
journey. Regional rail services vary within different regions and are different from national rail 
systems.   
 
The development of the HST network 
The development of the high-speed train (AVE) network began in 1986. The Spanish government 
decided to build the first high-speed train line of 293 miles (472km), designed to run at speeds of 
300 kph to bring down rail travel time to two hours and 20 minutes between Madrid and Seville in 
1992, ready for the opening of the World Expo in Seville.  
The first AVE line has been successful and popular in terms of both transport and economic 
effects. ―Journey times are about 60% less than via the old line, and 99.8% of trains arrive within 
three minutes of their scheduled arrival time (the corresponding figure for UK InterCity trains is 
70% within 10 minutes)‖ (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004).  The first success led to growing public 
and political pressure, as all the remaining regional governments wanted to be connected to the 
network (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). The expansion of the AVE network gathered rapid pace.  
The second HST line eastbound opened in 2003 between Madrid and Lleida, totalling 291 miles. 
In 2008, AVE arrived in Barcelona from Madrid in two hours and 30 minutes over a distance of 
621 km. In 2010, Valencia was connected to Madrid by AVE; over 391 km can be travelled in 95 
minutes. In 2010, the cross-border line Perpignan–Figueres was completed. A through route from 
Barcelona to Perpignan was expected to open in 2012. The overall HST network has reached 2,665 
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km, and became the largest network in Europe in terms of length at the end of 2010 (Bel, 2011). 
However, despite the fast development of the network, the usage of HST is relatively low. HST 
passengers in Spain equal around 6% of those in Japan, fewer than 20% of those in France, and 
approximately 30% of those in Germany (Bel, 2011). By the end of 2010, the accumulative 
investment was nearly €45 billion and showed very low rates of return (cited in Bel 2011, p.700). 
Bel (2011) argues that two reasons account for the low volume of traffic: the small number of 
inhabitants served by HST and severe competition from air travel.   
The HST approach: Existing quality, geography, assessment   
There are four aspects underlying the investment styles of HST in Spain. Firstly, geography and 
urban distribution is a fundamental factor. Spain is the second largest country in terms of area in 
Europe. There are four major administrative divisions, namely state, region, province and 
municipality, running from the highest to the lowest level. Currently there are 17 regions and 50 
provinces. The creation of the regional tier arrived in 1978 with the new constitution. Prior to that, 
provinces were traditionally the major intermediate level between the state and municipality.      
It has been widely argued that Spain‘s space economy is similar to France regarding the scatter of 
dense cities and population across a vast territory, rather than continual conurbations similar to 
England. However, unlike the French capital, Madrid, the capital city, resides at a precisely central 
position with over three million inhabitants and another three million in the metropolitan area. The 
second largest city and metropolitan area is Barcelona, with about a population about half that size. 
Most major cities are located on the coastal areas about 400-600 km distant from Madrid (Steer 
Davies Gleave, 2004).  
The geographical distribution of cities provided a key foundation for HST development in Spain. 
Unlike the French model, which focuses on serving the largest urban agglomerations, the Spanish 
government intended to use the HST network to serve a wider population at the provincial level. 
This rationale was clearly expressed by the Prime Minister at the time, Jose´ Marı´a Aznar, on 25
th
 
April 2000 ―A high-speed rail network that, in ten years, will place all provincial capitals within 
four hours from the centre of the peninsula‖ (quoted in Bel, 2011, p.701) . In 2010, the Ministry of 
Public Works reported 40% of the Spanish population had a high-speed train station within 30 
miles (50kms). This number is expected to increase to 90% by 2020.     
Secondly, the large scale of building an HST network was associated with the technical issues of 
conventional rail. Firstly, Spain joined the European Union in 1986 and its conventional broad rail 
gauge (1.668m) was not compatible with the international standard gauge. Thus rail mobility for 
goods and passengers between European countries was not able to be achieved under these 
circumstances. Secondly, the condition of the conventional rail lines was poor. Rail capacity was 
limited to long sections of single track and speeds were low as a result of curves and gradients. For 
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instance, to travel from Madrid to Barcelona, a similar distance to London to Edinburgh, would 
take seven hours by conventional trains (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004).  In contrast, AVE has 
effectively slashed almost two thirds of the journey time by reducing travel time to two hours and 
30 minutes over the same distance.  
Thirdly, after becoming a member of the EU, massive funding from the EU has encouraged and 
supported Spain in constructing their infrastructure network. Despite the contingency of continual 
large funding from the EU in the future, past funding has been used to pay for the majority of the 
infrastructure costs (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004). Over the period between 1986 and 2006, EU 
funding for all infrastructure amounted to €118 billion (T. Marshall, 2009c).   
Fourthly, the evaluation and decision-making methods regarding transport infrastructure 
investment are less than transparent and greatly driven by political will. The first high-speed line 
served another ambitious national project, as it had to be ready for the opening of the World Expo 
in Seville. Steer Davis Gleave (2004) stresses that there is no evidence of an economic appraisal to 
justify the decision to build this line to the fourth largest city, Seville, earlier than Barcelona, the 
second largest. In addition, the commonly-applied method of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was not 
used as a tool to determine the feasibility of the transport project. An evaluation shows that HST 
investment has not been justifiable economically. De Rus and Inglada conducted an ex-post CBA 
analysis of the Madrid-Seville HST line and the findings show that if CBA had been used to 
determine this project, the decision to build this line would not have been made (De Rus & Inglada, 
1997). Likewise, with regard to the Madrid-Barcelona HST line, the potential demand would not 
offset the large-scale investment and the time savings would be too small (quoted in Bel, 2011, 
p.700). Instead, CBA is used to decide the priority of implementing cases listed in the 
infrastructure investment plan. ―Although detailed economic appraisal is carried out, the purpose 
of this analysis is to prioritise schemes rather than to make a decision in principle as to whether 
they should be undertaken. In effect, the political decision was made when the government 
committed that all regional capitals should be within 4 hours of Madrid and  hours of Barcelona 
by high-speed train‖ (Steer Davies Gleave, 2004).  
Despite the rapid expansion of the HST network, propelled by state intervention at a provincial 
level, a coordinated plan is lacking. T.Marshall (2009) reveals that the conventional network was 
ignored and left without proper investment, so some lines had to close. Since the state still owned 
these conventional networks, if necessary, the regional government could develop its own regional 
system to compensate for the deficit of national rail services within regions. In addition, a conflict 
in HST stopping patterns also easily occurred based on different concerns between the state and 
the regional government. This led to a difficulty in the shift to rail since the HST could not serve 
the population where demand was greatest and road travel was comparatively much more 
accessible (T. Marshall, 2009c).         
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Appendix 19: Quotations from the Interviews:    
The British Case  
Codes Quotations  Corresponding 
pages 
CG-1 They (OPRAF) said on West Coast definitively we wanted a 
railway which would get you from Manchester to London in less 
than two hours….. The only way you could do that was a tilting 
train. Technically there was no other way. Actually OPRAF forced 
all the bidders to go for tilting trains at 125 mph. Virgin trains 
was the only one who said we wanted our trains to go 140mph.   
p.239 
CG-2 We decided which station to serve by the business model which is 
available to everyone… What people were doing was to test 
whether it should be Wilmslow or the other…whether it should be 
Macclesfield or Congleton. And out of that came the answer 
where the market was… The model said Liverpool was in decline. 
There was not much business from London. Business probably 
would be in Runcorn. I think it proved to be true. Liverpool now is 
served by long 9-coach trains. That was a good result. 
p.240 
CG-3 “British Rail had run it well. British Rail knew the market and 
knew the timetabling problems. You could not take three trains 
that way if you took all three trains from Manchester to Stoke 
that way and then there is no room for local train services. So you 
take the third one off to Wilmslow. Wilmslow is a rich middle 
class area and has an airport. Arguably Wilmslow should have 
two trains an hour”.  
p.240 
CG-4 The model also said that there was frustrated business in Chester 
which had to change at Crewe or had very slow trains. It was a 
middle-class town, not industrial, and a tourist area. It is more 
likely to make money... The government decided to run the diesel 
trains all the way to London, which is proved right. 
p.240 
CG-5 It was more complicated than that because your rival is stopping 
at one of these stations. If you stop you will get half income. So if 
you have 5 trains and I have 5 trains, we share 50% income of the 
station. So you will be motivated to stop to take money from your 
rival. There is nothing to do with passengers. 
p.240 
DT-1 When the Channel Tunnel was opened at that time which brought 
European trains to our notice, significant in the middle of the 
country… We felt that we should have proper freight link right to 
the north England, higher passenger link which would be west 
coast and also international link becoming part of the through 
European Network. It gradually took hold of people’s 
imaginations and the original plan of the WCML upgrade was 500 
million pounds. It was very poor, very small. Really could not do 
much at all. We campaigned to have a more significant 
upgrade…and to improve connectivity with London, potentially 
p.241 
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with Europe. 
MP-1 I’m not sure how much public conversation there was about 
West-Coast Mainline and upgrading it… I’m trying to ask “was 
this a very politicised debate or not, or was it a more technocratic 
transport theme or not”. Clearly it’s in the newspapers saying 
that “the service isn’t good enough, it’s too slow”. But I can’t 
recall very much conversation around here about the strategic 
significance of this. 
p.252 
MP-2 There were a lot of forces going on in the mid-nineties, which 
means Liverpool started to change its view of itself - it needs 
different politics, it needs better public, private coalitions; it needs 
to think more of itself in European terms. It begins to see what 
success different European cities are doing, such as Hamburg and 
Rotterdam. And a lot of our work was underpinning this because 
we did the work for the core cities, making the point of trying to 
get Liverpool as a European city. 
p.254 
IW-1 I had been pushing Greater Manchester for 3 or 4 years, trying to 
get them support the electrification of Liverpool-Manchester 
railway line, which will bring down the journey time between the 
two cities to 30 minutes and to support the electrification of 
Preston-Chorley-Bolton-Manchester rail which similarly will link 
together pretty buoyant economies. But they are not interested at 
all. 
p.242 
IW-2 “There are two biggest cities in the North West. For almost the 
last 30 or 40 years, Liverpool has been completely shameful …the 
place was falling apart economically, socially, and politically. That 
had been an enormous advantage for Mancunians, wasn’t it? No 
competition. So the natural point to think about it, when you’re 
coming to the North West, put your investment in Manchester 
because Liverpool just came across a place with no cases 
basically”. 
p.253 
AH-1 We are in a highly centralized country, where we have two levels 
elected politicians we have national government and local 
governments. All the initiatives we have taken over the years to 
try building institutions at the local in between the locality and 
the national level have been pretty unsuccessful, it seems to me. 
p.242 
AH-2 From that point onwards, Manchester city council was extremely 
welcoming to national government initiatives…economic 
restructuring of the city was extremely positive in terms of the 
relations with the business community locally. Basically it would 
talk to everyone who has invested money available for the 
restructuring of particularly the centre of the conurbation. I think 
that is the turning point, basically economically because what 
enabled Manchester to do is to put in place the whole range of 
schemes.          
p.247 
AH-3 From the Manchester Independent Economic Review, if you look 
at the effects on house price for example, they tend to heat off 
these lines to places like Bury. There has been fairly determined 
campaign to get extra investment into the Metrolink network. In 
p.252 
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order that other rears could be connected.  
PH-1 The development corporation concentrated all its efforts on the 
edge of town and it has obvious problems with the existing city 
council because all the development wrapped around the edge in 
the Business Park next to the motorway. And the city centre just 
was a mess and remains a mess. 
p.257 
PH-2 They just started to do it in the early 1970s when the Labour 
government decided that the priority was inner city regeneration. 
This was in the 1977 White Paper and the 1978 Inner Urban Areas 
Act. They pulled all the money away from the New Town and it 
suffered very badly. So strange bits and pieces were done around 
motorway junctions- business parks in Leyland, and north of 
Preston, but they didn’t tie up as a coherent town. It should have 
been a linear town. It would have been quite interesting.  
p.257 
PH-3 The argument to support the case was based on fact: there would 
be enormous traffic and people coming in the weekends in 
particular to gamble, including from London. And of course when 
we lost the super casino, the strong case effectively for a direct 
service was greatly weakened. So everything kind of unravelled 
together, unfortunately. 
p.261 
SL-1 I think the problem is as ever, both are now related, in that 
internal problems really significantly limit Pennine Lancashire 
capacity to access external opportunities. Not just physically. If 
you were to ask – and we did ask – we did surveys about it back 
when it was known as East Lancashire (we branded it Pennine 
Lancashire but that’s not what it’s known as. It probably is still 
known as East Lancashire). We did survey people in Manchester 
and Leeds and other areas. What do you think of East Lancashire? 
Well, the sheer number of people who had very negative 
conceptions of it, which there’re all kind of potential reasons for. 
They couldn’t pin it down to a specific place. They weren’t quite 
sure where or what it was. If they did think of it at all, they 
thought of it because of the riots that took place in 2001 or as 
almost a black and white photograph of Victorian cotton industry. 
External perceptions of it indicated that there was very little 
market as a leisure destination, as a potential, cost effective place 
you can retire to where you can have a good quality of life. That 
affected the way the potential investors saw it. They didn’t see it 
as somewhere they could do – they saw it as a rural backwater, 
rather than somewhere where they could bring impact. 
p.263 
SL-2 Having this sort of lifestyle offered in a small town with services 
you’d expect from a town but with countryside immediately 
around where you live, access to outdoor activities and the 
benefits of being within short commuting distance to a major city. 
p.264 
SL-3 The people who worked on my team who did live there, were 
born there and had moved away to go to university and then 
came back in their forties. And that’s a pattern that repeats 
itself…It (PL) remains a sort of island, over the hill from 
Manchester, with very little social or economic interaction. 
p.266 
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DW-1 “What the situation is that we have no space to put more 
services, what we want to do is to reduce the journey time as 
well. For example, journey time to Leeds still 50 mins for a 50 
miles journey, which is not very fast; it is still 45 or 50 mins to 
Liverpool for a shorter journey, but again because of the lack of 
capacity, it is difficult to put on more services. We like services 
every 15 mins to Liverpool like metro services; we like services 
about every 12 mins to Leeds because the demand is so high. But 
that’s constrained by not just HSTs, but the fact we’ve got HSTs 
every 20 mins in Piccadilly makes that difficult”. 
p.240 
DW-2 The executive and the leader of council have been working as a 
team for a long time. They have been really good at promoting 
Manchester, encouraging people to come here, to do business 
here, and getting money from the government for regeneration, 
or for transport… When one does want some big developments 
would have happened, they haven’t had this very good working 
relationship between the bureaucracy officers and members 
between the CX and the leader because they work very well as a 
team. 
p.246 
DW-3 The Bomb just makes the process speed up. That kicked-start a 
total change in the way Manchester wasn’t. I came to 
Manchester before the bomb happened and I went through the 
whole transformation of city centre. It wasn’t recognizable from 
what it was 15/ 20 years ago. It’s been upgraded. It’s become 
more attractive. 
p.247 
DW-4 In fact, we are getting some prestigious companies locating here. 
I think the transport link has got a very important factor in that. 
For example, Bank of America put one of their key offices in 
Manchester (maybe 4-5 years ago). And I think it is the 
combination of two things. It is the fact we got the most 
important international airports outside the South East England. 
Also at the same time, we’ve got very good connection to London. 
p.269 
DW-5 “The CX of airport said that they are quite happy that a large 
proportion of the London to Manchester market has switched to 
rail, as that released the capacity for other connections, they 
don’t necessarily want to compete with the rail network. They 
cannot because city centre to city centre rail always wins, but that 
means they can offer a good international airport and network, 
so links to other countries or that combined is really making much 
more attractive places for people to locate their business.” 
p.323 
DB-1 It has a very weak road structure. The town boundary is very 
tightly drawn around the urban area and the north/south route in 
Blackpool is basically the promenade, but that’s also the major 
public realm area: It’s where people walk, play, and enjoy 
themselves, but it’s also now the main traffic route. And there’s 
no parallel satisfactory route. So Blackpool has to make choice 
about improving the quality of the promenade as a public realm 
and providing traffic in the area there has been done some work 
recently, they’ve narrowed the carriage way between Chapel 
Street and Talbot Road and down to...it’s a sort of shared-space 
type scheme. And that makes it a rather nicer area to be, but it 
p.259 
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means travelling north-south in Blackpool is more difficult as a 
result. So in terms of a weak internal road system, which is one of 
its problems. 
DB-2 That’s all changed. And some people go on holiday by train now – 
youngster who can’t drive; people who are very poor and don’t 
have a motor care; people who are too old to drive – so these are 
not a premiere section of the market: This is down market 
tourism. Blackpool needs some down market tourism, but it also 
needs higher quality tourism. And higher quality tourism and 
domestic tourism these days generally go by car, families with 
children and money to spend, they would go by car than by train. 
So it’s road access that’s probably more important. 
p.259 
JT-1 I think the WCML probably has an impact on our domestic 
services…it was not the only factor, but I think it played a part in 
the decline of London-Manchester services because the WCML 
upgrade gave more reliability and greater frequency. Quite 
frankly, during the upgrade period and previously, the WCML to 
London journey was dreadful. It was a disaster. The airline in a 
sense took the opportunity of the shift from rail to air. Once when 
the disruption and the upgrade settled down, it switched back 
again. 
p.322 
BC-1 I spoke to one of the new deputy head-masters. He said to me… 
he has new intake of children 11 years old. He said to them, put 
your hand up those who think after their education they are going 
to become a doctor, nobody put hands up; those who may 
become solicitors or lawyers, nobody put hands up; those who 
might become teachers, maybe one or two; those who think I 
would work in Tesco, then that is when people started to put their 
hands up… and that is that low level of aspiration even at that 
age…Really you have to raise that. People don’t think those kinds 
of career offered to them. It is like a feel of vendetta. If you don’t 
aim high, you certainly won’t even get half way, will you? So 
turning that around, reinvigorating the enthusiasm of the 
communities is really a difficult task. 
p.263 
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Appendix 20: Quotations from the Interviews:    
The French Case  
Code Quotations  Corresponding 
page 
ML-1 For an operator like SNCF, when we build the HSL, we want to 
have new traffic. Where does the traffic come from? It is from the 
air sector….The main traffic mainly comes from people travelling 
more or people coming from the air sector. But from Paris to the 
north of France, you don’t have air traffic because it is too short. 
There is nothing to be expected from that. But from Paris to 
London, yes- there was a lot of air traffic.  
p.272 
ML-2 People are going to travel more and more as the distance is short, 
and there will be people who buy season tickets and will not pay 
more. If we take the route Paris-Lyon, there was a lot of air traffic 
before TGV, so people travel more without having season tickets. 
Some will use them, but many others won’t. Therefore, they will 
pay more. So that is the difference…We prefer the TGV in the 
south to the north because of the location of Paris in France. 
[Similarly], the market from Paris to London is more important 
than the market from Paris to Lille, not comparing the number of 
passengers, but in terms of revenue. … In terms of business, it is 
not in our interests to serve the city of Lille, but it is in our 
interests to serve London, Paris, and Brussels.  
p.272 
ML-3 Our idea was that in France, historically speaking, the network is 
like a star round Paris. So it is very easy to go from Paris to the 
provinces, but very difficult to go from one province to another 
because everything is Paris-oriented. So once we had built the 
Paris-Lyon line, Paris-Lille, we had the idea that we could 
overcome the difficulty of going from one province to the other 
with just a link between these two HST lines. With this solution in 
mind, we discovered that we could make a link through the 
airport of CDG and it would be the best result because we could 
have the synergy between people going from province to 
province and people going from province to Paris region and Paris 
airports. And this synergy is very efficient …People living in Lille 
can access the airport easily, but also the south-east and 
south-west of France, even the east and west of France. So this is 
a commercial synergy that works.  
p.272 
ML-4 The choice we made was to link all the cities to Charles de Gaulle 
(airport) and make it a very strong hub. And we used the 
possibility and potential of the provincial airports. 
p.272 
ML-5 The more we extend this network, the more we extend the 
possibilities for regional high-speed trains… If we develop all 
these regional services which are very often services with high 
frequency, we will lose capacity from high-speed lines for 
long-distance trains. So this is the problem of competition 
p.278 
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regarding capacity on the lines.   
ML-6 The second point is that sometimes, there is a competition 
between these regional services and our trains (TGVs) because 
SNCF gets no subsidy for running the TGV whereas the regional 
trains have a lot of subsidy from the regional government 
because people do not pay and pay back the expenses. So it is 
unfair competition. 
p.278 
ML-7 What we said to them, instead of paying us quite a lot of money 
each year, we could run a joint-venture. That is what we 
proposed to the NPDC region, to build a joint-venture with them 
and to operate international and regional services between 
London, Paris and Belgium. For example, trains can go from 
London to Brussels with many intermediate stops. We are OK 
even with the participation of many other operators from 
Belgium or from England, but we think this is really an exception. 
There is no other similar case elsewhere in France in our opinion 
because of the human geography, economic geography, density 
of population and the short distance. 
p.289 
PM-1 The consensus was to place the station neither in Amiens nor in 
Saint-Quentin, where either of the two cities could legitimately 
claim TGVs. They built it in the middle, which means you need to 
take the bus for half an hour from Amiens or Saint-Quentin to get 
to the TGV station. Previously, the major international routes 
were either going to, then with the arrival of TGV-Nord, the major 
international routes all went through Lille. This illustrates what 
we might call political constraint, which is reaching a consensus 
in order to have the project accepted by other cities, even though 
there are winners and losers in this process. You need to 
somehow gain the consensus of the losers, which in that case was 
Amiens and Saint-Quentin.   
p.276 
TB-1 It is not something we have control over. I think the biggest 
question is: who will do what in this and how will they treat cities 
like this one when they make decisions? This is sometimes 
difficult to understand. I give you an example, a few years ago, 
Lufthansa decided to serve Lille and schedule a direct flight from 
Lille to Munich. The idea was to develop Munich to serve the 
south-east of Europe. It started very slowly because in fact people 
didn’t take the plane to Lille… when people realised it existed. The 
first time the plane was empty. Two or three months later, the 
plane was starting to be full and then they cancelled the flight 
because they didn’t recognise the time needed for people to 
realise there was a route to Munich.  
p.290 
NJ-1 The TGV station was renewed in 1993 when the TGV arrived. At 
the same time, Michel Delebarre and the council decided to 
develop all the new cities and central facilities around the old 
part of the derelict ports and shipyards. So it was the same 
project. We are continuing this project now with another town 
planner, Joan Busquets, who was the town planner in Barcelona 
for the Olympic Games. He is really involved in public places. We 
are continuing urban regeneration of the city centre of 
Dunkerque. The TGV station will have interchanges between 
p.292 
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different transport modes around the station as part of the 
project. There is no difference.  
NJ-2 Due to historical issues, Calais doesn’t want this kind of 
organisation. Calais district is really little. There are only five 
towns around Calais. They don’t want to forge a link with the 
state… they don’t want to develop partnerships. They want to 
work alone in their cities, so it is very difficult sometimes.  
p.295 
NJ-3 In order to achieve that, the SMCO needs to work together and to 
be strong enough while negotiating with the SNCF to say we 
exist, we want to increase services to put people on trains instead 
of in cars (highways). There is still a long way to go and we are 
working on it. But it is not so easy because Calais has a different 
political orientation than Dunkerque. So we have to discuss. 
p.295 
YDD-1 The difference comes from history and tradition. Lens is a town 
which was born with mining, so problems are more intense with 
Lens, stronger than in Valenciennes which has traditions and an 
image – good museums, theatres, a university- it’s not the same. 
In Valenciennes there are people with money and the house 
prices are very different. Douai and Béthune are in between the 
two. The miners’ heritage is stronger in Lens. That’s why they 
chose Lens to build the Louvre: the challenge was the biggest and 
the most difficult! 
p.297 
YDD-2 People moving from Lens to Douai, they can take a bus or train 
since trains stop everywhere too. So it’s a problem. You cannot 
have two different systems. The train must be integrated into the 
regional system and have fewer stops than before. If you have 
fewer stops than before, the opportunities for another system 
may be taken by local authorities. And all these different systems 
must be studied together to be coherent. Now it’s not. 
 
p.303 
AL-1 In Lille Metropolis, all links go to Lille and there is a very weak link 
between Béthune, Lens, Douai, Valenciennes and Lille. This should 
be changed. Also, better articulation with the HST system is 
needed. In addition, it needs to be modernised. Speed could be 
improved on the regional HST system… As a pole (hub) function, 
Lille could not compete with Paris, but the system may increase 
polarity inside the region. 
p.303 
DP-1 I think it is necessary for medium-sized cities of the region to have 
their own development projects and their own strategies. Certain 
cities, over a long time, have developed their own strategies … In 
Valenciennes, they changed their mayor 15 /20 years ago. A new 
team launched a new strategy for Valenciennes… focused on the 
centre of the agglomeration. In all other cities, in Douai, Lens, 
and Béthune (in this part of a former mining area), it was not so 
evident whether they had a strategy in the 1980s and 1990s. 
p.297 
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Appendix 21: Urban Redevelopment Schemes in 
North West England  
 Strong Intervention in Manchester during the Transformation Process    
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A Glossary of Regeneration Projects in Manchester and Liverpool 
Central Manchester 
Development 
Corporation 
For Central Manchester Development Corporation, Castlefield and 
Bridgewater are two well-known flagship projects. The Castlefield area 
which was converted into mixed housing, office development, culture, and 
leisure activities became a popular tourist site attracting more than 2 million 
visitors per year. As for Bridgewater Concert Hall and Great Bridgewater 
Office complex which were developed in partnership between CMDC and 
Manchester City Council catered for new types of economic activities in the 
expanded city centre (Mann, 1998). 
Liverpool City Centre 
Redevelopment 
The waterfront / the commercial district/ live work area/ lime street 
gateway/ cultural quarter/ retail/ rope walks/ Liverpool One/ Hopes/ 
university district/ public realm and movement/ utility infrastructure/ city 
living 
Liverpool Lime Street 
Station 
The remodelling Liverpool Lime street station area was crucial. Although the 
refurbishment of the rail station was not completed fully before the ECOC in 
2008 and the arrival of the full completion of the WCML in December 2008, 
the recreation of a key gateway had transformed the public space and 
changed people’s perception. The Council leader Joe Anderson said, “This is 
a key gateway to the city and many visitors’ first sight of Liverpool and now 
we have a station that befits a city of Liverpool’s status which I’m sure will 
leave a lasting impression” (NWDA, 2010) 
Liverpool Waterfront The waterfront areas were intensively transformed with the improvement of 
its Canal link and the enrichment of its cultural offers and facilities in 
addition to the Tate Liverpool which was opened in 1984, including the new 
Echo Arena Liverpool (Arena and Convention Centre) located on the 
former King's Dock opened in 2008 and the Museum of Liverpool on the Pier 
Head which was just opened in July 2011. 
Liverpool One The largest retail scheme developed by the Grosvenor Group was an 
extraordinary mending plan of Liverpool urban fabric. New public space, 
parks, gardens, and 40 individually buildings including two largest 
departments stores John Lewis (240,000 sq ft) and Debenhams (180,000 sq 
ft) filled existing urban settlements covering 42 acres across six districts. 
Manchester Airport Manchester Airport established in 1938 is located in the south of City of 
Manchester about 14 km from Manchester city centre. The escape from the 
requisition by the Ministry of Defence after WW2 allowed it to develop a 
major civil aviation hub as a municipal enterprise. In 1971, Manchester 
Airport had already been a key airport for both passenger and freight 
outside London and South East, much more significant than another two 
regional airports, with about 2 million passengers in contrast to 496,500 
passengers in Liverpool Airport and 143,944 passengers in Blackpool Airport.  
Media City UK Media City UK located in a brownfield site of 200 acres of former dockland 
at Salford Quays belonging to Salford and Trafford two local authorities. It 
began with BBC’s vision for rebalancing a "London-centric" BBC with a 
potential move of major departments to the North of England (BBC Press 
Office, 2007). The two major candidates were Salford Quays and Whitworth 
Street in Central Manchester (BBC, 2006). In 2006, BBC announced Salford 
as the preferred bidder, and developed a partnership consisted of the 
Central Salford Urban Regeneration Company, Peel Holdings, Salford City 
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Council and the North West Regional Development Agency. ITV and 
University of Salford also followed to collectively relocate in Media City. The 
whole project began construction in 2007 and completed its first phase in 
2010. In late 2010 a Metrolink extension to Media City was accomplished. In 
2011, the University of Salford opened unique digital learning, teaching and 
research space at Media City UK. 
New East Manchester 
Urban Regeneration 
Company 
In 1999, New East Manchester Urban Regeneration Company (URC) covering 
an area of 1,100 hectares located immediately east of Manchester’s city 
centre was established to regenerate this previously industrialised brown 
field through the creation of “a new town in the city” envisaged to 
accommodate 60000 over 10-15 years with a transport corridor formed by 
Metrolink extension from Manchester Piccadilly into this area (planned to 
be completed in 2012). This area is the home of the 2002 Commonwealth 
Games which received strong government support for investment and the 
legacy was continued to develop as a genuine Sport city in a sustainable 
way. Economically, a 160 hectare business park plus 200 hectare of 
commercial and industrial land was created to specialise in new and 
emerging technologies. However, the achievement showed the regeneration 
is a long-term process with contingency. Even though the 2002 
Commonwealth Games was successfully delivered, the set objective is still 
far from being achieved fully. In 2010, the proportion of people wanting to 
move from the area has reduced from 40% to 24%, but the population has 
increased by over 4,000 since 2001 and only a little under 5,000 new homes 
built (New East Manchester Ltd, 2010). 
Spinningfields Spinningfields is located in the western side of the city centre between the 
River Irwell and Deansgate, developed in partnership between Allied London 
properties and Manchester city council to offer approximately 220000 
square metres of flexible offices and the potential for 25000 jobs (Hebbert, 
2010). 
The Piccadilly 
Partnership 
The Piccadilly partnership created in 2003 is a strategic public and private 
partnership bringing together a range of stakeholders like Manchester city 
council, City co., GMPTE (now called TfGM), Marketing Manchester, and 
other public sector and local occupiers. The aim is to regenerate Manchester 
traditional “heart and soul” which is a linear area from Piccadilly station to 
Piccadilly Garden into a transport and commercial hub. 
The Knowledge 
Partnership 
The knowledge partnership provide a clear knowledge economy strategy 
based on the academic and cultural aspect in the combination of a wider 
spatial strategy “Arc of opportunity”, stretching across two local authorities 
from University of Salford in the west to Piccadilly station in the east and the 
higher education campus (UMIST, Manchester University, and Manchester 
Metropolitan University) in the south. 
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1960s-1980s  
 
 
Electrification 
(WCML-60s) 
New Towns 
(1961-1980s) 
Motorways   
-until early 1980s 
 
1980s 
National Urban Policy  
 
 
Enterprise Zone 
Urban Development 
Corporation  
City Challenges  
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Late 1990s: 
National 
Urban/Regional 
Policy  
 
The construction of 
the WCML 
upgrade 
Urban Regeneration 
Company 
New Deal for  
Community 
Housing Market 
Renewal 
Strategic regional 
Sites 
 
Uneven Growth within  
North West England 
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Appendix 22: Arguments For and Against the HS2 
Proposal   
 
 The case for HS2 The case against HS2 
1 Underinvested new rail infrastructure:  
The UK‟s HST network is under-invested behind 
international competitors.  
 
Whether HST is right for the UK is not justified 
from abroad experiences; and the evidence is 
mixed.  
2 The demand for rail capacity:  
In response to projected demand for extra rail 
capacity, HS2 is the only option.   
 
The forecast is dubious and the need for new lines 
is not certain. 
The lack of context and a coherent transport 
strategy. 
Alternative solutions by upgrading existing lines 
and lengthening trains. 
3 Affordability and Business case:  
HS2 is affordable for taxpayers and passengers. 
 
Calculating the benefit of time savings, the 
government assumes that all time spent on 
trains is unproductive. 
 
HS2 is too expensive and a rich man‟s railway.  
High uncertainty and opportunity cost 
A flawed economic case and overstated benefits. 
The assumption of all time spent on trains is 
unproductive is erroneous. 
4 Modal shift and operational capacity:  
HS2 could encourage modal shift from short haul 
aviation to rail, reducing carbon impacts and 
helping the UK meet its climate change 
targets.  
 
Future technological developments are expected 
to see that increased to 18 trains per hour on a 
wider high speed network. 
 
Evidence that HS2 will encourage modal shift is 
slight. The domestic aviation is already in 
decline and significant modal shift from road to 
rail is unlikely.   
The unproven technical and operational assertion. 
5 Environmental impacts:  
HS2 will be carbon neutral and have no adverse 
climate impacts. Any immediate environmental 
impacts will be properly mitigated.  
 
HS2 will have no positive carbon impacts and its 
impact on local environment, particularly 
through the Chilterns, could be catastrophic.  
The need for considering alternative routes 
6 The impact on the conventional network:  
The capacity of the conventional network could be 
freed up for better intra-regional rail services 
and freight.  
 
The government‟s plans stopping services on the 
conventional WCML line will actually be 
reduced. 
7 The wider impact on the productivity of urban 
economies: 
HS2 will shrink the time-space distance between 
London and provincial cities and encourage 
economic development in these provincial 
cities.  
 
 
There is evidence that closer to a major centre, 
such as London, could adversely affect smaller 
economies rather than stimulate them.   
8 Regional economies 
HS2 could rebalance British uneven regional 
economies.  
 
No evidence that HSR will deliver any economic 
benefits to the regions. 
Unfounded claims for economic regeneration and 
rebalancing. 
Source: (Butcher, Keep, Rehfisch, & Minnis, 2011; House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a) 
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Appendix 23: The Timeline of Developing the HS2 
Proposal  
July 2007  [... ] it would not be prudent to commit now to „all-or-nothing‟ projects, such as network-wide 
electrification or a high-speed line, for which the longer-term benefits are currently uncertain and 
which could delay tackling the current strategic priorities such as capacity (DfT, Rail White 
Paper, Delivering a Sustainable Railway, Cm 7176, July 2007, p 9) 
Jan 2009 A new Secretary of State for Transport Geoff Hoon announced an investigation into a 
high-speed line between London and the West Midlands and potentially beyond the West 
Midlands. 
Jan 2009 High Speed 2 (HS2) Ltd is a company set up by the DfT to advise the Government on 
high-speed rail. It was incorporated on 14 January 2009 and was subsequently classified as an 
Executive Non-Departmental Body. The remits:  
1. To identify a route between London and the West Midlands with the primary aims of 
increasing passenger capacity on the corridor and optimising journey times. It was a requirement 
of the remit that the route should include an interchange between HS2, the Great Western Main 
Line and Crossrail, with convenient access to Heathrow. The nature and scope of the 
interchange were for HS2 Ltd to advise on. 
2. A further requirement was that there should be no intermediate stations between this 
interchange station and the West Midlands. It was for HS2 Ltd to advise on whether stations 
should be city centre or parkway or both. 
3. The remit also invited HS2 Ltd to consider how transport and land use planning could be 
properly integrated in respect of the new line, particularly in relation to housing and economic 
regeneration in the West Midlands. 
4. The remit required the company to “pay close attention” to the environmental impacts of the 
new line. 
Mar 2010 White Paper High Speed Rail -The feasibility study by High Speed 2 (HS2) Ltd 
May 2010  Coalition Government committed developing a high-speed rail network (though not necessarily 
HS2), stressing the low-carbon benefits  
(HM Government: The Coalition: our programme for government, 20 May 2010, p 31) 
Nov 2010 DfT, Business Plan 2010-11, November 2010, (updated May 2011) 
http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/view-srp/39  
Feb 2011 The then Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, launched a major public 
consultation exercise on this Government‟s proposal for HS2. 
DfT and HS2 Ltd, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain‟s Future, Consultation, February 2011 
July 2011 HS2 consultation ended. 
Jan 2012 After the consultation, the government announced the policy statement for HS2 with some 
amendments to initial proposals.  
Jan 2013 HS2 Phase 2 proposal was announced on 28 January 2013. 
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Appendix 24: The Implications for High-Speed Two 
 
This research has great relevance for future HST policies in the UK, in particular for the HS2 
proposal which is still under development by the time of completing this thesis. With the exception 
of the 113 km Channel Tunnel Rail Link (HS1) linking London with continental Europe, the UK is 
situated at a turning point, making a move from an incremental approach (low-speed high speed) 
in the 1970s to major construction of new lines (high-speed high speed). However, a 
mega-transport project as significant as HS2 is unavoidably controversial. Regardless of a 
cross-party political support, the Government‘s HS2 case has caused strong reactions, both for and 
against. Written evidence from both sides of the debate have collected and discussed in two major 
parliamentary documents (Butcher, et al., 2011; House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a). 
The perspective of critics is wide-ranging. Major aspects involving both sides of views are listed in 
Appendix 22.  
Undoubtedly, the new lines will, in their turn, cause major spatial-economic effects, just as the 
lower-speed version of HST has done over the past thirty years. One might argue that the existing 
upgraded HST system is fast enough, offers more access points well integrated with other rail 
operations in comparison with a newly dedicated HST system. However, it is not speed in itself 
that will prove important, but the effect of speed in shrinking critical time-distances. The motto of 
the Swiss Railways, in their Rail 2000 strategy, ―not as fast as possible, but as fast as necessary‖, 
is thus correct. But in the UK‘s larger space economy, 200 miles (320 km) from London to 
Manchester or Leeds, 400 miles (640 km) from London to Edinburgh or Glasgow, the rule must be 
modified: as fast as possible has proven to be crucial to achieving as fast as necessary (P. Hall, 
2009a, p.352). The new network will bring cities like Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds around 
one hour of London, folding them potentially into London‘s commuter belt. Equally, they will 
bring distant cities like Newcastle within a two-hour range of London, potentially conveying the 
same kinds of economic benefits that have been brought to places like Manchester and Leeds.  
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to discuss all aspects to reach a final judgement. Instead, the 
major concern is, in line with this thesis, on the strategic role of HS2 in supporting long-term 
regional growth and rebalancing British uneven economic geography- what implications from this 
research could draw. The French experience is relevant, but, in some aspects, needs to be adapted 
for the UK. This section began with an overview of the HS2 proposal and its anticipation for 
regional development. Next, the discussion will focus on the challenges for rebalancing British 
uneven economic geography and what needs to be done for wider regional effects. 
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1.Overview of the HS2 Proposal  
The Wider Policy Context 
Since 2000, prior to the HS2 proposal, there had been a general awareness of growth in inter-city 
long distance rail demand and the need for substantial additional rail capacity by the government at 
several stages. In 2003 the now-defunct Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) published a strategic 
document ―Everyone’s Railway: The Wider Case for Rail‖ to urge a long-term agenda for 
investment to overcome capacity constraints on the principal north–south routes. It said that 
―Looking ahead 15 years, it is clear that the principal north–south rail routes in the country will be 
overloaded‖ (Strategic Rail Authority, 2003a, p.64). The Eddington Transport Study (2006) 
revealed unprecedented growth in demand for rail travel had occurred over the last 10 years. In 
2007 White Paper Delivering a Sustainable Railways, the DfT reveals demand growth of 40 per 
cent in the last decade and forecasts a further 30 per cent of growth for the decade ahead. 
Long-distance passenger demand will lead to severe overcrowding both on commuter services into 
London and on the longer distance inter-city business network by 2030 (Department for Transport, 
2007a). This trend virtually continues. The DfT showed that the total number of long-haul rail 
passenger journeys more than doubled in the 15 years from 18 billion in 1994/5 to almost 32 
billion in 2009 (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011b, p.249). 
However, by then the focus emphasised the problematic aspect of meeting potential rail demand 
for economic growth rather than a strategic role. Consequently, whether a new north–south High 
Speed Line (HSL) is the solution for demand was not convinced by the government. In 2007 
White Paper, the then Secretary of State for Transport, Ruth Kelly, argued that it would not be 
prudent to commit because long-term benefits of HST are currently uncertain. ―On the basis of the 
present carbon footprint of electricity generation, the balance of advantage would appear to favour 
services running at conventional speeds on reopened alignments‖ (Department for Transport, 
2007a, p.67). Similarly, in a report Towards a sustainable transport system, a narrow view 
towards HST as one of various options to tackle future capacity problems and congestion was 
demonstrated (Department for Transport, 2007b).  
The support for HS2 began to gain momentum before long. In the wider context of the evolution 
of national transport policy, unlike the rejection of investment in additional motorways and the 
expansion of the third runway at Heathrow, the case for building a HST network has gathered 
cross-party support (Brown, 2008; House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a). By the time 
when the WCML modernisation was fully completed in December 2008, a new wave of political 
engagement led to the planning of HS2 by the Government. A timeline of developing the HS2 
proposal is illustrated in Appendix 23.   
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A Core HS2 Network  
According to the latest version of the HS2 proposal (January 2013), the HS2 project aims to 
deliver hugely enhanced rail capacity and enhance connectivity between Britain‘s major 
conurbations. A new, dedicated Y-shaped HST network catering for speeds of up to 225 mph (with 
the potential to rise to 250 mph) will be constructed in two phases, namely phase one, extending 
from London to Birmingham in the West Midlands and a link to mainland Europe through HS1; 
phase two, further extending to Manchester and Leeds. Interoperability between new HST lines 
and conventional tracks will be applied to serve a wider catchment such as Derby, Nottingham, 
Sheffield, Liverpool, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Newcastle (a proposed diagram of the future HS2 
network).      
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A Proposed Diagram of the Future HS2 Network 
 
Source: Department for Transport  (2012, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
425 
 
The Role of HS2 for Reducing Regional Inequality  
With cross-party support, the HS2 proposal has been continually developed under two political 
regimes, but the strategic role of HS2 for regional development has been emphasised differently.  
 
Supporting regional economic growth and prosperity 
In the White Paper High Speed Rail published in March 2010 (Department for Transport, 2010), a 
strategic case for HS2 was denoted expressively, beyond purely addressing problems, to achieve 
multiple objectives of capacity, connectivity, and sustainability. At this stage, it was highlighted 
that such a scheme could ―provide important support for long-term regional economic growth in 
the UK‖ through the following four aspects. 
Faster and more reliable inter-urban journeys could increase the productivity of the UK’s urban economies.  
The enhanced links between provincial cities through HS2 new lines in combination with improved 
Trans-Pennine services could enable the major cities in the Midlands and the North to compete and collaborate 
more effectively and incentivise greater specialisation and promote investment in these regions.  
The use of released capacity on existing lines could provide enhanced commuter services and support housing 
growth in the Milton Keynes/ South Midlands growth areas (MKSM).  
The provision of efficient connections between urban, national, and international networks could promote 
London’s long-term competitiveness. (Department for Transport, 2010,p.55).  
It was well recognised that the growth opportunity which HS2 could deliver needs to be assessed 
further and involve the future development of regional strategies and local development 
framework. Although this view has an implicit suggestion to address an unbalanced North-South 
Divide by HS2 through supporting regional economic growth and regional prosperity in a long 
term, this rebalancing argument had not be explicitly stated yet.  
 
Rebalancing the North-South Divide 
The Coalition Government continued the HS2 policy, officially announcing the decision to invest 
in Phase 1 of HS2 for Britain‘s future in January 2012 after public consultation (Department for 
Transport, 2012) and the Phase 2 scheme in January 2013 (Department for Transport, 2013). The 
issue of rebalancing the widening North-South Divide has been specially highlighted. Regarding 
this ambitious regional perspective, the then Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, 
stated on the launch of the consultation process on 18th February 2011.  
―I believe that a national high-speed rail network from London to Birmingham, with onward legs to Leeds and 
Manchester, could transform Britain’s competitiveness as profoundly as the coming of the railways in the 19th century. 
It would reshape Britain’s economic geography, helping bridge the north-south divide though massive improvements in 
journey times and better connections between cities—slashing almost an hour off the trip from London to Manchester‖ 
(House of Commons, 2011). 
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2.Challenges  
Although the current Government‘s perception and support for HS2 investment demonstrates a 
significant move away from a market-led approach in the 1980s and makes a resolution to address 
the persistent North-South regional divide through the HST investment, the challenge is enormous. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the advent of HST has simultaneous impacts on both inter- and 
intra-regional scales. One spatial scale interacts with and influences the other scale. In a national 
HST system, national capitals and large well-established regional capitals tend to be revived much 
more easily than their wider sub-regions. The ignorance of intra-regional inequality may lead to 
worsening inter-regional inequality. Without deliberate interventions, spreading the benefits for 
intra-regional development is problematic. In response to the HS2 proposal and the current 
government spatial-economic planning framework, the following discussion focuses on the 
challenges for the wider impact of HST in reducing regional inequality at these two scales.    
 
Reducing Inter-regional Inequality  
 
The Absence and A Need for An Overarching National Strategy of High-Speed Networks    
 
The French experience demonstrated an evolving national spatial strategy of integrating air and 
HST, which has converted an over-dominant Île-de-France into an enhanced national high-speed 
transport network. 2-hour domestic TGV services could effectively outperform air services by 
transporting people from regional cities to catch long-haul airline services in Paris CDG Airport 
which, with four runways, has the largest airside capacity in Europe (Aéroports de Paris, 2011a). 
Consequently, Lille‘s international airport has had no chance to develop so far. The Lyon Satolas 
Airport-HST hub which is located outside Lyon city centre initially suffered from an underused 
HST station though the condition is improving with the construction of urban transit systems to 
and from the city centre.  
The current HS2 proposal has been questioned about its integration with the other high-speed 
transport system, aviation. In the UK, air and HST have not been well integrated yet. The 
long-term aviation policy has been questionable due to the controversy of the third runway in the 
Heathrow Airport, which has resulted in the constrained aviation capacity and could hamper UK‘s 
international connectivity without active intervention. It has been argued that an overall transport 
strategy which could specify how HS2 fits to be part of the strategy has been absent (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2011a). ―Investors find it extraordinary that we are taking 
decisions over high-speed rail and aviation in isolation‖(Eagle, 2012). What is more, the UK‘s 
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major hub airport is currently poorly connected to Britain‘s main rail lines and the rail access to 
HS1 is difficult (Department for Transport, 2012).  
 
The French approach of integrating air and HST needs to be adapted to British economic 
geography and national contexts. Gradually, a different model of integrating airs and HST has 
emerged in the HS2 proposal. HS2 stations in Birmingham and Manchester have been proposed 
with two stations for each city: one in the city centre and the other outside the city centre, with 
good connectivity for airports, motorways and the existing national railway. The allocation of the 
two stations outside city centres appears to address the constrained aviation capacity in Heathrow.   
  
―Heathrow is not the only airport whose customers might make use of any high speed network. HS2 Ltd’s report also 
recommends that a second interchange station should be built close to the National Exhibition Centre, providing direct 
access to Birmingham Airport, as well as to the [WCML] and the M42 and M6. The Government agrees that such 
an interchange has great potential to support wider connectivity […] HS2 Ltd will evaluate the business case and 
options for a similar interchange providing access to Manchester Airport on similar terms‖ (Department for Transport, 
2010, p.20).     
 
Given that Manchester Airport has become a key international airport hub outside London, and 
concerning the constrained capacity of Heathrow, better connectivity of airports and HST hubs in 
regional cities seems to be an alternative.  
 
However, apart from the Birmingham Interchange HS2 station has been approved, according to the 
latest route of Phase 2, Manchester Airport HS2 station is not a through station on the 
national HST network but on a spur to Manchester Piccadilly. It does not have an 
equivalent and serious hub position as Birmingham Airport, which in the long term 
could possibly shrink half of the air market which Manchester Airport has so far 
established, because major cities in the east coast and midlands even Liverpool could 
easily take high-speed services to Birmingham Airport. It is untimely that Sir Howard 
Davies‘ Airport Commission is not completed until 2015. But an interim report should be released 
in 2013 and closely integrate with the HS2 Phase 2 scheme to vitally address these concerns.  
 
 
The HS2 Route and New Stations   
 
Owing to the French economic geography, France demonstrated the hub-and-spoke architecture of 
a national HST system between national capital and major provincial cities although Paris is not 
centrally located. There is a clear pattern that two regional cities Lille in NPDC and Lyon in 
Rhône-Alpes have benefits the most from their HST opportunity and connectivity through a key 
decision of locating new HST stations in the city centre to integrate with urban redevelopment 
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projects and interchange with multi-modal connections into their city-regions or wider regional 
territories. The key is not a stop on TGV lines but the service pattern of HST because HST 
naturally tends to favour major hubs with more frequencies than other intermediate stops. TGV 
Haute-Picardie, Calais-Fréthun, Le Creusot, and Mâcon stations which are located outside city 
centres as intermediate stations between two hub cities are typical examples to illustrate this point. 
The lesson learnt here is to avoid creating new Beetroot stations in the future (Monde, 2004). In 
addition, the decision-making process of the TGV-Nord route and Lille Europe station presented 
in Chapter 8 is a classic example to illustrate how a hub location was critically decided and created 
with regional consensus that they needed to be in the same boat: Lille is traditionally a regional 
capital, deserving to be a major hub; meanwhile, the rest of region will mutually benefit too from 
TGV services as a result of the interoperability through the electrification of conventional lines 
implemented by decentralised regional government.    
For the UK, the decision of locating two HS2 stations around Birmingham in Phase 1 as 
mentioned above did not arouse much opposition except the concern for the poor connection at the 
proposed location in Birmingham Curzon Street, which will be discussed further later. However, 
regarding new HS2 stations in Phase 2, two relevant problems could be identified from the French 
experience mentioned above.   
First, a regional consensus on decisions of HS2 stations in NWE in the long term is absent, which 
inevitably leads to intensive speculation over winners and losers from HS2. The Financial Times 
vividly reported the tensions from these fragmented views before the proposal of Phase 2 was 
announced. Liverpool city region local enterprise partnership (LEP) has concerned that the rail 
time from Liverpool to London will be nearly 40 minutes longer than from Manchester. The 
Cheshire and Warrington LEP lobbies for a stop at Crewe with a new proposal campaigned by 
Cheshire business and political leaders (Bounds, 2013). As for all these reactions, Manchester is 
mainly concerned that the fastest connectivity to London would be weakened if many intermediate 
stops are made (Bounds & Odell, 2012). Later, the lately announced Phase 2 scheme (HS2 will 
connect with the WCML at Crewe, which further reduced 10 minutes between London and 
Liverpool) demonstrated that, in the absence of regional operation, the DfT (HS2 Ltd.) proposed 
this scheme based on the attempt to relieve political pressure from individual local authorities.   
This lack of regional consensus is worsened and more difficult to tackle after the abolition of 
regional strategies and mechanism post-2010. All local authorities and LEPs are concerned about 
their own connectivity to London rather than with a regional perspective and, in this case, it has an 
inherited negativity and impossibility for intra-regional development. In fact, without a strategic 
solution endorsed by regional apparatus, the possible result will be the case, as we have seen, that 
larger cities will have the most frequent services and benefit the most, while other cities could 
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have marginal effects although they are served by HS2. This does reflect serious implications for 
regional development through HS2; this part will be further elaborated in section 10.3.2.2.   
Secondly, the proposed HS2 stations in the east branch such as Sheffield Meadowhall and East 
Midlands Hub are intermediate stations outside city centres, which will have fewer stops than large 
provincial core destinations such as Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. This circumstance does 
not necessarily mean that they will lose. The key point is that whether local authorities could 
collectively develop strategies exploiting the arrival of the HS2 opportunity for the wider East 
Midlands to enhance their interchange function with several traditional city centres and avoid 
Beetroot stations from the French experiences.     
                     
The Integration of New HS2 and Existing Stations   
 
Due to the well-developed and compact urban fabric, the integration of new HS2 stations with 
existing stations in the city centre with urban regeneration projects is a big challenge too. 
According to the essential guidelines for developing the HS2 project, since HS2 stations will be 
limited to large regional cities, special attention needs to be paid to their locations in city centres, 
otherwise potential may not be maximised. Firstly, regarding the integration of stations, two HS2 
hub stations have been planned in London by the government: one in central London with a rebuilt 
Euston station and the other in suburban London with a Crossrail interchange station at Old Oak 
Common in West London, where a massive confluence of different transport modes is planned: 
national rail, regional express train (Crossrail), metro, a link to Heathrow International Airport, 
and motorways. A direct link between HS1 and HS2 is included too, but the terminal station of 
HS1 in St. Pancras and HS2 in Euston station are still treated in isolation, despite the fact that the 
two are located less than a half mile apart. An extended super hub in central London could replace 
the Euston scheme if an imaginative solution could be worked out. Also in Birmingham, a new 
HST station in the city centre is proposed at Curzon Street, 800 meters away from the existing 
Birmingham New Street station, which seems poorly designed to serve as a regional super-hub. 
The Lille experience provides a relevant lesson: the interchange function between Lille Flandres 
and Lille Europe stations has been carefully designed to make the 400-meter transition as smooth 
as possible, though it is not perfect. For both challenges, Sir Terry Farrell proposed a new 
dedicated pedestrian link to connect Euston station with St. Pancras and King‘s Cross for a 
Europe‘s super rail hub which is estimated to serve more than 250 million passengers per year, and 
an anticipated new rail hub which would improve interchange between the three stations (new HS2, 
Birmingham New Street, and Moor Street stations) with a major urban regeneration area in East 
Birmingham. Secondly, in order to realise the anticipated place-making through the HS2 
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opportunity, the funding mechanism and cooperation will be critical to realise the vision and 
projects as EuraLille and its following urban projects have achieved.  
 
Reducing Intra-regional Inequality  
Based on the comprehension of North West England in this thesis, the following implication in 
reducing intra-regional inequality further is drawn out for North West England as follows.  
 
The Need to Ensure the Improved Intra-regional Connectivity for Regional Interest    
 
The experience of the WCML showed that a market-led upgraded approach prioritising the 
inter-regional HST services has resulted in a negative impact on intra-regional development. 
Clearly, HS2 will relieve the pressing capacity problems on existing main lines and major hubs, 
freeing space for growth in freight usage and short-haul commuter journeys, and present the 
opportunity to integrate the region‘s economy using the conventional rail networks. However, the 
released capacity is just the first step. A strategic role will be needed for long-term regional 
revival. 
Firstly, it is well-established that HS2 should not be treated in isolation. Before the completion of 
HS2 by 2032/3, the rail capacity of conventional lines into the regional hub in Manchester will be 
significantly improved. Manchester hub rail enhancements across Manchester city centre, the 
North West electrification, the North Transpennine electrification, and Todmodern curve 
reinstatement which were approved by the British Government in 2011 could remove the 
bottleneck and technical barrier from which the regional centre and the wider region have suffered, 
including Manchester–Preston via Bolton, Manchester–Liverpool, Preston-Blackpool, 
Manchester-Burnley, Manchester -Leeds and York. The ―high-speed high speed‖ HS2, the existing 
―low-speed high-speed‖ WCML, and regional electrification will need to be closely integrated in 
order to melt away the relentless, long-lasting North/South intra-regional unequal structure (P. 
Hall & Wray, 2011). Also, Hall (2013c) emphasises the importance of irrigating hosepipes which 
connect the local links to HS2.     
Secondly, the long-awaited electrification or reinstatement to improve connectivity is not enough 
to ensure the rail services work for regional interest. Under rail privatisation, these different rail 
systems HS2, the WCML, and other transport operators naturally concern for different rail markets. 
A devolved transport authority (or at least a partnership) responsible for a region beyond the 
metropolitan cities will be needed and empowered at the local level to take care of any blind spots 
and ensure these train operators could work collectively to benefit region development, in 
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particular due to rail privatisation in the UK, regional rail services are not provided by the 
government, but through specific train operators on specific routes. Moreover, the experience in 
NPDC has shown that SNCF and regional government have gradually divided views on train 
services when the regional passenger rail services were decentralised. The lesson from the issue of 
financial sustainability for running TERGV services has illustrated a need for proper involvement 
from private input rather than pure public money. In addition, as IPPR North has maintained, a 
need for a reform of decision-making process on transport funding (the way transport projects are 
assessed and prioritised) beyond BCR (benefit-cost-ratios) and high population densities (IPPR 
North & The Northern Economic Futures Commission, 2012). 
 
The Absence of An Enabling and Inclusive Regional Planning Framework for Regional 
Intervention  
 
This thesis demonstrates that it is not the arrival of TGV alone that achieves the reduction of 
regional inequality. As the French experience shows that decentralised regional governance, the 
concern for transport equality, and supportive funding for capacity building are critical. Given that 
the current HS2 proposal has well recognised that HS2 alone is not enough and a number of key 
factors are needed to maximise the wider effects, it is unclear and confusing that the ―region‖ 
which is termed by British Government actually means a genuine ―regional‖ territory or a 
―sub-region‖ type of city-region (regions and sub-regions were defined in section 2.5.2). 
According to the HS2 decision report, the concern for the distributional impacts of HS2 depends 
on integrated transport network, rail market and demand, leadership, and city planning- an 
―effective integration of high speed rail into city centres and local transport networks, serving 
corridors where markets are well understood and where demand justifies providing a high 
frequency service, strong local leadership, and […] the integration of high speed rail with wider 
city planning‖ (Department for Transport, 2012, p.66). In line with this awareness, the 
Government stressed the importance of developing strategies by cities‘ leaders to capitalise on 
those opportunities offered by high-speed links and to maximise the long-term positive impact on 
local and regional economic development. In order to extend the benefits beyond the station 
vicinity, the Government promises to establish a broader local policy framework (local and 
regional planning frameworks and wider policies) which will facilitate effective delivery in both 
cities with new HST and non-HST stations which would benefit from integration with a HST 
network (Department for Transport, 2012, p.67).  
However, there is a contradiction between these statements and national spatial-planning policies. 
Although the British government sets the vision on rebalancing the North-South divide, its 
statement and approaches have been subconsciously concerned with the urban scale or, at the best, 
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with the city-regional scale rather than a regional scale. In fact, in England post-2010, regional 
strategies and mechanisms had been abolished and replaced by local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) 
which have been largely based at the city-regional level. Without a clear and effective transport 
and spatial-economic strategy for a region, benefits may be reduced. And in the absence of any 
regional tier, effective regional planning becomes a responsibility of government itself, and its 
agencies. This view could be subtly perceived from this statement in the HS2 proposal below.  
―The Government and HS2 Ltd will work with local authorities as detailed plans for the proposed high speed rail 
network are developed, but it will be for the authorities themselves to ensure that effective integration happens‖ 
(Department for Transport, 2012, p.67). 
 
In addition, the delivery would depend on strong and visionary political leadership alongside 
effective institutional governance which is Condition 5 identified in this study (section 9.2.1.5). 
But there is a danger of ignoring the need for political leadership and governance at the regional 
level. In North West England, five LEPs have been established, namely Greater Manchester LEP 
(10 UAs), Liverpool City Region LEP (Merseyside & Halton), Cheshire and Warrington LEP, 
Lancashire LEP, and Cumbria LEP. However, these LEPs possess different capacities and strength. 
In fact, Lancashire LEP embraces the two non-HST sub-regions which had delivered the weakest 
economic performance in this study. Without strategic regional intervention, the disadvantage will 
possibly remain and regional inequality will be persistent.  
At the national level, strong LEP development is important to develop strong hubs. It could be 
regarded as the first step for the wider impact of HST as the experience of city-regional 
development Lille and Manchester offer. But it could not guarantee positive regional development 
as the contrasting outcome between NWE and NPDC. In particular, when several LEPs in NWE 
are competing with each other for a fastest link with London rather than seeking a regional 
consensus, it is not constructive for regional prosperity. As Will Hutton, Executive Vice Chair of 
the Work Foundation, has stated the clear implication, from the City Relationships study, is that 
―parochialism is the enemy of prosperity‖(The Northern Way, 2009c, p.1). Although this 
statement is based on a study regarding city-regional prosperity, it is also true and applicable to 
regional prosperity. Among the five LEPs in NWE, the Manchester city-region may be well placed 
(and well organised) to take advantage of the arrival of a dedicated high-speed rail route.  
Spreading the benefits more widely and promoting balanced growth across the region will be a 
challenge. These necessary transport investments could not sufficiently guarantee the 
transformation of post-industrial towns which have suffered from path dependency and a lack of 
indigenous innovative capacity. The experience of Lens in NPDC has proven this point. Therefore, 
the second aspect must be an emphasis on social change in parallel with economic change in these 
peripheral areas. Hall (2012) points out there are ―the endless unaltered people‖ who find it 
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difficult to adapt to changes even if transport improvements are made; thus, other conditions are 
needed. The same learning point could be taken from NPDC. An inclusive governance structure 
and concern for equality is very important for any possible transformation. 
 
 
 
 
